

Islamic Philosophy, Science,
Culture, and Religion

Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science

Text and Studies

Edited by

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VOLUME LXXXIII

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.nl/ipts



Dimitri Gutas

Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion

Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas

Edited by

Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman



BRILL

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2012

Cover image: All Gizah Pyramids taken on June 19, 2006 in Nazlat as Samman, al-Jizah, Egypt, by Ricardo Liberato.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Islamic philosophy, science, culture, and religion : studies in honor of Dimitri Gutas / edited by Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman.

p. cm. — (Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; v. 83)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-90-04-20274-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Islamic philosophy. 2. Islamic philosophy—Greek influences. 3. Science—Islamic countries—History. 4. Islamic civilization. I. Gutas, Dimitri. II. Opwis, Felicitas Meta Maria. III. Reisman, David.

B741.I838 2012

001.0917'67—dc23

2011035777

ISSN 0169-8729

ISBN 978 90 04 20274 0 (hardback)

ISBN 978 90 04 21776 8 (e-book)

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DEDICATION

When reflecting on Dimitri Gutas, what comes to mind is the *adīb*, in the classical sense of the term—a person of “Bildung,” who represents the cultural and educational ideals of his community. Such characteristics are acquired, honed, and reproduced in a variety of ways. Dimitri’s life and career illustrates some of the best qualities of the *adīb*. Born in Giza, in the shadow of the pyramids, raised in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, his search for knowledge did not take him to China but eventually to the US. Studying with the great scholars of Arabic and Islamic Studies of the time, his scholarly accomplishments combine erudition in the languages he intimately knows with the intellectual questing of a philosopher and philologist. Needless to say, his scholarly works are broad in range, deep in detail, and seminal in their influence.

In the manner of an *adīb*, Dimitri shares his *adab* freely. He educated, and still continues to do so, countless generations of students, instilled in them the love of learning and research, and served them as a role model of a teacher-scholar. Dimitri is demanding as a teacher, yet, as his students will attest, at the same time he is amazing in his mastery and timing of the didactical process. No class period ends without him giving students the additional piece of information and evidence that enables them to connect the dots between facts and influences on the subject of study.

Dimitri’s “Bildung” goes well beyond his professional realm. Together with his wife Ioanna, he opens up his home to friend and stranger alike, receives each in the language and cultural etiquette of their native environment, and makes all feel welcome and at ease.

This small collection¹ of essays by colleagues and former students shows the range of scholarship influenced by Dimitri and, we hope, celebrates his many and multifaceted accomplishments.

Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman

¹ We included in this celebration but a few of the many friends, colleagues, and students of Dimitri; no slight was intended toward those not participating in this Festschrift.

Tragically, before the project was completed, David Reisman was taken from us. He died in London in January 2011. This book is a testimony also of David's prodigious scholarship.

PART I

THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE: ISLAMIC CULTURE

GRAECO-ARABICA CHRISTIANA: THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR
‘ABD ALLĀH IBN AL-FADL FROM ANTIOCHIA (11TH C. A.D.)
AS TRANSMITTER OF GREEK WORKS

Hans Daiber

Christian scholars played a decisive role in the transmission of Greek science to the Arabs, either as translators or as commentators and authors of monographs based on Greek works. This is well documented in Georg Graf's classical work *Geschichte der christlich-arabischen Literatur* (CGAL) and Joseph Nasrallah's *Histoire du mouvement littéraire dans l'église Melchite du V^e au XX^e siècle*. Both historians of Christian-Arabic literature pay sufficient attention to the most prolific Melkite scholar Abū l-Faṭḥ ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Muṭrān al-Anṭākī, a deacon from Antiochia, whose grandfather after the death of his wife became bishop.¹ We do not know anything about the life of Ibn al-Faḍl. Two of his works are dated 1052 A.D.² Graf concludes that a part of his works belong to the middle of the 11th century; Nasrallah maintains that Ibn al-Faḍl died at the end of the 11th century, before the first Crusade.³

Ibn al-Faḍl translated parts of the Bible and patristic works from Greek into Arabic and a section of Isaac of Nineveh's *Way of Monasticism*⁴ from Syriac into Arabic. His original works are often anthologies and compilations from other works and concentrate on questions of Bible exegesis, Christian theology, morals and polemics. They show the erudition of the author also in the field of philosophy and sciences. I refer to the following:

¹ Georg Graf, CGAL, II, *Studi e Testi* 133 (Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1947), 52–64; Joseph Nasrallah, *Histoire du mouvement littéraire dans l'église Melchite du V^e au XX^e siècle* (Louvain-Paris: Peeters, 1983), 191–229.

² Cf. Graf, CGAL, II, 56, no. 6; and 60, no. 17.

³ Nasrallah, *Histoire*, III, 193; cf. id., “‘Abd Allāh Ibn Al-Faḍl (XI^e siècle),” *Proche-Orient chrétien* 33 (1983), 133–59, at 151: “Nous avons vu que ‘Abd Allāh n'était plus de ce monde au moment de la première croisade”.

⁴ Nasrallah, *Histoire*, III, 209–11; cf. Ignatius Aphram I Barsoum, *The Scattered Pearls*, 2nd rev. ed. (Piscataway, New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2003), 140f.

- a) A treatise on the refutation of astrologers, his *Maqāla fī r-radd ‘alā aḥkām an-nuḡūm*,⁵ which quotes Galen’s lost *De moribus*.⁶
- b) A treatise on God’s providence and human free will, his *Maqāla taštamilu ‘alā mā ‘ānin nāfi‘a li-n-nafs*,⁷ which uses Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*⁸ and *Physics*⁹ and which denies the influence of stars on human acting.
- c) ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl’s “Book on the Delight of the Believer” (*Kitāb Bahğat al-mu‘min*)¹⁰ written in the shape of questions and answers as a kind of catechism for the educated believer, including references¹¹ to Galen’s *De usu partium*¹² = *Kitāb Manāfi‘ al-a‘ḍā’*

⁵ Graf, CGAL, II, 62, no. 19.

⁶ Cf. ed. Georg Graf, “Die Widerlegung der Astrologen von ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl,” *Orientalia* N.S. 6 (1937), 337–46, 341, 15f./transl. 344. ‘Abd Allāh’s comparison of the person who chooses pleasure with a pig can be found in the Arabic fragment, ch. 1, end (ed. ‘Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, *Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ fī l-falsafa wa-l-‘ulūm ‘ind al-‘arab* (Beirut: al-Mu‘assasa al-‘Arabiya li-d-Dirāsāt wa-n-Naṣr, 1981), 196,25 / translated John N. Mattock, “The Arabic Epitome of Galen’s Book *Peri ethon*,” in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, Essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday*, eds. S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1972), 235–60, at 244. On ‘Abd Allāh’s treatise see also the additional remarks in Robert Caspar (etc.), “Bibliographie du dialogue islamo-chrétien,” *Islamochristiana* 1 (1975), 125–81; 2 (1976), 187–249; 3 (1977), 255–86; 4 (1978), 247–67; and 2 (1976), 213f. On Galen’s treatise (which is only preserved in an Arabic fragment), see the literature mentioned in H. Daiber, *Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), Index 151, title *Fi l-‘ādāt*.

⁷ Ed. P. Sbath, *Vingt traités philosophiques et apologétiques d’auteurs arabes chrétiens du IX^e au XIV^e siècle* (Cairo: Imprimerie Syrienne Héliopolis, 1929), 131–48; on ed. Sbath 146–8 and its Greek source, see Marwan Rashed, “La classification des lignes simples selon Proclus et sa transmission au monde islamique” in *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba*, eds. Cristina d’Ancona and Giuseppe Serra (Padova: Il Poligrafo, 2002), 256–79, at 276f. On the *Maqāla*, cf. the remarks in Robert Caspar (etc.), “Bibliographie du dialogue islamo-chrétien,” *Islamochristiana* 2 (1976), 212f.

⁸ Ed. Sbath, *Vingt traités philosophiques*, 133.10–12, on self-control = *egkráteia* = *‘iffa*, on which cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book V, 2ff., esp. 12.

⁹ Ed. Sbath, *Vingt traités philosophiques*, 133.12–7; Ibn al-Faḍl refers to book III; cf. however, book II.1, 192b8ff. on *physis* (*ṭabī‘a*) and *technē* (*ṣinā‘a*); different from Ibn al-Faḍl (who here perhaps refers to a Neoplatonic source), Aristotle does not mention reason (*‘aql*) as a third acting cause.

¹⁰ Graf, CGAL, II, 60–1, no. 17.

¹¹ See Floris Sepmeijer, “The Book of Splendour of the Believer by ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Al-Faḍl,” *Parole de l’Orient* XVI (1990–1991), 115–20, esp. 116f. Sepmeijer used the ms. Bodleian Library Marsh 408 in Oxford, of which we have access to the pages containing the 4th, 20th and 60th question. We thank Floris Sepmeijer for providing us with this text. On the text see additional remarks in Robert Caspar (etc.), “Bibliographie du dialogue islamo-chrétien,” *Islamochristiana* 2 (1976), 211f.

¹² Book III 10, ed. G. Helmreich (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1907), I, 173f., on the proof of God’s existence from man’s structure.

(*Bahġa*, question no. 20), to Pythagoras (*Bahġa*, question no. 4),¹³ Plato (*Bahġa*, question no. 4¹⁴ and 60),¹⁵ Plotinus (*Bahġa* question no. 60),¹⁶ and to Aristotle's *De anima* (*Bahġa*, question no. 60),¹⁷ *De caelo* (*Bahġa*, question no. 4),¹⁸ *De generatione et corruptione* (*Bahġa*, question no. 4),¹⁹ and *Physics*, 8th book (*Bahġa*, question no. 4).²⁰

- d) A similar compilation, written as instruction for the educated believer, is Ibn al-Faḍl's *Kitāb al-Manfa'a*,²¹ which is quoted in his *Bahġat al-mu'minīn*²² and which might be composed between 1043 and 1052. This work is also still waiting for an edition. It quotes among others John Philoponus' treatise *Contra Aristotelem*, against the eternity of the heavens.²³ This excerpt is followed, after a short

¹³ On the number one as principal number and as proof that God is one; cf. Aetius, *Placita philosophorum*, I 3.8 and I 7.18.

¹⁴ On the existence of the "forms of things" (*ṣuwar al-aṣyā*) "in the knowledge of Benefactor" (God) "like the engraving in the seal ring" cf. Plato, *Sophist*, 265B ff.

¹⁵ The explanation that the light is the form of the shining (*muḍī*) and that the light of the sun is the form of the sun, appears to be an allusion to Plato's simile of the sun in *Rep.* 507a ff.

¹⁶ On light as *enérgeia* (= *fi'l*) of the shining (*muḍī*) cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* IV 6f.

¹⁷ Cf. *De anima*, II 7, esp. 418b10ff.; a comparison proves that Ibn al-Faḍl relied on the Greek original and did not use the shortened late hellenistic paraphrase, which was translated into Arabic in the school of al-Kindī (9th c. A.D.): cf. ed. Rüdiger Arnzen, *Aristoteles' De anima, Eine verlorene spätantike Paraphrase in arabischer und persischer Überlieferung*, Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 9 (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 259, 2f.

¹⁸ This is not an exact reference to *De caelo*, I 3, esp. 270b; I 9, esp. 279a6ff.; II 1, esp. 284a2ff.; II 3, 286a9ff. The text cannot be found in Ḥunayn's *Liber celi et mundi* (ed. Gutman, see below n. 28), perhaps because the source used by Ibn al-Faḍl was more complete. Ibn al-Faḍl says he has taken his quotation from Aristotle's *De caelo* "after his discussion on the four elements." The preserved Latin version, however, ends with the chapter on the four elements.

¹⁹ This is not an exact reference to *De gen. et corr.* II 10 and 11.

²⁰ This refers, in fact, to *Phys.* VIII 10, a chapter on the prime and motionless mover which cannot have magnitude.

²¹ Graf, *CGAL*, II, 59f.; Nasrallah, *Histoire*, III, 223–225. Additional remarks in Robert Caspar (etc.), "Bibliographie du dialogue islamo-chrétien," *Islamochristiana* 2 (1976), 210f.

²² S. Sepmeijer, "The Book of Splendour," 117.

²³ Georg Graf, "Psychologische Definitionen aus dem 'Grossen Buche des Nutzens' von 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl (11. Jh.)," in *Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag Clemens Bäumker gewidmet* (Münster: Aschaffendorf, 1913), 55–77; this contains a list of all chapters and a German translation of ch. 10–13, 52–68, (for 56 Graf wrongly refers to Philoponus' treatise against Proclus' *De aeternitate mundi*). On the Philoponus-passus in Ibn al-Faḍl see Marwan Rashed, "The Problem of the Composition of the Heavens (529–1610): a new fragment of Philoponus and its readers," in *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement. 83,1, eds.

list of philosophical terms, by sections on meteorology and cosmology. The sections on meteorology are excerpts from a hellenistic compendium of Aristotle's *Meteorology*, translated by Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq.²⁴

Ibn al-Faḍl slightly shortens the text, omits single words or replaces them by other words; his text contains some mistakes, which however might be due to the copyists of the text. Notwithstanding, the excerpt in *al-Manfa'a* appears in a few cases to be based on a better reading.²⁵

The sections on cosmology²⁶ explicitly refer to Aristotle's *De caelo* (*Kitāb as-Samā' wa-l-'ālam*). They differ, however, from the wording of Aristotle's *De caelo* and from the known Arabic translation.²⁷ A comparison shows that they are literal excerpts from an Arabic text, which appears to be a paraphrase of Aristotle's *De caelo*, attributed to Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (d. 876 A.D.). This paraphrase is preserved only

Peter Adamson, Han Balthusen, M.W.F. Stone (London: Inst. of Classical Studies, 2004), 35–58, at 37–41, and on the Arabic text by Ibn al-Faḍl, 58. On Philoponus' *Contra Aristotelem, against the eternity of the heavens*, cf. Walter Böhm, *Johannes Philoponus, Ausgewählte Schriften, übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert* (München: F. Schöningh, 1967), 326–32. On John Philoponus in Arabic transmission, see the references listed in Daiber, *Bibliography*, Index, s.n.

²⁴ Ed. H. Daiber, *Ein Kompendium der aristotelischen Meteorologie in der Fassung des Hunain Ibn Ishāq* (Amsterdam-Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1975). We give here a complete concordance of the passages (we thank Samuel Noble, Yale University for sending us copies of the Beirut ms.): *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541 (= cod. ar. 82, copied 1663 A.D.), 64.12–65.11 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 33.44–35.65; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 65.13–9 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 35.72–37.76; 37.82–5; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 65.22–66.6 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 43.139–46 (replaces 'illa by *sabab*); *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 66.9–16 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 49.199–51.210; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 66.19–67.4 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 53.239–55.250; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 67.6–10 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 57.269–270; 273–277; 271; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 67.13–16 = *Hunain*, ed. Daiber (with translation) 57.282–283; 59.284–285; 287–289.

²⁵ Ed. Daiber 33.51 after *kulli šay'in add nadiyin*; 35.60 omit *an-nadiyu* (1.loco); 43.144 instead of *tataballu* read *tanballu*; 49.203 after *wa-l-āharu* add *buḥārun*.

²⁶ *Al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 67.18–71.11.

²⁷ Ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣriya, 1961). On revisions of the Arabic translations see Gerhard Endress, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen von Aristoteles' Schrift De caelo* (thesis Frankfurt/M. 1966). Compare *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 68.6–69.19 with *De caelo* I 2, and 541, 69.21–70.11 with *De caelo* II 7.

in the Latin translation by Dominicus Gundissalinus, in collaboration with Johannes Hispanus, perhaps between ca. 1150 and 1175; it has the title *Liber celi et mundi* and is attributed to Ibn Sīnā.²⁸

Finally, the section on the four elements²⁹ is a compilation from different sources, of which one main source might be identified as the *Placita philosophorum* by Aetius, which was translated from Greek into Arabic by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (c. 205–300/820–912).³⁰

This Christian translator is referred to by Ibn al-Faḍl in his *Kitāb Tafsīr sittat ayyām al-ḥālīqa*, his *Explanation of the Hexaemeron*,³¹ which is a free rendering of the nine *Homilies* by Basilus the Great (died 379 A.D.)³² and of the supplements by Basilus' brother Gregor of Nyssa.³³ Ibn al-Faḍl made his translation in the year 1052³⁴ and added comments introduced by *ḥāshiya li-Ibn al-Faḍl* or by *qāla al-mufasssīr*, one of which,³⁵ on the proof of the spherical shape of the earth from the changing visibility of the fixed stars, is based on Aristotle, *De caelo* II 14 (297b31ff.)³⁶ and one, on the planets and

²⁸ The Latin text is edited with English translation by Oliver Gutman, *Pseudo-Avicenna, Liber Celi et mundi, A Critical Edition with Introduction* (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Ibn al-Faḍl's version in his *Manfa'a* corresponds to the β version of the Latin manuscripts. Compare the following, *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 67.19–68.4 with ed. Gutman 60.9–62.7. = part of a paraphrase of Aristotle, *De caelo* I 5; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 68.6–69.19 with ed. Gutman 14 (*Quod natura celi est preter quattuor naturas, et quod est corpus simplex*) –24.2 (*naturalis*) = part of a paraphrase of Aristotle, *De caelo* I 2; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 69.21–71.2 (*bi-nārin*) with ed. Gutman 222.4 (*qui dixerunt*)–224.17 (*ignee*); *al-Manfa'a* 71.2–7 (*wa-ḡairu dālika min al-aḡsām*) with ed. Gutman 230.1 (*postquam stelle revolvuntur*), 230.7 (*et alia*) = part of a paraphrase of Aristotle, *De caelo* II 7; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 71.7–8 with ed. Gutman 236.3–4; *al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 71.8–10 with ed. Gutman 262.4 (not literally) = part of a discussion of Aristotle, *De caelo* II 8. Ibn al-Faḍl adds (77.10–11) a quotation from the “holy fathers” (*al-Ābā' al-qiddīsūn*).

²⁹ *Al-Manfa'a* ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 541, 71.12–79.12. The text differs from the chapter *De generatione quattuor elementorum et quod opus fuit eis* in Ḥunayn's *Liber celi et mundi* (ed. Gutman, 266–75).

³⁰ Arabic translation by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, ed. by H. Daiber, *Aetius Arabus* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980), book I, 2–3.

³¹ Mentioned by Graf, *CGAL*, II, 56, no. 6.

³² Greek text in Jacques Paul Migne, *Patrologia graeca*, Lutetiae Parisiorum, 29, 4–208.

³³ Greek text in Migne, *Patrologia graeca* 44, 61–124.

³⁴ See *al-Mašriq* 7 (1904), 678, 15f.

³⁵ Reproduced from ms. Beirut, Bibliothèque Orientale 479 (18th c.) in *al-Mašriq* 7 (1904), 678.20–679.10.

³⁶ The chapter on the spherical shape of the earth in the *Liber celi et mundi* (ed. Gutman, 181–189) is different.

the distances of the stars from earth, is based on the *Placita philosophorum*,³⁷ a text which appears with the title *al-Mudḥal ilā l-falsafa* and with the author Qusṭā ibn Lūqā.

I return to Ibn al-Faḍl's *Kitāb al-Manfa'a*. A second source of this book is Aristotle's *Parva naturalia*, the *Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs*, which is mentioned at the end of the chapter on the elements and which is quoted with the saying that "plants do not have sensation because of the prevalence of the earthy (substance)." Ibn al-Faḍl mentions this doctrine in the context of a discussion about the perceptibility of the elements. His direct source cannot be clearly identified as the *Parva naturalia*, on Sleep and Waking (454a16f.), because neither the Greek original nor its Arabic adaptation³⁸ contains the additional explanation.³⁹

The already mentioned section on meteorology in 'Abd Allāh's *Kitāb al-Manfa'a* urges us to examine another text, which is mentioned by Georg Graf⁴⁰ and Joseph Nasrallah⁴¹ as a monograph on meteorology by 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Faḍl, with the title *Ta'tīrāt al-ḡauw al-muḥtaṣar* [correct: *al-muḥtaṣṣ bi-'ilm al-falsafa*]. Both refer to one manuscript from the year 1648 A.D., containing 82 folios, and preserved today in the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint-Petersburg Branch.⁴²

³⁷ II 15.4 = ed. Daiber, *Aetius Arabus*, 150–2, as doctrine of Plato (cf. *Timaeus*, 36bff. and 40a f. and commentary Daiber, *Aetius*, 394). On Basilus' *Hexaameron*, cf. here also the discussion in Moses Bar Kepha's (9th c.) Syriac commentary on the *Hexaameron* in his chapter "On the height and the position of the lights," translated by Lorenz Schlimme, *Der Hexaameronkommentar des Moses Bar Kepha*, Göttinger Orientforschungen, I, Reihe: Syriaca. 14.1–2 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), II 420–2.

³⁸ Cf. Rotraud Elisabeth Hansberger, *The Transmission of Aristotle's Parva Naturalia in Arabic* (thesis Oxford, 2006), Arabic text p. 61.7.

³⁹ Even Aristotle's *De plantis* in the adaptation of Nicolaus Damascenus, who has a passage on this topic, does not give this explanation: cf. ed. and transl. H.J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus: Nicolaus Damascenus, De plantis, Five Translations* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1989), 130f., §§ 11–21.

⁴⁰ CGAL, II, 64.

⁴¹ Nasrallah, *Histoire*, III, 228.

⁴² Number B 1234 (see the new still unpublished catalogue prepared by Nikolaj Serikoff, Wellcome Library, London).

The same text, with the title *Ḥawādiṭ al-ğauw*, is also transmitted in five more mss. These manuscripts, with the exception of one anonymous ms., attribute the text to Bonaventura de Lude, who was custodian for the Capuchin missions in Syria and neighbouring regions and who stayed in Aleppo from 1629 until his death in 1645 or 1647.⁴³

Both attributions are wrong, as I show in my contribution to the International Congress “The Letter Before the Spirit, The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle” (2–5 June 2009, The Hague). The author, perhaps a Christian-Arabic scholar from Antiochia in the 16th century, supposedly wrote his monograph on meteorology on the basis of Greek authors, including Aristotle and his commentators, and Seneca’s *Quaestiones naturales*, and knew Islamic philosophers like Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd.

⁴³ CGAL, IV, 195–7.

ARISTO OF CEUS: THE FRAGMENTS CONCERNING EROS

William W. Fortenbaugh

In 2006 a new edition—texts and translation with notes—of the fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Aristo of Ceos was published in the series Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, commonly known as RUSCH.¹ I took part in preparing this edition, being largely concerned with the translation. Along with the other editors, I had occasion to focus on a block of texts that had been assigned by an earlier editor, Wilhelm Knögel, to Aristo's work entitled *Erôtika homoia*.² We accepted this assignation, but I had doubts regarding at least one fragment and worries concerning the meaning of the title *Erôtika homoia*. I remain puzzled, and when asked to contribute an article to the present Festschrift honoring Dimitri Gutas, it occurred to me that I was being presented with an opportunity to express my worries and to offer some reflections. I have hardly resolved all the puzzles that the several texts present, but perhaps I have succeeded in advancing a few thoughts that the honoree of this volume will find of interest. In the past, Dimitri has been a contributor to the RUSCH series³ and worked with me on other Peripatetic authors, most especially Theophrastus. His contributions to the edition of Theophrastean fragments, 1992, are many,⁴ and his recent edition of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* is outstanding.⁵ I hope that he will not be disappointed with what follows and that by bringing new perspectives, he will resolve one or more of the difficulties that continue to puzzle me.

¹ *Aristo of Ceos: Text, Translation, and Discussion*, RUSCH 13, eds. W. W. Fortenbaugh and S. A. White (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006), 1–177.

² *Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos bei Philodem*, *Klassisch-philologische Studien* 5 (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1933), 82–5. See also F. Wehrli, *Lykon und Ariston von Keos* (Basel: Schwabe, 1952), 41–2.

³ He has contributed to RUSCH vols. 2, 5, and 11.

⁴ *Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence* (Leiden: Brill, 1992 = FHS&G [G standing for Gutas]).

⁵ *Theophrastus, On First Principles (known as his Metaphysics)*, *Philosophia antiqua* 119 (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

1

It is hardly surprising that the Peripatetics took an interest in eros. For Plato, Aristotle's teacher, not only wrote two dialogues, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, in which eros figures prominently, but also developed a doctrine of sublimated love: erotic desire is elevated from body to soul and on to the world of Forms, in which truth resides free from the continuous change that all too often mars the world in which we live. To be sure, Plato's doctrine of sublimation is intriguing and in some ways inspiring, but as presented by Plato it is also an exercise in fantasy that falls far short of the reality it claims as its goal. The early Peripatetics recognized that, and if the surviving fragments of Peripatetic works on eros are not misleading, Aristotle and his followers chose to ignore the Platonic doctrine. They did, however, have much to say about eros not only in lecture within the school but also and especially in dialogues that circulated widely and in various collections for use within and outside the teaching curriculum.

In his *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle largely ignores eros. He does touch upon it in the chapters on friendship,⁶ but it is not the focus of a special book or chapter. Elsewhere, however, eros took center stage: namely, in Aristotle's *Erôtikos* and *Theses concerning Eros*. The former was almost certainly a dialogue, and the latter is likely to have been a collection of arguments used primarily in dialectical and rhetorical instruction. In the case of Theophrastus, three titles that make explicit mention of eros are recorded: *Erôtikos*, *On Eros*, and *Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems*. Most probably, the first refers to a dialogue, the second to a treatise for use in lecture within the Peripatetic School, and the third to a collection of problems: each problem will have been introduced by *dia ti*, "why" or "for what reason," and a selection of problems was devoted to questions concerning eros. Clearchus, the Peripatetic from Soli on Cyprus, wrote a work entitled *Erôtica*. The Greek adjective is neuter plural: the title may be deliberately vague, referring to erotic "matters." But two Clearchan fragments dealing with eros exhibit the *dia ti* format, so that one might supply *problēmata* and view the work as a collection of problems similar in form to the Theophrastean collection already cited. We should, however, keep in mind that the work was at least two books in length, so that the work may have contained not only problems but also other

⁶ NE 8.3 1156b1–3, 8.4 1157a3–14, 9.1 1164a3–8; EE 7.3 1238b32–9, 7.10 1243b14–22.

material as well. Concerning Demetrius of Phalerum, we know that he wrote an *Erôtikos*. The title is identical to titles attributed to Aristotle and Theophrastus. In all three cases, a dialogue is likely. Finally, there is Aristo of Ceos who in antiquity was confused with the like-named Stoic of Chios. Diogenes Laertius reports a book list for the latter, but adds that Panaetius and Sosicrates attribute all the works except the *Epistles* to the Peripatetic (7.163 = Aristo of Ceos fr. 8 SFOD).⁷ The list includes a work entitled *Erotic Dissertations*. Given the Peripatetic works on eros that have already been cited, the attribution to the Cean by Panaetius and Sosicrates enjoys a certain plausibility, but equally it cannot be confirmed.⁸ A second title, *Erôtika homoia*, is mentioned three times by Athenaeus in *The Sophists at Dinner* (10.14 419C = fr. 11.3–4 and 13.15 563F = fr. 13A.8–9 and 15.16 674B = fr. 10.2–3). Like the Clearchan *Erôtika*, the *Erôtika homoia* was at least two books long.⁹ The title leaves room for guessing. *Homoia* is the neuter plural form of the adjective *homoios*, whose basic meaning is “similar” or “alike.” If we think of the Theophrastean title that refers to ethical problems and of the Clearchan fragments that exhibit the *dia ti* format, we might understand *problēmata* and conclude that the work was a collection of similar problems, *homoia problēmata*, concerning eros. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the title refers not to a collection of problems, but to a collection of similar cases. I shall develop this idea by citing two different texts: one from Athenaeus’ *The Sophists at Dinner* and one from Aristo’s work *On Relieving Arrogance*.

The Athenaeus passage is from Book 13, in which the grammarian Myrtilus is made to discuss eros at length. In what immediately precedes, Myrtilus has warned against indulging in sexual acts that are contrary to nature. He has mentioned the Spartan Cleomenes as someone who acted according to nature when he took two hundred beautiful women as hostages. Also, he has cited Epicrates in claiming to have learned all about the love affairs of Sappho, Meletus, Cleomenes and Lamynthius (13.84 605D–E). At this point, the passage that interests me begins. Myrtilus cites Clearchus and instructs the other diners: If you fall in love with women and come to realize that it is impossible to achieve fulfillment, understand that passionate desires (*erôtes*) come to

⁷ SFOD = Stork, Fortenbaugh, van Ophuijsen and Dorandi, whose edition is found in RUSCH 13. See above, note 1.

⁸ Wehrli, *Lykon und Ariston von Keos*, 50 and 63 suggests that the work may be identical with the *Erôtika homoia*.

⁹ Each time Athenaeus cites the title, he says “in the second book.”

an end (605E).¹⁰ The instruction is of interest, for eros is being treated very much like a goal-directed emotion, which is “practical” in the sense that experiencing the emotion necessarily involves acting or preparing to act in ways that may be expected to achieve some desired goal. For example, fright involves the goal of safety, and when it is realized that safety cannot be achieved, then fright ceases and may be replaced by, e.g., resignation or self-pity. Similarly a man can be angry, only so long as he believes revenge possible. If revenge seems unattainable, anger is replaced by, e.g., frustration or indignation.¹¹ So too with eros: when a person experiences eros, that person desires a goal, typically sexual involvement with a particular partner, and when that goal is perceived to be impossible eros ceases. It may be replaced by, e.g., painful feelings of helplessness or embarrassment, but eros is no longer experienced.

But is eros really comparable to fear and anger? Is it true that no one experiences erotic desire when the impossibility of fulfillment is clearly understood? Myrtilus seems to understand the force of these questions and moves straightway to answer them by introducing a string of particular cases that may be said to illustrate and in this way to support the general claim that eros disappears when the goal is understood to be impossible. The first four cases involve animals. We hear of a bull that mounted the bronze cow of Peirene, and of a dog, a pigeon and a gander, all of whom attempted to engage a painted image of the female of their kind. We are told that when it became clear that satisfaction was impossible, all four of these animals desisted. After that Myrtilus introduces a case involving a human being, Cleisophus of Selymbria. He fell in love with a marble statue at Samos, locked himself in the temple where the statue was housed and expected to have intercourse with the statue. That proved impossible (the marble was both too cold and too hard), so that Cleisophus abandoned his erotic desire and relieved himself on a small piece of meat that he placed before himself (605E–F). Whether we admire Cleisophus for dealing with frustration in a harmless manner, or find his solution laughable and mildly embarrassing, he is like the four animals in that his case too illustrates and supports the claim that eros goes away once the

¹⁰ The text is corrupt, but the overall meaning is clear enough.

¹¹ On practical emotions like fright and anger, see *Aristotle on Emotion*, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1975, 2002), 79–83.

goal is seen to be impossible. Indeed, the five cases form an inductive argument, and if we choose to adopt rhetorical terminology, we might say that Myrtilus offers an argument by example, *paradeigma*. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, I omit Myrtilus' additional example (it too involves a human being and a stone statue)¹² and state what should by now be obvious. Aristo's title, *Erôtika homoia*, could be used to cover cases like those trotted out by Myrtillus. They are similar in that all concern frustrated eros, and they might be brought together as examples in order to render probable a particular claim concerning frustrated eros.¹³ Of course, it would be absurd to think that Aristo filled two books or more with similar cases all intended to support a single claim. We must think of various claims, each of which had its own list of supporting examples.

The second passage is from *On Relieving Arrogance*. The authorship of this work is disputed. I accept the attribution to the Cean and will not defend the attribution in this place.¹⁴ Moreover and more importantly, whoever the author may have been, the work can be cited in order to illustrate a particular use of similar cases. I am thinking of the person who not only wishes to collect similar cases in order to establish a general claim but also to mark differences between things that are similar and therefore in danger of being confused. Take arrogance and magnanimity, which Aristo discusses together in *On Relieving Arrogance*. He recognizes that both are marked by negative judgments (fr. 21f, lines 4,27–8, 32), but he also states clearly that the two must be distinguished and not lumped together as one and the same thing (lines 22–4). He underlines the point with a medical analogy—he compares the difference between a body that is physically sound and one that is bloated (lines 24–6)—after which he states that “it is characteristic of the magnanimous man to despise the gifts of

¹² The example concerns a man who became enamored of one of two stone statues at Delphi (both were of boys), locked himself in and left behind a wreath as payment for intercourse (606A–B). The story is like that of the man at Samos, except that now we read that a wreath was considered payment for intercourse. Unfortunately we are told no more. Intercourse cannot have occurred (the statue did not suddenly become warm and soft), so that something else must have occurred. My guess would be that man ceased to desire the impossible. Instead, he used the statue to excite his imagination and left the wreath as payment for fantasy intercourse.

¹³ This way of taking the title would be in agreement with the translation *Erotic Examples*, which is found in RUSCH 13, 41.

¹⁴ For some discussion with references to the literature on this issue, see n. 2 to Aristo fr. 21a in RUSCH 13, 69 and 71.

fortune because he surpasses (them) by the solidity of his soul, while it is characteristic of the arrogant man to look down on others because, through the flimsiness of his soul, he is inflated by possessions" (lines 26–33). The medical analogy is striking and cleverly echoed in the subsequent characterization of the two souls. Such attention to style is not surprising in a Peripatetic, and neither is the use being made of two similar cases. Arrogance is Aristo's primary concern. He recognizes that it can be confused with magnanimity in that both share an important feature, i.e., both are marked by negative judgments. By bringing the two together and pointing out an important difference, i.e., the different grounds for making negative judgments, he guards against confusion.

The application to eros is straightforward. What counts as eros is not always clear, so that it is helpful to collect various cases of desire that are often referred to as erotic. Similarities can be picked out and differences noted. Some cases will be recognized as central, and others will be declared erotic only on the basis of similarity. Still others will be deemed quite remote, having so little in common with the central cases that the label "eros" will be withheld. For example, it might be decided that the central cases of eros are all concerned with a desire for sexual relations, so that Plato's notion of sublimated eros needs another name. It might also be decided that eros is typically associated with intense desire,¹⁵ so that milder forms of sexual desire are eros only in a qualified sense. It might even be decided that animals experience eros, for they exhibit a strong desire to copulate. But what, then, about domestic animals, dogs for example, that show strong affection for their masters without exhibiting a desire to copulate? Moreover, dolphins, hardly household creatures, are known to form strong attachments to human beings. Indeed, in antiquity dolphins were reported to have formed close and faithful attachments to particular youths. Pliny the Elder speaks of a young boy at Iasus named Hermias, who was carried around in the sea by a dolphin. During a storm, the boy lost his life, and the dolphin brought the body back to shore. The dolphin did not return to sea, but admitting responsibility for the boy's death, the dolphin died on dry land. According to Theophrastus, the same thing happened at Naupactus (*Natural History* 9.27–8 = Theophr., fr. 568A). Similarly, Aulus Gellius tells of amorous and loving dolphins in the

¹⁵ Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 557 FHS&G, where eros is said to be an excess of irrational desire.

sea of Puteoli, and like Pliny he refers to Theophrastus who reported on passionate dolphins at Naupactus (*Attic Nights* 6.8.1–3 = Theophr., fr. 568B). We could add other animals to the list, like the goose in Aegium and the ram and the goose on Chios,¹⁶ but there is no need to pile up examples. It is clear that a philosopher interested in eros and particularly in similarities between animal and human behavior would do well to collect numerous cases, evaluate them carefully, and make decisions about fact (Are animals capable of loving in the way that human beings are?) and about language (Is there an everyday use of “eros” that is inclusive and therefore appropriate to the attachments that animals form with human beings?). None of these reflections can be said to demonstrate how Aristo viewed the affectionate behavior of animals. But perhaps they suggest a serious purpose that the *Erôtika homoia* may have served both within and outside the Peripatos.

2

I have been speaking of a collection of similar cases. It is now time to introduce a qualification. Assuming that the work *Erôtika homoia* did bring together similar cases of various kinds, all of which were in one way or another concerned with eros, it does not follow that strings of similar cases exhausted the content of Aristo’s work. In other words, it would be wrong to assume without corroborating evidence that the work was a pedantic series of examples, unrelieved by context and witty remarks that aimed to entertain and not to support a general thesis. Indeed, the three surviving fragments that make explicit reference to the *Erôtika homoia*—all found in Athenaeus’ *The Sophists at Dinner*—tell against an unbroken series of similar cases.

One is found in Book 15 within a discussion of wreaths. The discussion is prompted by the arrival of slaves bringing wreaths and perfumes for the diners (15.8 669C). The Cynic philosopher Cynulcus asks why broken wreaths are taken as a sign of being in love (669C), and an answer is provided by Democritus of Nicomedia, who cites Clearchus’ *Erôtika* (15.9 669F–670F = fr. 24 W). After that Democritus takes up a problem concerning Plato’s *Laws* and then addresses the question why some people are wreathed with withes. Democritus claims that he

¹⁶ Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.85 606C = Theophr., fr. 567A; Aelian, *On the Nature of Animals* 5.29 = Theophr., fr. 567B.

found the answer in Mendotos of Samos and that Hephaestion took over and published it as his own (15.12 672A–15.15 673F).¹⁷ Shortly thereafter Democritus cites Aristotle's *Erôtika* and Aristo's *Erôtika homoia*, and reports that the ancients devised bandages to bind their temples in order to relieve headaches caused by drinking. Later men added the wreath as an appropriate adornment and as a better way of dealing with the effects of wine (15.16 674B–C = fr. 10 SFOD). Unfortunately our text does not explain in any detail the manner in which the wreath works its beneficial effect. Nor is there any mention of eros, so that we are left wondering why both Aristotle and Aristo referred to the wreath in works that are concerned with eros. One possibility is that both works were dialogues, whose setting was a symposium, so that an excursus concerning wine was not out of place. We can imagine someone asking why broken wreaths indicate that the persons wearing them are in love (i.e., the question put by Cynulcus in *The Sophists at Dinner*). That question or a similar one might become the occasion for a digression of some length that included discussion of the role of bandages and wreaths in fighting headaches.

A second fragment occurs in Book 10. The dining is coming to an end and the symposium proper will soon get under way (at 10.21 423A). Athenaeus has introduced the topic of gluttony and made mention of persons who both eat and drink large amounts.¹⁸ In what immediately precedes the text that interests us, we are presented with verses from the comic poet Alexis, in which moderation is extolled over excess (10.14 419A–C). After that we read what Aristo said in the second book of the *Erôtika homoia*: namely, that “Polemon the Academic advised all who go out to dinner to consider how to make their drinking pleasant not only for the present moment, but also for the morning after” (419C = fr. 11). Here too there is no explicit reference to eros, and it may be that there never was one. If the *Erôtika homoia* was a dialogue whose setting was a symposium, then it is easy to imagine an introductory exchange in which one of the symposiasts referred to Polemon while recommending moderate drinking. But that said, we cannot rule out a connection with eros. For the person who has

¹⁷ This portion of text contains Theophrastus, fr. 437 FHS&G. For discussion, see William Fortenbaugh, with contributions by Dimitri Gutas, *Theophrastus of Eresus, Commentary Volume 6.1: Sources on Ethics* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), on the fr. 437.

¹⁸ E.g., Cambles, the King of Lydia is described as one who eats much, a *poluphagos*, and drinks much, a *polupotês* (10.8 415C). But there are plenty of other examples.

consumed large quantities of alcohol is not in good condition for erotic encounters, either that night or the next morning, and if the consumption is continued over a long time he is likely to become impotent and disinterested in intercourse. A well-known example is Alexander the Great.¹⁹ Others with livelier imaginations will be able supply other possibilities. My point here is simply that this fragment does not mention eros and cannot be said to support (in any straightforward way) the idea that Aristo's work was a simple collection of similar cases.

The third fragment is found in Book 13. This time the content is clearly erotic. Aristo is said to have quoted Homer in addressing someone from Attica, who singled out a certain person for his good looks. That person was named Dorus and was large for his age. Aristo's words were: "I'll take the rejoinder that Odysseus made to Dolon and apply it to you. 'Surely now your heart was eager for large rewards'" (13.15 563F = fr. 13A lines 7–14). There is a play on words here. In the *Iliad*, Dolon is pleading for his life and therefore is said to be eager for large rewards, *dôra*. In the Athenaeus, the name of the youth is *Doros*. Aristo's remark is characterized as "not bad" (line 8), which is something of an understatement. Hesychius puts it more strongly: urbane or elegant.²⁰ That this remark belongs to a string of similar cases seems to me unlikely. To be sure, we might imagine a collection of erotic jokes, each of which involves word play or depends on the size of the beloved, but that would be a stretch. Far more likely is a witty remark that was appropriate in its context. Indeed, the fragment supplies a context and a speaker: namely Aristo, who is said to address someone who has called attention to a large youth. Moreover, Aristo's remark is recorded in the first person: *moi dokô*, "me thinks" (lines 11–12). That would be at home in a dialogue in which Aristo is a speaker, but equally Aristo may have chosen to record one of his witty remarks in the first person quite apart from a dialogue format and quite apart from a string of similar jokes. I leave the matter open.

In what follows Aristo's witty remark, we first hear of Hegesander, who in his *Memoirs* remarked that people prefer the seasoning to the fish and meat that it enhances (13.16 546A = lines 15–19). After that the focus returns to eros, and we seem to be offered two reports concerning

¹⁹ See Athenaeus 10.45 434F–435A = Theophr., fr. 578.

²⁰ Both authors express themselves with an adverb. Athenaeus says *ou kakôs* and Hesychius says *asteiôs* (*Commentary on Homer's Iliad* 20.47 = fr. 13B line 9).

Aristo. First, he said that those who are loved are called *paidika*, “boyfriends,” because in ancient times boys were objects of erotic love (lines 20–2). Second, he endorsed what Clearchus said in Book 1 of his *Erôtika* and cited verses of Lycophronides in which beauty is tied to character: the countenance is fair only when it is naturally decorous, *kosmion*, for it is modesty, *aidôs*, that sows the bloom (of beauty) on it (lines 22–8). Both reports involve problems. In the first report, the name of Aristo is an emendation by Meineke; the codex reads *Aristophôn*. The occurrence of a secure reference to Aristo only a few lines earlier (at lines 7–8) strongly suggests emending to Aristo, but it hardly counts as certain proof. Nevertheless, the emendation receives some additional support from another fragment of Aristo, this time found in Plutarch’s *Dialogue on Love*. Plutarch is defending conjugal love and has recalled the Platonic doctrine of recollection. He recognizes that recollection can take its start from youthful beauty, both male and female, providing a well-ordered, *kosmion*, character shines through. And this idea is illustrated by a simile attributed to Aristo: just as a straight shoe reveals a well-shaped foot” (21 766F = fr. 22 lines 13–14).²¹ Whether we like the simile or not, it is in line with the second report in which beauty is tied to character, so that we may feel more comfortable in following Meineke and making Aristo the subject of both the first and second reports.

The second report has its own difficulty in that it is awkwardly written. The verb *phêsi* occurs twice in close proximity. In the first occurrence, the subject is clearly Clearchus: “as Clearchus says, *phêsi*, in the first (book) of the *Erôtika*” (lines 22–3). In the second occurrence, we seem to return to Aristo: “he (Aristo) says, *phêsin*, that Lycophronides said” followed by three verses that tie beauty to modesty (lines 23–8). Perhaps others will see no awkwardness in the text and assert without hesitation that Aristo, in the work *Erôtika homoia*, aligned himself with Clearchus and quoted verses tying beauty to a countenance that is naturally modest. But if that is the case, then Meineke is a notable exception. For he deleted *phêsin* (line 24), so that Aristo’s remark concerning *paidika* (lines 20–2) is followed by a reference to Clearchus, who quoted verses of Lycophronides (lines 23–8). In the Loeb edition, Gulick does not delete *phêsin*, but he translates as if he had: “For in truth, as Clearchus says in the first book of his *Love Stories*, quoting

²¹ Plutarch does not mention the title of a work by Aristo.

Lycophronides.”²² As all too often, a firm decision is elusive, but if forced to choose, I prefer not to emend through deletion. Aristo will have referred to Clearchus and quoted Lycophronides, who mentioned not only the beloved boy but also conjoined beauty with a countenance that exhibits modesty, *aidôs* (lines 27–8). On that reading, both Peripatetics, Clearchus and Aristo, are in good company. We are immediately told that Aristotle said that lovers look to the eyes, in which modesty, *aidôs*, dwells (lines 29–31). Whether we should accept this view of the eyes is a different issue. Certainly it was widespread in antiquity.²³

3

In the *Life of Aristides*, Plutarch discusses the rivalry between Aristides and Themistocles. Citing what “some people say,” he tells us that the two Athenians were brought up together and competed against each other in deed and word. Early on this love of rivalry, *philonikia*, made clear that they were of different natures, *phuseis*. Themistocles was cool, daring, and unscrupulous. Exhibiting a certain quickness, *oxutês*, he was easily moved to action. In contrast, Aristides’ nature was settled or steady, *hidrumenê* (*phusis*); he was intent on justice and unwilling to accept falsehood, buffoonery and deceit, even when at play (2.2 = fr. 14A.1–10). After the account of these differing natures, Plutarch cites Aristo, adding “the Cean” (hence, not the like-named Stoic from Chios) but without mentioning a particular work by title. We are told that the enmity between the two had its beginning in eros. The two fell in love with a beautiful young man named Stesilaus. They were

²² Loeb (1937) vol. 6 (= 327), 47. See also Wehrli, *Lykon und Ariston von Keos*, whose fr. 17 on page 41 contains only the first report concerning *paidika*. The second report mentioning Clearchus is omitted.

²³ An adequate discussion of the issue cannot be attempted here. It would involve not only collecting texts from a large range of ancient authors but also looking at the modern literature on the subject. I offer only two reflections. First, we need to distinguish between character and emotion. It is clear that the face expresses a wide range of emotions, but it is less clear that the face expresses character. To be sure, there may be faces that have a naturally modest appearance, in that they are marked by features that regularly accompany emotional response, i.e., features that are exhibited when one feels shy or embarrassed or ashamed. But such faces seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Second, when a person says that the eyes express modesty (cf. fr. 13A lines 30–1), he is likely to be using “eyes” inclusively, so that the eyebrows and the area between the eyes are included. By themselves, the eyes are not good (clear) indicators of either character or emotion.

immoderate in their passion and did not abandon their rivalry, *philonikia*, even when the beauty of Stesilaus faded. Rather having been trained in this erotic rivalry, they turned to politics and remained at loggerheads (2.3–4 = fr. 14A lines 10–18).²⁴

Each of the two segments summarized above (lines 1–10 and 10–8) is of interest. In the first, we hear of innate attributes that determine the behavior of two prominent Athenian politicians. Given Themistocles' unscrupulous daring and quickness to act and Aristides' steadiness of character in combination with an unwavering preference for justice, conflict in the political arena was inevitable.²⁵ In the second segment, we are told that the political rivalry was the result of an earlier erotic competition. Both men were immoderately passionate about Stesilaus, their competition over the youth served as a kind of training that was carried over into politics. It is tempting to treat the two segments as a unit and to see here an intriguing account of how innate dispositions can work together with erotic passion to determine not only the present but also the future in a quite different arena. Nevertheless, the temptation is to be resisted, for at least two reasons. First the two segments are clearly distinguished. At the outset, Plutarch tells us that he is following what "some say" (line 1). Then he shifts to Aristo and states that clearly (line 10). Second, the two segments do not fit well together. In particular, the first segment presents Aristides as a steady, well-grounded individual (lines 7–8), but in the second segment, his passion for Stesilaus is said to be immoderate, *ou metriôs* (line 14). And the subsequent rivalry in politics is not explained in terms of natural endowment, but rather as the result of the training or habituation that occurred during an erotic rivalry.

If the preceding is correct, what we have from Aristo is disappointingly limited. He reported on an erotic rivalry and viewed it as a training for subsequent rivalry. Perhaps Aristo's report was put forth in the work *Erôtika homōia*. It might have been brought together with

²⁴ On my reading, *diaphorôs echontas* (at the end of 2.4 = line 18) is used synonymously with *diapheresthai* (toward the beginning of 2.2 = line 3). That does not, however, imply that Plutarch is following a single source. Rather, a single author, Plutarch, is reporting from two different sources.

²⁵ We may compare Callisthenes and Alexander the Great. If we think of the former as innately lethargic and the latter as choleric by nature, a disastrous conflict seems inevitable. For discussion, see "Theophrastus on Fate and Character" in *Arktouros* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979), 372–5, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies*, Philosophie der Antike 17 (Suttgart: Steiner, 2003), 146–9.

other stories of erotic rivalry that had future consequences. But that is speculation.

4

I conclude with a brief look at a few lines of text in the second book of Athenaeus' *The Sophists at Dinner*. The text was assigned to the *Erôtika homoia* by Knögel²⁶ and is similarly placed in the most recent edition of Aristo. The Cean is said to have stated well that the most pleasant drink is one that combines sweetness with bouquet, and for this reason, certain persons around the Lydian Olympus prepare the so-called nectar by mixing wine, honey and the fragrances of flowers (2.8 38F–39A = fr. 12). No proportions are given, and no names of flowers are recorded. It may be that Aristo gave none, but it is also possible that Athenaeus omitted them, or that they were not present in his source, or that the epitomist, to whom we owe what survives of Book 2, chose to omit them. There is also no mention of eros. That was a problem that we encountered at the beginning of this paper in regard to fragments 10 and 11. In those fragments, however, there is an explicit reference to the *Erôtika homoia*. The text under consideration gives no such reference. That might be attributed to one of the explanations listed for the failure to mention proportions and specific flowers. But positing possible explanations of omission, however plausible they may be, does not tell us why a work on eros included a remark on mixing a drink that was both sweet and fragrant. The modern reader (and one with a sense of humor) is likely to think of the Old Fashioned and other mixed drinks that are sweet, appeal to ladies and on occasion loosen their morals to the delight of their male escorts. But in ancient Greece, the modern cocktail party had not been invented, and on the whole men did their drinking by themselves, unless they were joined by female flute players and the like.²⁷

²⁶ Knögel, *Der Peripatetiker Ariston von Keos bei Philodem*, Fr. 11, 83. So too Wehrli, *Lykon und Ariston von Keos*, fr. 23, 42.

²⁷ It is hard not to think of Plato's *Symposium* in which Eryximachus proposes that the flute girl be sent away, so that if she wishes, she can play to herself or to the women within (176E). For some discussion of the place of women in symposia with special reference to vase painting, see J.-M. Dentzer, *Le Motif du Banquet Couché* (Rome: Bretschneider, 1982), 123–5.

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ETHICS FROM A FOREIGN PAST*

David C. Reisman

Contemporary physicians have but a glancing interest in the history of medicine, although much of the theoretical apparatus that they employ has its roots and developments in the past, including that foreign past that is the domain of medieval Arabic-speaking physicians. The most common example given of the influence of medieval Arab physicians on Western medical education is the important role of the *Canon*, a textbook written by the great Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037),¹ and translated into Latin in the twelfth century, thereafter occupying a critical role in the standard curriculum of European medical students until the eighteenth century. There was no medical theory attached to this textbook; the conceptual conflict of Galenic and Aristotelian thought in it made this sparsely attainable. Its central role was located in medical practice, exemplified by its precise presentation of human anatomy, physiology, pathology, the diagnosis and prognosis of diseases and the pharmacological knowledge necessary for the treatment of various diseases.

However, it is not the much-discussed role of Avicenna's *Canon* that will occupy my interest here; many scholars more suited to that task have expertly presented it.² I will instead focus the reader's attention on a lesser-known physician of the medieval Arab civilization, 'Alī ibn Riḍwān, an eleventh-century Cairene physician (died either 453 or 460/1061 or 1068) who spent much of his time in a deep formulation of a medical ethics for his students and contemporary physicians (although we shall see that he had little regard for the latter) and on a concentrated reading and implementation of the thought of past

* My focus here on medical ethics is incidental, in that it is influenced by the vagaries of my own recent experiences with that profession. The focus on ethics per se pays tribute to my master who is an *adīb* par excellence and the model of my own meager efforts to be such.

¹ The scholarly community has benefited so greatly by the untiring work on Avicenna's life, works and philosophy which Professor Gutas has produced that I dare not add to his corpus here.

² See for example D. Jacquart, "Lectures universitaires du Canon d'Avicenne," in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, ed. J. Janssens (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 313–24.

masters, the Hippocratics (430–330 B.C.) and Galen (129–c. 210 C.E.). Medieval Arabic-reading scholars had much more knowledge of these two ancient medical corpora than we ourselves do. In Ibn Riḍwān's treatise *The Way to Perfection in the Medical Discipline* he lists seven more entries in Hippocratic Corpus than we have in the extant Greek and Latin sources.³ An equal amount of interest was directed towards the Galenic corpus. The chief translator of Galen and an author of original medical works himself was Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (died 260/873); he wrote up a list of Galenic translations that he or other members of his circle of translators had produced from Greek or Syriac texts that Ḥunayn obtained in the lands of the old Byzantine empire.⁴ In addition to the technical and practical data gained by these texts there was also obtained by the Arabic scholars a large body of attendant theoretical discussion of medicine. In this division of the literature we can place not only discussions of the ancient medical sects and the comparative strengths and weaknesses of their methods but also a large body of deontological works concerning what it means to be an ethical physician in a social and professional sense. Here we can cite Arabic translations of the *Hippocratic Oath*, the *Canon* and the lesser known *Pact*⁵ as well as the Galenic *Exhortation to the Study of the Discipline* and *On the Ethical Disposition* (in summary form).⁶ These texts could

³ *Maqāla fi t-Taṭarruq bi-t-tibb ilā s-sa'āda*. See the useful introduction to this work by F. Rosenthal "An Eleventh-Century List of the Works of Hippocrates," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 28 (1973), 156–65. The Arabic text is edited and provided with a German translation and notes by A. Dietrich, 'Alī Ibn Riḍwān, *Über den Weg zur Glückseligkeit durch den ärztlichen Beruf, Arabischer Text nebst kommentierter deutscher Übersetzung*, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 129 (Göttingen: Vadenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982).

⁴ For an excellent introduction to this circle of scholars, see Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad in Early 'Abbāsīd Society* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

⁵ The Arabic translations are preserved in Ibn Abī Uṣaybī'a's *'Uyūn al-anbā' fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'* (Beirut, s.n.), 45–6. For the Greek text of the *Oath* and an English translation, see L. Edelstein, *Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, eds. Owsei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 3 ff. For an English translation of the *Canon*, see G. E. R. Lloyd, *Hippocratic Writings* (New York: Penguin, 1983), 68 ff.

⁶ For the Arabic summary of Galen's *Peri ethon*, see the seminal study and edition of P. Kraus, "Kitāb al-Akhlāq li-Jalūnūs," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Egyptian University* 5 (1939), 1–52 (where in typical Krausian fashion he tells the reader, p. 9, s/he does not need to know Greek to distinguish *epsilon* from *eta* to know which Galenic treatise he is talking about); the edition of Kraus was translated into English on suggestion of R. Walzer by J. N. Mattock in "An Arabic Epitome of Galen's Book

be and often were studied in close conjunction with Aristotelian works on the subject such as *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁷ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was knowledge of Neo-Pythagorean ethical texts, the most widely known of which was the *Carmina aurea* paired with the commentary of Iamblichus (c. fourth c. C.E.).⁸

It is through this corpus of ethical texts in Arabic translation (to which many more titles could be added) that Ibn Riḍwān constructed both his very personalized self-representation as well as his conception of the young physician's ethical formation. He also added to this influence the very powerful one of his understanding of Galen's self-assertive and contentiously critical personality. The two influences combined give reason for one interpretation of the seemingly contradictory facets of Ibn Riḍwān's personality: one of his intense disregard for the medical practitioners of his day; and the other of his concern and indeed compassion for the young medical student's development into what he considered an ethical physician. He valorized autodidacticism over slavish obedience to one's master; and prized virtuous character over the figure of the money-grubbing, self-serving and thus immoral doctor.

Ibn Riḍwān was born in Giza, Cairo, in 388/998⁹ during the height of Fāṭimid rule and spent all of his life in Cairo, ostensibly a member

Peri ethon," in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, Essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday*, eds. S. M. Stern, Albert Hourani and Vivian Brown (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1972), 235–60 and F. Klein-Franke, "The Arabic translation of Galen's *Peri ethon*," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 1 (1979), 125–50. The Greek *Protreptikos* is edited by K. G. Kühn, *Opera omnia Claudii Galeni* (Leipzig, 1821–33), I; the Arabic summary is edited by 'A. Badawī, *Dirāsāt wa-nuṣūṣ fī l-falsafa wa-l-'ulūm 'ind al-'arab* (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiya li-d-Dirāsāt wa-n-Naṣr, 1981), 187–9. There is an English translation by P. N. Singer in Galen, *Selected Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁷ See Hunayn's Arabic translation edited by 'A. Badawī in *al-Ahlāq* (Kuwait: Wakālat al-Maṭbū'āt, 1979). The influence of the *Ethics* among Arab philosophers is evident, for example, on every page of al-Fārābī's *Risālat at-Tanbīh 'alā sabīl as-sa'āda*, now in English translation in J. McGinnis and D. Reisman, *Classical Arabic Philosophy, An Anthology of Sources* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), 104 ff.

⁸ The Neo-Pythagorean thought had a profound effect on the interpretation of the Hippocratic corpus in the hellenistic and classical Arabic schools. The *Carmina aurea* was a popular work among Arab physicians and philosophers. The Arabic edition was undertaken by H. Daiber, *Neuplatonische Pythagorica in arabischem Gewande*, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, nieuwe reeks, d. 161 (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995) [hereafter CA].

⁹ This date was determined by G. Gabrieli in "Medici e scienziati Arabi: Ali ibn Riḍwān," *Isis* 6 (1924), 500–6 on the basis of Ibn Riḍwān's natal horoscope. That he was born in Giza should not go unnoticed in this volume.

of the Caliph's court, presumably by way of his skills as a physician. The Fāṭimid dynasty was nominally made up of rulers endorsing the Šī'ī understanding of Islam but who were practically engaged in building an empire that was at once tolerant of others' views and eager to situate every skilled or knowledgeable individual into a multicultural and interconfessional circle of scientific and philosophical endeavour.

Ibn Riḍwān was by all accounts a cranky man. We might thus imagine him a controversial figure both in his own life and, not surprisingly, in posterity's understanding of him. We can posit him as progenitor and centre of controversy during his own lifetime from the reports and texts which document a viciously emotional clash with his contemporary Ibn Buṭlān (died after 441/1049), a Christian philosopher and physician (although not of the calibre of Ibn Riḍwān) originally from Baghdad.¹⁰ Their arguments, both oral and written, began with a commonplace medical question (the temperature of a young chick in comparison to a fully-grown chicken) but also included a difference of opinions on the best pedagogical method in medicine. In the latter disagreement, Ibn Buṭlān championed the master-student relationship (by way of his limited reading of the medical corpus, especially his blind adherence to the statutes of the *Oath*),¹¹ with Ibn Riḍwān extolling the benefits of his fiercely protected autodidacticism (from his reading of the personality and career of his philosophically "eclectic" hero Galen).

We can situate Ibn Riḍwān's disdain for contemporary medical education in this attitude of eclectic individualism. In his *Useful Handbook of Medicine*, Ibn Riḍwān condemns the educational system of his day for producing ignorant and greedy quacks and con-men. He recounts his own experience in learning medicine in eleventh-century Cairo to illustrate this deterioration in educational standards. The

¹⁰ The standard investigation of this controversy and its related texts is M. Meyerhof and J. Schacht, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy between Ibn Butlan of Baghdad and Ibn Ridwan of Cairo, A Contribution to the History of Greek Learning among the Arabs*, Egyptian University, Faculty of Arts Publication, no. 13 (Cairo: Egyptian University, 1937).

¹¹ The *Oath* contains the earliest reference to the sanctity of the master-student relationship in its articulation of a father-son educational pattern. The role of controversy in the career of the ancient and medieval physicians was very important in establishing one's reputation. See V. Nutton, "Galen and Medical Autobiography," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 18 (1972), 50–62; and F. Rosenthal, "The Physician in Medieval Muslim Society," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 52 (1978), 475–91.

core of the curriculum consists of recently composed medical abridgements that over-simplify, to the point of sophistry, the principles of the discipline. These books are taught by self-appointed authorities who neither understand medicine nor take any particular interest in the student's progress. The aim is simply to learn enough basic healing skills to make money or achieve social status through preying on the wealthy. There is neither an institutionalized means of accreditation nor a process of peer review to ensure consistent standards of practice. Finally, the drugs employed for therapy and cure are commonly adulterated or counterfeited by opportunistic pharmacists.¹² These critical opinions likely originate in his own experience but we can equally posit the reconstruction of Galen's own "crankiness" in Ibn Riḍwān's formulation of the personality of that ancient authority regarding the medical tradition.

A reading of Ibn Riḍwān's corpus of medical theory (mostly on the subjects of methodology, pedagogy, and epistemology) almost leads us to characterize him as a philosopher rather than a practicing physician. That impression, however, is strongly countered by his detailed commentaries of the medical corpus that he had inherited from the ancients, as well as his particularized knowledge on anatomy, physiology and humoral content (our "constitution") of the patient. Both types of knowledge, that is, a theoretical understanding of medical texts paired with a practical skill as physician, is evident in his unprovoked attacks against the unfortunate misapprehension of his Muslim forebears as they attempted to read the works of the Greeks and to practice medicine themselves (all of this, again, in Ibn Riḍwān's opinion).¹³

Despite the record of his autobiography (understood by scholars to date as an "historical" text), aside from the thin data above, we know very little about the particulars of Ibn Riḍwān's life; although we shall see that this same document does give us slight insight into his interior life.¹⁴ Clarification must come through a close reading of his

¹² I refer to manuscript Chester Beatty Ms. 4026 of his *Kitāb an-Nāfi' fī 'ilm at-ṭibb*, which I had the opportunity to study in that library, with the gracious hospitality of its staff, in the Summer of 1996. The above summary is taken from folia 1b–3b.

¹³ In his *Kitāb an-Nāfi'* (Ms Chester Beatty 4026, 12b ff.), Ibn Riḍwān takes his predecessor Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq (mentioned above) to task for his laughable misapprehension of Galen's theory of bilious humours.

¹⁴ I am obliged here to say that scholarly *communis opinio* has it that this "autobiographical" text does in fact give historical facts about Ibn Riḍwān's life; my contrarian

extant works, which has yet to be undertaken. It should come as some surprise that nowhere in Ibn Riḍwān's bibliography do we find a self-standing treatise on professional ethics.¹⁵ However, while the majority of his works are infused with his exhortations to the moulding of good character, this fact alone does not account for his sparse literary output on professional ethics. In light of this, we can point to the treatise that is often misapprehended as his "autobiography" but which does in fact contain all the elements hypothetically considered by him as constituting the noble and virtuous life of a physician. This treatise, at least according to a later biographer, is titled with the Arabic word *sīra*, which has connotations of "model of life" or "behavioural standard of living." Thus, we can identify this so-called "autobiography" as the one writing in which Ibn Riḍwān expressed his thoughts on the virtuous life, taken now to be a universal "model" on which others could pattern their own personalities and habitual behaviours. That this characterization of the small work is correct can readily be observed by its content.

His autobiography was not intended as a tell-all account of the sequence of actions and thoughts that make up a particular individual's life (akin to the mediocre "memoirs" genre of our own time) but was intended to demonstrate or at least exemplify the process by which a strong moral stance affects the contours of an individual's world-view. In the case of the physician, that strong moral stance was seen to have repercussions on his professional attitude with his patients.

The "autobiography" of Ibn Riḍwān is found in summary form by a later and, ironically, hostile biographer.¹⁶ The independent (and perhaps more detailed?) version does not seem to exist as an integrated Arabic treatise¹⁷ but there is sparse evidence of a medieval Hebrew translation

view is found next in the above. See also my "Medieval Arabic Medical Autobiography," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 129.4 (2009), 559–69.

¹⁵ We do, however, find a commentary on a Pythagorean treatise on virtue in his bibliography; see Meyerhof and Schacht, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy*, 43, no. 23.

¹⁶ This is Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, the author of the *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ* cited above. Here I use the Cairo facsimile of M. Müller's edition of 1882, vol. 2, 99–102.

¹⁷ W. Pertsch, *Die orientalischen Handschriften der herzoglichen Bibliothek zu Gotha* (repr. 1987), records a fragment in Ms. Gotha arab. 981, no. 2035 of his catalogue, vol. 4, 71. Another fragment in Genoa was announced by De Sacy in *Bollettino Ital. degli studii orient* I (1919), 410, n. 10. To my knowledge, these announcements were not pursued. Franz Rosenthal, *Die arabische Autobiographie*, *Studia Arabica* 1 (Rome:

noted by Jehuda Charizi in early thirteenth-century Provence.¹⁸ What follows here is an English translation of that Arabic summary with its main points numbered in aid of the discussion below of its Greek sources and influences.

1. Everyone should study the discipline most appropriate and agreeable to him. Medicine is next to philosophy in terms of obedience to God.
2. The astrological signs at the time of my birth indicated that my discipline would be medicine and it was my opinion that living a life of excellence is more pleasing than any other kind of life. I began studying medicine when I was fifteen years of age—but it would be best to tell you my whole story. I was born in Egypt in the latitude of thirty degrees and the longitude of fifty-five degrees. [Provides his natal horoscope].
3. I began to study when I was six and when I reached ten I moved to the capitol [Cairo] and devoted myself to [further] study. When I had finished my fourteenth year, I began to study medicine and philosophy, but I had no money to pay for it, and that made studying difficult and a source of obstacles. So sometimes I paid my way by [practicing] astrology, sometimes by medicine, and sometimes by teaching. I continued like that in my studies, with extreme effort, until I was thirty-two.
4. In [the latter] year I became established in medicine and what I earn by it became sufficient—indeed, it has been more than sufficient to this day, which is the end of my fifty-ninth year. From the revenue I have over my cost of living expenses I acquired a number of properties in this city that are sufficient (if God keeps them safe!) for my expenses now that I have reached old age. From the time I was thirty-two until now I have made a yearly statement for myself and modified it each year until I had established this account [of property], with which I greet my sixtieth year.

Pontificum Institutum Biblicum, 1937), 22, n. 4, suggested it may have formed part of Ibn Riḍwān's *Maqāla fī t-Taṭarruq bi-ṭ-ṭibb ilā s-sa'āda*.

¹⁸ M. Steinschneider, *Die hebraeischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters, und die Juden als Dolmetscher, Ein Eitrag zur Literaturgeschichte des Mittelalters, meist nach handschriftlichen Quellen* (Berlin: Kommissionsverlag des Bibliographischen Bureaus, 1893), 204.

5. The daily activities of my profession suffice as exercise to keep my body healthy. After resting from that exercise I eat a meal designed to preserve my health.
6. In all of my activities I strive to be humble and courteous, to be helpful to the downhearted, to dispel the worries of the distressed and to aid the needy.
7. I make my goal in all of this the pleasure [that comes from] good deeds and sentiments, but no doubt along with that comes [money] to spend. So from that money I spend on my health and the maintenance of my household in amounts that are neither wasteful nor miserly but which adhere to the middle amount according to what rational discernment deems necessary at every time. I examine the furniture of my household and what requires fixing I fix, what requires replacing I replace. In my household I keep at hand the necessary foods and drinks, honey and oil, firewood and clothes. Whatever remains after that I spend in good and useful causes, such as donations to family, friends and neighbors, and maintenance of the household. The revenue gathered from my properties I set aside for their maintenance and repairs and for times of similar need.
8. When I plan a new enterprise, in commerce or building or something else, I treat it as a required need and analyze its essential and incidental aspects. If I find it to be mostly possible, I get started at once. If I find it to be barely possible, I drop it. I keep informed as much as possible about any impending contingency and prepare for it.
9. I adorn my clothes with the signs of quality, cleanliness and perfume.
10. I keep silent and hold my tongue about people's shortcomings. I try to say only what is appropriate and guard against cursing and criticizing the opinions of others. I guard against boastfulness and vainglory and eschew covetousness and self-pity.
11. If tragedy befalls me, I submit myself to God, Most High, and counter the tragedy with the requirements of rational discernment, with neither timidity nor temerity.
12. I pay cash in my transactions with others, neither giving nor requesting credit, unless it is unavoidable. If someone requests a loan from me, I grant it to him as a gift, but I do not reject [later] repayment from him.

13. After completing my daily rounds, I occupy myself in the remaining time with worship of God, may He be praised, by reflecting on the kingdoms of heaven and earth and praising their Founder.
14. I meditate on Aristotle's *Economics* and admonish myself to adhere to its prescriptions from morning to evening.
15. In my private time, I review my actions and sentiments of the day; I take pleasure in those that were noble, good or beneficial and I regret and swear to avoid in the future those that were evil, useless or harmful.
16. [Ibn Riḍwān also] said: Of my various recreational activities, I deem most important the recollection of God and His praise, through reflection on the kingdoms of heaven and earth.
17. The ancients and the philosophers have written many books on this but I deemed it best to limit myself to the following: five books on literature; ten books on law; the books of Hippocrates and Galen on medicine and those of a similar nature, like Dioscorides' *Materia Medica*, the books of Rufus, Oribasius and Paulus, Rāzī's *Continens*; four books on agriculture and pharmaceuticals; various books of mathematics; [Ptolemy's] *Almagest* and its introductions (along with whatever may be of use to me); the *Quadripartitum* of Ptolemy; books of the philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, Themistius, al-Fārābī; and whatever else may be useful. Anything else I sell [after reading] for whatever price I can get or I store them in chests; but selling them is better than storing them.

This treatise is articulated within an autobiographical framework. However, it is important to observe that, both in ancient Greek and medieval Arabic medical literature, statements of personal anecdote, attitude and behaviour very often represented a particular example of generalized ethical philosophy. Their exemplifying nature meant that they could be utilized by the reader in his own daily life. For example, this is a regular feature of Galen's writings from which Ibn Riḍwān's intellectual life was self-consciously constructed. When read this way, one immediately discerns the classical references in Ibn Riḍwān's "autobiographical" statement.

In the list of books that Ibn Riḍwān singles out in the conclusion to the piece as the main constituents of his library (par. 17), he provides the main parts of a curriculum of study to be followed by any young

student who has the natural propensity, sharpness of intellect and personal drive to begin the arduous process of becoming an accomplished physician. Also encapsulated in this list are the main influences of his own self-portrait, the major subjects of his own learning and the discrete parts of a holistic ethical attitude towards which he thinks the young physician should work.

Throughout the treatise, the main figure that Ibn Riḍwān appropriates as the ideal model of his personal and professional life is that of the Hellenistic philosopher and physician Galen, but he adds to this the basic sources of his ethical construction of his character.

In addition to the biographical literature and thought produced by the Hippocratics and Galen, the other classical references in the treatise point towards the standard ethical works of ancient and medieval professional ethics a few of which I listed above in the introduction. Ibn Riḍwān's model of life begins with a very concise summary (in a few lines no less) of Galen's *Exhortation to Study the Arts* (*Protreptikos*) and his ethical work *On Traits of Character* (*Peri ethon*, *Fī l-ʿādāt*). In the Arabic translation of the latter work we can see the source of his opening statement. In his *Peri ethon*, Galen states that "every infant has in its imagination an image of that which suits it and that which does not suit it, and a love of that which suits it and a hatred of that which does not suit it."¹⁹ In the *Protreptikos*, Galen makes a distinction between the two qualities of humans, one which they share with non-rational animals by nature (for example, techniques of building), the other the rational quality of humans that spur them to study the intellectual disciplines in order to attain the divine attributes.²⁰ The theoretical and practical disciplines that will cause them to reach that divine "perfection" or "completeness" include philosophy and medicine. In the two sentences of paragraph (1), Ibn Riḍwān encapsulates those two qualities, the nature agreeable to the person, and the techniques that the rational animal learns and appropriates in "obedience," as he has it, to the divine (this may also be seen in the "praise paragraph," 16, above).

¹⁹ Ed. Kraus, "*Kitāb al-Akhlāq li-Jalūnūs*," 28; the translation above is that of Mattock, "An Arabic Epitome of Galen's Book *Peri ethon*," 239 (I would imagine that his translation of *taṣawwur...fī l-wahm* with "in its imagination is an image" is highly unsuitable but I have not confirmed this through the Greek).

²⁰ Greek, Kühn, I 1–2; Arabic, Badawī, 187; English, Singer, 35 (for these references, see above, n. 6).

The next paragraph (2) opens with the same theme, to which Ibn Riḍwān adds his natal horoscope.²¹ The horoscope perhaps has literary parallels to the dream of Galen's father that pointed to the career of physician for his son.²² Indeed, Ibn Riḍwān's early education with the ages he records seems to be an echo of Galen's own early career but with one difference: the sequence of Ibn Riḍwān's education falls a little behind (presumably he expects the percipient reader to note this) because he was studying on his own. Elsewhere, Ibn Riḍwān explains that those studying medicine on their own must first learn logic to discern what is true and false in the books he reads.²³

With his report of self-criticism and also the praise of the divine (pars. 13, 15), we see the influence of Neo-Pythagorean thought concerning a daily review of one's actions and statements, obtained for instance from the *Carmina aurea*.²⁴ In this regard it may be significant that Ibn Riḍwān's older contemporary Mubaššir ibn Fātik had ascribed this daily review to Galen himself.²⁵ In Ibn Fātik's *Muḥtār al-ḥikam* we find the following ascribed to Pythagoras.

Do not grant your eyes sleep before you review the actions you committed during the day. Set against the errors what you should have done, if you have erred. Reflect on what you did that you should not have done; and what you should have done but did not. When you have done something reprehensible, let it be cause for great alarm. When you have done something decent, let it be cause for joy. This practice will pave the way to your approximation of divine excellence.²⁶

²¹ I chose not to record it here because of its length, but it is on the basis of it, and the acumen of the great Italian scholar G. Gabrieli, that we know Ibn Riḍwān's birth date as 998 C.E. and his birthplace Giza; see Gabrieli's "Medici e scienziati Arabi: Ali ibn Riḍwān," 500.

²² See V. Nutton, "The Chronology of Galen's early career," *Classical Quarterly* 23 (1973), 158–71.

²³ Ibn Riḍwān records this in his *Maqāla fī t-Taṭarruq bi-ṭ-ṭibb ilā s-sa'āda*; see ed. Dietrich, *ʿAlī Ibn Riḍwān* (see note 3), 13. The listing of ages and achievements could also have connection to Posidonius, *apud* Galen, and the observation of different temperaments displayed in children as they advance through the years; cf. R. Walzer, "New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy," in his *Greek into Arabic, Essays on Islamic Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 162.

²⁴ F. Rosenthal (*Die arabische Autobiographie*, 23 and n. 4) was the first scholar to observe this connection.

²⁵ Arab philosophers learned of Galen's practice in his autobiographical report of this habit in his *On the affections of the soul* (Kühn, V 30; tr. Singer, 114). Mubaššir ibn Fātik records it in his *Muḥtār al-ḥikam wa-maḥāsin al-kalim*, ed. ʿA. Badawī (Madrid: al-Maʿhad al-Miṣri li-d-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiya, 1958), 296.

²⁶ *Muḥtār al-ḥikam* (see note 25), 65. We know of a commentary on Pythagoras' work by Ibn Riḍwān; see F. Rosenthal, *Die arabische Autobiographie*, 24. The Greek

Ibn Riḍwān's review of his psychological actions and reactions extend to the notion of moderation in his physical and dietetic regimes (par. 5); this influence of the temperaments of the body on the virtues and vices of the soul is a common theme of classical Greek and Arabic literature.²⁷

In his statements of moderation in habits and economics (pars. 4, 5, 12, 14, and the end of 17), Ibn Riḍwān delineates the theory of the mean between extreme actions that is the core theory in (ps.-?) Aristotle's *Oeconomica*²⁸ and Aristotle's ethical works. The discussion of his attitude towards money has deep resonance with the Pythagorean tradition as it was read within medical literature. We can find a parallel passage again in the Arabic *Carmina aurea* with Iamblichus' commentary:

With regard to property, let your aim be that as soon as you acquire it, you spend it. [Iamblichus] said: In saying this [Pythagoras] does not teach greed in the acquisition and accumulation of property. Rather, he means that your aim in seeking and acquiring property [should] not be to amass and hoard it. Instead your aim in acquiring it [should] be to spend and dispense it in the correct ways on those things necessary for your welfare and for those in need of what you have. When one makes this his aim with property, he does not seek more than what he needs and gathers, and seeks what comes to him in the correct ways.²⁹

In the same work, Pythagoras says:

Do not be a spendthrift like one who has no idea what he has in his possession; nor should you be stingy so that you lose liberality. Rather the noble [way] in all things is moderation.

[Iamblichus] said: He says this to prevent both profligacy and miserliness and to encourage moderation, which is spending in the correct ways. He says that you should not at any time waste what you have like the one who, while striving for rank and status, is still not aware of what he has and so finds himself lacking what he needs at the one time that he does need it. Neither, however, does [Pythagoras] promote

theme of "approximation to the divine" was in the Muslim tradition (as with all monotheistic cultures) put in terms of one's worship of God.

²⁷ See Galen's *The affections of the soul follow the body*, Greek text, Kühn, IV, 767–821.

²⁸ I know only of the Arabic excerpts of the first book of this title which were collected by Abū l-Faraǧ ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in his "*nukat wa-ṭimār* series;" see Ms. Escorial 888, 145v–149r.

²⁹ CA 16, ed. Daiber, *Neuplatonische Pythagorica in arabischem Gewande* (see note 8), 54, with commentary, 106–113.

accumulating and hoarding. He forbids you to apply what you possess in the wrong ways, thus taking leave of liberality and equity in spending. In both cases, striving towards moderation and sticking to it is most suitable and requisite.³⁰

We find this sentiment again in Menander Arabus: "Those who love property have no freedom."³¹ The good man, then, has no untoward identification with his wealth (and thus is "free"), but is content to gather lawfully as much as his basic needs require; also, he should not be loathe to give it away to those equally in need. This ideal of one's disassociation with money and material possessions could be the explanation of Ibn Riḍwān's final statement that he sells his books rather than storing them.³² That the issue of financial management was important to Ibn Riḍwān we can surmise by his composition of an independent *Treatise on the lawful gain of property*.³³

Next, we see Ibn Riḍwān giving advice on how a professional physician should dress and comport himself during his working day. This advice, again given through self-description, Ibn Riḍwān takes from the Hippocratic *Oath* and *Canon* as well as the image constructed of Galen in the Arabic wisdom literature. The physical presentation, with the adornment of the body with "signs of quality, cleanliness and perfume" (par. 9), he takes from the literary portrait of Galen, for example in Ibn Fātik's *Muḥtār al-ḥikam* (which in some manuscripts actually contained painted portraits of philosophers and physicians).³⁴ Ibn Riḍwān's discretion in speaking (or gossiping) about people, especially

³⁰ CA 37–8, ed. Daiber, ib., 70–4.

³¹ Ed. M. Ullmann, *Die arabische Überlieferung der sogenannten Menandersentenzen*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XXXIV, 1 (Wiesbaden: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, Franz Steiner GmbH, 1961), I, no. 36.

³² F. Rosenthal ("Of making books there is no end: The Classical Muslim View," in *The Book in the Arabic World* [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995], 37) was perplexed by this statement made by an autodidact and "champion of the hotly debated view that learning from books was better than by means of oral instruction." The explanation above, however, accords with the overall textual background of the treatise.

³³ Ar. *Maqāla fī ktisāb al-ḥalāl min al-māl*. Cf. Meyerhof and Schacht, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy*, 47, no. 84.

³⁴ *Muḥtār al-ḥikam*, 293, adding that Galen wore "immaculately clean clothes," and gives the same description of Ptolemy (252). The theme can be traced in Arabic to Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq's *Ādāb al-falāsifa*, ed. 'A. Badawī (Kuwait: Maḥad al-Maḥṭūṭāt al-'Arabīya, 1985), 209, where it is Pythagoras who says "The one who freshens his odour increases his intellect."

patients, is explicitly recommended in the Hippocratic *Oath*.³⁵ In general, the relation between one's dress and one's character can be seen throughout the anecdotes and sayings of Pythagoras. In Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq's *Ādāb al-falāsifa*, it is recorded that "Pythagoras saw a man wearing ostentatious clothes who, when speaking, made errors in his speech and said to him 'Either speak with words that resemble your clothes or dress with clothes that resemble your speech'." In the Arabic wisdom literature, some of which is taken from the Greek and which served to teach a young person the protreptic rules of etiquette and cultured manners, we read of another juxtaposition: "He whose face is beautiful but whose morals are bad is like a golden vessel containing vinegar."³⁶

There are certainly more such themes and the connections we might observe to the classical literature available to the medieval Arab physicians in Ibn Riḍwān's ethical treatise. However, the above serves to highlight Ibn Riḍwān's immersion in the traditions of his chosen career. In terms of the importance his account might have for the history of medical ethics, Ibn Riḍwān's contribution was to discern similar tropes in that literature and combine them to form a portrait of a moral individual and an ethical physician. The so-called "autobiography" has a number of points that would be of equal benefit to contemporary medical students. One is the formation of the medical student's education through persistent work, even in situations of extreme monetary constraint and thus the lowered social standing it entails. A more significant point is the connection that the ancient Greek and medieval Arab philosophers observed between one's private moral training and attitude and the public enactment of that training in his dealings with others and in connection with the management of his household, investments and expenses. Still another, though similar, point (this time in terms of professional conduct) is the effect one's interior moral and ethical stance has on one's dealings with his patients; pertinent here is the compassionate discretion the physician must have with his patients' feelings and states of mind when confronted by disease. The

³⁵ The Greek text of the *Oath* is readily accessible in L. Edelstein, *Ancient Medicine*, 3 with his translation. The Arabic translation is to be had from Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Uyūn al-anbā'*, 45. There is another translation from the Greek in G. E. R. Lloyd, *Hippocratic Writings*, 67.

³⁶ D. Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature, A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1975), 71.

physical debilitation that a patient confronts can be improved by the skilled and compassionate physician (whose own appearance should reflect his interior psychological perfection) and thereby can have an incidental salutary effect on the patient's recovery and indeed his own ethical stance.

The last, we can presume, will have benefits for the society at large, producing a common sense of social responsibility founded on courtesy, manners and especially virtuous character. It is no surprise that in such literature the skilled physician is constantly compared to a noble king who, at the centre of his land, can effect, through his skills and cultured behaviour, the supreme benefit of good health and its attendant moral character for his subjects.³⁷ The good physician, we must conclude, can occupy a central role in curing not only the bodily but also the psychological ills that often beset his community. That by his own example.³⁸

³⁷ Ibn Riḍwān repeats this trope in his *Useful Handbook*, Ms. Chester Beatty 2065, f. 15b.

³⁸ I would add here in personal note that Dimitri has served as my master in education and my father in moral training. I thank him for teaching me through the example of his words and actions.

THE ARABIC HISTORY OF SCIENCE OF
ABŪ SAHL IBN NAWBAḤT (FL. CA 770–809) AND
ITS MIDDLE PERSIAN SOURCES*

Kevin van Bladel

A long excerpt of the lost *Kitāb *at-Thmk'n fī l-Mawālīd* (*Book of the *Tohmagān on Nativities*)¹ of Abū Sahl al-Faḍl ibn Nawbaḥt

* It is a pleasure to offer this study as a token of gratitude to Professor Gutas, who has been for me a teacher, mentor, and friend. I thank Yuhan Vevaina for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.

¹ The critical editions of the text (as in an-Nadīm's *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. M. Riḍā-Taḡaddud [Tehran: Asāṭir, 1981], 333.15) give the name of the book as *nhmṭ'n*, following the manuscripts. This is evidently a distorted MP word but it has never been explained before adequately. I propose that the word should be read *tohmagān*, written originally in the Arabic script as *thmk'n*. The distortion in the transmission of the text involves just two easy changes: the initial *tā'* has lost one diacritical dot, giving *nūn*, and the early 'Abbāsīd-period *kāf* (for MP /g/, also written *k* in the "Pahlavi" script) was mistaken by a later copyist for *tā'*. The word *tohmagān* will render the idea of Greek γενεθλιαλογία or γενεθλιαλογικόν, "genethlialogy," the science of astrological prognostications concerning an individual; genethlialogy begins with the native's parents, family, and birth (cf. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, ed./tr. F. E. Robbins, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940], 2.1, 3.1, 3.3). The term *tohmagān*, "(matters) concerning birth," will have been formed from late Middle Persian *tohm/tōhm* "seed, stock, family, birth, lineage." The word *tohmagān* is a plural denominal adjective used substantively; although attested elsewhere to mean "family, relatives, lineage" (Desmond Durkin-Meisterernst, *Dictionary of Manichaeic Middle Persian and Parthian*, *Dictionary of Manichaeic Texts*, Texts, vol. 3, part 1: Texts from Central Asia and China [Turnhout: Brepols, 2004], 330), it is used here, I propose, to translate the technical sense of "genethlialogy" on analogy with the Greek denominal adjective stem γενεθλι- formed from γενεθλη "race, stock, family, birth." The Arabic addition to the title, *fī mawālīd* "on nativities (or birth horoscopes)," is no more than a translation or explanation of the MP word in the title. Claudia Ciancaglini (*Iranian Loanwords in Syriac* [Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2008, 182–3] argues that the word *tōhm* is a SW Iranian, properly Persian form, as opposed to Parthian (NW Iranian) *tōxm*. Dieter Weber ("Pahlavi Phonology," in *Phonologies of Asia and Africa*, eds. Alan S. Kaye and Peter T. Daniels, 2 vols. [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1997], vol. 2, 617) suggests that /x/ and /h/ in MP are phonemically indistinct non-initially. In any case, /h/ and /x/ are written with the same letter in the "Pahlavi" script. The remaining problem is the length of the vowel. The *o* of *tohm* is assumed to have been long in Middle Iranian (*tōhm*, *tōxm*) because it derives from an ancient diphthong (as in Old Persian *tau^hmā-*, Avestan *taoxman-*), and we should expect this /ō/ to be written in Arabic with a *wāw*. Nevertheless the form with short *o* is not strange in this late period: the early New Persian cognates (*toxm*, *toxma*, *toxmagān*) already show a short vowel. Moreover, the letter *wāw* in the various scripts in which its Middle Iranian forms are written is ambiguous about the vowel length. A phonemic contrast

(fl. c. 153–193/770–809) appears in the *Fihrist* of an-Nadīm (wr. 377/987), providing us with the earliest extant history of science, as such, in Arabic literature.² In his book *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*, Dimitri Gutas used a part of it, along with other, related texts, to demonstrate the revival of a Sasanian ideology in the patronage of the translation of the ancient sciences by the caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 136–158/754–775) and his immediate successors.³ In this study of the text in its entirety, I will corroborate his observations about it: almost all of its sources were indeed older Iranian traditions once available in Middle Persian (MP).⁴

Abū Sahl ibn Nawbaḥt, the author of the account, was an astrologer in the early ‘Abbāsīd court following in his father’s footsteps. Nawbaḥt, the father, a convert to Islam from Zoroastrianism,⁵ was one of the team of astrologers who made the horoscope for the foundation of Baḡdād in 145/762 for the caliph al-Manṣūr.⁶ Abū Sahl, apparently also a convert to Islam,⁷ succeeded his father as an astrologer for al-Manṣūr by 158/775. Later, Abū Sahl is found in the service of al-Manṣūr’s grandson, the caliph Hārūn ar-Rašīd (r. 169–193/786–809): he worked

between /o/ and /ō/ has never been clearly demonstrated for MP (Weber, “Pahlavi Phonology,” 2, 611–2). Finally, it is known that New Persian lost most distinctions of vowel length at some stage—probably not this early, but the chronology and spread of this change are still unknown (Gernot L. Windfuhr, *Persian Grammar: History and State of Its Study* [The Hague: Mouton, 1979], 134–7).

² Māhānkard’s introduction to Zarādušt’s *Book of Nativities* is older but it is not a history of science as a whole. See Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbāsīd Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries)* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 37–8. [Hereafter *Greek Thought*]

³ Gutas, *Greek Thought*, 39–40.

⁴ The transliteration systems of Arabic and MP words used here are admittedly mutually inconsistent. The Arabic transliteration is that selected for this volume, whereas the MP follows the universally accepted standard for that language. The inconsistency has the small advantage of keeping clear which text (Arabic or MP) is under discussion in any instance.

⁵ Gutas, *Greek Thought*, 30, citing al-Aḥbārī *apud* al-Maṣ’ūdī.

⁶ D. Pingree, “The Fragments of the Works of al-Fazārī,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 29 (1970), 104. On the descendants of Nawbaḥt, see L. Massignon’s brief entry “Nawbakht,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2009), vol. 7, 1043–4.

⁷ I infer that he is a convert from his father’s conversion, from his reference to Zoroaster as “their prophet,” and from the change of his purely Persian Zoroastrian name to al-Faḍl. His first-person account of his original name and his adoption of the *kunya* Abū Sahl at the behest of al-Manṣūr (although this in itself was not necessarily a conversion) is preserved by Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ta’rīḥ al-ḥukamā’*, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1903), 409.3–14.

in ar-Rašīd's library, the *ḥizānat al-ḥikma*.⁸ An-Nadīm, whose book catalog preserves the text studied here, names seven titles by Abū Sahl in total and states also that he was a translator of works from Persian into Arabic and a reliable authority on the books of the Persians.⁹ This marks him as an expert not only in astrology but also in ancient history. For in the 'Abbāsid court in the late eighth century, it was Persian and Indian learning that was preeminent, whereas translations from Greek were relatively few, and even of these, a number were known through MP intermediaries (these intermediaries being no longer extant today).

The only complete English translation of this difficult passage by Abū Sahl is wanting in several respects,¹⁰ so I begin with a new translation of the entirety, to which I add a brief commentary and conclusions about its sources. Abū Sahl's Arabic leaves a great deal to be desired and is often abnormal and unclear.¹¹ This will be evident from the following translation, where a few passages defy easy interpretation.

The story is that of the loss and recovery of learning, particularly of astrology, which was dispersed to other countries at different times. There are roughly three parts: the primordial period, including the succession of Ġam and aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk, in the times prior to Alexander (1–6); the depredations of Alexander and his theft of the sciences (7–8); and the restorations by the Sasanids (9–12). The section numbers are my own addition to facilitate the discussion to follow.

⁸ On this library see D. Gutas and K. van Bladel, "Bayt al-ḥikma," *Encyclopaedia of Islam* Three (Leiden Brill, 2009), vol. 2, 133–7.

⁹ An-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, ed. M. Riḍā-Taḡaddud, 333.14. The passage in the edition of Flügel (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1871–1872), 238.9–239.31, is almost identical.

¹⁰ B. Dodge, *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 1, 572–5. Gutas' translation, in *Greek Thought*, 39–40, naturally covers only the parts relevant to his argument. D. Pingree, *The Thousands of Abū Ma'shar*, Studies of the Warburg Institute, 30 (London: Warburg Institute, 1968), 9–10, presents not a translation but a summary of the text. There is a Persian translation of the entire *Fihrist* by Muḥammad Riḍā-Taḡaddud, *Fihrist-i Ibn-i Nadīm* (Tehran: Asāṭir, 2002–3); for this passage, see 434–8.

¹¹ Also noted by Gutas, *Greek Thought*, 38, who plausibly suggests that this indicates it was translated from MP.

Translation

Abū Sahl ibn Nawbaḥt said in *Kitāb at-Thmk'n*:

1. The [different] types of sciences and the [various] kinds of books had become numerous, along with the different methods and procedures from which are derived the stars' indications of the existence of things before their causes are manifest and people know them, as the Babylonians described it in their books, and the Egyptians learned from them, and the Indians practiced it in their own country[.]
2. [This was] just as the first human beings had been before they yielded to sin, committed evil deeds, and fell into the depths of barbarism (*al-ḡahāla*), to the point that their intellects deceived them and led them astray from their wits. For that is what had affected them—in the reports in the books about their affairs and their deeds—to a degree that robbed them of their intellects, confused their wits, and wrecked their religion for them. They became confused and went astray, understanding nothing.
3. They continued like this for some time until they received support from those who followed them, springing up from their progeny, sown from their loins, bringing recollection, comprehension, and understanding of these matters, and knowledge of the past, including the inherent conditions of the world,¹² and regulating its first part, and the beginning of administering its middle part, and the end of its last part,¹³ and the condition of its inhabitants, the positions of the celestial circuits of heaven, their paths, their degrees and minutes, their mansions, both the superior and the inferior among them, in their routes and all their courses. That was in the time of King Ġam son of Awanḡhān.
4. The scholars understood this and composed books on it, and they explained their compositions. In addition to composing¹⁴ them on that, they described the world, its majesty, starting point of its celestial tethers (*mubtada' asbābihā*)¹⁵ and its foundation, its stars, the status of drugs, remedies, magic incantations, and other instruments of man that he uses for the good and evil things that he desires.

¹² The Arabic phrase has troubled previous translators and editors. My translation follows the emendation of Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid (*Kitāb al-Fihrist* [London: Mu'assasat al-Furqān li-t-Turāt al-Islāmī, 2009], vol. 1/2, 132 lines 8–9): *wa-l-'ilm bi-l-māḍī min aḥwāl ad-dunyā fī ša'nihā*—the emendation is the addition of *bi*.

¹³ On this obscure and difficult phrase regarding first, middle, and last parts of the world, which posed problems also for the previous translators (Riḍā-Taḡaddud's translation, *Fihrist-i Ibn-i Nadīm*, 234, simply leaves it out), see the commentary below in the section "Ġam."

¹⁴ Reading *waq'* instead of *waṣf*.

¹⁵ This translation reflects Zoroastrian cosmology; see van Bladel, "Heavenly Cords and Prophetic Authority in the Quran and its Late Antique Context," *BSOAS* 70 (2007), 223–46, at 237–9.

5. That is how they were for a long age until aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk ibn Qayy became king—

[Inserted here] “From the words of another author:¹⁶ *Dah Āk* means [in Persian] “ten calamities,” and then the Arabs turned it into *aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk*;¹⁷ we return to the words of Abū Sahl—

...ibn Qayy in the period, successive stage (*nawba*), and dominance of Jupiter and its authority to govern the years. In the land of as-Sawād [al-ʿIrāq] he built a city [300] the name of which was derived from the name of Jupiter. Then he gathered there knowledge and scholars and built twelve palaces (*qaṣr*) according to the number of the zodiacal signs; he named them with their [the zodiacal signs] names, stored the books of the scholars [in libraries] [in them], and housed the scholars in them.

[Inserted here] From the words of another author: He built seven houses according to the number of the seven planets and designated each one of the houses for a man; he designated the house of Mercury for Hermes, the house of Jupiter for Tinkalūs, and the house of Mars for Ṭinqarūs;¹⁸ we return to the words of Abū Sahl:

The people submitted to them, submitted to their doctrines, and administered their affairs because they understood their superiority to them in the various sciences and useful mechanisms (*ḥiyal al-manāfiʿ*) [.]

6. [This lasted] until a prophet was sent in that time, but they rejected [him] when he appeared. Their knowledge could not comprehend anything about him. Much of their opinion was confused, their authority was dissolved, and their inclinations and their community became at variance. So every scholar among them went to a country to dwell in it and to be in it and to become chief of its people. One of them was a scholar called Hermes. He was among them one of the most perfect in intellect, most accurate in knowledge, and most subtle in investigation. He went down to the land of Egypt and ruled its people as king, civilized it, improved the conditions of its inhabitants, and revealed his knowledge there.

¹⁶ The source of this insertion is either Ḥamza al-ʿIṣfahānī, writing two decades before an-Nadīm—see the former’s *Kitāb Sinī mulūk al-arḍ wa-anbiyāʾ*, ed. al-Sayyid Gawād al-ʿIrānī at-Tibrizī (Berlin: Kaviani, 1921–22), 24: *bāb* 1, *faṣl* 4—or another source shared with Ḥamza (who cites the Persian *kutub as-siyar*).

¹⁷ In other words, the Persian name was naturalized in Arabic as *aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk*, “the Laugher.”

¹⁸ C. A. Nallino “Tracce di opera greche giunte agli arabi per trafila pehlevica,” in *A Volume of Oriental Studies Presented to E.G. Browne*, eds. T. W. Arnold and R. A. Nicholson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 356–63, showed that these two names are both transliterations of Teukros, and at least one from the Pahlavi script. See also A. Borissov, “Sur le nom ‘Tankaloūchā,’” *Journal Asiatique* 226 (1935), 300–5. The repetition here of the two renderings of the same name is hard to explain.

7. The bulk and the majority of it [the knowledge] remained at Babylon until Alexander, king of the Greeks, went forth, invading the land of Fārs, from a city of the Romaeans called Macedonia (Maqdūniya), when he refused [to pay] the tribute that was still due to the Babylonians and the kingdom of Fārs, killed the king Dārā son of Dārā, made himself master over his kingdom, ruined the towers (*al-mağādīl*) built with the demons and giants (*bi-š-šayāṭīn wa-l-ğabābira*), and destroyed the varieties of learning that had been inscribed in the different kinds of buildings, written on their stones and timber, tearing them down and burning them, scattering their arrangement.
8. He copied the part of it that was gathered in the offices and the libraries (*fī d-dawāwīn wa-l-ğazā'in*) in the city of Iṣṭahr. He translated it into the Romaeans and Egyptian tongues. Then, after he finished copying what he needed of it, he burned what had been written in Persian (*al-Fārsīya*) and a script¹⁹ called *kaštaj*.²⁰ He took whatever he needed of astrology, medicine, and natural science (*aṭ-ṭabā'i*),²¹ and he sent those books, and the rest of the sciences, property, treasures [libraries?] and scholars that he obtained, to the land of Egypt.
9. Some things [of these books] had survived in the region of India and China that the kings of Fārs had copied in the time of their prophet, Zarādušt, and Ġamāsb the learned (*al-ālim*). They [the kings] preserved them there when their prophet and Ġamāsb had warned them about what Alexander would do, that he would conquer their country, destroy what he could of their books and sciences, and transfer it from them to his country.
10. Then learning perished in al-'Irāq. The scholars were torn apart, disagreed, and became few. The people became partisan and factious. Every party (*tā'ifa*) among them had its own king, so they were called the party kings (*mulūk aṭ-ṭawā'if*). The kingdom of Rome [by contrast] was united for a single king—after the division, confusion, and warfare that had been among them—after King Alexander, and they became thereby a single power. The kingdom of Babylon remained dispersed, weak, and corrupted.
11. They continued to be subjugated, overcome, unable to protect a sanctuary or to repel an injury, until Ardašīr son of Bābak, of the lineage of Sāsān, became king. He harmonized their controversy, united their division, conquered their foe, and took mastery over

¹⁹ Reading *kitāba* for *kitāb*.

²⁰ On the **gaštaj*-script of twenty-eight letters and its pre-Islamic use in works of medicine and philosophy see Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, Ar., 15–16 and A. Tafazzoli, "Dabīre, Dabīrī," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 6, 540–1.

²¹ Understanding this loosely as ('ilm) *aṭ-ṭabā'i*. See commentary below.

their country. He obtained authority over all of them. He did away with their partisanship and their kingdom became upright for him. Then he sent [messages] to India and China about the books with them, and to Rome, and he copied what had reached them, and he investigated a few remnants that remained in al-ʿIrāq. He gathered those of them that had been scattered and harmonized those of them that were at variance. His son Sābūr did that after him until all those books were copied in Persian, according to the views of Hermes the Babylonian, who had been king over Egypt, and Dorotheus the Syrian, and Fydrws²² the Greek from the city renowned for learning, Athens, and Ptolemy of Alexandria, and Farmāsb the Indian. They commented on them and taught them to the people just as they had taken from all [these] books, the origin of which was from Babylon.

12. Then, after those two, Kistrā Anūširwān collected and harmonized them and put them into use, because of his desire for and love of learning. The people of every time [301] and age have experiences occurring and science renewed according to the determination of the stars and zodiacal signs, which is in charge of governing time by the command of God—his glory is exalted! End of Abū Sahl's discourse.

The Persian Sources of Abū Sahl

Abū Sahl indicates directly in section 2 that he is citing books that describe the deeds of the ancients. He was educated in MP and a translator of MP books; the books he is referring to must have been among the MP works he had studied or had at his disposal. All the figures in his account are from Iranian legends about Iran (Ġam, aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk, Zoroaster, Ġamāsb), or kings and conquerors of Iran (Dārā, Alexander, Ardašīr, Sābūr, Kistrā), or astrologers whose works were known in MP (Hermes, Dorotheus, Ptolemy, and others).²³ There is no explicit reference to Islam. Thus the earliest extant history of science in Arabic is a strictly Iranian one with clear pre-Islamic roots.

Indeed the text contains a number of close parallels, to be discussed below, with passages extant in Zoroastrian MP books. Several of these are found in books 3, 4, and 5 of the large Zoroastrian

²² The name of this Athenian has been corrupted in its transmission through MP. See Gutas *Greek Thought*, 29, n. 31.

²³ On these astrological works in MP see van Bladel, *The Arabic Hermes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27–30.

compendium called the *Dēnkard*. These books of the *Dēnkard* were assembled from older materials by a leader of the Zoroastrian community, Ādurfarnbag-i Farroxxzādān. Ādurfarnbag's floruit can only be estimated from a reference in a MP text describing his victory in a debate between an apostate from Zoroastrianism and the chief qāḍī at Baḡdād in the presence of al-Ma'mūn (r. 197–218/813–833).²⁴ He therefore held a position of leadership (he is called *wehdēnān pēšōbāy*, "leader of those of the Good Religion [i.e., Zoroastrians]") during the reign of that Caliph. He must have been a contemporary with or slightly younger than Abū Sahl. It is even possible that the two scholars met at some time. In any case, Abū Sahl appears to be a slightly earlier and parallel witness to some of the information contained in the *Dēnkard*. The remainder of the commentary here, necessarily concise, deals with the individual parallels between the Arabic text and a variety of MP passages.

The Repeated Dependence of Egypt on Babylon and the Persian Kingdom

Egypt appears in three different episodes of the narrative. In the pre-historic prelude of the story (part 1), the peoples of Babylon, Egypt, and India already possess the sciences, especially astrology. In works of astrology at Abū Sahl's disposal, such as those of Dorotheus and Ptolemy, the doctrines of the Babylonians and Egyptians are mentioned side by side.²⁵ But Abū Sahl explicitly states that even in this extremely ancient time, the Egyptians had learned their astronomy from the Babylonians. The second instance of Egyptian dependence on Babylon comes in part 6, when Hermes departed from Babylon for Egypt, where he became king and taught his knowledge to the Egyptians. Abū Sahl and his astrologer colleagues were familiar with the figure of the Egyptian Hermes Trismegistus through MP astrological

²⁴ A. Barthelemy, "Gujastak Abāliš, Relation d'une conference théologique présidée par le calife Māmoun," in *Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études, Sciences philologiques et historiques*, 69 (1887), 10 and 34. The MP text is known as *Gizistag Abāliš*; see A. Tafazzoli, "Abāliš," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 1, 58; and idem, "Ādurfarnbag ī Farrōxzādān," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 1, 477–8.

²⁵ E.g., Dorotheus, *Carmen Astrologicum*, ed./tr. D. Pingree (Leipzig: Teubner, 1976), V.1; Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, 1.20–1.

texts attributed to that name.²⁶ The achievements of ancient Egypt, and particularly the ancient Egyptian monuments and sciences, are thus made dependent upon the Persian kingdom, which includes Babylon. The astrological Hermetica are therefore, in Abū Sahl's understanding, at their roots proper to his Persian tradition, not really foreign imports. The third phase of Egypt's dependence on Babylon occurs through Alexander's theft of the sciences of Babylon and the Persians (section 8). Abū Sahl is effectively admitting that some of his MP works of astrology came from Egypt, but he claims that all of it was originally Babylonian.

The Human Race before Ğam

The legendary history of ancient Iran as presented by sources dependent on the putative MP *Xwadāy-nāmag* is familiar to historians.²⁷ Ğam (Ğamšīd) is preceded by only three kings: the first king (or first man) Kayūmart, then Hūšank, then Ṭahmūraṭ. In sections 1 and 2 of Abū Sahl's account, we have instead a vague account of an earlier time in which learning flourished, followed by a time of sin, decadence, and ignorance; then learning was revived again under Ğam. Abū Sahl appears to have used not the tradition of the earlier kings but a different MP source similar to that reflected in *Dēnkard* 3:²⁸

Before Jam came to power, innate wisdom was weak among rulers, because the *dēws* had taken it away, and lust was predominant...men resembled beasts. By departing from the precepts they entered into corruption... They became estranged from the Mean in matters of conduct, food, alms, property, and other activities, and the world was disrupted... When Jam came into the world by the will and indication of the Creator, he first removed the demons from rule over men and saved the divine innate wisdom...

²⁶ van Bladel, *Arabic Hermes*, 27–30.

²⁷ E. Yarshater, "Iranian National History," in *Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), vol. 3(1), 359–477.

²⁸ *Dēnkard* 3.286; see J. de Menasce, *Le troisième livre du Denkard* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1973), 281–283. This English translation is adapted from Shaul Shaked, "Paymān: An Iranian Idea in Contact with Greek Thought and Islam," in *Transition Periods in Iranian History, Actes du Symposium de Fribourg-en-Brisgau (22–24 mai 1985)* (Paris: E. Peeters, 1987), 237, and R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 250–1.

Like Abū Sahl, this MP account omits reference to specific earlier kings. It admits that there were earlier rulers but focuses on a revival in the time of Ğam. It is so close to Abū Sahl's notion of the time preceding Ğam that we should regard both as representing the same tradition, one emphasizing Ğam's revival of goodness.

The "age of Ğam" is described in sections 3 and 4 of this story as the second time during which knowledge flourished.²⁹ Several different passages in the *Avesta* refer to Ğam (Avestan Yima) as presiding over a time without old age or death, but it is the second fragard of the *Avestan Videvdad*, wherein the story of Ğam is told at greater length, that seems to have been decisive for Abū Sahl's treatment. It is likely that Abū Sahl knew the tale through a MP work, or oral instruction, based in turn on the MP translation of the *Videvdad*.³⁰

Videvdad 2 describes how Ahura Mazda grants to Yima the role of protector of the world. Yima governs a world in which is neither sickness nor death. Ahura Mazda entrusts to Yima two special tools; modern philologists consider these to be a cattle prod and "either some kind of pick or a shepherd's flute."³¹ When Ahura Mazda warns him three times that the world is becoming crowded by its thriving population, Yima must use these tools each time to enlarge the extent of the earth, following the path of the sun. Then Ahura Mazda warns of a terrible winter that will afflict the earth, and instructs Yima in specific terms to build a shelter for selected humans and animals. Ahura Mazda also responds to a question posed by Yima about the heavenly lights as seen from within this shelter.

Abū Sahl's list of the subjects of knowledge in the time of Ğam corresponds with the various things mentioned in *Videvdad* 2, notwithstanding the unnatural and difficult Arabic phrases he uses. The opaque Arabic reference to "knowledge of...the inherent conditions of the world" (*aḥwāl ad-dunyā fi ša'nihi*) might refer to Ğam's participation in the expansion of the habitable world. The obscure phrase of Abū Sahl about "the regulation of its [scil. the world's (*ad-dunyā*)] first [part], the beginning of administering (*tadbīr*) its middle [part], and

²⁹ On Ğam see the comprehensive article of P. O. Skjærvø, "Jamšid i. Myth of Jamšid," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 14, 501–22.

³⁰ I thank Alberto Cantera for giving access to the MP *Videvdad* through his internet site videvdad.com.

³¹ Skjærvø, "Jamšid," (see note 29), 14: 503.

the end of its last [part],” corresponds to the almost equally obscure instructions given by Ahura Mazda to Yima in *Videvdad* 2 to build the shelter for the beings of the world in preparation for the devastating winter: Yima arranges the paths and beings in his enclosure according to a formula, occurring twice, in “the first...middle...and last [parts] of the land” (Avestan *fratəməm daiŋŋhəuš...maδəmō...n itəmō...;* MP trans. *ān frāztom deh...ān mayānag...ān nidom*) (*Videvdad* 2.30, 2.38). Yima’s arrangement of the inhabitants within the enclosure corresponds to Abū Sahl’s next Arabic phrase “and the condition of its [scil. the world’s] inhabitants” (*wa-ḥāl sukkānihā*). Abū Sahl then mentions the positions of the celestial spheres of heaven and their paths. In the *Videvdad* Yima goes forth three times “on the path of the sun,” twice toward the south (Avestan *hū paiti aδβanəm*; MP *pad ān ī xwaršēd rāh*) (2.10, 2.14, 2.18; cf. Abū Sahl’s *ṭuruq*, “paths,” of the *aflāk*, “heavenly circuits”). Also, after Yima has built his shelter for good beings to survive the winter, Ahura Mazda makes a statement to Yima about the stars, sun, and moon (Avestan *starasca māśca huuarəca*; MP *star ud mäh ud xwaršēd*), and whether they would be visible from the enclosure (2.40). This is the only extant passage of the *Avesta* in which Yima is mentioned together with the heavenly bodies.

In section 4, which appears to be an addendum to the basic description, Abū Sahl specifically refers to cosmology, astrology, medicines, incantations, and other “instruments of humankind” (*ālat an-nās*) that proliferated under Ğam’s reign through the effort of scholars. These are not connected directly with *Videvdad* 2, except perhaps the “instruments,” which may ultimately refer to the instruments granted to Yima. The reference to medicine points to the renown of Ğam’s time as free from sickness. The mention of magical incantations (*ar-ruqā*) along with drugs (*al-‘aqāqīr*) and remedies points to Avestan learning. *Videvdad* 7.44 and *Ardawihīšt Yašt* (*Yašt* 3.6) list together various methods of healing, including the knife, herbs (MP *urwar*), and sacred chants (Avestan *mąθras*, MP *mānsrspanđ*, *afsōn*), the latter considered the best medicine of all. Other parts of the *Videvdad* (esp. fragards 20 and 21) deal with medicine and the heavenly bodies, although they do not mention Yima. Abū Sahl’s source of information seems to take the *Videvdad* as representing learning from this ancient time.

Abū Sahl or his source has thus interpreted the text of *Videvdad* 2, and perhaps other parts of the *Videvdad*, not strictly literally, but

treated it as a catalogue of the ways in which the human race thrived and the subjects studied under Ğam's rule. It is not surprising to find some astronomical terms (such as degrees and minutes) and astrological houses, inserted by the astrologer directly in connection with the reference to the heavenly bodies and the directions. The similarity of references in Abū Sahl's account of the age of Ğam to the things discussed in the *Videvdad* 2 indicates that Abū Sahl had at his disposal an interpretation of this particular Avestan text, no doubt in MP. The golden age of Ğam(šid) was well known to later Arabic and Persian authors from different sources, but Abū Sahl's account appears to be the earliest known Arabic reference to the story.³²

The beginning of paragraph 5, leading into the reign of aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk, states that things were good under Ğam "for a long age." According to the Avestan *Druuāsp Yašt* (9.10), Ğam was granted a thousand years of prosperity. In early Arabic chronography the exact number of centuries of Ğam's reign was disputed, following MP sources, but figures ranged from about six to seven centuries.³³

Aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk at Babylon

The demonic king aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk (MP *Dahāg*, Avestan *Aži- Dahāka*-)³⁴ is mentioned in many Zoroastrian sources, but the connection of aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk with Babylon is based ultimately on an interpretation of the passage in the Avestan *Ābān Yašt* (*Yašt* 5.29), which tells about the failure of the Three-Mouthed Serpent Dahāg (*ažiš θrizafā Dahākō*) to receive a boon through his sacrifices because his stated goal—to depopulate the seven regions of the earth—was an unjust one. The text says that Dahāg made his offering in the land of Baḡri. Exegetical traditions found in MP works compiled in the ninth century, such as book 7

³² For references to other accounts, see Skjærvø, "Jamšid" (see note 29); and M. Šiddiqiyan, *Farhang-i Asāṭiri-Ḥamāsi-yi Irān bih rivāyat-i manābi'-i ba'd az Islām, Ğild-i Avval: Pišdādiyan* (Tehran: Pižūhišgāh-i 'Ulūm-i Insāni va-Muṭāla'āt-i Farhangī, 1996), 76–125.

³³ E.g., as recorded by aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḥ ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. M. J. de Goeje et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1879–1901), 1.179–183; see also Yarshater, "Iranian National History," 384.

³⁴ P. O. Skjærvø, "Aždahā i. In Old and Middle Iranian," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 1, 191–9. See also Yarshater, "Iranian National History," 383–7 and 426–7. For Muslim writings on aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk, see Šiddiqiyan, *Farhang*, 126–93.

of the *Dēnkard*³⁵ and the *Bundahišn*,³⁶ identify this place as Babylon (MP *Bābēl*). Another MP account, also found in the *Bundahišn*, says that Dahāg built a dwelling at Babylon with a special name: *Kulang Dušdīd*, “ill-aspected crane.”³⁷ Abū Sahl likewise situates aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk at Babylon.

The statement that aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk built a city in Iraq the name of which was derived from Jupiter apparently reflects an attempt to etymologize “Bābēl.” The Aramaic name for Jupiter was Bēl, as any astrologer in Mesopotamia would know. Bābēl must have been understood as derived from Aramaic “house of Bēl,” *bē(t) Bēl*, or “gate of Bēl,” *bāb Bēl*. The connection between the two names was obvious enough that Bar Bahlūl in the forth/tenth century knew a reverse derivation, that the idol of Bēl was named for Bābēl.³⁸

The statement that aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk ruled in the period of Jupiter derives from then-current historical astrology. According to Abū Sahl’s elder colleague Māšā’allāh, Jupiter rules the second and ninth millennia of the twelve world-millennia.³⁹ In many accounts of pre-Islamic Iranian chronology, Dahāg rules the second millennium of the world; hence according to these astrologers he rules the millennium of Jupiter. The

³⁵ *Dēnkard* 7.4.72; tr. Molé, *La Légende de Zoroastre selon les Textes Pehlevis* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1967), 56–57, says that Dahāg built many marvels at Babylon through sorcery and led the people to idolatry.

³⁶ T. D. Anklesaria, *The Būndahishn, Being a Facsimile of the TD Manuscript No. 2 brought from Persia by Dastur Tīrandāz and now preserved in the Late Ervad Tahmuras’ Library*, Pahlavi Text Series v. III (Bombay: British India Press, 1908), 209.8; id., *Zand-Ākāsīh: Iranian or Greater Bundahišn, Transliteration and Translation into English* (Bombay, s.n. 1956), 268–9 ch. xxxii.4.

³⁷ The odd name represents an attempt to interpret a phrase in the Avestan *Rām Yašt* (*Yašt* 15:19): *upa kuuirintəm dužitəm*, “in inaccessible Kwirinta.” See Skjærvø, “Aždahā,” 1, 194–6.

³⁸ Payne-Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1879–1901), vol. 1, 518. Firdawsī’s *Šāhnāmāh*, 1.311–12 briefly likens the huge *ayvān* of Ḍaḥḥāk to planets, saying that it seemed to Fereydūn to be higher than Saturn and resplendent like Jupiter. It is uncertain whether this reflects an ancient tradition or is due merely to the poet’s usual hyperbole. Other potentially relevant information for future investigations of the problem: Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīḥ*, (see n. 33), reports a name of the city that aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk built at Bābil, but the name is corrupt: *ḥwb* or the variant *h’ḥwb* (1.206). In the MP *Šahrestānī-hā-ī Ērān* it is said that Bābēl was built by a man named Bābēl (a mistake for Bēl?), who invented astrology, in the time of Jam. Cf. Daryaei, *Šahrestānīhā ī Ērānšahr: A Middle Persian Text on Late Antique Geography, Epic, and History* (Costa Mesa: Mazda 2002), §18. On the interpretation of the passage see D. N. MacKenzie “Zoroastrian Astrology in the ‘Bundahišn,’” *BSOAS* 27.3 (1964), 524, n. 65.

³⁹ E. S. Kennedy and David Pingree, *The Astrological History of Māshā’allāh* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 73.

same count of years, without the astrological context, was reported by the (apparently third/ninth-century) *mobad* of Fārs, Bahrām ibn Mardānšāh, another translator of texts from MP.⁴⁰

Abū Sahl's peculiar story about the twelve astrologers at Babylon, each occupying a palace built by aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk, appears in only two other known instances, both in the *Dēnkard*. One occurs in the list of deeds of Zoroaster related in *Dēnkard* 5: "[Zoroaster] prevailed in the contest (*pahikār*) against the twelve astrologers who were named after the twelve signs of the Zodiac (*kē-šān nām az dwāzdah axtar*), and against all the Babylonian prognosticators" by miraculous acts the likes of which had not appeared since the time of Jamšēd.⁴¹ The other is at *Dēnkard* 7.4.73, where Zoroaster is said to have prevailed in "the contest over the religion (*pahikār ī abar dēn*)" against "the twelve astrologers who were named after the twelve signs of the Zodiac;"⁴² these are described as Zoroaster's most formidable opponents in the conflict or debate. Abū Sahl provides another detail: that it was aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk who established the institutional positions of these twelve at Babylon; he imagines a library and buildings for each of them. The matching *Dēnkard* accounts identify the unnamed prophet whose advent divides the people in section 6 as Zoroaster. At this time the scholars of Babylon, including Hermes, were scattered when dissent arose following Zoroaster's refutation of them. Through this event Egypt and other countries derived their science yet again from Babylon. We are not told exactly when the prophet arrived, but just the words "in that time." This need not necessarily refer to the end of aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk's reign, even though it immediately follows reference to aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk; Abū Sahl's narrative omits other events between aḏ-Ḍaḥḥāk and Alexander, including the entire reign of the Kayānians. Zoroaster's advent was traditionally understood to have been in the reign of Kay Wištāsp.

⁴⁰ Ḥamza al-ʿIṣfahānī, *Kitāb Sinī*, [n. 16 above], 20: *bāb* 1, *faṣl* 3 and al-Bīrūnī, *al-Āthār al-bāqīya ʿan al-qurūn al-ḥāliyah*, *Chronologie orientalischer Völker von Albērūnī*, ed. C. Eduard Sachau (Leipzig: A. F. Brockhaus, 1878), 103. See also Djalal Khaleghi-Motlagh, "Bahrām b. Mardānšāh," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 3, 523.

⁴¹ *Dēnkard* 5.2.9, Amouzgar and Tafazzoli, *Le Cinquième livre du Dēnkard*, *Studia Iranica Cahier* 23 (Paris: Association pour l'Avancement des Études Iraniennes, 2000), 28–29, refer in their commentary, 112, to Abū Sahl's account by the page number of their edition, but with no remarks. Cf. the incorrect reading and interpretation of Molé, *La Légende de Zoroastre selon les Textes Pehlevis*, 108–111.

⁴² Molé, *ib.*, 56–7.

The break in narration probably reflects his omission of a passage from his source or his switch to sources of information.

The Giants

In section 7, Abū Sahl refers to the towers at Babylon built by or through giants and devils (*bi-l-ğabbābira wa-š-šayāṭīn*). Christian world chronicles,⁴³ following the book of Genesis, explained that Nimrod “the giant” (*al-ğabbār*)⁴⁴ founded the Chaldaean nation with its first city of Babylon, and built the tower of Babylon with an arrogance that matched that of the antediluvian giants (the Hebrew Nephilim of Genesis 6), to whom Nimrod was likened.⁴⁵ The term *ğabbār* is also used in the Qur’ān, following this biblical tradition, in reference to tyrants or tyrannical peoples of the distant past, who are presented as examples to be avoided and whose ancient nations God destroyed.⁴⁶ Perhaps Abū Sahl had this in mind; however, in his account it is not the winds of God that destroyed the tower, but Alexander who destroyed the towers (plural). It is likely that he is familiar with the idea of *ğabbābira* from a tradition of Qur’ānic exegesis that took into account some of this biblical lore. Abū Sahl himself may have had Nimrod in mind: aṭ-Ṭabarī states that Hišām ibn Muḥammad (i.e. Ibn al-Kalbī, c. 119–205/737–821), a contemporary of Abū Sahl, claimed that aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk was Nimrod himself.⁴⁷

There is also the possibility that Abū Sahl was thinking of the Kayānian kings when he mentioned these giants; for the Kayān are in some instances glossed as giants. The Aramaic term for giants (*gabbārē*) in Mani’s scripture *The Book of Giants*, containing the Prophet of Light’s interpretation of the biblical passages just mentioned, was translated into MP as *kawān* (Parthian *kawān*, Sogdian *kawīšt*). This

⁴³ Examples: Syncellus 38; Agapius, *Kitāb al-Unvān, Histoire universelle écrite par Agapius (Mahboub) de Menbidj*, ed./tr. A. Valliev, *Patrologia Orientalis* 5.4, 7.4, 8.3 and 11.1 (1910–1915).

⁴⁴ Nimrod in Genesis 10:8 and 1 Chronicles 1 (1:10): *gibbōr bā-areš*, LXX γίγας ἐν τῇ γῆς, a word usually translated as “hero” or “mighty man” “in the earth;” the Greek word *gígas* also means “giant.”

⁴⁵ Genesis 6:4, where the antediluvian Nephilim are also understood as γίγαντες, giants: οἱ δὲ γίγαντες ἦσαν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις ἐκείναις, “The giants were on the earth in those days.”

⁴⁶ Qur’ān 5:22, 11:59, 14:15, 19:14, 19:32, 26:130, 28:19, 40:35, 50:45, 59:23.

⁴⁷ Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta’rīḥ ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, vol. 1, 205.

word was perhaps understood to refer to the ancient Kayānian kings who ruled before Alexander. Walter Henning has suggested that “In Sasanian times the words [in Iranian languages] derived from Avestan *kavi* were generally understood as ‘giant’.”⁴⁸ Thus, al-Birūnī refers to the Kayānian kings saying, “*al-Kayāniya wa-hum al-ġabābira*”, “The Kayānians, that is the giants.”⁴⁹ Whether this was also Abū Sahl’s concept is not clear because he refers to the giants only in passing.

Alexander’s Invasion and Zoroaster’s Prophecy

Alexander’s theft of Persian learning was to become famous in Arabic literature as it already was in MP.⁵⁰ Alexander’s translation of the Persian books into Greek is also attested in *Dēnkard*: 3.420.⁵¹ Abū Sahl is unusual in his specification of how Persian learning survived in China and India, and in connecting that with the prophecy of Zoroaster and Ġāmāsb, which he mentions in part 9 of the translation. The belief in this prophecy of Zoroaster is attested in *Dēnkard* 5.3.3–4: Ādurfarnbag explains that Zardušt had revealed all future events, including the invasion and destruction of Alexander, and had instructed Ġāmāsb in signs of past and future events; the *Avesta* and its commentary (Zand) were written on cow-skins with golden ink and stored in “the treasury of the lord” (*ganj ī xwadāyān*).⁵² From Abū Sahl we see that Iṣṭaḥr was understood as the specific site of this depository of treasured books, the precise location of which is not stated in the *Dēnkard*.⁵³ Iṣṭaḥr is named, however, as the site of the depository in two other MP texts: the *Tansar-nāma*, translated into Persian from an Arabic

⁴⁸ W. Henning, “The Book of Giants,” *BSOAS* 11 (1943), 53–4.

⁴⁹ Ātār, (see n. 40), 102.21 and 104.

⁵⁰ van Bladel, *The Arabic Hermes*, 33–6.

⁵¹ De Menasce, *Le troisième livre*, (n. 28), 379–380; A. Cantera, *Studien zur Pahlavi-Übersetzung des Avesta* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2004), 116.

⁵² Amouzgar and Tafazzoli, *Le Cinquième livre*, 32–3; Molé, *La Légende*, 110–13.

⁵³ The site of Iṣṭaḥr is very close to the ruins of Persepolis, the capital of the Achaemenian Persian Empire. Persepolis became associated at an unknown but early time with Ġamšīd, and it was thought to be the site of Ġamšīd’s palace. (See A. D. H. Bivar and M. Boyce, “Eṣṭaḥr,” *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 8, 643–6; M. Streck and G. C. Miles, “Iṣṭaḥr,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 4, 219–22; and M. Šiddīqiyān, *Farhang*, Gild-i Avval: Pišdādiyān, 91. Assuming that Abū Sahl knew this association, he must have seen the ruins of Persepolis as the remains of the civilization of Ġam as he describes it in sections 3 and 4.

version which was itself translated from MP,⁵⁴ and the ninth-century *Ardā Wirāz Nāmag*.⁵⁵ Abū Sahl calls the depository “the offices and the libraries” (*ad-dawāwīn wa-l-ḥazā’in*) in section 8.⁵⁶ Arabic *ḥizāna* corresponds exactly with MP *ganj*.

The Parallel with Dēnkard 4

Probably no passage in all of MP literature has been more closely scrutinized than the important history of the Zoroastrian scriptures in *Dēnkard* 4. Notwithstanding the attempts made in fourteen annotated, scholarly renderings into modern languages, many of which are accompanied by transcriptions of the MP text and detailed commentaries (despite the lack of a critical edition),⁵⁷ several words in the text still defy interpretation. At least one point of scholarly consensus is that the passage was composed in the time of Xusrō I (r. 531–579).⁵⁸ *Dēnkard* 4 describes itself as “selected from [older] discourses” (*az gōwišnīhā wizīd*); this passage is therefore merely one of the pieces assembled by Ādurfarnbag.⁵⁹

Dimitri Gutas observed an especially striking similarity between sections 7–12 of Abū Sahl’s account given above and this famous text from the *Dēnkard*.⁶⁰ How correct this is will be demonstrated below. When some sentences of Abū Sahl’s Arabic are compared word for word with this passage in the *Dēnkard*, the verbal correspondences are

⁵⁴ M. Boyce, *The Letter of Tansar* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1968), 37.

⁵⁵ F. Vahman, *Ardā Wirāz Nāmag: the Iranian “Divina Commedia”*, (London: Curzon, 1986), 1.14 (trans., 191); Cantera, *Studien*, (n. 51), 116. More than a century later, al-Mas’ūdī mentions this prophecy, along with the numbers of years taken to fulfill it, as a “religious and royal secret” among the Zoroastrian priests of Fārs and Kirmān, which Zoroaster spoke in the Avesta, and which was not otherwise reported in the (Arabic) books on Alexander. See al-Mas’ūdī, *Kitāb at-Tanbīh wa-l-Iṣrāf*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, *Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum VIII* (Leiden: Brill, 1894), 97–8.

⁵⁶ R. Gyselen, “Diwān et ‘trésorerie’ sassanides: premières attestations sigillographiques,” *Studia Iranica* 32 (2003), 123–6, presents two Sasanian seals marked for a *diwān* and a *ganj* respectively, the latter bearing a royal symbol. These were evidently real pre-Islamic institutions, but we know very little about them.

⁵⁷ Cantera, *Studien*, (n. 51), 107, n. 3 lists thirteen prior renderings.

⁵⁸ *Ib.*, 106.

⁵⁹ On the selection, P. Gignoux, “La composition du *Dēnkard* et le contenu du livre V,” in *Yād-nāmāh-yi Duktur Aḥmad Taḡaddūli*, ed. ‘Alī Iṣrāf Ṣādiqī (Tehran: Sukhan, 2001), 31–2.

⁶⁰ Gutas, *Greek Thought*, 38. Pingree, *The Thousands*, (see note 10), 7–10, also compared the *Dēnkard* account with the Arabic of Abū Sahl.

exact enough to indicate that Abū Sahl had before him the same MP text. Abū Sahl was paraphrasing it closely. He is thus a relatively early witness, outside of the *Dēnkard*, to its existence. The Arabic also offers hints about the meanings of a few disputed words in the MP original. Since Abū Sahl's first language of learning was MP, his interpretation should be taken quite seriously. That said, Abū Sahl does not offer an exact translation, and he may have misunderstood the obscure words that we would hope he could clarify. Regrettably, there is no room here to repeat the entire MP text; only individual words and passages are treated below.⁶¹

The “books” (*al-kutub*) of “astrology, medicine, and natural science” (*‘ilm an-nuḡūm wa-ṭ-ṭibb wa-ṭ-ṭabā’i*) that Alexander steals in section 8 of the Arabic correspond closely with the “writings—outside of the religion—on medicine, astrology, movement, time, space, substance, accident, becoming, decay, transformation, and logic” (*nibēgihā-iz ī az dēn bē abar bizeškīh ud star gōwišnīh ud čandišn ud zamān ud gyāg ud gōhr ud jahišn ud bawišn ud wināhišn ud jadag-wihīrīh ud gōwāgīh*) restored by Ardašīr in the *Dēnkard* account. The unusual Arabic reference to “natures,” which I have translated freely, according to context, as “natural science,” makes more sense when it is seen as summarizing the MP list of subjects that form a part of Aristotelian physics.

In the MP, Ardašīr sends for scattered (*pargandag*) teachings; then it is his son Šābuhr who restores the books that were scattered (again *pargandag*) in India, Rome, and other lands (*Hindōgān ud Hrōm ud abārīg-iz zamīgihā*). In the Arabic, it is Ardašīr who sends missions to gather the scattered (*mutafarriq*) books “to the land of India, China...and to Rome” (*ilā bilād al-Hind wa-ṣ-Ṣīn...wa-ilā r-Rūm*) but also “his son Sābūr did that after him.” The next MP sentence has many corresponding Arabic words:

*abāz ō ham āwurd ud abāg Abistāg abāz handāxt ud har ān ī drust
paččēn ō ganj ī *špyk'n dād framūd ud ēstēnīdan ī hamāg *rst'n abar dēn
māzdēs'n ō uskār kard*

[Ardašīr] gathered [the books] together and assessed them with the *Avesta*. He ordered that every correct copy be put into the treasury of [obscure word]. He caused all the [obscure word] to stand for discussion about the Mazdayasnian religion.

⁶¹ For the entire MP text romanized and translated, with the most thorough commentaries, see Mansour Shaki, “The *Dēnkard* Account of the History of the Zoroastrian Scriptures,” *Archív Orientální* 49 (1981), 114–25; and Cantera, *Studien*, 106–13.

Compare with Abū Sahl's text:⁶²

fa-ğama'a minhā mā kāna mutafarriqan wa-allaḡa minhā mā kāna mutabāyinan wa-fa'ala ḡālika min ba'dihī ibnuhū Sābūru ḡattā nusiḡat tilka l-kutubu kulluhā bi-l-Fārsīyati...fa-šaraḡūhā wa-'allamūhā n-nāsa 'alā miṡli mā kānū aḡaḡū min ḡamī'i tilka l-kutubi allatī aṡluhā min Bābil.

[Ardašīr] gathered those of [the books] that had been scattered, and harmonized those of them that were at variance. His son Sābūr did that after him until all those books were copied in Persian...[The list of authors whose works were received is added]. They commented on them and taught them to the people according to what they had taken from all those books, whose origin was Babylon.

About half the Arabic words here correspond, exactly or loosely, with most of the MP words:

Arabic	MP
<i>ğama'a</i> (<i>minhā mā kāna mutafarriqan</i>) "gathered (of them what was scattered)"	= <i>abāz ō ham āwurd</i> "gathered (them) together"
<i>allaḡa</i> (<i>minhā mā kāna mutabāyinan</i>) "harmonized (of them what was at variance)"	~ (<i>abāḡ</i>) <i>abāz handāxt</i> "assessed, measured (against [a standard])"
<i>ḡattā</i> + subjunctive "in order that"	~ <i>framūd</i> + "short infinitive" "commanded that"
<i>kulluhā</i> "all of them"	= <i>har</i> "every"
<i>nusiḡat</i> "(those books) were copied"	= <i>paččēn</i> "copy (of a book)"
<i>fa-saraḡūhā wa-'allamūhā n-nāsa</i> "they explained and taught them to the people"	~ <i>ēstēnīdan...ō uskār kard</i> "caused...to stand for discussion"
<i>ḡamī'</i> (<i>tilka l-kutub</i>) "all (of those books)"	= <i>hamāḡ</i> "all"

⁶² *Fihrist*, 300.24–5.

There are even two different Arabic words corresponding to the two MP words for “every” and “all”: *har* = *kull*, *hamāg* = *ġamiʿ*. Other correspondences are less precise: the MP mentions copies put into a treasury or library, but the Arabic at that point refers merely to copies made in Persian. Nevertheless, the pervasive word-correspondences, nearly in the same sequence, are too numerous to be fortuitous. Abū Sahl must have read this particular text and used it when he wrote his own.

The phrases *allafa minhā mā kāna mutabāyinan* and *abāg Abistāg abāz handāxt* require special attention. The MP expression has deservedly attracted commentary in the studies of this *Dēnkard* passage. The two main types of interpretation are summarized by Shaki: either Šābuhr added or incorporated these texts into the *Avesta*; or he compared or collated them with the *Avesta*.⁶³ Both interpretations present obvious problems. The first is impossible given our knowledge of the *Avesta*, and the purpose for the activity described in the second is unclear. Although Abū Sahl does not mention the *Avesta* in his paraphrase, his corresponding expression says that the king “harmonized (*allafa*) those [books of science] that had been at variance.” Arabic *allafa* often refers merely to putting things together, but the interpretation “harmonize,” or “fit [something to something else],” just proposed—also normal meanings of this Arabic word—is supported by Abū Sahl’s use of the verb *allafa* two other times in the passage. Once it refers to Ardašīr’s elimination of differences when he united the kingdom (300.22: *allafa muḥtalafahum*). It also refers to Kīsrā’s gathering and *taʿlīf* of books (300.29); in the corresponding MP source, this refers more specifically to Xusrō’s scrutiny and recognition of a harmonized doctrine. In all three occurrences *allafa* is collocated with the verb *ġamaʿa*, “to bring together, to gather.” Ardašīr and Šābūr unite and harmonize their kingdom both politically and doctrinally.

When Abū Sahl says that the king “harmonized those of [the books] that were at variance,” we may ask: with what were they at variance? The Arabic text by itself makes it appear as if the Persian king ordered the creation of an internally coherent system of philosophy or set of books—one that would not be at variance with itself—but Abū Sahl’s source shows the original meaning: at variance with Zoroastrian scripture, the *Avesta*. The sense of *abāg X abāz handāxt* here is “to measure

⁶³ Shaki, “*Dēnkard* Account,” 121–2.

(something) against X.”⁶⁴ Abū Sahl understood the phrase *abāg Abistāg abāz handāxt* as saying that the philosophy expressed in these books was harmonized with or “fitted to” the *Avesta* by order of Ardašīr and Sābūr, and that the foreign learning was accepted only where it did not conflict with the measuring standard of Zoroastrian scripture. He did not make explicit reference to the *Avesta* in his Arabic paraphrase because that would be inappropriate for the Muslim audience. The very next MP phrase says that “every correct copy” (*har ān ī drust paččēn*) was stored in the library; the word *drust* therefore probably refers not to the trivial matter of correctly copying manuscripts, but to texts containing the correct doctrine, harmonious with the established religion.⁶⁵ Abū Sahl immediately lists those books that he considered to have been part of this effort, mostly astrological—but this is his own addition to the text.

The two words bracketed above as “obscure words” in the translation of the MP have troubled modern translators. Rather than attempting to understand the difficult Pahlavi letters, one can refer to Abū Sahl’s interpretation to search for their meaning. Unfortunately, the designation of the *ganj*, or treasury, is simply not explained by Abū Sahl.⁶⁶ Perhaps he himself did not understand the word; or he omitted it in his paraphrase; or it referred to some site at Iṣṭaḥr; or it referred to wisdom, as in the *ḥizānat al-ḥikma* of al-Ma’mūn in which Abū Sahl worked. The second obscure word appears from what Abū Sahl says to refer either to all the books or doctrines put up for discussion (*ḡamī tilka l-kutub*), or perhaps to all the people (*an-nās*) who were meant to study them.⁶⁷

In the last part of the MP text, Xusrō issues “with the utmost desire” (*abardom xwāhišnīhā*) a decree demanding the study of scripture and acquisition of learning (*dānāgīh*); this corresponds with Kīsrā’s desire and love (*nīya* and *maḥabba*) for learning (*al-‘ilm*) in the Arabic of Abū Sahl. Perhaps Abū Sahl’s general reference, immediately following, to “science renewed” (*‘ilm muḡaddad*) in every age echoes Xusrō’s order in his edict for study of scripture that is carried out “ever anew” (*nōg nōg*).

⁶⁴ Shaki, “*Dēnkard* Account,” 122.

⁶⁵ Thus also *ibid.*, 119, n. 38.

⁶⁶ For attempts at this word, see Cantera, *Studien*, 108, n. 12.

⁶⁷ On this obscure word, see Cantera, *Studien*, 109, n. 25.

More verbal correspondences between the two passages could probably be found, but these examples should suffice to demonstrate that Abū Sahl was using a copy of the very text found also in *Dēnkard* 4.

Conclusion

Abū Sahl's account is the earliest known history of science as such in Arabic. It is also an early witness to several different Zoroastrian book traditions, being contemporary with or a part of the generation prior to Ādurfarnbag, the author and compiler of *Dēnkard* 3–5. Most important of these traditions represented by Abū Sahl are the interpretation of the Avestan passages dealing with Jam and Dahāg and the MP account of the history of science from the court of Xusrō I. It is evident that Abū Sahl ibn Nawbaḥt knew independently, presumably from his earlier education in MP, and from books to which he had access, some of the same sources used by his contemporary Ādurfarnbag in the compilation of the *Dēnkard*. It is likely that also several lost, and therefore unidentifiable, texts were at Abū Sahl's disposal—for example, an account of the twelve astrologers at Babylon and their contest with Zoroaster—but it is a remarkable fact that almost every sentence of his can be matched with something at least alluded to in extant Zoroastrian MP texts.

The question remains whether this was an original composition of Abū Sahl or merely something he translated. In either case, the passage studied here, obviously based on different sources, presents an example of the kind of learning that a Persian scholar of Zoroastrian upbringing could have in the late eighth century. There is no sign that Abū Sahl had a priestly training—the family profession was, up to this point, astrology—but he was nevertheless familiar with a variety of traditions current in MP, deriving from his former religious community, but which he employed for non-Zoroastrian purposes. Because the compilation of the *Dēnkard* was part of the effort to systematize and preserve Zoroastrian knowledge and to create an intellectual bulwark for the defense of the faith in a time when many Zoroastrians were converting to Islam, it is nothing strange that Abū Sahl would have been educated in so much of what the *Dēnkard* relates. Abū Sahl's text shows that the *Dēnkard* is a good representative of what was being taught to Zoroastrians and discussed by the educated among them in the late eighth century.

THE PHYSIOLOGY AND THERAPY OF ANGER: GALEN ON MEDICINE, THE SOUL, AND NATURE*

Heinrich von Staden

On no emotion did Galen of Pergamum (A.D. 129–ca. 216) dwell at greater length and with greater frequency than on anger; indeed, he discussed anger in more than forty of his extant works. Of all the emotions, he deemed anger to be the most common and the most difficult emotion to treat successfully. As both an activity (*energeia*) of the soul and something by which the soul is affected (a *pathos*), anger is, in his view, the province of philosophy. Yet he argued that anger is a subject for medicine too, inasmuch as anger also has somatic causes and consequences. Only the medical *technē* can explain the pathophysiology of anger and thus show the way to medical interventions that might prevent or cure anger. This he saw as a necessary complement to the philosophical therapy of such emotions. Furthermore, he viewed anger as a particularly useful test case for investigating the relation between body and soul.

Galen's life-long interest in anger and other emotions may have been stirred by his early philosophical training, and especially by the theories of the emotions developed by Plato and by the Stoics Chrysippus and Posidonius.¹ But personal experiences, starting in his childhood in

* It is an exceptional pleasure to participate in a celebration of Dimitri Gutas, to whose erudition and 40-year friendship I owe more than words can express. To audiences in Heidelberg, Princeton, Newcastle, and Saskatoon I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier versions of parts of this paper.

¹ See *Galien et la philosophie*, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, vol. 49, eds. J. Barnes and J. Jouanna (Vandoeuvres-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 2003); Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions," in *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998); P. Donini, "Psicologia ed etica in Galeno e in Alessandro di Afrodisia," in P. Donini, *Tre studi sull'aristotelismo nel II secolo d. C.*, *Historia Politica Philosophica* 7, ed. P. Donini (Turin: G. B. Paravia, 1974), 127–85; id., "Galeno e la filosofia," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II.36.5, ed. W. Haase (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 3484–3504; id., "Seneca e Galeno sulla struttura proposizionale delle passioni in Crisippo," *Rivista di storia della filosofia* N.S. 62 (2007), 431–52, and id., "Psychology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Galen*, ed. R. Hankinson (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 184–209; C. Gill, "Did Galen understand Platonic and Stoic thinking on emotions?" in *The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy*, 113–48; R. J. Hankinson, "Galen's Anatomy of the Soul," *Phronesis*

Pergamum, also left their mark on his views. His vivid autobiographical recollections suggest that he had ample opportunities to witness angry Greeks from a young age. His hot-tempered mother, his father's irascible friends and other enraged adults made a lasting impression on the young Galen. Contrasting his father's and his mother's susceptibility to anger, he remarked:

As for myself, I cannot tell what kind of nature I used to have [as a child]: you see, knowing oneself is difficult even in the case of grown men, let alone in the case of children. But I did have the great good fortune of having a father who was the least irascible, the most just, the most decent, and the kindest of fathers. My mother, on the other hand, was the most irascible, to the point of sometimes biting her maids and constantly yelling at my father and fighting with him.... Seeing side by side the beautiful qualities of my father's deeds and the ugly-shameful affects of my mother awoke in me a fondness and love for the former but a hatred and avoidance of the latter.²

36 (1991), 197–233; id., “Actions and passions: affection, emotion, and moral self-management in Galen’s philosophical psychology,” in *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum*, eds. J. Brunschwig and M. C. Nussbaum (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 184–222; id., “Body and Soul in Galen,” in *Common to Body and Soul: philosophical approaches to explaining living behaviour in Greco-Roman antiquity* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2006), 231–57; W. V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 88–128 (especially 120–3); M. Maróth, “Galen als Seelenheiler,” in *Galen und das hellenistische Erbe*, Sudhoffs Archiv, Beiheft 32, eds J. Kollesch and D. Nickel (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993), 145–55; J. Pigeaud, *La maladie de l’âme* (Paris: Les Belle Lettres, 1981), 55–70; id. “La psychopathologie de Galien,” in *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno, atti del terzo Colloquio galenico internazionale, Pavia, 10–12 settembre 1986*, eds. P. Manuli and M. Vegetti (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), 153–83; T. Tieleman *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul, Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis II–III*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 68 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996); id., “Galen’s Psychology,” in *Galien et la philosophie*, 131–69; M. Vegetti, “La terapia dell’anima, Patologia e disciplina del sogetto in Galeno,” in *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno*, 131–55; id. “Anima e corpo,” in *Il sapere degli antichi*, ed. M. Vegetti (Milan, 1985), 201–28; id. “In nervi dell’anima,” in *Galen und das hellenistische Erbe*, 63–77; von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves, Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics, and Galen,” in *Psyche and soma, Physicians and metaphysicians on the mind-body problem from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*, ed. J. P. Wright and P. Potter (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 79–116. Most of the modern discussions of Galen’s views on the relations between the emotions, the soul, and the body have understandably focused on a small number of Galenic texts that deal extensively with philosophical issues: *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato, That the Capacities of the Soul Follow the Blendings [Temperaments] of the Body*, and *On the Diagnosis and Therapy of the Distinctive Emotions in the Soul of Each [Person]*. However, see below.

² Galen, *De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione* 8.1–2 (V, 40–41 Kühn [hereafter K]; *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* [hereafter CMG] V.4.1.1, 27–28 De Boer). Cf. Harris 2003 (see n. 1 above), 135.

He likewise recalled that some of his father's friends, during violent outbursts of anger, brutally victimized their slaves:

Many were the friends whom my father rebuked when they bruised a tendon [in their hands] in the act of striking their servants in the teeth [in a rage]...Some not only strike them with their fists but even kick them, gouge out their eyes, and stab them with a pen. I once even saw someone out of anger striking his servant in the eye with a reed pen with which we write.³

According to Galen, even the emperor Hadrian lapsed into this kind of violence because of anger, much to the emperor's subsequent regret:

The emperor Hadrian, they say, once struck one of his attendants in the eye with a pen. When the emperor realized that the man had lost the eye because of the blow, he summoned him and invited him to request a gift from him to compensate for his affliction. When the man who had suffered the injury remained completely silent, Hadrian again asked him to request whatever he wanted, and to do so confidently. [They say] the man requested nothing but his eye back. For what gift could compensate for the loss of an eye?⁴

Anger is directed not only at other human beings. As a child, Galen observed people enraged at inanimate objects too: "I watched a person eagerly trying to open a door. But when his action did not achieve the desired result, he began biting the key, kicking the door, and reviling the gods. He had grown wild in the eyes, just as madmen do, and he was all but letting off froth from his mouth, like wild boars."⁵

Later in life, Galen again repeatedly observed uncontrolled rage, for instance:

When we were at Thriasion, he [my fellow-voyager] asked the servants who were attending him about [the whereabouts of] a certain piece of luggage. They had no answer. He therefore became enraged and, since he had nothing else at hand with which he could strike the lads, he picked up a good-sized sword in its scabbard and brought it down, sheath and all, onto the heads of both of them, not assaulting them with the flat of the blade (which would not have had such a terrible effect) but with the edge of the sword. The sword instantly cut through the sheath and

³ *De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione* 4.6–7 (V, 17 K; CMG V.4.1.1; 13 De Boer).

⁴ Ibid. 4.7–8 (V, 17–18 K; 13 De Boer). See A. R. Birley, *Hadrian, The restless emperor* (London/New York: Routledge, 1997), 167 and 337, n.13.

⁵ *De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione* 4.5 (V, 16 K; 12 De Boer).

inflicted two very serious wounds on the heads of both, for he struck each of them twice...⁶

Galen's philosophical training, his subsequent medical training, and his personal observations of angry people prompted him to reflect on whether a predisposition to irascibility is already observable in the early stages of life. He concluded that "some children are always bright and cheerful, others sullen.... Some children become vehemently enraged at the most trivial occasions, so that they bite and kick those near them and attack them with stones and sticks whenever they think they have been wronged..."⁷ His medical theories allowed Galen to offer physical explanations of such divergent predispositions in children and adults and to devise individualized medical therapies for them. That is not to say that Galen's philosophical heritage can be ignored in these contexts, but rather that expanding the investigation beyond the three or four more "philosophical" Galenic texts that have served as the basis of most of the recent discussions of Galen's accounts of the emotions (see note 1 above), so as to include his thoroughly 'medical' texts too, will yield a fuller, more nuanced understanding of his views.

The analysis that follows is developed in four main steps: I. a brief rehearsal of Galen's views concerning the relation between 'body', 'soul', and 'nature'; II. somatic factors conducive to anger; III. physical consequences of becoming angry; IV. the power and limits of a medical therapy of anger and other emotions.

I. *Body, Soul and "Nature"*

Galen more than once suspended judgment or expressed ambivalence on issues such as the incorporeality of the soul, its substance, its immortality, the number of its parts (and whether these should indeed be called "parts" or rather "forms" or "faculties/powers" of the soul),

⁶ Ibid. 4.10–11 (V, 18–19 K; 14 De Boer).

⁷ Ibid. 7.9 (V, 37–8 K; CMG V.4.1.1—25–6 De Boer). On the anger of children see also Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* [hereafter = PHP], 5.7.74–5 (*Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* [hereafter = CMG] V 4, 1, 2, pp. 354–6 De Lacy), where Galen quotes Plato, *Republic* 4.441a7–c2; A. E. Hanson, "Your mother nursed you with bile": anger in babies and small children," in *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, Yale Classical Studies 32, eds. S. M. Braund and G. W. Most (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 185–207; below, n. 35.

and the scope of the soul's activities.⁸ These uncertainties did not stop him from following his philosophical precursors in making the soul central to his conception not only of the living body but also, at times, of the emotions. In this context he commented in detail on interactions between soul and body.

Fundamental to Galen's view of the body-soul relation are his theories about the four primary qualities (hot, cold, wet, dry), the four humors (*chymoi*, "juices"), the 'temperaments' (*kraseis*, "blends", "mixtures"), capacities (*dynameis*, "powers", "faculties"), bodily instruments (*organa*), homoeomerous (as opposed to instrumental) parts, and the anatomical topography of the powers or parts of the soul. To offer a perilously reductive sketch of the larger Galenic picture of the body: the body is proximately composed of the four humors (blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm), each characterized by the prevalence of one of the four elements and two of the four primary qualities. The proper "blending" (*kraasis*) of the qualities and humors is, however, different in different parts of the body, so that, for example, the brain, the heart, the lungs, the spleen, and the liver each has its own distinctive, appropriate blend ("temperament") that affects the capacities (*dynameis*) and activities (*energeiai*) of the soul that resides in it. This relation between the qualitative or humoral blend of internal bodily organs and the soul's capacities and activities is a central feature of Galen's view of the body-soul relation, and later in life he devoted an influential treatise to precisely this subject: *That the soul's capacities follow the body's temperaments*.⁹ But what are these capacities or

⁸ For example, *De propriis placitis* 3, 7 (Boudon-Millot and Pietrobello, 2005, 173.13–35, 178.22–179.34); *PHP* 7.3.19–22 (V, 606 K; *CMG* V 4.1.2, pp. 442.36–444.11 De Lacy). See below n. 15.

⁹ Galen, *Scripta Minora* II, 32–79 Müller. See L. García Ballester, "La 'Psique' en el somaticismo medico de la antigüedad, La actitud de Galeno," *Episteme* 3 (1969), 195–209; id., *Alma y enfermedad en la obra de Galeno* (Valencia-Grenada, 1972); M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, Handbuch der Orientalistik, 1. Abt., Ergänzungsband VI.1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 39 (no. 6); F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, Band III: *Medizin-Pharmazie-Zoologie-Tierheilkunde bis ca. 430 H.* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 70; H. Biesterfeldt, *Galens Traktat, Dass die Kräfte der Seele den Mischungen des Körpers folgen, in arabischer Übersetzung* (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag F. Steiner, 1973); R. Degen, "Galen im Syrischen," in *Galen: Problems and Prospects*, ed. V. Nutton (London: The Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1981), 138 (no. 23); G. E. R. Lloyd, "Scholarship, authority, and argument in Galen's *Quod animi mores*," in *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno*, (n. 1), 11–42; Hankinson, "Actions and passions," (n. 1) and "Body and Soul in Galen," (n. 1); Barras, Birchler and Morand,

faculties of the soul, what are the ‘temperaments’ of the body, and which, if any, of them pertains to anger and the other emotions?

Galen’s answers to these questions are not always consistent or free of internal tension. He often divided a human being’s capacities (*dynameis*) and activities (*energeiai*) into those that belong to the soul (*psychē*) and those for which nature (*physis*) is responsible. When he proceeded from this distinction, the “natural activities” of the body included respiration, the pulse, appetite, digestion, the distribution of nutriment throughout the body, the generation of blood, sexual intercourse and reproduction, and the excretion of residues, whereas the activities of the soul were restricted to all levels of cognition and to voluntary motor functions.¹⁰ In *On the natural faculties* and elsewhere, Galen argued that the “natural activities” within the body are all explicable in terms of four “natural capacities”—the attractive, retentive, alterative, and secretory faculties—that belong to nature (*physis*), not to the soul (*psychē*).¹¹ Each natural faculty uses many different bodily parts as its natural instruments and is a connate power of these parts. By contrast, the sensory and motor faculties of the soul are not innate in their bodily instruments but rather “flow to the soul’s instruments from its *archē* [that is, from the brain], like light from

Galien, *L’âme et ses passions* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1995); Donini, “Psychology,” (n. 1).

¹⁰ E.g., Galen, *De symptomatum differentiis* 3 (VII, 55–6 K; ed. B. Gundert, CMG V 5,1 [2009], pp. 216–219). For Galen’s division of activities and capacities into natural (*physikai*) and psychic (*psychikai*) see also *De sanitate tuenda* 6.2.15 (VI, 387 K; 170.30–2 Koch); *De motu musculorum* 1.1 (IV, 372.11–5 K); *De crisis* 1.14 (IX, 612–3 K; 108.6–7 Alexanderson); *De temperamentis* 2.1 (I, 576–7 K; 43.2–4 Helmreich); *De propriis placitis* 3, 13 (Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli, 2005, 173–4, 187.2–8; cf. Nutton, 1999, 108). See also *De naturalibus facultatibus* 1.1 (II, 1–2 K; *Scripta minora*, III, 101 Helmreich): with plants, animals share growing and being nourished, which are the works of nature, whereas sensation and voluntary motion, which are the works of *psychē*, are peculiar to animals.

¹¹ *De naturalibus facultatibus* (II, 1–214 K.; *Scripta Minora*, III, 101–257 Helmreich), passim; *De propriis placitis* 3, 13 (Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli, 2005, 173.14–35, 174.3–15, 187.2–6; cf. IV, 759 K; Nutton, 1999, 108); *De symptomatum differentiis* 4 (VII, 63 K). But, perhaps under the influence of Aristotle’s version of the vegetative soul, the powers of the soul (*psychē*) and those of nature (*physis*) at times seem to converge; see Galen, *In Hippocratis Epidemiarum III, comment.* 1.17 (CMG V.10.2.1, p. 46.12–5 Wenkebach): the liver is the *archē* of that soul which is called either “vegetative” (*phytikē*) or “natural” (*physikē*), the four powers of this soul are attraction, retention, alteration, and secretion, and by virtue of these powers the processes of being nourished and of growing exist in bodies. See also below, n. 20.

the sun".¹² The temperament (*krâsis*) not only of the brain but also of each of the sentient and moved parts of the body 'in relation to which' the soul's sensory and voluntary motor activities exist co-determines the capacity of the psychic faculties to exercise their activities in a normal way.¹³

Galen repeatedly has recourse to this 'soul-nature' distinction. At times, however, the emotions, including anger, become something of an embarrassment for the theory based on this distinction. If (a) the soul's activities are limited to cognitive and voluntary motor functions; if (b) these functions have their control center in the brain; (c) the emotions do not belong to the cognitive activities (see n. 12) and are not simply excessive alterations of the reasoning part of the soul but something quite different (as Galen insists, especially in his criticisms of Chrysippus);¹⁴ and if (d) the emotions do not belong among the 'natural' capacities and activities enumerated above either; then it becomes difficult to accommodate anger and other emotions within a theory of the soul that is driven by this demarcation of 'soul' from 'nature'. Perhaps in part for this reason, Galen in his discussions of anger sometimes dispensed with the nature-soul distinction and even with the soul itself (see below, Part II), while at other times reverting to the tripartite account of the soul in some of Plato's works, notably *Timaeus*—a "likely story" whose validity Galen claims to have established by means of dissection, experimentation, and physiological observation.

In Galen's Platonizing application of anatomical topography to psychophysiology, a human being after birth is governed by three principles (*archai*), one each residing in the head, the heart, and the liver,

¹² *De locis affectis* 1.7 (VIII, 66–8 K). The soul's cognitive powers are subdivided into: (a) those that flow from the brain to the five senses through the sensory nerves; (b) those that belong only to the 'command center' that resides in the brain, including *phantasia*, memory, recollection, different kinds of thought, and choice or volition: *De symptomatum differentiis* 3 (VII, 55–6 K); *De locis affectis* 2.10, 3.9 (VIII, 126–7, 174–5 K); *De usu partium* 8.6 (III, 641 K; I, 465 Helmreich); *PHP* 7.3.2 (V, 600 K; *CMG* V 4,1,2, p. 438 De Lacy). For diseases linked to these powers see Pigeaud, "La psychopathologie de Galien," (n. 1); on the brain see J. Rocca, *Galen on the Brain: Anatomical Knowledge and Physiological Speculation in the Second Century AD*, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 26 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

¹³ *De consuetudinibus* 4 (*Scripta minora*, II, 25 Müller; *CMG* Suppl. III, 26 Schmutte). For "by itself" (*kath' heautên*) vs. "in relation to" (*to pros ti*) see also *PHP* 7.3.2 (438.29–33 De Lacy).

¹⁴ See Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul* (n. 1).

and each capable of functions or 'works' (*erga*) both 'by itself' and 'in relation to other things'.¹⁵ The second *archē*, located in the heart, is most directly implicated in Galen's explanations of anger (as in Plato). By itself, this principle has several functions: it maintains the proper tension (*tonos*) of the soul; it ensures a good humoral blending (*eukrasia*); when functioning properly, it is constant in its submission to the commands of reason, but in passion it causes the 'boiling' (*zesis*) of the innate heat. In its relation to other things, the cardiac principle functions as the source both of heat for the individual parts and of the pulsating motion of the arteries.

Galen recognized that in some respects the tripartite Platonizing model of the soul is on a collision course with his uses of the "soul-nature" theory. He acknowledged, for example, that the activities

¹⁵ PHP 7.3.2 (438–40 De Lacy). The functions of the principle in the brain are (a) itself, the higher cognitive activities enumerated above (n. 12), and (b) relation to other parts of the body, sensory activity and voluntary motion. The third principle, residing in the liver, likewise has a variety of functions, including nutrition; through several of its physical instruments or organs, it supplies some of the material substances whose mixtures form the body's temperament. Not only Platonic tripartition (as in the *Republic* and *Timaeus*) but also the influence of Erasistratus' depictions of the brain, the heart, and the liver are visible in this Galenic account. See von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," (n. 1), 92–6. Galen used varying terms to refer to these three 'principles' (*archai*): 'part', 'form' or 'faculty' of the soul. At times he also designated them by their famous Platonic labels (not surprisingly, by far most often in *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato*): 'rational' (*logikon*), 'affective' (*thymoeides*, 'spirited'), and 'desiderative' (*epithmētikon*) parts of the soul. Despite his occasional acknowledgment that a lack of terminological standardisation can be perilous to science, and despite his optimistic prescriptions for eradicating equivocity from scientific language, he is notoriously tolerant of nomenclative instability, so long as he thinks clarity can be achieved (see Hankinson, "Usage and Abusage: Galen on Language," in *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3), ed. S. Everson (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 166–87; von Staden, "Science as text, science as history, Galen on metaphor," in *Ancient Medicine in its Socio-cultural Contexts*, eds. P. J. van der Eijk, H. F. J. Horstmannshoff, and P. H. Schrijvers (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), vol. 2, 499–518; Barnes, "Logique et pharmacologie: à propos de quelques remarques d'ordre linguistique dans le *De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac facultatibus* de Galien," in *Galen on Pharmacology*, ed. A. Debru, *Studies in Ancient Medicine* 16 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 3–33; B. Morison, "Language," in *The Cambridge Companion to Galen*, ed. Hankinson (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 116–56). For an example, see *Methodus medendi* 9.10 (X, 635.14–5K): "It will make no difference whether you call it [the power that resides in the liver] 'desiderative' [like Plato] or 'nutritive' [like Aristotle] or 'natural' [like Herophilus and some Stoics], nor whether you call it 'soul' or 'power'... [And the power that resides in the heart] likewise is called by many names. You see, it is called 'vital faculty', 'affective faculty', 'vital soul', and 'affective soul'." See also De Lacy, "The third part of the soul," in *Le opere psicologiche di Galeno*, (n. 1); Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul*, and "Galen's Psychology," *Galen et la philosophie* (n. 1); von Staden, "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 89–90; below, n. 16.

assigned to the affective and desiderative parts of the soul in his tripartite account are excluded from the domain of the soul in his explanations based on “psychic” vs. “natural” activities. More than once he seems to signal a discomfort with the divergent implications of the two theories, and in one of his later works, *On My Own Opinions* (see above, n. 8), he says that he adapted his terminological choices to his audiences.¹⁶ In *On Natural Faculties* he advocates the adoption of “customary usage” in this matter, by which he means, significantly, calling sense-perception and voluntary motion ‘the works of the soul’ but growth and nutrition ‘the works of nature’—again tacitly leaving the emotions dangling somewhere between ‘soul’ and ‘nature’.¹⁷

In many of Galen’s works, his Platonizing model yields tacitly to the “soul-nature” model and to its Hellenistic anatomical and physiological foundations. He repeatedly argues for instance that soul-pneuma (*pneuma psychikon*) is produced in the brain from life-enabling or ‘vital’ pneuma (*pneuma zōtikon*) that is carried to the brain from the left ventricle of the heart by arteries. This soul-pneuma then is distributed throughout the body by the sensory and motor nerves that emanate from the brain; it serves as the first instrument (*organon*) of the soul, not of nature. Furthermore, when the soul uses other bodily parts as secondary instruments (for example, eyes, ears, and nose in the case of sensory activity and, in the case of voluntary motion, the muscles), it again does so through the medium of the soul-pneuma in the nerves.¹⁸ This view of how the soul carries out its activities builds on the anatomical and physiological theories developed by Erasistratus and Herophilus in the third century B.C.E. on the basis of

¹⁶ *De propriis placitis* 3 (Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli, 2005, 174.16–23): “When I converse with Platonists, I call the substance that governs plants ‘soul’, but when I talk with Stoics, I call it ‘nature’, just as, whenever I talk to the multitudes, I also call the powers of this “soul” “natural” powers, [as] in my three books *On Natural Faculties*, whose account of these powers is addressed to all physicians as well as all other people.” Cf. Nutton, *Galen, On My Own Opinions*, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* V 3,2. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999), 150. See also *De usu partium* (hereafter = *UP*) 4.13 (III, 308–9K; I, 226.18–25 Helmreich): “I leave to others the question whether it should be called “nature” or “nutritive faculty [of the soul]”. *De propriis placitis* 13 (Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli, 2005, 187.2–6); *PHP* 6.3.7 (374 De Lacy; see also 662); De Lacy, 1988; above, nn. 11, 12.

¹⁷ *De naturalibus facultatibus* 1.1 (II, 1–2 K; 101 Helmreich).

¹⁸ *PHP* 7.3.21, 7.3.30 (pp. 444.4–8, 446.11–3 De Lacy). See Vegetti, 1993 (see above, n. 1).

their discovery of the nerves.¹⁹ It also reflects the Hellenistic physicians' new line of demarcation between soul (*psyche*) and nature (*physis*): the soul's activities in the body depend directly on the existence of the nerves, whereas nature's activities in the body do not. But, once again, this version of the soul's operations identifies no room for the emotions.

Galen's own detailed investigation of the nervous system seemed to him to confirm fundamental features of the early Hellenistic medical view of the relation between the soul and the nerves. Yet he was far from ready to abandon all features of Plato's accounts of the soul, even as he recognized that moving from the "nerveless" body depicted by Plato and Aristotle to the thoroughly "nerved" body of his own anatomy and physiology entailed consequences not only for the activities and affections of the soul but also for the relation of medicine to the soul. Against this Galenic background, I turn to an exploration of how this relation plays out in the case of Galen's paradigm emotion, anger.

II. *Somatic Factors Conducive to Anger; 'Causes' of Anger*

Given Galen's insistence on the interactive nature of the relation between soul and body, the question arises, what occurs in the body before, while, and after we get angry? If, as Galen claims, there are forty different types of natural bodily constitution (a number determined by the range of possibilities allowed by the existence of four primary qualities and the four principal organs, i.e., brain, heart, liver, and lungs), then which of us, by the very nature of our physical constitution, are more predisposed to anger than others?

In its account of qualitatively different temperaments of the heart, Galen's influential treatise *Medical Technē* (chapters 10–11) offers some of his more specific observations about the physiological roots of

¹⁹ See F. Solmsen, "Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves," *Museum Helveticum* 18 (1961), 150–67, 169–197; von Staden, *Herophilus, The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 159–61, 200–204, 225 (T125), 250–7, 317–319; id., "Body, Soul, and Nerves," 111–2; id., "Early European Conceptions of the Brain and the Nerves: Classical Intuitions and Hellenistic Discoveries" in *Sphinx*, *Societas Scientiarum Fennica/Suomen Tiedeseura*, 2005 Yearbook (Helsingfors, 2006), 11–32.

anger.²⁰ It is striking that Galen here puts neither the heart nor anger in any explicit relation to the soul, albeit Plato's localization of the affective power of the soul in the heart (*Timaeus* 70a7–d1) might lurk in the background. After reminding his readers that he uses “hot(ter)”, “cold(er)”, and so on relative to the normal qualitative state of the part itself, and that “if a [given] heart is comparatively cold by nature, its temperament will still be much hotter than that of the hottest brain”,²¹ he discusses the physical, affective, and moral signs of different types of cardiac temperaments—again without any reference to the “soul”. Indeed, while the concept “nature” plays a fundamental role in his observations on the emotions in *Medical Technē*, “soul” does not appear until chapters 23–25 (where Galen briefly and belatedly identifies anger and other emotions as belonging to the soul).²²

Galen begins his account of the heart in *Medical Technē* with pathological signs by which an abnormally hot heart can be recognized, and he then turns, in sequence, to a cold heart, a drier (or quite dry) heart, and a wetter heart (see below, Table A, column 1, 1–4). Next follow a hot and dry heart, one that is hot and wet, another that is colder and wetter, and, finally, a cold and dry heart (Table A, col. 1, 5–8).²³ The first four types of blends that deviate from the healthy cardiac norm are accordingly characterized by an excess of a single primary quality, the last four by an excess of a pair (*kata syzygian*)²⁴ of primary qualities.

Six of these eight deviant cardiac temperaments can be recognized inter alia by some or other form of anger, according to Galen's enumeration of the pathological signs (Table A, column 2, nos. 1, 3–6, 8),

²⁰ *Ars medica* became one of Galen's more influential works in the Middle Ages and Early Modern period. It was translated into Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin. See V. Boudon, *Galien, tome II, Exhortation à l'étude de la médecine. Art médical* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2000), 43–79; Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, 45 (no. 38); Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttum* (1970), 80–1 (no. 4). On the influence of medical traditions on Galen's theory of the emotions, see also C. G. Gill, “Die antike medizinische Tradition: die körperliche Basis emotionaler Dispositionen,” in: *Klassische Emotionstheorien: von Platon bis Wittgenstein*, ed. by H. Landweer and U. Renz (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 97–120.

²¹ *Ars medica* 10 (I, 331–2 K; 301–302 Boudon).

²² Ibid. 23.8, 24.8, 25.5 (pp. 367, 371, and 373 K; pp. 347, 351, and 353 Boudon). In ch. 37.2 (406 K; 386 Boudon) Galen also introduces the distinction (which he tacitly took over from Erasistratus) between “life-enabling” (“vital”) pneuma and soul-pneuma, but once again without relating the latter to the emotions.

²³ Ibid. 10.3–11.6 (I, 332–6 K; 302–8 Boudon).

²⁴ Ibid. 11.1 (I, 334 K; 305 Boudon).

and a sign of the seventh type is that a person with such a heart is not prone to anger (Table A, col. 2, no. 7). From this taxonomy emerges a conception of anger as a complex emotion that takes different forms determined by different physical qualities of a single bodily organ: each type of angry behavior is a sign of an excess of a different primary physical quality—or of pair of primary qualities—of the heart.²⁵ The least irascible persons are those with colder hearts, whether their hearts are colder and wetter, or colder as well as drier (Table A, col. 2, nos. 7–8). In all these cases their hearts would, however, still be very hot relative to the temperature of other parts of the body. A sign of a heart that is both colder and drier is that people with such a heart are the least irascible. However, if constrained (*biasthentes*) to be angry, a brooding anger will simmer for a long time (*mênis*, like Achilles' wrath; Table A, col. 2, no. 8).²⁶ A sign of a colder and wetter human heart, on the other hand, is not being prone to anger (*orgê*; see below, Table A, col. 2, no. 7).²⁷

In persons with a drier heart than normal, anger likewise is not easily aroused.²⁸ But when aroused, their anger is fierce and implacable (Table A, col. 2, no. 3).²⁹ By contrast, a sign of a wetter heart is a character easily moved to an anger that is also easy to stop (Table A, col. 2, no. 4).³⁰ If the wet dominates in the heart along with the hot, the person readily falls into anger, but the emotion is not 'fierce' (Table A, col. 2, no. 6).³¹ Two types of qualitative deviance remain: a heart hot to the extreme, and a hot and dry heart. The former is signaled inter alia by a quick temper (*oxythymia*), and the latter by a quick, implacable anger (Table A, col., nos. 1 and 5).

²⁵ The association of anger with the heart has a long pre-Galenic history. Galen frequently invoked it, and not only in his defense of Plato's tripartite account of the psyche (see above, n. 16). The purpose of this paper is, however, in the first instance, an exploration of Galen's own understanding of the pathophysiology of anger, rather than source criticism or an analysis of the philosophical or medical provenance of those strands in his system that he appropriated overtly or covertly from precursors.

²⁶ *Ars medica* 11.6 (I, 336 K; 308 Boudon). See also *mênis* in the Stoic classification of types of anger: *SVF* III 394–7.

²⁷ *Ars medica* 11.5 (I, 336 K; 308 Boudon). In his list of the signs of a colder heart whose other three primary qualities—hot, moist, dry—display no excess, Galen, however, says nothing about irascibility (Table A, 2), conceivably because he thought such a person shows no proclivity to anger.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 10.8 (I, 334 K; 305 Boudon).

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.* 10.9 (I, 334 K; 305 Boudon).

³¹ *Ibid.* 11.3 (I, 335–6 K; 306–7 Boudon).

Ars Medica 10–11 (I, pp. 332–337K): A Selective Summary

Primary qualities (of the heart)	Anger	Pulse	Other physical characteristics	Other affective/ moral characteristics
1. Hot to the greatest degree	A quick temper (<i>oxythymia</i>)	[Large, fast, frequent]	Hairy chest; whole body hot (unless the liver greatly counteracts this effect); broad chest (unless brain counteracts it greatly); small head combined with broad chest	Rashness
2. Cold	[No reference to anger]	Smaller than the norm, but not slower or less frequent	Smallness of chest; smooth, hairless chest	Timid, hesitant, lacking in courage
3. Drier [than normal]	Anger not readily aroused, but fierce and hard to placate [when aroused]	Harder	Body as whole usually drier (unless parts at the liver counteract this)	
4. Wetter [than normal]	A character (<i>êthos</i>) easily moved to anger (<i>orgê</i>) but also easily pacified (<i>eukatapauston</i>)	Soft	Whole body more moist (unless parts at liver counteract this)	
5. Hot and dry	Quick-tempered (<i>oxythymoi</i> <i>thymikoi</i>) and hard to placate (<i>dyspaustoi</i>)	Hard, large, fast, and frequent	Whole body hot and dry; large, fast and frequent inhalations and exhalations; broad chest; hairiest of all on the breastbone and just below it	Ready for action, spirited, speedy, fierce, not gentle, reckless, shameless, tyrannical
6. Moisture dominates along with heat	Readily angered (<i>orgê</i>), but spirit/anger is not fierce	Soft, large, fast, and frequent	Less hairy (than the hot and dry); if chest is in proportion to heart, breathing follows pattern of pulses; if deviation in temperament is great, putrefaction	Not fierce

Table (cont.)

Primary qualities (of the heart)	Anger	Pulse	Other physical characteristics	Other affective/ moral characteristics
7. Colder and wetter [than normal]	Not prone to anger (<i>orgē</i>)	Soft	No hair on breast- bone; smaller chest (proportionate to degree of coldness)	Timid, cowardly, hesitant; least given to mania
8. Cold and dry	Least irascible (<i>aorgētotoi</i>) of all; if they are constrained to become angry, they retain their anger (<i>mēnis</i>) for a long time	Hard and small	If chest is small in the right proportion to the degree of coldness, well proportioned breathing; if chest is disproportionately long, breathing is infrequent and slow; breastbone most hairless of all	

Six of Galen's eight types of qualitative deviation from the cardiac norm therefore entail anger, and different deviant qualitative conditions of the heart are correlated with different types of anger. Those in whose hearts the dry dominates, whether singly or in combination with another primary quality, tend to experience an anger that is hard to placate and therefore endures (Table A, col. 2, nos. 3, 5, and 8). By contrast, the anger of those with a wetter heart, though readily aroused (Table A, col. 2, nos. 4 and 6), is more easily checked. But if the heart is both moister and colder than normal, the cold prevents one from being prone to anger, despite the excess of the moist (A, col. 2, no. 7). A dominance of the hot, in turn, manifests itself in a quick temper (A, col. 2, nos. 1 and 5; cf. 6), whether the hot dominates singly or in combination with another quality.

Different forms of anger also are correlated physical signs of an abnormal temperament of the heart, among which a pulse that deviates from the norm is of particular importance to Galen (see Table A, column 3). The pulse, in Galen's view, is produced by a power or faculty (*dynamis*) in the arteries that constantly draws a mixture of "vital" pneuma and blood into the arteries from the left ventricle of the heart (as in Herophilus' account of the vascular system). The pulse

of a quick-tempered person will be larger, faster, and more frequent than normal, due to an excess of heat in the heart, whereas one who is not prone to anger will have a smallish pulse as a consequence of the victory of the cold in the heart. Similarly, a person whose anger tends to be implacable will have a harder pulse because of the dryness of the heart, whereas one whose anger is more easily appeased will have a softer pulse due to a more moist heart (Table A, col. 3). The importance of this correlation between pulse types and types of anger should not be underestimated. On no diagnostic and prognostic tool did Galen dwell at greater length than the pulse. He devoted at least eight influential treatises to the pulse, seven of which are extant (covering about a thousand pages in Kühn's edition). In his essay *On My Own Books* he classified six of these extant treatises as well as one lost work on the pulse as prognostic works.³² Among the many prognostic values of the pulse is that it enables a skilled doctor to predict or diagnose the nature of each person's type of susceptibility to anger and thus to devise an appropriately individualized preventive or therapeutic treatment for anger.

Other somatic signs that permit a nuanced prognosis or diagnosis of types of irascibility include the size of the chest, the amount of hair on the chest, breathing patterns, the size of the head, the proportional relations between chest and head, and the qualitative disposition of the body as a whole (Table A, column 4). In these and other references to anger, we witness a characteristic Galenic accommodation of anatomical, physiological, pathological, and psychological perspectives, all within an account of only one organ—the heart—of a large, complex living organism.³³

It is worth noting that Galen often emphasizes the four primary qualities rather than one or more humors in his explanations of the somatic sources of irascibility. In *Medical Technē*, for instance, each blend or temperament of the heart is described in terms of the qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry), not a humor (Table A, column 1), although it

³² *De libris propriis*. 8.1–6 (XIX, 32–3 K; 158–9 Boudon-Millot). See also *De ordine librorum suorum* 2.22 (96 Boudon-Millot); cf. *Ars medica* 37.11 (I, 410–11 K; 390–1 Boudon). See Hankinson, 2008, 16–8.

³³ The account in *Medical Technē* alludes to several other pertinent features of Galen's system, for example to his theory of forty constitutional types and to his theory of 'temperaments', both of which he developed at length in *On the Temperaments* I–III.

is of course clear that the humor that dominates in the heart is blood.³⁴ At other times Galen more vaguely holds an unspecified “incorrect blending responsible for anger and other emotions, without explicit reference to any specific humor or quality. His *Hygieina*, for instance, states that children “who are more passionate (*thymikōteroi*) than they should be or more timid or less sentient necessarily are not correctly blended (*kekrâsthai*) in those parts of the body by which we exercise (*energoumen*) each of the things mentioned”.³⁵ Subsequently, Galen adds that “passion, weeping, anger, sorrow, excessive care, and much sleeplessness supervene upon these [undesirable temperaments], kindling fevers, and they thus constitute the beginnings of serious diseases”.³⁶ But how do the affects bring about such physical changes in the body?

III. *Physical Consequences of Becoming Angry; Anger As a ‘Cause’*

Not only the different somatic conditions that render one susceptible to different types of anger, but also the bodily consequences of anger and of other emotions were of great interest to Galen. In this context three recurrent Galenic distinctions are significant: (1) anger as *energeia* (activity, active motion) vs. anger as *pathos* (what is experienced by x or done to x; see below); (2) anger as an “external” and “antecedent” cause (that is, as opposed to internal or ‘cohesive’ or ‘containing’ causes); (3) anger as both an “unnatural” and a “non-necessary” cause, but not a “natural” cause.

(1) More than once Galen raised the question whether anger and other emotions should be called *energeiai* or *pathê*. In this context, he identified two senses in which *energeia* and *pathos* can be used as an antithetical pair. According to the first, to which I shall refer as A, *energeia* is an active motion (*kinesis drastikê*), which is defined as a motion that comes from the thing itself which moves (*ex heautou*), whereas a *pathos* is a motion whose source lies in something other

³⁴ In a fragment on melancholy, however, Galen depicts an increase in the heat of yellow bile as being conducive to anger; here both a qualitative change (‘hotter’) and a humor (yellow bile) are invoked to explain an affective susceptibility; see the excerpt from Galen in Aëtius of Amida 6.9 (CMG VIII 2, pp. 143.8–146.23 Olivieri; especially 144.29 and 145.1).

³⁵ *De sanitate tuenda* 1.8.11 (VI, 39 K; 19 Koch). On children see above, n. 7.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 1.8.16 (VI, 40 K; 19 Koch); see also 1.8.17–8.

than that which experiences the *pathos*.³⁷ Often, Galen adds, *energeia* and *pathos*, in sense A at least, are necessarily combined in a single underlying thing. A separation made in an object by cutting it, for example, is at the same time an *energeia* of the cutter but a *pathos* of the object that is cut. So too, in Galen's Platonizing version of the soul, anger is an *energeia* of the affective ('spirited') part of the soul but a *pathos* or *pathema* not only of the other two parts of the soul but also "of our entire body, whenever the body is forcibly driven to actions by anger".³⁸

According to the second sense (B), *energeia* is a natural motion or, more precisely, "a motion in accordance with nature" and *pathos* as "a motion contrary to nature".³⁹ Explicitly recognizing that the expression "in accordance with nature" is polysemous, Galen here limits it to that which occurs through nature in the first instance, namely, that which nature seeks as an end, and not that which naturally and necessarily follows on something else. A motion is 'natural' in sense B and hence an *energeia*, regardless of whether it has its source of motion in itself or in another thing. Pulsation, for instance, is an *energeia* B, as it is a motion of the heart 'in accordance with nature', whereas palpitation is a *pathos* B, inasmuch as it is a motion contrary to nature, even though both motions arise within the heart itself. Furthermore, not all pulses are *energeiai* in sense B: if a pulse is slower, faster, shorter, longer, etc. than a 'natural' or normal pulse, it is a *pathos* B, even though it is "a movement of the heart itself out of the heart itself" and therefore an *energeia* in sense A but not B.⁴⁰

In this context Galen turns to the pulse for an analogy that would explain emotion as both *energeia* and *pathos*. Anger and other emotions are always *energeiai* (sense A) of the affective part (here *pathetikon*) of the soul. But "insofar as they are runaway and immoderate motions, and not in accordance with nature, they could not be said to be *energeiai* [sense B] but rather *path* in the second sense [B]; in anger, the motion of the affective ('spirited') part [of the soul] is like that of a big pulse [i.e., a contrary-to-nature pulse] in the motion of the arteries".⁴¹ At the same time, however, Galen reiterates that anger

³⁷ *De moribus* 1 (Mattock, 1972, 238); *PHP* 6.1.5 (360 De Lacy).

³⁸ *PHP* 6.1.7 (360–2 De Lacy).

³⁹ *De moribus* 1 (Mattock, 1972, 237); *PHP* 6.1.8 (362 De Lacy).

⁴⁰ *PHP* 6.1.8–13 (362 De Lacy).

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 6.1.14–5 (362–364 De Lacy).

is also an *energeia* in sense A and, inasmuch as the whole body along with the soul is carried away by it, a *pathos* in both senses (A, B).⁴²

(2) How to reconcile Galen's account of anger as *energeia* A of the affective part of the soul with his classification of anger as one of the 'external (*exôthen*) causes' of disease is perhaps not immediately obvious. In a discussion of three classes of fever—quotidian, hectic (consumptive), and fevers due to a putrefaction of humors—he remarks, for example:

Some causes (*prophaseis*) are external, and this is well known not only to physicians but also to lay people: consumption of foods and drinks, any kind of motion, an affection of the soul (*pathos psychikon*) of those who have become angry or scared or anxious or disturbed in any other way. But other causes take their start from the body itself, and I spoke about them a bit earlier, when I mentioned shuddering, shivering, and becoming chilled.⁴³

If anger is, among other things, an *energeia* A, the source of whose motion lies within the body-soul complex itself, and notably in the qualitative blending of the heart, in what sense is it an external cause?⁴⁴ Some clarification about his understanding of anger as an 'external cause' of disease could be gained from Galen's polemics against Erasistratus and his followers, particularly in his treatise *On antecedent causes*.⁴⁵ Galen takes them to task for their denial of antecedent external causes of disease, notably in the case of fever. He argues that 'external' causes such as an ill-advised exposure to ambient heat and cold could, in some fashion, contribute to the development of a fever, whereas—if Galen is to be believed—Erasistratus held that the body lapsed into disease only because of internal causal processes (notably those occasioned by *plethora*), whose presence invariably coincides with the presence of their effect.

In this context Galen adopted and adapted the well-known distinction between an antecedent (*prokatartikon*), preceding (*proh-*

⁴² Ibid. 6.1.16 (364 De Lacy); cf. 6.1.21.

⁴³ *De praesagitione ex pulsibus* 3.7 (IX, 381–2 K).

⁴⁴ There was a long pre-Galenic medical and philosophical tradition of distinguishing between external and internal causal factors, and part of this tradition may be reflected in Galen's uses of 'external cause'.

⁴⁵ E.g., *De causis procatarteticis*, 102–4, 12.155–15.197 (104–7, 126–47 Hankinson). See also Hankinson's excellent analysis, especially *ibid.*, 25–6, 30–5, 46–8, 250–70; Erasistratus, fr. 211, 226 (137, 142 Garofalo).

egoumenon), and cohesive or containing cause (*synhektikon aition*).⁴⁶ Briefly, “antecedent causes” are “external” and precede the effects that are referred to them, but they are not sufficient conditions for the effect, though they are part of the set of factors that could bring about the “containing” or “cohesive” cause (see below) of the event in question. Galen characterized ‘preceding causes’ as the internal effects of the external antecedent causes-effects which are, however, not themselves the “containing” or “cohesive” causes of diseases but precede them.⁴⁷ A ‘containing’ or ‘cohesive’ cause, by contrast, not only is co-temporal with its effects (its presence invariably coinciding with the presence of its effects), but its effects also vary concomitantly with variations in the cause itself.

This triad of causes allowed Galen, like some of his precursors, to give an account of causal sequences in which “antecedent” (external) and “preceding” (internal) causes of disease have a significant role to play but do not necessitate their pathological effects, whereas “containing” or “cohesive” internal causes of disease do. It is in this context that Galen also mentioned anger among the ‘antecedent’ causes of disease that Erasistratus failed to acknowledge.⁴⁸ Other such antecedent causes include external heat, cold, fatigue, grief, and sleeplessness.⁴⁹ Galen thus regarded anger as itself having internal somatic causes (above, Part II) but as being causally “external” or “antecedent” to disease, insofar as anger causes an internal physical change that in turn can become a “preceding cause” of disease. Such an internal change belongs to the set of factors that could bring about the “containing” or “cohesive” cause of disease (a cause that is invariably co-present with

⁴⁶ Some sources attribute the introduction of all three of these causes to the Stoics. Galen, however, seems to believe that ‘preceding’ causes were first distinguished from ‘antecedent causes’ by the founder of the Pneumatist school of medicine, Athenaeus of Attaleia (see below, n. 49).

⁴⁷ Galen, *De causis contentiuiis* 2 (CMG Supplementum Orientale II, 134.3–19 Kalbfleisch, Lyons, Kollesch, Nickel, Strohmaier). Cf. *ibid.*, 54–5.

⁴⁸ *De causis procatarcticis* 15.195 (144.22 Hankinson): *ira*, in Niccolò da Reggio’s fourteenth-century Latin translation of Galen’s lost Greek original.

⁴⁹ The antecedent or external causes correspond to Galen’s enumeration of six things that of necessity alter the body (an influential precursor of the six “non-naturals” of mediaeval Galenism): (1) ambient air, (2) motion and rest of the body as a whole or of its individual parts, (3) sleep and wakefulness, (4) food and drink, (5) evacuated and retained matter, and (6) affects of the soul. See *Ars medica* 23.6–8 (I, 367 K; 346–7 Boudon); García Ballester, “On the origin of the ‘six non-natural things’ in Galen,” in *Galen und das hellenistische Erbe*, eds J. Kollesch and D. Nickel (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993), 105–15.

the disease). The nature of the internal physical changes caused by anger, and of their pathological consequences, will be taken up below, but it will be useful first to consider a further triadic causal distinction introduced in Galen's depictions of anger—a distinction partly visible in his analysis of anger as *energeia* and *pathos* too.

(3) Galen's influential distinction between 'natural' (*kata physin*) causes, "non-natural" but nevertheless not "unnatural" causes (*ta ou physei aitia*), and "unnatural" or "contrary-to-nature" causes (*ta para physin aitia*) is applied to changes in the pulse too,⁵⁰ and in this context anger again plays a role (cf. above, Table A, column 3). The "natural" causes—to which Galen sometimes refers as 'necessary' changes—of a given individual's normal pulse include the person's natural temperament, gender, stage of life, and sleep habits, as well as the seasons.⁵¹ The "non-natural" causes of the behavior of a normal pulse include exercise in moderation, baths, and appropriate food and drink.⁵² But excesses of the "natural" and of the "non-natural" causes (for instance, immoderation in sleep habits, exercise, and baths) can turn these same causes into "contrary-to-nature" causes that either dissolve and dissipate the life-enabling power ("vital faculty") or compress and burden it.⁵³ Galen adds that he cannot offer an enumeration of all such "contrary-to-nature" or "unnatural" causes, because "their multitude is unlimited, not only in quantity but also in kind".⁵⁴

A role of the medical *technē* is, however, to provide some measure, and for this reason Galen identifies some genera and species of unnatural causes of changes in the pulse. One such is affective excess, a species of which is strong anger. He describes the effects of this species of "unnatural" cause as follows: "The pulse of anger is high, large,

⁵⁰ See, e.g., *De pulsibus ad tirones* 9–11 (VIII, 462–73 K).

⁵¹ Ibid. 9 (VIII, 462–7 K).

⁵² Ibid. 10 (VIII, 467–70).

⁵³ Ibid. 11 (VIII 471 K). This 'vital faculty' (*dynamis zōtikē*) is in part responsible for the production and distribution of the mixture of blood and the vital pneuma that is drawn from the left ventricle of the heart into the arterial system. Given that the psychic pneuma (*pneuma psychikon*) carried from the brain by the sensory and motor nerves is generated from the vital pneuma (*pneuma zōtikon*) that reaches the brain through the arteries, the affective impairment of the vital faculty presumably would also harm the normal functioning of the nervous system. But Galen passes over this issue in silence, although he often enough insists on the interactivity of parts of the body.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 11 (VIII, 470.12–4 K).

vehement, quick, and frequent”.⁵⁵ At issue here is not a congenital physical predisposition to irascibility that can be diagnosed by everyone’s habitual pulse and by other bodily signs (above, Part II), but rather the temporary somatic “turns” or changes (*tropoi*, VIII.470.7 K) for which a fit of anger itself is responsible. The emotions are, then, in the first instance “non-natural” causes of changes in the pulse, but any excess can transform them into “non-natural” causes, namely, when the emotions no longer are kept in bounds by their interactions with reason. Whenever anger or other emotions become such “unnatural” causes, they can in turn have harmful physical consequences that are not limited to the pulse.⁵⁶

Anger therefore is not only both an *energeia* (A) and a *pathos* (A and B), arising in part from innate physical predispositions, but also an ‘external’ or antecedent, a ‘non-natural’, and, when not kept in bounds, an ‘unnatural’ cause of physical changes in the body. Galen frequently refers to these physical changes. In *Medical Technē*, for instance, he remarks that one should refrain from immoderation with regard to all the affections of the soul, including anger (*orgē*), because “these dislodge the body from its natural composition and alter it”.⁵⁷ So too, he remarks in *On the Opinions of Hippocrates and Plato* that disturbances of the soul that occur in anger cause the heart to depart from its natural activity (*energeia*)⁵⁸ and to undergo “a great change of motion”.⁵⁹ And, as pointed out above, in his major work on health (*Hygieina*), he remarks that immoderate somatic movements triggered by anger can raise the innate heat of the body beyond its healthy limits and thus can kindle fevers, increase yellow bile, and constitute “the beginnings of serious diseases”.⁶⁰

A causal link between anger and fever is introduced in several other Galenic works.⁶¹ Fevers that arise from anger are, in Galen’s view, for the most part quotidian fevers (*ephēmeroi*, the simplest and most

⁵⁵ *De pulsibus ad tirones* 12 (VIII, 473.14–5 K). Cf. above, Table A, column 3.

⁵⁶ *De symptomatum causis* 2.5 (VII, 191–2 K).

⁵⁷ *Ars medica* 24.8 (I, 371 K; 351.2–6 Boudon).

⁵⁸ *PHP* 6.3.4 (372 De Lacy).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* 8.1.22–23 (484–6 De Lacy).

⁶⁰ *De sanitate tuenda* 1.8.16–17 (VI, 40–1 K; 19–20 Koch).

⁶¹ See, for example *Methodus medendi* 10.4 (X, 679 K); *Ad Glauconem de methodo medendi* 1.2–3 (XI, 6, 16 K); *In Hippocratis De uictu acutorum* 2.1, comment. 4.3 (XV, 739–40 K; CMG V.9.1; 275 Helmreich); *De crisis* 2.13 (IX, pp. 696–7 K); *De causis procatarcticis* 11.139 (118–120 Hankinson).

common kind of fever). These can be brought on not only by anger but also by fatigue, intoxication, grief, and ambient heat and cold. Quotidian fevers, he says, are easy to treat, for instance by means of a “moistening” diet, baths, emotionally pleasing distractions, and, in milder cases of a fever triggered by anger, wine.⁶² A vehement anger, however, could lead to a more dangerous ‘burning’ fever (*kausos*), which, ever since the writings of the classical period attributed to Hippocrates, was classified among acute diseases that are difficult to treat.⁶³

A further physical effect of anger, Galen believes, is a harmful increase in the amount of yellow bile in the body. Whenever anger raises the temperature of the innate heat of the body, the liver too becomes affected, producing more yellow bile. This in turn results in an unhealthy accumulation of yellow bile in the stomach, which could trigger further pathological events.⁶⁴ Given that yellow bile and blood are the hottest humors, any increase in yellow bile could cause a perilous increase in the heat within the body. Anger therefore not only causes a temporary change in the heart’s motions, aberrations of the pulse, a fiery redness in the eyes, and a red, hot, and swollen face;⁶⁵ it can also cause somatic changes that result in severe diseases.⁶⁶

Galen further describes anger (*orgê*) as perilous to the health of the body inasmuch it is an irritant (*erethismos*) that dissolves the patient’s physical strength and thus leads to illness.⁶⁷ Indeed, he explicitly numbers anger, along with various internal and external physical factors, among “the causes (*aitiai*) that are capable of destroying [bodily] health itself”.⁶⁸ The nature and the effects of anger should accordingly be investigated and understood not only by philosophers concerned with “the health of the soul itself” but also by all physicians, who must

⁶² E.g., *Ad Glauconem de methodo medendi* 1.3 (XI, 15–6 K).

⁶³ Galen, *In Hippocratis De uictu acutorum* 2.1, comment. 4.3 (XV, 739–740K; 274–5 Helmreich). See ‘Hippocrates’, *De uictu acutorum* 5.1, 66.2 (II, 232, 368 Littré; 37, 66 Joly); *De uictu acutorum* (*Spur.*) 1–2, 12.1 (II, 394–6, 418 Littré; 68–9, 74 Joly).

⁶⁴ *De temperamentis* 2.6 (I, 633 K).

⁶⁵ *De moribus* 1 (Mattock, 1972, 239). Such a red, swollen face is a less reliable indication of the true humoral *krâsis* of the body than is a person’s permanent complexion, for a face reddened by anger is transient; see *De sanitate tuenda* 4.4.52 (VI, 255 K; 112 Koch).

⁶⁶ *De sanitate tuenda* 1.8.16 (VI, 40 K; 19 Koch).

⁶⁷ *In Hippocratis De uictu acutorum* 48.1–2 comm. 2.54 (XV, 622 K; 215 Helmreich).

⁶⁸ *De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum* 19 (I, 302 K; CMG V 1,3; 126 Fortuna).

ensure that “the [healthy] body does not slip gradually into diseases” on account of anger.⁶⁹

IV. *The Power and the Limits of a Medical Therapy of Anger*

Galen’s principal expositions of the therapy of anger belong to his moral psychology, but he did not lose sight of the therapeutic possibilities opened up by his account of the physical origins and physical consequences of anger. After all, if the *arché* itself of anger and of the other emotions is corporeal (the heart; above, Part II); if anger, like other undesirable emotions is a consequence of bodily matter predisposed in an undesirable way (Part II); if anger is a causal agent of harmful physical changes in the body (Part III); and if the body of an irascible person displays observable physical symptoms (Part II), then anger should in principle also be treatable by a physician’s interventions.

In Galen’s view, a skilled practitioner’s knowledge of human anatomy, physiology, and pathology will enable him to understand the physical causes and effects of anger, and thus to regulate the regimen (*diaite*) of an irascible patient in an expert, efficacious way, with a view to both the prevention and the therapy of anger. Galen believes that “the character” (*êthos*) of the soul is destroyed by bad habits (*ethismoi*) with reference to foods, drinks, exercises, the spectacles one watches, the music one listens to, and the arts as a whole”.⁷⁰ If a physician helps patients to make appropriate adjustments in all these physical and mental activities, they will maintain the body’s innate heat and the temperaments of all its parts in the right condition. This in turn will keep the body in a healthy state and restore or preserve the ability of both the soul and the body to manage all their capacities—including the affective—efficaciously.⁷¹ Galen’s claim that the physician of the body can and should also be a physician of the soul is consonant with his assertion that, in order to understand the demonstrations provided in his works on the soul, one must first be trained

⁶⁹ *De sanitate tuenda*. 1.8.15–6 (VI, 40 K; 19–20 Koch).

⁷⁰ *De sanitate tuenda* 1.8.14–6 (VI, 40–1 K; 19 Koch).

⁷¹ *Ibid.* 1.8.15–6 (VI, 40–1; 19–20 Koch).

in anatomical dissection, above all, of course, with the help of Galen's principal anatomical treatise, *On Anatomical Procedures*.⁷²

This too is, however, merely a further strand in a more complex Galenic story. Galen often observed that nature makes different individuals different, not only in terms of their physical characteristics but also with respect to their emotional and moral proclivities. Each of the forty bodily constitutions has its affective characteristics, but within each constitutional type there also are numerous individual variations. In some cases, neither medical expertise nor moral education through philosophy can change what people naturally are. In these cases, nurture, science, and practical medical expertise cannot overcome nature. At times Galen suggested that nature has a primary role in determining one's affective character only during childhood, and that later in life the major determining factors are one's training and practice (*askēsis*) and one's beliefs (*dogmata*).⁷³ But even then, he depicted anyone who has not been "tamed" by "a good trainer" before the age of forty or fifty as beyond the reach of therapy.⁷⁴ Here the negative deterministic implications of his pathophysiology for his theory of the emotions become more visible, notably in his analogies between humans and plants and between humans and animals:

The farmer would never be able to make a bramble bush bear a bunch of grapes. For the nature (*physis*) of a bramble bush does not admit such a perfection.... So too in the case of animals: if you train a horse, you will have [an animal] useful for many purposes. But a bear, even if it at times appears tame, does not possess this as a steady disposition (*hexis*), while a viper and a scorpion never goes so far as to give even the appearance of being tame.⁷⁵

At best, it seems, one might hope to be born with a nature amenable to therapeutic amelioration or rectification of one's irascibility. As Galen remarks in the same context, the nature of grape vines, unlike that of bramble bushes, will allow them to bear grapes, but "...if a farmer neglects the grape vines, causing them to rely on their nature alone, he may make the vines—which are in and of themselves quite ready to bear fruit—bear bad fruit, or indeed none at all".⁷⁶

⁷² *Ars medica* 37.8–9 (I, 408 K; 389 Boudon).

⁷³ *De propr. animi cuiuslibet affect. dign. et curat.* 7.8 (V, 37 K; 25 De Boer).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 10.5 (V, 53–4 K; 35 De Boer).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 7.16–7 (V, 40 K; 27 De Boer).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 7.16 (V, 40 K; 27 De Boer).

'Nature' thus imposes significant limitations on both a somatic and a philosophical therapy of anger. Among humans, Galen suggests, there are affectively educable vines but, on his pessimistic view, there are also emotional bramble bushes that will never yield grapes. Among us are human bears, vipers, and scorpions as well, whose emotions will never be tamed, neither by medicine nor by philosophy. But, he suggested, those irascible humans whose nature, for reasons of natural constitution, age, habituation, etc., does not lie beyond the healing hand, could benefit significantly not only from philosophical training but also from expert medical interventions informed by the anatomical and pathophysiological views explored above.

IN ARISTOTLE'S WORDS...AL-ḤĀTIMĪ'S (?) EPISTLE ON
AL-MUTANABBĪ AND ARISTOTLE

Beatrice Gruendler

Plagiarism is as old as literature to which it indirectly pays homage. Indeed plagiarism shows a sort of admiration, for it belongs to a masterpiece to spur other authors to explore the paths it has broached, or to dream they had written it themselves.

Pierre Bayard, *Le plagiat par anticipation*.

A curious treatise connects the most illustrious Arab poet with sententiae of the most illustrious philosopher. The text's popularity is attested by at least thirty-five manuscripts, but everything else about it is uncertain.¹ Initially anonymous, it is attributed in most later versions to al-Ḥātimī (d. 388/998) who famously debated al-Mutanabbī in Baḡdād, but manuscripts and citations in the commentaries and the biographical literature do not predate the late twelfth century, two hundred years after the supposed author's death. The text, consisting of up to one hundred pairings between Mutanabbī's gnomic verse and philosophical maxims (with some maxims switching between pairs) appears in many forms: as a book chapter; an independent list with or without a preface, joined with another epistle of al-Ḥātimī, or broken up and distributed among the respective verses in a *Dīwān* commentary. The way in which verses and maxims relate to each other is left undecided. The sayings themselves share little direct resemblance with those attributed to Aristotle in the major gnomologies of the time, as

¹ For a list of manuscripts, see F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967ff.) [hereafter GAS] II, 488; and S. A. Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī and His Encounter with Mutanabbī: A Biographical Sketch* (Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984), 21–6. To this should be added the unattributed MS Tehran Dānešgāh 5084/9. I thank the staff of the Tehran University Library for placing it at my disposal.

Abbreviations used here: A: Aristotle, M: al-Mutanabbī, R: Rescher's edition of *al-Ḥātimīya*, B: al-Bustānī's edition (see n. 5). D: *Dīwān* of al-Mutanabbī with commentary of Pseudo-'Ukbarī (see n. 13), PQ = a recension of the *Šiwān al-ḥikma* (see n. 67). The verse-maxim pairs are cited after their number in the edition by Rescher, followed by that in Bustānī; for a concordance with Pseudo-'Ukbarī's commentary, see appendix A. References to the commentary are by number of volume, poem, and verse; each verse is translated together with the Aristotelian maxim paired with it; identical words in verse and maxim are underlined.

far as these have been published. Finally, the maxims do not constitute any cohesive vision, but alternate between preaching otherworldly detachment and the pursuit of earthly aspirations.

The putative author was a critic and philologist who kept the company of the luminaries Abū ‘Alī al-Fārisī (d. 377/987), Ibn Ḥālawayh (d. 370/980–1), and Abū ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Luġawī at the court of Sayf ad-Dawla in Aleppo at least until 341/952, when al-Fārisī joined it, and he probably left the city after the massacre by Nocephorus Phocas in 351/962 which took Abū ṭ-Ṭayyib’s life. In the summer of 352/963 (or a year earlier) he sought out al-Mutanabbī in Baġdād perhaps upon the encouragement of the vizier al-Muhallabī (d. 352/963) to satisfy the hurt pride of the Būyid ruler Mu‘izz ad-Dawla whom the poet had refused to praise. This meeting (and three further ones that are probably fictional) the critic recorded in the ornate *Risālat al-Mūḍiḥa* but also in three simpler versions, the shortest of which Bonebakker holds to be the original transcript.² Often quoted but of uncertain authorship is a second epistle discussed in the present essay, usually referred to as *al-Ḥātīmīya*, on verses in which al-Mutanabbī allegedly echoes sayings of Aristotle. The text consists of a bare listing of parallels between verses and sententiae, and the only discussion is a short introduction explaining its purport, contained in only 15 of the manuscripts, and which may have been a later addition.³ The version appearing as chapter of Ibn Munqid’s poetics refers to the linkage of verses and maxims as “transfer” (*munāqala*) from prose to poetry;⁴ the titles

² The long version is *ar-Risāla al-Mūḍiḥa fī ḍikr sariqāt Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī wa-sāqit šī’rihi*, ed. M. Y. Naḡm (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1385/1965). The three shorter versions are edited—respectively by I. A. al-Bisāṭī as appendix to al-‘Amidī’s *Ibāna ‘an sariqāt al-Mutanabbī* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1961), 251–70 (also in Yāqūt, *Iršād al-arīb ilā ma‘rifat al-adīb*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, 20 pts. in 10 vols [Leiden: n. p., 1907–27, rpt. Beirut, n.d.], pt. 18, 149–79); Ḥ. M. aš-Šammā’, *al-Munāẓara bayna Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī wa-l-Ḥātīmī*, reprinted from *Mağallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb IV* (Riyadh: n.p., 1396–6/1975–6); and by ‘A. M. al-Ḥulw as part of al-Ḥafāḡī’s *Rayḥānat al-alibbā’* (Cairo: ‘Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1386/1967), vol. 2, 421–7; cf. Bonebakker, *Ḥātīmī*, 14–9 and 29–35. For an interpretation of the epistle as a literary emulation of a Mutanabbian ode, see Wen-Chin Ouyang, “Literature as Performance: The theatre of al-Hatimi’s *Al-risala al-mudiha*”, in *Classer les récits: Théories et pratiques*, ed. Aboubakr Chraïbi (Paris: Harmattan, 2007), 115–45. On the author see Seeger A. Bonebakker, “Al-Ḥātīmī,” *EP*, vol. 12 (suppl.), 361–2; and Geert Jan van Gelder, “Al-Ḥātīmī,” *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* (New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 1, 276–7.

³ See the comparison of four preface versions in Bonebakker, *Ḥātīmī*, 27–33.

⁴ Usāma ibn Munqid, *al-Badī’*, eds. ‘A. Badawī et al. (Cairo: Maktabat wa-Maṭba‘at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1380/1960), 264–83.

of the separate versions call it a “coincidence” (*muwāfaqa*, *ittifāq*).⁵ In two manuscripts which combine the first and second epistle, the introduction terms al-Mutanabbī's project an “imitatio” (*muḍāhāt*) of the sententiae, and the narrative transition to the second epistle, a “matching” (*muqābala*) of them.⁶ The introduction, where it appears, reserves judgment as to whether the poet intentionally emulated the sententiae or drew on his own inspiration. To trace the transmission of the epistle's maxims and their potential dependence from maxims of philosophers in the gnomologies (which are not to be confused with the philosophers' actual teachings) cannot be undertaken here, especially as those have not yet been edited as a comprehensive corpus—a desiderate voiced by the honoree to whom the present essay is dedicated as a poetic gift.⁷

The ascription to al-Ḥātimī is not implausible, because he knew Aristotle's works. Twice he traces al-Mutanabbī's verses to the philosopher, once in the shorter version of the first epistle, and once in Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary.⁸ However, the two epistles hardly resemble each other. The *Mūḍiḥa*'s elaborate prose, scathing tone, and detailed verse-by-verse criticism contrasts with the *Ḥātimīya*'s uncommented list of parallels between Aristotle and al-Mutanabbī. Even if *al-Mūḍiḥa* was thoroughly reworded later in al-Ḥātimī's career, its most stripped down version already contains dialogue and a narrative frame. The ascription also finds support in two of the shorter versions of the recorded debate, namely at the end of the one edited by al-Bisāṭī and at the beginning and the connecting passage of the joint version

⁵ *Ar-Risāla al-Ḥātimīya fīmā wāfaqa l-Mutanabbī fī šī'rihi kalām Aristū fī l-ḥikma*; ed. Otto Rescher, “Die Risālet el-Ḥātimijje Ein Vergleich von Versen des Motenabbī mit Aussprüchen von Aristoteles,” *Islamica* 2 (1926), 439–73, including a facsimile of MS Ayasofya 3582/3; and by Fu'ād Afrām al-Bustānī, *ar-Risāla al-Ḥātimīya*, *Maṣriq* 29 (1931) in nine parts, reprinted separately, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1931. The second is a critical edition based on MS Beirut Bibl. St. Joseph 342 with variants of MS 341/1 of the same library, the earliest attributed MS from 644/1206 (see n. 12), Rescher's edition, and the *Dīwān* commentary by Pseudo-ʿUkbarī (see n. 13). For English excerpts, see Franz Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (London and New York: Routledge, 1975), 261–3. For the present essay I have relied on Rescher, Bustānī and Pseudo-ʿUkbarī.

⁶ MS Ambrosiana N.F. F 300 and Mecca Ḥaram Adab 255/5, the latter edited by aš-Šammā' (see n. 2); cf. Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī*, 29 and 33.

⁷ Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature in Arabic Translation: A study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1975), 436–41.

⁸ See nn. 47 and 48 and Iḥsān ʿAbbās, *Ta'riḥ an-naqd al-adabī ʿinda l-ʿarab* (Amman: Dār aš-Šurūq, 1971), 243–4.

edited by aš-Šammā'. In both, the encounter, in which al-Ḥātimī has harshly criticized the ungracious behavior of al-Mutanabbī and boasted his own defeat of the poet (for which al-Ḥātimī is the only source), ends on a conciliatory note. Claiming he has become convinced of the poet's talent and fearing his future reprisals, he declares to have composed the *Ḥātimīya* as a tribute to his philosophical insights.⁹ Al-Ḥātimī further announces at the end of the first epistle a work in which he intends to treat both the poet's merits and faults.¹⁰ Scholars question the *Ḥātimīya*'s authenticity, notably Seeger A. Bonebakker, who has devoted the most detailed analysis to it.¹¹ Bonebakker's main argument is the lack of any mention of the second epistle in the biographical literature before Ibn al-Aṭīr (d. 637/1239) or any description of its contents before Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248). An unattributed version of the epistle forms the bulk of a chapter on prosification and versification (*al-ḥall wa-l-'aqd*) in the poetic treatise *al-Badī'* by Usāma ibn Munqid (d. 584/1188). The earliest manuscript attributed to him dates slightly earlier, to 644/1206.¹² Many of the pairings further figure in the commentary attributed to al-'Ukbarī (d. 616/1219), which was probably written by his student,¹³ and as scattered glosses written in a hand other than the copyist's in an unedited commentary on al-Mutanabbī's *Dīwān* by 'Abd Allāh aš-Šiqillī, dated 570/1174–5.

Whether or not al-Ḥātimī was the true author, his relevance to the second epistle may be of another order. He is the first major

⁹ Al-Bisāṭī, *İbāna*, appendix, 270; and aš-Šammā', *Munāẓara*, 267–8; see Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī*, 32–3.

¹⁰ Al-Ḥātimī, *ar-Risāla al-Mūḍiḥa*, (see above n. 2), 196.

¹¹ See n. 1. See also Ḍayf Allāh ibn Hilāl al-'Uṭaybī, *Naqd al-Ḥātimī li-l-Mutanabbī: dirāsa wa-taḥlīl* (Jedda: Ḍ. A. ibn H. al-'Uṭaybī, 1424/2003). The ascription is questioned by 'Abbās, *Ta'riḥ*, 245; van Gelder, "Al-Ḥātimī," but accepted by Sezgin (GAS vol. 2, 488); Régis Blachère, *Un poète arabe du IV siècle de l'Hégire (X siècle de J.-C.), Abou ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1935), 268–9; al-'Uṭaybī, *Naqd al-Ḥātimī*; Wen-Chin Ouyang, *Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic-Islamic Culture: The Making of a Tradition* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997), 149; and Amidu Sanni, "The Historic Encounter between al-Mutanabbī and al-Ḥātimī," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 35 (2004), 159–74.

¹² MS Reisülküttap 1190/6, edited in the *adab* compilation *at-Tuḥfa al-baḥiyya wa-ṭ-ṭarfa aš-ṣaḥīya* (Istanbul, 1302/1884), 144–59. The earlier MS Medine 548, copied 479H, is unattributed; the 5th/11th century date of Saray Ahmet III 2578/1 is erroneous; see Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī*, 21 n. 59 and 25 n. 77.

¹³ *Dīwān al-Mutanabbī bi-Ṣarḥ Abī l-Baqā' al-'Ukbarī*, 4 pts. in 2 vols., eds. M. as-Saqqā, Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī and 'Abd al-Ḥafīẓ Ṣalabī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1936), probably composed by al-'Ukbarī's student 'Alī ibn 'Adlān al-Mawṣilī (d. 666/1268); cf. GAS vol. 2, 495 and Mohammed Yalaoui, "Al-'Ukbarī," EI², vol. 10, 790–1.

representative of the kind of criticism based on literary influence, which dominated the poetic discourse on modern (*muḥdaṭ*) poetry in the tenth and eleventh centuries and the reception of modern poets, al-Mutanabbī in particular. As such, al-Ḥātimī posed a plausible candidate to which to ascribe the second epistle.¹⁴ With Bonebakker one should discount Blachère's assumption that al-Ḥātimī intended the association as a back-handed accusation of heresy. Al-Ḥātimī could have easily impugned the poet's faith in a more direct and eloquent way, and al-ʿAmīdī (d. 433/1042), who criticized the poet for not acknowledging his sources, explicitly dismissed his (and other poets') heterodoxy as irrelevant to poetic merit:

His religion and low birth are of no consequence: I have established as a fact that most of those whose verses are adduced as proofs are polytheists, unbelievers, dissimulators and profligates, and there are the stutterers and the eloquent ones, the vile and the pure.¹⁵

The questions surrounding the *Ḥātimīya* cannot be resolved without a critical edition of all manuscripts. In the following, I am looking at this text from the perspective of the poetic tradition to ask two questions: first, what was the nature of those verses that received an Aristotelian pedigree and how did the commentators formulate and motivate this ascription, and, second, what was the verses' function within al-Mutanabbī's odes?

I. The Aristotelian Pedigree

Al-Mutanabbī's Proverbial Verse Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary of the verses in question deems them superior to any prose—not only that of Aristotle—by virtue of the successful versification,¹⁶ especially when it accentuates the contrasting ideas with greater brevity and compactness.¹⁷ The poetry is called “best speech”, “novel”, or “a solitary

¹⁴ For a historical survey of the reception of al-Mutanabbī in the poetics of the period, see ʿAbbās, *Taʾrīḥ an-naqd*, 252–336 and 373–97; and Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 146–54.

¹⁵ Al-ʿAmīdī, *Ibāna*, 24 (see n. 2).

¹⁶ *kalām ḥasan* (*Ḥātimīya* 41A+59M/55), *hādā min aḥsan al-kalām* (41M/57, 64/99, 71/68, 78M/60, 82/64, and 98/77), *hādā min aḥsan al-kalām wa-badīʾihī* (90/88).

¹⁷ *laqad naẓamahū Abū ʿ-Ṭayyib wa-aḥsana* (67/82); *aḥsana Abū ʿ-Ṭayyib fī qawliḥī “fī ṭibāʾika ḍidduhu” kulla l-ḥusn* (48/97). The commentator finds the wording of 71/68 excellent both on its own account and as a versification *hādā min aḥsan*

pearl", and al-Mutanabbī is declared "master in that which baffles outstanding poets".¹⁸ The poet further enriches the gist of some maxims with additional figures, such as feigned wonder (67/82), theological jargon (*maḍhab kalāmī*; 73/70), antithetical parallelism (48/97, 67/82, 76/72), paronomasia and paradox (79/61), and the personification of abstract concepts (87/98).

The verses are pithy and quotable, and the commentary frequently describes the poet as "coining a proverb" or reformulating an existing one.¹⁹ According to az-Zamahṣarī (538/1144), it is the wording that makes *amṭāl* (meaning both proverb and parable) so attractive: he describes them as concretizing an abstract truth and casting it into rare wording that facilitates memorization and forestalls alteration.²⁰ The poet's contemporaries already collected and cited these proverbial verses. Despite his antipathy for having been snubbed by the poet, aṣ-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād (d. 385/995) prepared such a collection for the Būyid ruler Faḥr ad-Dawla (r. in Rayy 366–87/977–97) who loved to adorn his speech with them.²¹ Of the Ṣāhib's 302 collected items 59 coincide with those in the *Ḥātimīya*. In the preface he credits the poet for his unique talent in producing proverb-like verses, "This poet, with all his discernment, brilliance, and prominence in his craft, had particularly in proverbs a style with which he outdid his likes."²² Aṣ-Ṣāhib also

al-kalām wa-huwa min kalām al-ḥikma...[maxim follows] *wa-laqaḍ aḥsana Abū ṭ-Ṭayyib fī naẓmi ḥādā l-kalām.*

¹⁸ *durra yatīma* (65/96); *ḥādā min aḥsan al-kalām wa-law ḥarisa ba'dahu la-kafāhu* (57/53); *min aḥsan al-kalām allādī ya'gīzu 'an mitlihi l-muḡīdūn* (97/74).

¹⁹ *maṭal ẓarabahū*; *maṭal ẓarabahū li-naḥsihī* (49/45, 88/79, and 93/91), *maṭal* being understood in the double sense of an analogy the poet draws with himself and the resulting proverb. The commentator traces (80/62) moreover to the extant proverb "One empty nut rolls towards another."

²⁰ Aṣ-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād, *Amṭāl al-Mutanabbī*, ed. Zahdī Yakan (Beirut and Ṣaydā: al-Maktaba al-'Aṣriya, [1950]), 4–5.

²¹ Aṣ-Ṣāhib ibn 'Abbād, *al-Amṭāl as-sā'ira min šī'r al-Mutanabbī*, ed. M. Ḥasan Āl Yāsīn (Baghdad: Maktabat an-Nahḍa, 1385/1965). In both editions, the items are not numbered. Yakan breaks them up into single verses and adds the ode's occasion and his own commentary. Āl Yāsīn groups verses from one ode together uncommented and includes the Ṣāhib's preface. A third edition by M. Ibrāhīm Sālim (*Amṭāl Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī* (Cairo: Dār at-Ṭalā'i, 1993) rearranges the verses alphabetically by rhyme letter and reproduces Pseudo-'Ukbarī's commentary. The collection's authenticity is questioned by Blachère, *Un poète arabe*, 268 n.1, and M. Mandūr, but Āl Yāsīn accepts it based on Ibn Ma'sūm's (d. 1107/1705) claim to have edited in his *Anwār ar-rabī'* (Iran 1304) an autograph by aṣ-Ṣāhib including check marks by Faḥr ad-Dawla on the verses he chose (reproduced in the edition); see *ibid.*, 10–1.

²² *Ibid.*, 22.

used a series of them to conclude a letter of condolence.²³ Aṭ-Ṭaʿalibī (d. 423/1038) who created with his *Yatīma* the clearing house for the literature of his time, implicitly confirms this by devoting three subsections of al-Mutanabbī's entry to verses containing or coining proverbs, 34 of which overlap with the *Ḥātimīya*.²⁴ Aṭ-Ṭaʿalibī captured al-Mutanabbī's unique talent in producing such "rarities" in another list of examples, prefaced by the words:

Those adept in the knowledge of poetry and the critics concur that Abū ṭ-Ṭayyib [al-Mutanabbī] had rarities (*nawādir*) that no one else achieved in poetry and which penetrate the minds....

The citation of 115 popular verses follows, mostly by *incipit* or hemistich, 32 of which reappear in the *Ḥātimīya*. He concludes:

No poet achieved the like of this. We cite [the verses] summarily to facilitate reference and memorization. If you leafed through the collected works of the outstanding late-born and modern poets, you would not find one of these rarities among them. But God gives excellence to whom he pleases, and he gives wisdom (*ḥikma*) to whom he pleases (D I: 34: 6).²⁵

Al-Mutanabbī produced simple and profound verses on the human condition. They were detachable and quotable according to the tastes of the time and survived—like those of Shakespeare for the English language—as proverbs and sententiae and became his hallmark. The fame of al-Mutanabbī's gnomic verses in their own right thus preceded their juncture with Aristotle.

Al-Mutanabbī's Ḥikma Aṭ-Ṭaʿalibī introduces the term "wisdom" (*ḥikma*) as a qualification for the proverbial verses. *Ḥikma* exists as a poetic topic since pre-Islamic times and appears increasingly in the Abbasid period in the monothematic ascetic poem (*zuhdīya*)

²³ 94/75, 98/77, and 96/73 (translated below); *Yatīmat ad-dahr*, ed. M. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 4 pts. in 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1366/1947), vol. 1, 126. The verses are taken from the lament for ʿAḍud ad-Dawla's aunt and are cited by aṭ-Ṭaʿalibī in a section on prosification of the poet's verse in epistles of aṣ-Ṣāhib and other stylists.

²⁴ Aṭ-Ṭaʿalibī, *Yatīma*, vol. 1, 198–212 on poetry that has become proverbial, including the topic of the blame of fate and people.

²⁵ The list itself does not appear in the *Yatīma*, although 42 of the *Ḥātimīya*'s verses recur in the poet's entry in the sections on poetry in the philosophical style (ibid., 172, 1 parallel), lamentations (ibid., 212–4, 7 parallels), and proverbial poetry (see n. 24, 34 parallels).

and the prelude of the early Abbasid ode.²⁶ Beyond poetry, *ḥikma* also included the lore of Bedouins, pre-Islamic Arabic sages, such as Luqmān, and sayings of early Islamic statesmen, but also Persian kings and Ancient Greek philosophers, notably in the gnomological works received through the translation movement.²⁷ Later the term came to be used as an equivalent for philosophy. In Pseudo-ʿUkabārī’s *Dīwān* commentary, many verses are labeled as wisdom, or the speech of philosophers.²⁸ This philosophical flavor is already noted by al-Maʿarrī, cited by Pseudo-ʿUkabārī in his commentary to the verse:

The habit of this air imprints upon the souls
that death tastes bitter.

This verse confirms what precedes it, for it provides an excuse to whomever schemes against [the praised one] and does not meet him in open battle [where he is invincible], because the love of life made cowardice attractive to them and showed them that the taste of death is bitter, as their souls have become habituated to the sweet delicate air [of this world] . . . al-Maʿarrī says: this and the following line²⁹ outdo the books of the philosophers because they are utterly true *and* beautifully put into verse, and if their poet had composed nothing but this couplet, he would have had honor and beauty . . . This is transferred from the words of the philosopher [i.e., Aristotle]:

The animal-like souls are habituated to dwelling in earthly bodies and therefore find it difficult to part from their bodies, whereas the pure souls are the opposite of that (D 35/29 II: 162: 31).³⁰

Al-Maʿarrī underscores both the truth value and the poetic rendering of the verses; they coincide with the type of “rational (*ʿaqlī*) poetry,” which ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Ġurġānī (471/1078) distinguishes from “imaginary (*taḥyīlī*) poetry” as being based on truth, establishing proof, and providing wise guidance. Only the wording is poetic, while the content derives from the scripture, the prophetic tradition, ancestral wisdom,

²⁶ Stefan Sperl, *Mannerism in Arabic Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 71–94.

²⁷ Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature*, (see note 7); Julie Meisami, “*Ḥikma*,” *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* (New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 1, 286–7.

²⁸ *hādā l-bayt min al-ḥikma* (19/19); *huwa/hādā min kalām al-ḥikma* (71/68, 72/69), *huwa kalām al-ḥikma* (90/88); *hādā min kalām al-ḥukamāʾ* (82/64); *wa-hādā l-bayt fihi ḥikma* (10/10).

²⁹ While the preceding verse on fear of death being a weakness does not appear in the *Ḥatimiya*, semantic equivalents are 65/96 and 94/75.

³⁰ See n. 13. Italics are the author’s.

proverbs, or adages of the ancients. Reason conveys this type of poetry superiority (although al-Ğurğānī's greater fascination with imaginary poetry comes through in his work). Half of the examples elucidating the rational category consist of al-Mutanabbī's gnomic verses (all contained in the *Ḥātimīya*), although al-Ğurğānī gives as their source not Aristotle but the Qur'ān and a prophetic *ḥadīth*.³¹ The classifying of those Mutanabbian verses as true was a necessary prerequisite for matching them with the philosophical truth of maxims.

Literary influence and motif history. The impetus to find precedent for any verse is a common technique of poetic commentary, which grew in importance with the rise of the modern poets. These were expected to master the canon of established genres, and they had to live up to the classics. Intellectual ownership was well established and even orally disseminated verse or orations could not be simply taken from someone else. But like the ownership of material things, authorship was transferable either as a gift or for a fee. There were certainly cases where accusation of plagiarism furthered one's career by harming a competitor, such as that by as-Sarī' ar-Raffā' (d. 362/972) against the Ḥalidīyān brothers (d. 380/990 and c. 390/1000), and some patrons, like the Regent al-Manṣūr in Cordoba (r. 368–92/978–1002), pleased themselves in the role of adjudicating poetic disputes. But generally, discourse on borrowing was not driven by trying to incriminate the later poet, but rather meant to establish a motif pedigree and evaluate the aesthetic success of the borrowing.

The age of al-Mutanabbī witnesses a rise of interest in motif history in which broader sense *sariqāt*, literally "thefts," should be understood.³² Al-Mutanabbī in particular fueled this debate by allegedly denying his debt to any predecessors.³³ Al-Ḥātimī devotes an entire meeting with the poet proving his dependence on the early Abbasid classics Abū Tammām and al-Buḥturī.³⁴ Al-'Amīdī, author of another of the many works that proved the poet wrong on this point makes clear that the borrowing *per se* was not the target of criticism, rather the quality of the new rendition, and he faults the poet's enthusiastic supporters for

³¹ 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Ğurğānī, *Asrār al-balāġa*, ed. H. Ritter (Cairo: Maktabat al-Mutanabbī, 1399/1979), 241–5 (16.1) and 251 (16.6), translated by Geert Jan van Gelder and Marlé Hammond (eds.) in *Takhyil: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics* (Oxford: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008), 30–2 and 36. Al-Mutanabbī's examples are identical with *Ḥātimīya* 47/44A+100M, 38/32 and 23/22.

³² See n. 14.

³³ The Ḥalidīyān brothers dismiss the truth of this denial; see 'Abbās, *Ta'riḥ*, 380.

³⁴ Al-Ḥātimī, *ar-Risāla al-Muḍāḥa*, 157–95 (fourth debate).

ignoring the literary tradition from which he drew and against which his oeuvre should be measured:

Do those who profess allegiance to him have any insight into good borrowing, subtle taking, well-rendered plagiarism, modes of transfer [between genres], hiding of the ways of theft (*salb*), obscuring of the places of inversion (*qalb*), altering of form and order, switching of the distant for the close, and exhausting the mind with straightening and pruning?... I do not deny finding perfection in the conditions of borrowing when [al-Mutanabbī] notices a novel theme, nor [do I deny] his reaching the utter limits in stripping (*salh*) a motif [from its original wording] and dressing it with his own words.³⁵

Did the poet improve a model, stay at the same level, or spoil it? Only in the last case was the borrowing blameworthy. Al-Ḥātīmī himself already uses part of this terminology in the *Mūdiḥa*, and the three classes of borrowings would become standard in scholastic literary criticism, such as al-Ḥaṭīb al-Qazwīnī's (d. 739/1338) *Talḥiṣ al-Miftāḥ*.³⁶ Evaluation of the borrowings was what fans and foes of al-Mutanabbī fervently disagreed about.

According to the rules of *sariqa*, aesthetics even provided a way to acquire authorship of an extant verse, to wit, it belonged to whoever succeeded best in formulating a given idea, irrespective of the chronology. The better rendition of an earlier motif thus entitled the later poet to rightfully claim it as his (*istiḥqāq*). The concept of earned ownership was applied *mutatis mutandis* to the recipients of praise poets, and an earlier patron could be faulted for "plagiarizing" praise that fitted better to a later recipient. Ibn ar-Rūmī, who loved logical twists, makes this very argument for his patron, the Ṭāhirid governor of Baḡdād 'Ubayd Allāh ibn 'Abd Allāh (d. 300/913):

Of all praise, said about people from old,
you rightly own two-thirds.

Poetry judged thus in your favor out of gratitude to you,
you best steward and tender [of it]!...

The *imāms* of poetry said about you what they said
without [verification by] sight or encounter [i.e., for they preceded you].

³⁵ Al-ʿAmidī's *Ibāna*, 23 (see n. 2).

³⁶ *Mūdiḥa*, 150–4 (third debate); on borrowings, see Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Sariqa," EI², vol. 12 (suppl.), 707–9, including an extensive bibliography, and Amidu Sanni, "The Historic Encounter," (see note 11).

How much well-wrought praise of someone else means you,
while bearing the name of so-and-so...

You deserve it more than someone
slothful and lagging in high deeds.³⁷

Enhancement by Pedigree Even if no ownership was claimed, to place a later verse in the context of an earlier rendition was a tribute to the poet who manipulated the registers of the literary tradition. Invention was no great merit in itself, even if some poets, like Ibn ar-Rūmī and al-Mutanabbī were more known for it. To rewrite and improve an extant motif was seen as more demanding, and it gave the audience the added pleasure of recognition and variation of the familiar. With verse recreating the topoi of the literary tradition, the tracing of antecedents was easy, and the commentaries of Ibn Ġinnī (d. 392/1002), al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1075), and Pseudo-ʿUkbarī (d. 616/1219) abound with proof verses (*ṣawāhid*) of earlier poets.³⁸ Gnostic verses, however were harder to tie to a precedent and many of them remain literary-historical orphans: in nearly half of the cases in Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary, an Aristotelian sententia remains the sole parallel provided.

The many manuscripts of the second epistle vary in the number of pairings, and not all of them recur in the commentary.³⁹ A comparison of the two editions with the commentary shows one abbreviated wording of a maxim in the latter (88/79), and the shift of another to the following verse (85/85). The effort of the commentators and poeticsians to identify precedents becomes visible in one verse receiving three different "origins," namely two Aristotelian maxims, one in each of the editions by Rescher and al-Būstanī, and the last words of al-Ḥālid ibn al-Walīd in Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary:

If there is no escape from death,
it is a weakness to be a coward (65/96, M, D IV: 274: 9).

To fear the occurrence of adversity before life's expiration is softness of character (A; B).

³⁷ Ibn ar-Rūmī, *Dīwān*, eds. Ḥusayn Naṣṣār et al., 6 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub, 1973–1981), vol. 6, no. 1373, 180–1, 186, and 191–2. The concept of forward plagiarism has lately been introduced to modern literary criticism; cf. Pierre Bayard, *Le plagiat par anticipation* (Paris: Minuit, 2009); and François Le Lyonnais et al., *La littérature potentielle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973).

³⁸ The commentary by al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1057) only uses paraphrase.

³⁹ The maxims of the pairs 6/8, 7/5, 19/19, 26/25, 31/80, 39/81, 47/44A+100M, 57/53 58/54, 65M/96, 68/65, 70/76, 75/71, 79/61, 87/97, and 94/75 are absent in Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary. 70/76 quotes instead lengthy paraphrases by the previous commentators Ibn Ġinnī, al-Wāḥidī, al-ʿArūḍī, and Ibn Fūraḡḡa (d. after 437/1045).

People are like plants, they are sown and harvested, while the earth remains the same (A; R).

Al-Ḥālīd ibn al-Walīd: My body bears a hundred thrusts and blows, and here I am dying a natural death? May God not soothe the cowards! (D).

But how did the great philosopher come to corroborate al-Mutanabbī? The Arabic poetic tradition was markedly separate from philosophy, including philosophical poetics, until the age of al-Qaṭṭāḡannī (d. 684/1285). Al-Buḥṭurī had famously faulted Ibn ar-Rūmī for spoiling his poetry with logic.⁴⁰ Even though, Aristotle had joined the canon of exemplary figures in Abbasid-period poetry. Ibn ar-Rūmī satirized the Christian scribe Šāʿid ibn Maḥlad and his son al-ʿAlāʾ with, “He praises his foolish son, preoccupied with the tales of Aristotle.”⁴¹ Al-Mutanabbī praises his last patron, the Būyid vizier Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970), by calling him Aristotle, “Raṣṭālīs,” with little regard for spelling.⁴² Sporadically Aristotle is also recognized as the source of versified prose (*ʿaqd an-naṭr*, *naẓm an-naṭr*), which, together with the reverse, prosification, gained in importance with the rise of epistolary prose in the fourth/tenth century.⁴³ The philologist al-Mubarrad (d. 285/898) traces gnomic verses on the death of Alexander by the ascetic poet Abū l-ʿAtāhiya (d. 213/828) to the philosopher, as does the poetic critic Ibn Ṭabaṭabāʾ (d. 322/934) for the same motif treated by the preacher-poet Šāliḥ ibn ʿAbd al-Quddūs (executed c. 167/783) in a chapter on “Poets’ beautiful borrowings from pre-existing motifs” (*ḥusn tanāwul aš-šāʿir li-l-māʾānī llātī subīqa ilayhā*).⁴⁴ In *al-Muḍḍiḥa*, al-Ḥātimī traces a verse of al-Mutanabbī on the motif of stopping time to Aristotle via the Abbasid poet an-Nāḡim (d. 314/926)⁴⁵ and, in Pseudo-ʿUkbarī’s commentary, another one to him directly.⁴⁶ Men of letters, such as

⁴⁰ Beatrice Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 210, 260, and 314 n. 45.

⁴¹ *Dīwān* V, no. 987: 70. The poet also mocks the father’s Arabic pronunciation with, “The speech defect of the Christians affects him so that [even] the treatment of Hippocrates fails” (v. 60).

⁴² D II: 124: 39 and 41. He also calls him Alexander and Ptolemy.

⁴³ For an introduction, see Amidu Sanni, *The Arabic Theory of Prosification and Versification* (Beirut-Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998).

⁴⁴ For the first, see Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature*, 464; for the second, Ibn Ṭabaṭabāʾ, *Iyār aš-šīʿr*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Šāliḥ al-Mānī (Riyadh: Dār al-ʿUlūm: 1405/1985), 130–1; and Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī*, 27.

⁴⁵ Bisāṭī, *Ibāna*, 260; and Bonebakker, *Ḥātimī*, 20. In Pseudo-ʿUkbarī’s commentary to this verse (D II: 103: 16) Aristotle is not credited.

⁴⁶ *wa-ḍakara l-Ḥātimī anna ḥāḍā l-bayt min qawl al-ḥakīm* (78A+64M/99).

the vizier Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) deemed ignorance of the great philosopher unacceptable, “A man of excellence must follow in the meanings [of his writings] the way of Aristoteles, for he prepared the paths of wisdom... God created him in a propitious era,... inspired him with perceptive sententiae, and perfected on his tongue the truth of those nations that have come before.... Only a dull-witted commoner (ʿammī ḥaṣwī) ignores the rank of this philosopher.”⁴⁷ Given the popularity of al-Mutanabbī from Iran to al-Andalus already during his lifetime, he deserved a worthy precedent for his gnomic verse, and the First Teacher provided a fitting candidate. The mention of the philosopher’s name in the indisputably authentic first epistle by the earliest authority on al-Mutanabbī’s borrowings, al-Ḥātīmī, may have been the missing link for attributing the second epistle to him as well (lest its authenticity be still proven). Once his authority was accepted, the second epistle could be cross-referenced in the first or attached to it by a narrative link, as was done in two manuscripts.

The Description of the Relationship to Aristotle The second epistle as well as Pseudo-ʿUkbarī (1/1, 12/12) clearly identify Aristotle as the source of most gnomic sayings, the latter referring to him thereafter simply as *al-ḥakīm*. But Aristotle is not the only textual basis offered. He shares credits with the Qurʾān (78A+64M/99), Ḥadīṭ (49/45), the pre-Islamic Arabic sage Luqmān (90/88), Caliph Umar II (93/91) and his son (94/75), a Bedouin (83A+68M/65), proverbial lore (80/62), and Arabic poets, cited side-by-side with his sayings. Occasionally the ascription to him is disputed; Ibn Wakīʿ (d. 393/1003) twice derives a verse from the “people of the craft,” whereas Pseudo-ʿUkbarī prefers Aristotle.⁴⁸ Ibn Fūraġġa (d. after 437/1045) exposes one pairing as relying on a questionable interpretation of the verse by al-Ḥātīmī (62/40).⁴⁹ Pseudo-ʿUkbarī faults al-Wāḥidī tacitly for not being aware of an Aristotelian precedent.⁵⁰ Inversely Pseudo-ʿUkbarī traces to the Qurʾān a verse al-Ḥātīmī had credited to Aristotle.⁵¹

⁴⁷ [Pseudo-]Ṣiġistānī, Abū Sulaymān, *Muntaḥab Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Tehran: Intiṣārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1974), 151/ed. D. M. Dunlop (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 48. Hereafter the edition by Badawī is cited.

⁴⁸ *lam yaʿḥudhu min al-ḥakīm wa-innamā aḥada min ahl ṣināʿatihi* (1/1), represented by six *ṣawāhid*; *wa-laysa kamā qāla [Ibn Wakīʿ, who adduces ʿAlī ibn Zayd] innamā naqalahū min al-ḥakīm* (14/14).

⁴⁹ Al-ʿUṭaybī, *Naqd al-Ḥātīmī*, (see n. 11), 183. However, in 72/69 Aristotle corroborates the commentators’ charge that Ibn Ginnī misunderstood this verse.

⁵⁰ *wa-hādā l-bayt fihi ḥikma lam yaḍkurhā al-Wāḥidī* (10/10).

⁵¹ See n. 46.

This being said, the exact nature of the relationship between sententiae and verses was not insisted upon. The *Hātimīya*'s title and preface envision both options: a meeting of minds between poet and philosopher, or the poet's study of him.⁵² In Pseudo-ʿUkbarī's commentary the Aristotelian maxims seem often adduced as a parallel more than as an origin. The bulk of the attributions are worded loosely as "from the [words of] the Philosopher" or "with a look toward the Philosopher."⁵³ But in a few cases, Pseudo-ʿUkbarī labels the maxim as the "root" (*aṣl*) and the verse as "borrowed" (*ma'ḥūd*) or "transferred" (*manqūl*) from it.⁵⁴ In two cases both al-Mutanabbī and his poetic models are traced back to the philosopher.⁵⁵ One may however posit that *aṣl* was intended in a disciplinary manner, giving precedence to philosophy proper over its poetic formulation, and not suggesting a textual filiation.

Comparison with Gnomologia Whence derived these sayings that stood in for the philosopher? As a genre they belong to popular philosophy, in the form of gnomologies, such as Ḥunayn ibn Ishāq's (d. 260/873) *Anecdotes of the Philosophers*, or *Ethical Sayings of the Philosophers* (*Nawādir al-falāsifa* or *Ādāb al-falāsifa*),⁵⁶ the *Depository of Wisdom/Philosophy* (*Ṣiḡwān al-ḥikma*) attributed to Abū Sulaymān as-Siġistānī (d. after 377/987–88) but authored by a student of al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992) and extant in three later recensions (see note 47), and Mubaššir ibn Fātik's *Choicest Maxims and Best Sayings* (*Muḥṭār al-ḥikam wa-maḥāsin al-kalim*), written in 440/1048–9 and famously received in Europe as *Bocados de Oro*.⁵⁷ The sententiae increased in circulation in particular during the half century following the death of al-Mutanabbī. They did not, as Dimitri Gutas has shown, reflect the actual teachings of the philosophers they were attributed to, but formed a separate literary genre of biographical tidbits and *bon mots*. These had been collected and re-shaped by the Stoics and the Cynics for doxographical purposes and transmitted through the Alexandrian

⁵² Al-ʿUṭaybī argues for the latter option (1424/[2003], 176–7).

⁵³ *huwa/hādā min qawl/kalām al-ḥakīm; qāla al-ḥakīm; kalām min kalām al-ḥakīm* (95/76 et passim); *wa-fihi naẓar ilā qawl al-ḥakīm* (4/3).

⁵⁴ *wa-aṣluḥū/aṣlu l-bayt min qawl al-ḥakīm* (14/14 and 92/90).

⁵⁵ *hādā kulluhu min qawl al-ḥakīm* (50/46); *wa-aṣlu hādā kullihī min qawl al-ḥakīm*, the models are three *ṣawāhid*, one of them by Ḥatīm Ṭāʾī, and one *ḥadīṭ* (48/97), or a verse by Ḥalīl ibn Aḥmad (49/45).

⁵⁶ Abridged by M. al-Anṣārī, ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Safat, Kuwait: Institute of Arab Manuscripts, 1406/1985).

⁵⁷ Ed. ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān Badawī (Madrid: Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos, 1377/1957).

School tradition.⁵⁸ They were received distorted and out of context by the Arab audience, yet this did not prevent them from becoming very popular, as their both edifying and entertaining content met the requirements of *adab* literature. In al-Mutanabbī's lifetime gnomologies had entered the canon of fine literature. They were used in letters and cited in the gatherings of the Būyid elite. In at-Tawhīdī's (d. c. 414/1023) works, maxims have merged completely into the canon of quotable *adab*, sharing the page with poetry, Qur'an, and prophetic tradition.⁵⁹

A cursory survey of the edited gnomologia and gnomological material in *adab* literature could duplicate only few maxims from the *Hātimīya*, such as the near-verbatim parallel in Mubaššir ibn Fātik's *Muḥtār al-ḥikam*, on the minimum of virtue being abstention from vice, although the saying is also attributed in a shorter formulation to Plato in the *Šiwān al-ḥikma*.⁶⁰ Four further maxims match closely with the *Muḥtār*, but three of these are there attributed to other philosophers.⁶¹ In style, the *Hātimīya*'s maxims are similar to the rhetorical polish and use of antithesis and paronomasia of Mubaššir's work. The author of the *Hātimīya*, whoever he may be, is closest in content and style to Mubaššir (or his sources). The dearth of verbatim matches may also indicate that a closer model existed which has not survived or remains unedited. The collections have a complex textual history and await a comprehensive critical edition beyond the individual collections that exhibit much overlap and variation in the wording of

⁵⁸ Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature*, 451–69; cf. also his "The *Šiwān al-ḥikma* Cycle of Texts," *JAOS* 102 (1982), 645–50, with a review of the editions by D. M. Dunlop and 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī.

⁵⁹ See his collection described in the *Imtā'* (Gutas, *Greek Wisdom Literature*, 459–60) and the *Baṣā'ir* as a whole. For the use of such gnomes, or *chreiae*, for didactic purposes by Cynics, Stoics, and Peripatetics, see the Ph.D. thesis by Denis Michael Searby, *Aristotle in the Greek Gnomological Tradition* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1998), 28–37.

⁶⁰ 92/90; *idā lam taqdir 'alā fi'li l-faḍā'ili, fa-l-takun faḍā'iluka tarka r-radā'ili* = Mubaššir, *Muḥtār al-ḥikam* 198:14 *man lam yaqdir 'alā fi'li faḍīlatin fa-l-yakun hammuhū tarka raḍīlatin*; cf. also *Šiwān al-ḥikma*, ed. Badawī, 129: 6–7 *awwalu l-ḥayri tarku š-šarri wa-awwalu š-šarri tarku l-ḥayri*. See further the loose parallel 70/67.

⁶¹ 3/2 = *Muḥtār* 200:18 attributed to Aristotle; 98/77 = *Muḥtār* 174:3, 52/56 = *Muḥtār* 157:4–5 and 165:2–3, attributed to Plato; and 26/25 = *Muḥtār*, 76: ult. (also Hunayn, *Ādāb al-falāsifa* 112, 12–13 and PQ P16) attributed to Diogenes or Pythagoras. In the last maxim, *Hātimīya* and *Muḥtār* share the analogy of a beautiful face with a house, whereas PQ's analogy is with a vessel. See also 'Abbas, *Ta'riḥ*, 245–7; I discount the loose parallel with 48/97 given by 'Abbas.

single maxims. But the loose fit is also owed to the fact that prose sayings did not obey the strict verbatim transmission of verses, safeguarded by the prosody and literary etiquette. Definite pronouncement on the dependance from any particular gnomological text must therefore wait. Many *Ḥātimīya* maxims, it is true, coincide in essence with Aristotelian and Pseudo-Aristotelian lore on subjects such as man's distinction from animals,⁶² the proper use of wealth,⁶³ a fool's incapacity for an education,⁶⁴ or his ignorance of his ignorance.⁶⁵ But similar overlaps of a maxim's gist can be found with sayings attributed to Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and Socrates,⁶⁶ and they are little convincing. As a whole, the adduced maxims are often contradictory. Some have a Neoplatonic otherworldly flavor, focusing on the ephemerality and deception of life, death, and the next world (e.g., 9/9, 11/11, 14/14, 58/54, 63M/41, 73/96, 84/84, 86/86, and 87/98), others are pragmatic, giving advice about pursuing earthly fulfillment and ambition (1/1, 49/45, 66/69, 81/63, and 71/68), showing the proper attitude to material wealth (36/30, 50/46, 61/39, 74/94A, 77/33, and 90/88), and interacting with people (60/38 and 72/67). The entry on Aristotle, for example, in the "Selection of Sayings of the Four Great Philosophers," a recension of the *Ṣiwān*, is indeed heterogeneous; it comprises genuine and apocryphal elements, some translated from the Greek, such as the gnomological material, some composed in Arabic, such as the Pseudo-Aristotelian cycle of letters to Alexander.⁶⁷ Moreover, the first half of the 5th/11th century saw an accretion of previously anonymous maxims to the name of Aristotle in new pseudepigraphic

⁶² 76/72; cf. PQ A23 = *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* 143: 11–12 = *Muḥtār* 206: 8–9. The saying is still anonymous in Hunayn's translation.

⁶³ 39/61; cf. PQ A39 = *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma* 145: 10–12.

⁶⁴ 41A+59M/55 and 51/47; Hunayn, *Ādāb al-falāsifa*, 81: 8 = *Muḥtār* 204: 12–13.

⁶⁵ 73/70; cf. Hunayn, *Ādāb al-falāsifa*, 81: 6–7 = PQ P36. The formulation is closer to al-Mutanabbī's verse than the *Ḥātimīya*'s maxim.

⁶⁶ Respectively: adding to perfection decreases it, 43/58, cf. *Imtāʿ* vol. 2, 35: 10–14; man needs nothing beyond sufficiency, 93/91, cf. *Imtāʿ* vol. 2, 36: 10–11; the analogy between the human body and a craftsman's tool, 28/27, cf. *Imtāʿ* vol. 2, 34: 12–13; for the poet's use of this analogy, see note 69.

⁶⁷ See the edition and analysis by Gutas (*Greek Wisdom Literature*, 427 and 446), who refers to this recension as "Philosophers' Quartet" (PQ). Already at-Tawḥīdī notes a philosopher's rejecting Aristotle's authorship of one of the letters attributed to him; *Baṣāʾir* vol. 9, 216–7. A recent edition was prepared by Miklós Maróth, *The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great* (Piliscsaba: Avicenna Institute, 2006), reviewed by Dimitri Gutas, "On Graeco-Arabic Epistolary 'Novels,'" *MEL* 12 (2009), 59–70.

compilations, such as "The Ethics of Aristotle" (*Ādāb Aristūṭālīs*) and the *Sirr al-asrār* (*Secretum secretorum*), and orphan sententiae turned "Aristotelian."⁶⁸ This coincides with the date of the earliest and anonymous *Ḥātimīya* manuscripts and suggests a composition in the second half of the eleventh century. The ascription to al-Ḥātimī must then have fallen sometime between Ibn Munqid and Ibn al-Aṭīr around the turn of the 7th/13th century.

In direct opposition to the incomplete fit with the gnomologia, the *Ḥātimīya* exhibits a critical mass of pairs in which a verse perfectly renders the kernel of the adduced saying. Even more striking, in many of the couplets, essential words coincide, as can be seen in the underlinings of the translated passages in the second part of this essay. In a few cases, a syntactical feature, trope, or phrase are identical.⁶⁹ These parallels are more numerous than those found with the gnomological tradition and raise the possibility that the sayings in their quoted form were influenced by the wording of the verses.

Similarity in Form and Content The sheer amount of thematic correspondences means that al-Mutanabbī had at least a brushing of popular philosophy, and the quest for echoes of Aristotle in al-Mutanabbī's verse was a function of reading him according to the reigning general culture. This was not difficult as the virtues put into Aristotle's mouth were basic and universal and indeed similar to those al-Mutanabbī adopted in his poetic role. The poet could literally have stood by the philosopher's supposed daily lessons to Alexander on the four subjects of justice, wisdom, courage, and chastity, all constituents of Mutanabbian *fahṛ*.⁷⁰ His disabused outlook on life, scorn of ignorance, low expectations from human nature versus high demands on himself coincided with Cynic tendencies in the gnomologies. Al-Mutanabbī's genius consisted in marrying the stylistic complexity of late Abbāsīd mannerism with plain insights into the human

⁶⁸ The *Ādāb* is preserved in Ibn Miskawayh's (d. 421/1030) *al-Ḥikma al-ḥālida* (ed. Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya, 1952), 219–25 and 266–70. It shows no verbatim overlap with the *Ḥātimīya*.

⁶⁹ Superlative construction (66/92); the paradox of "being envied for what one weeps over," *al-ḥālu llati yabkī minhā l-'āqilu yaḥsduhū 'alayhā l-ḡāhīlu/innī bi-mā ana bākin maḥsūdu* (67/82); *kāna lahū awwalu/kānat lahunna awā'ilu* (53/49); "he who has little wealth," *man qalla māluhū* (46/60); "how come we loathe" *mā bālunā na'āfu* occurring in the verse of 94/75 and the maxim of the next following pair in both R and B; *tark aḍ-ḍamm* (70/67); the body as tool, *ālat al-ḡism/ālat al-'ayṣ*, recurring in 28/27 and the following verse in the same ode.

⁷⁰ *Ṣiwān al-ḥikma*, 147, 17–19.

condition in a way that rang true. Gnostic verses and gnostic sayings thus fitted each other doubly in message and rhetoric. The similarity must have struck al-Mutanabbī's educated contemporaries. Looking at both separate corpora, as they gained currency in the eleventh century, it was not surprising that they were mapped upon each other, and perhaps unavoidable.

To find philosophical statements thus undergirding his verse was a credit to him, an argument that the second epistle and those passages of the first that refer to it explicitly make. Al-Mutanabbī showed himself to be a poet of the broader intellectual universe of his time. He is also the first to be honored systematically with a philosophical model—a case in point that a newly found antecedent can elevate the status of a later text. What is more, the ascription showed an ambition on behalf of commentators, such as Pseudo-'Ukbarī, to show off their own broader knowledge.

II. *The Gnostic Verses in the Poetic Context*

The question of origin and attribution, however, does not help understand the success of those verses nor al-Mutanabbī's creative integration of them in his odes. How did he make the philosophical tone so convincingly his own? This I will address in the remainder of this essay, looking at the context in which the gnostic verses appear in the poet's odes. The verses figure in all major poetic themes (see tabulation in Appendix C). Most frequently they belong to the theme of *ḥikma* or *ṣakwā d-dahr*, and they appear either singly or in groups. Both scattered and clustered sententiae retain their impersonal form or include a general "you" or "we." This use, closest to the original format of the maxim is the most frequent (ca. 60 *per cent* of the verses).

Single sententiae are interspersed into passages of praise poetry (*madīḥ*),⁷¹ lament, blame of fate, boast, and love poetry. They often serve as poetic confirmation or argument for the preceding verses and can be combined with graphic analogies. Poeticians label the first use *tawkīd* or *iḥtiṣāḡ* and the added image *tamīl*.⁷² Analogies also

⁷¹ This also includes blame, or *'itāb*, e.g., of the Byzantine enemy 32/36.

⁷² See Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry*, 207; examples of analogies, all from *madīḥ*, are 35/29; 15/15 on seeing vs. hearing; 92/90; 93/91 a book analogy; 30/35 on Byzantines killed by their own siege machines.

conclude sections (61/39, 62/40) or entire poems (93/91). Clustered *sententia* form passages of *ḥikma* in the preludes of a panegyric ode (IV: 243) and a lamentation (I: 39).

A series of *sententiae* thus appears in the lament of Sayf ad-Dawla's younger sister, who died in 344/955. Al-Mutanabbī, it appears, produced as many quotables in his laments of women (his own and his patrons' relatives) as in his praises of male patrons. The poet addresses first the monarch as being above anyone's consolation. He has so busied the death fates with his battles, that the poet wonders at their ability to search for further victims. Then he turns to the deceased, reinterpreting her passing as a deliberate choice over remaining single, unmatched by any male, and enduring the trials of old age. The verse however restricts the maxim to earthly cares by making death the response to the denial of joy in life:

Delicious life is too precious (*anfas*) to the soul (*nafs*),
too desirable and sweet to be found frustrating (27/26, M, D III: 190: 25).
When the philosophical soul finds its essence, it attaches itself to the
upper world and does not stoop to earthly cares, nor does frustration
touch it (A).

These trials are illustrated in the following verse:

When the old man says "Ugh," he is not frustrated with life
but he is frustrated with his own weakness (28/27, M, D III: 190: 26).
Fatigue and frustration attach to the bodies because of the weakness of
the body as a tool (A).

An intervening verse that reuses the "tool" metaphor of the preceding Aristotelian maxim is not paired with a maxim but included among aṭ-Ṭa'ālibī's list of "rarities":

Health and youth are the tool of life.
When they depart from man, he [too] departs (D III: 190: 27).

The next verse is matched again with a maxim whose syntactic parallelism and paranomasia make it more pointed than the verse:

The world ever takes back that which it bestows,
if only her generosity were stinginess! (29/34, M, D III: 190: 28).
The world feeds its children and eats its newborn (A).

As on many other occasions, in two of the three parallels (vv. 25–6) the Aristotelian maxim is the only textual model offered in the commentary, while verse 27 receives no model at all. Of the three cases, verse 25

gives a more worldly outlook than the maxim. The other two verses (26 and 28) coincide with the gist of their maxim.

Another maxim cluster appears in the *ḥikma* section of the lament of ‘Aḍud ad-Dawla’s aunt, the poem with the highest amount of pairings in the commentary. The ode begins with al-Mutanabbī calling the fates ashamed of themselves, had they known the pain they inflicted upon ‘Aḍud ad-Dawla (1–7). He follows with a *ḥikma* passage, calling all life ephemeral and death a necessity:

We are children of the dead, how come we loathe
that which we must irrevocably swallow? (94/75, M, D I: 39: 10)
To hate that which must irrevocably be is a weakness in the sound intellect (A in R, B).

Here the commentary lacks the Aristotelian maxim and quotes instead a letter of condolence by ‘Umar II, “We are relatives of the family of the hereafter, living in this world, dead, fathers of the dead, children of the dead, and wondrous is a mortal, writing to a mortal, consoling him about a mortal.” The ode ensues:

Our hands are stingy with our spirits to a time
from which they were taken (95/76, M, D I: 39: 11).
If our spirits come into being through the recurrence of the days, how
come we loathe their return to their place? (A).

For these spirits are from the air of time
and these bodies are from the dust of time (96/73 M, D I: 39: 12).
The ethereal [parts] are heavenly and the solid [parts] earthly, so each
element returns to its origin (A).

If the passionate lover contemplated the end of the beauty of his beloved,
he would not love him (97/74 M, D I: 39: 13).
Reflection about the outcome of things adds to their truth, and love
passion is the senses’ being blind to gaining a view of the beloved (A).

The next three intervening verses are not attributed to Aristotle, but one, illustrating the idea that death is a fate equal to all beings, belongs again to at-Ta‘ālibī’s list:

The shepherd dies with his ignorance,
and Galen dies with his knowledge of medicine (D I: 39: 15).

The last pair reformulates the idea in general terms:

The end of the utterly peaceful man
is like the end of the utterly belligerent man (98/77, M, D I: 39: 17).

The end of excessive caution is the beginning of the very source of the fear (A).

In three of the five pairs, the commentary adduces Aristotle as the only textual parallel, and in most cases, philosophical maxim and verse coincide in their substance. A difference in degree occurs in the love verse (97/74), where Aristotle's condemnation of love as blindness is stronger than that in the poetry, and the focus shifts in the death verse (98/77), where al-Mutanabbī calls all deaths the same, whereas Aristotle makes fear bring about that which is feared. However, in another pair of similar content, both parts match perfectly in sense and syntax (75/71).

Another group of sayings is more integrated into the dramaturgy and impersonated by one of the ode's characters, for example the recipient of *madīḥ*. In a poem of excuse to Sayf ad-Dawla that contains several maxims, al-Mutanabbī attributes perspicacity to his patron for discerning that the accusations leveled against the poet by his enemies were false. He combines the sententia with an analogy:

Your wisdom is wisdom, not its affectation,
daubed antimony in eyes is not like their [true] blackness (17/17, M, D
III: 182: 43).

The difference between the affected and the natural is like the difference
between lie and truth (A).

Another patron, Badr ibn 'Ammār, is described as seeking death in battle and posthumous fame, which is corroborated with an Aristotelian statement on the eternal life of souls. In typical *madīḥ* fashion, the poet pairs excessive courage with excessive generosity in a double antithetical parallelism:

As if through poverty, you sought wealth
and through death in battle eternity (58/54, M, D I: 71: 16).

The death of souls is their life and their absence their existence, because
they rejoin their upper world (A).⁷³

Most often, or in approximately one third of the verses, the poet himself uses the philosopher's words, in the various roles he takes throughout the ode. This may come as first person statement⁷⁴ or a self-address or

⁷³ Further impersonated sententiae in *madīḥ* are 4/3, 15/15, 16/16, and 17/17, all from an ode of excuse to Sayf ad-Dawla; 22/4, 23/22, and 79/61.

⁷⁴ In *nasīb* 52/48 and 54/50; in *faḥr* 21/21 and 25/24.

self-exhortation in the second person.⁷⁵ In the *nasīb*, the poet performs the lover. Within an ode in praise of Sayf ad-Dawla, the poet argues for his faithful love by making this a character trait, concurring with an Aristotelian maxim:

The heart is bidden to forget you
but nature rejects him who wants to alter it (3/2, M, D III: 176: 2).
The wish to alter nature from its cravings is well-nigh impossible (A).⁷⁶

Another maxim motivates the lover's scorn at threats by the kin of his sweetheart. This *nasīb* occurs in the above-mentioned ode of excuse to Sayf ad-Dawla:

Abandonment is more fatal than that which I expect [from your
kinsfolk],
I am drowning, why should I fear getting wet? (14/14, M, D III: 182: 6)
For him who knows that all being is destined to die, blows of fate are
contemptible (A).

In a third *nasīb* the poet uses a sententia to depict himself as not easily falling in love so as to emphasize the virulence of his present passion:

The sweetest passion is that in which the lover doubts about encounter
and abandonment,
so that he hopes and fears forever (18/18, M, D II: 152: 4).
Hope is wishing and doubt is hesitation, both are the source of expectation (A).

In the three previous cases, the maxim has been general and specified by the poet to women's love. A different love is what the poet feels for his patron Sayf ad-Dawla, and the concomitant maxim corroborates the mental nature of this devotion. The commentator notes the poet's switch of the maxim's subject from knowledge to love, a common strategy to conceal a poetic borrowing:⁷⁷

Little love with sense is beneficial,
But much love with foolishness is harmful (8/6, M, D I: 59: 44).
A little light of perception is better than much memorization of wisdom
(A).

⁷⁵ In *nasīb* 53/49; in *faḥr* 71/68, 72/69, 84/84, and 85/85; in blame of fate 63M/41.

⁷⁶ See verbal overlap with an Aristotelian maxim in Mubaššir, *Muḥtār*, 200: 18; cf. 'Abbās, *Ta'rīḥ*, 245–6 (see n. 61 above).

⁷⁷ *hādā mimma naqalahū Abū ṭ-Ṭayyib min kalām al-ḥakīm ilā l-maḥabba.*

In a reverse manner, where a sententia explicitly discusses love, al-Mutanabbī generalizes it. It occurs in a passage on the blame of fate, in which the poet chastises people for pursuing those ephemeral desires that he himself has foresworn:

What harms people of passion is that they love
without knowing the world or understanding it (46/43, M, D IV: 273: 5).
Passion is a compulsion that enters the soul without the lover's awareness of that compulsion entering him (A).

More often the poetic persona of al-Mutanabbī adopts a philosophical flavor in boasting (*faḥr*) and blaming fate (*šakwā d-dahr*). A major subject of boast is his own poetic prowess. Here Aristotle serves to justify the poet's not stooping to respond to a poetaster wont to compete with him:

Conceitedness is not my habit with them, however,
an ignorant man pretending reason is abhorrent to me (25/24, M, D III: 189: 28).

Wisdom shows the philosopher that there is a knowledge above his knowledge, and he is modest before this higher knowledge, whereas the ignorant man thinks that he has reached the full extent and errs in his ignorance, so that the souls dislike him (A).⁷⁸

This prowess often fails to be recognized by others. In a boast composed in his youth, the poet belittles the double ignorance of those who grasp neither his knowledge nor their own ignorance of it. Aristotle's maxim substantiates this and adds the analogy of an incurable disease:

An ignoramus who ignores his own ignorance
and ignores my knowledge of his ignorance of me (73/70, M, D III: 197: 3).

For him who does not know his sickness, recovery cannot be achieved (A).

Al-Mutanabbī's expectations from others are low. In a passage on the blame of fate, the poet condemns his fellow men and patrons and embraces poverty and adversity, succinctly rendering an Aristotelian thought and pairing it with contempt for his patrons' empty promises:

I see people and my gain is from cattle,
and [I hear] the mention of generosity, and my gain is words (76/72, M, D IV: 233: 15).

⁷⁸ A similar feeling is expressed in 91/89 as a contrast to the courage and education of the patron al-Qāḍī al-Anṭākī.

He whose concern it is to eat, drink and cohabit has the nature of beasts,
because beasts left to their own devices prefer nothing to this (A).

In a *fahr* passage of an ode praising al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Hamaḍānī, the poet claims a stronger stance, traced to Aristotle in R and B (but not by Pseudo-ʿUkbarī), challenging his blamers to admit his excellence at least tacitly:

People benefit from my every rare word and requite [me]
with abstaining from blame, if it not be praise (70/67, M, D II: 75: 35).
The first level of virtue is to abstain from blame, thereafter perfection [of
virtue] is praise (A).⁷⁹

High status, though it be the envy of others, comes nonetheless with suffering. In the parting satire of the Egyptian regent Kāfūr, following a *ḥamriya* marred by the absence of the beloved and a description of his patron Kāfūr as depriving and confining him, the poet laments the mistreatment he endured all the while being begrudged his status. Here he eloquently improves upon the prose of the Aristotelian parallel, as the commentator Pseudo-ʿUkbarī remarks (*naẓama wa-aḥsana*):

Of what I encountered in the world the most wondrous is
that I am envied for that over which I weep (67/82, M, D II: 86: 9).
The insight [*istibṣār*, emended after Pseudo-ʿUkbarī] of the rational man
is the opposite of the wish of the ignorant man, and a circumstance a
rational man weeps over an ignorant man envies him for (A).

But the poet makes clear that his suffering is not dependence, and in the following verse, he boasts a detachment from wealth, or the freedom of nothing left to loose:

I became carefree, wealthy, both my hand and my treasurer,
I am rich, promises are my possessions (68A+M83/83, M, D II: 86: 10).
He is not rich whom greed rules and wishes dominate (A).

Others may blame him, but he remains aloof from complaining to them. In a lament of Abū Šuġāʿ Fātik, he exhorts himself not to accuse people:

Do not complain to people and chastise them,
like an injured man complaining to ravens and carrion birds (85/85, M,
D IV: 257: 32).

⁷⁹ A verbatim parallel with Mubaššir, *Muḥtār* (see n. 60).

All beings seek to overcome [*mutaḡallib* emendation from R] each other, so complaining to one another is not useful conduct (*siyāsa*) (A).

However, for himself al-Mutanabbī sets high goals. In his fever poem he defends his ambitions with his outstanding talent in the manner of *noblesse oblige*, which is likewise traced to Aristotle. Both renditions share the syntactic feature of the superlative (recurring in 69/66 A):

I see no fault in people like the lack of perfection
of those capable of achieving it (66/92, M, D IV: 253: 16).
The worst weakness is that of him who is capable of eliminating his
weakness and does not (A).

By the choice to brave hardship he distinguishes himself as high-minded. In the lament of the above-mentioned Abū Šuḡā⁶, al-Mutanabbī shows himself at his best, boasting his enjoyment of those challenges of life that lesser souls call afflictions:

Praise to the creator of my soul!
How it delights in that which other souls see as the worst pain! (86/86,
M, D IV: 257: 36)
Noble souls see death as eternity, but this is a situation humankind cannot embrace (A).

Elsewhere he shows himself disabused. In the lament of his grandmother—who died from the shock of joy when she received his letter long after he had departed from Kūfa where she had raised him—he concludes the description of his grief over her loss with a philosophical reflection. It is not only traced to Aristotle, but also to an anonymous verse and a Bedouin saw:

I knew the nights before that which they did to us,
And when they struck us, they did not thereby add to our knowledge
(83A+68M/65, M, D IV: 244: 8).
He who looks with his mind's eye and sees the consequences before they
arrive does not suffer at their occurrence (A).

The somber mood also pervades his last poem, the parting ode for 'Aḡud ad-Dawla in which the commentator Pseudo-'Ukbarī detects the poet's premonition of his own death that very year (364/965). The verse epitomizes the paradox of fulfilling the desire of rejoining his distant family at the expense of losing his cherished patron:

You sought to cure ill with ill
so the cure is the most deadly disease (89/87, M, D II: 173: 19).
If the recovery from the soul's sickness is by foolishness, then the cure
is fatal (A).

Conclusion

Al-Mutanabbī's detached pride and disabused heroism bear similarity (although from a more earthly standpoint) with tenets propounded in the gnomological collections. He brilliantly integrates these stylistically and dramatically into his odes and gives rise, in turn, to an ethical poetry that lends itself to single-verse quotation. The ubiquitous use of the gnomic register imbues the persona of al-Mutanabbī with a philosophical aura in the word's common parlance. Thus al-Mutanabbī comes to ventriloquize the Aristotle of popular imagination in his reception during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Whether the poet came across a collection of gnomology during his forays into the Baḡdād book markets (as his memory was prodigious and a single reading would have sufficed) or whether he simply breathed the air of his time is irrelevant for his literary appraisal—a point the introduction to the *Ḥātimīya* also makes. What the *Ḥātimīya* mainly attests to at its rise to popularity in the late twelfth century (if not before) is that poetry and popular philosophy were no longer seen as incompatible. Rather a philosophical stance enhanced the voice of a poet and gave him moral authority in the eyes of a well-rounded *adīb*. Al-Mutanabbī was the first to receive such distinction, and he, no doubt, would have approved.

Appendix

A. Concordance of Maxim-Verse Pairs in Editions and Pseudo-
'Ukbari's Dīwān Commentary

S = impersonal single maxim, P = impersonated maxim, Ḥ = *ḥikma* passage, ŠD = *šakwā d-dahr*, F = *fahr*, R = *riṭā'*, M = *madīḥ*, N = *nasīb*, R = Rescher, B = al-Bustānī

- 1/1 الأجسامُ III: 219: 6 of 18 S in M
 2/78 ركوبُ / المنصوبُ / والمرؤُ . . . not in *Dīwān*
 3/2 على الناقل يُراد . . . III: 176: 2 of 52 P in N
 4/3 من الحُللِ إذا خلعتُ . . . III: 177: 18 of 28 P in M
 5/7 من الحُللِ إذا خلعتُ . . . III: 177: 19 of 28 S in F
 6/8 غيرُ محمودٍ . . . فما ترجى النفوسُ I: 58: 10 of 27 S in R
 7/5 فوائدُ . . . بذا قضتُ I: 59: 32 of 44 S in M
 8/6 فاسدُ . . . فإن قليل الحبِّ I: 59: 44 of 44 S in M
 9/9 بطيبٍ إذا استقبلتُ . . . I: 12: 27 of 31 S in R
 10/10 كذبا . . . ومن صعبٍ I: 13: 5 of 45 S in N
 11/11 الحباءُ . . . فحب الجبانِ I: 13: 33 of 45 S in M
 12/12 والظُمُ وما انتفاعُ . . . III: 222: 14 of 37 S in M (*'itāb*)
 13/13 همُ إذا ترحلتُ . . . III: 222: 33 of 37 S in M (*'itāb*)
 14/14 من البلى . . . والهجرُ III: 182: 6 of 48 (*al-aḡallā*) P in N (*i'tidār ode*)
 15/15 رُحلي . . . خذ ما تراهُ III: 182: 24 of 48 S in M (*i'tidār ode*)
 16/16 بالعللِ لعل عتبكُ . . . III: 182: 41 of 48 P in M (*i'tidār ode*)
 17/17 كالكمحلِّ لأنَّ حلمكُ . . . III: 182: 43 of 48 P in M (*i'tidār ode*)
 18/18 يلتقي . . . وأحلى الهوى II: 152: 4 of 43 (*baqī*) S in N
 19/19 يلتقي . . . وماكل من II: 152: 9 of 43 P in N
 20/20 بمطرقِ . . . وإطراقُ طرف العينِ II: 152: 39 of 43 S in M
 21/21 عقولُ . . . يهون علينا III: 187: 61 of 66 P in F
 22/4 الوحولُ إذا اعتاد الفتى . . . III: 174: 9 of 17 S in M
 23/22 الندى . . . ووضع الندى I: 60: 30 of 42 S in M
 24/23 تُشاكلُ . . . وأبعد من نذاك III: 189: 27 of 43 P in F
 25/24 المتعاقلُ وما التيه . . . III: 189: 28 of 43 P in F
 26/25 الخلائقُ وما الحسنُ III: 153: 10 of 47 S in *ḥamriya*

- 27/26 وأحلى III: 190: 25 of 41 S in R
 28/27 ملأ III: 190: 26 of 41 S in R
 29/34 بجُلا III: 190: 28 of 41 S in R
 30/35 ربّ أمرأتاك . . . الأفعالا III: 191: 16 of 45 S in M
 31/80 الأجسامُ IV: 243: 3 of 43 S in H
 32/36 النزلا III: 191: 32 of 45 S in M (*'itāb*)
 33/37 من أطاق التماس . . . سؤالا III: 191: 44 of 45 S in M
 34/28 لولا العقول . . . الإنسان IV: 262: 4 of 49 S in H
 35/29 إلف هذا الهوى . . . المذاق II: 162: 31 of 39 S in M
 36/30 الإملاق . . . والغني II: 162: 34 of 39 S in M
 37/31 ذو العقل يشقى . . . ينعم IV: 249: 8 of 36 S in *šayb*
 38/32 لا يسلم الشرف . . . الدم IV: 249: 11 of 36 S in H (vv. 11–13)
 39/81 ومن العداوة . . . يؤلّد IV: 249: 26 of 36 S in *hiḡā'*
 40/33 والظلم . . . يظلم IV: 249: 13 of 36 S in H
 41A+59M/55 رَسَن فقر الجهل IV: 269: 7 of 42 S in ŠD
 41M/57 الفظني . . . أفاضل الناس IV 269: 1 of 42 S in H
 42/56 يُعَجِّن مَضِيماً . . . الكفن IV 269: 15 of 42 S in H
 43/58 متى ما ازددث . . . ازديادي I: 70: 9 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *šayb*
 44/59 وأبعد بعدنا . . . البعاد I: 70: 14 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *raḡīl*
 45A+78M/60 فساد [A and M better matched in B] I: 70: 36 of 43 S in M
 45M (R) corrupt verse; see 22/4 and 45A+78M/60
 46/43 مما أضرّ . . . فطنوا IV: 273: 5 of 25 S in ŠD
 47/44A+100M طيّب . . . وكلّ امرئ I: 35: 28 of 47 (*a'ḡabu*) S in M
 48/97 وأسرع مفعول . . . ضده II: 84: 4 of 48 S in N
 49/45 وأتعب خلق الله . . . وجدّه II: 84: 9 of 48 S in H
 50/46 مجدّد . . . مجدّد II: 84: 12 of 48 S in H
 51/47 وإذا الحلم . . . الميلاد II: 85: 5 of 28 (*al-ḡussādi*) S in M
 52/48 أصادق نفس المرء . . . التكلم IV: 252: 10 of 41 P in N
 53/49 ولذ . . . أوائل III: 209: 12 of 43 S in N
 54/50 وترى الفتوة . . . ضرّاتها I: 45: 9–10 of 40 P in N
 55/51 ذلّ من يغبط الذليل . . . الحمام IV: 243: 4 of 43 S in H

- 56/52 اللثامُ . . . كلِّ حِلْمٍ IV: 243: 5 of 43 S in H
- 57/53 إيلامُ . . . من يهنَّ يسهلُ IV: 243: 6 of 43 S in H
- 58/54 الخلودا . . . كأنك بالفقرِ I: 71: 16 of 20 P in M
- 59M see 41A+59M/55
- 60/38 المظالم . . . من الحِلْمِ IV: 245: 9 of 36 S in ŠD
- 61/39 مجرمٍ . . . لمن تطلب الدنيا . . . مجرمٍ IV: 252: 35 of 41 S in M
- 62/40 يتقلبُ . . . وأظلم أهل الظلم I: 35: 33 of 47 S in M
- 63A is a duplicate of 66A
- 63M/41 البدنُ . . . لا تلقَ دهرَكَ . . . البدنُ IV: 273: 3 of 25 P in ŠD
- 63bisA/42 الحزنُ . . . فما يدير سرور . . . الحزنُ IV: 273: 4 of 25 P in ŠD
- 64A in R missing
- 64M see 78A+64M/99
- 65A differs from 96A
- 65M/96 جبانا . . . وإذا لم يكن من الموت . . . جبانا IV: 274: 9 of 10 S in ŠD
- 66/92 التمامِ . . . ولم أرَ . . . التمامِ IV: 253: 16 of 30 P in F
- 67/82 محسودُ . . . ماذا القيْتُ II: 86: 9 of 30 P in ŠD following *ḥamrīya*
- 68A+83M/83 مواعيدُ أروح . . . أمسيْتُ أروح II: 86: 10 of 30 (*tağdīdu*) P in ŠD following *ḥamrīya*
- 68M see 83A+68M/65
- 69/66 عزما . . . إذا فلّ عزمي . . . عزما IV: 244: 31 of 34 P in F
- 70/67 حمدُ . . . ومتي استفاد . . . حمدُ II: 75: 35 of 37 (*wağdā*) P in F (MS)
- 71/68 العمرُ . . . ذر النفس . . . العمرُ II: 123: 5 of 41 P in F
- 72/69 الشكرُ . . . إذا الفضلُ . . . الشكرُ II: 123: 9 of 41 S in F
- 73/70 جاهلُ . . . ومن جاهلٍ . . . جاهلُ III: 197: 3 of 14 P in F
- 74/94A المأكُلُ . . . غثاثة عيشي . . . المأكُلُ III: 197: 14 of 14 S in H
- 94M in B not in *Dīwān*
- 75/71 عظيمٍ . . . فطعم الموت . . . عظيمٍ IV: 248: 2 of 9 S in R
- 76/72 الكلمُ . . . أرى أناساً . . . الكلمُ IV: 233: 15 of 31 P in F
- 77/93 العدمُ . . . وربَّ مالٍ . . . العدمُ IV: 233: 16 of 31 S in F
- 78A+64M/99 باقيا . . . إذا الجود . . . باقيا IV: 285: 9 of 47 S in ŠD
- 78M see 45A+78M/60
- 79/61 بالحزمِ . . . مع الحزمِ . . . بالحزمِ IV: 237: 22 of 39 P in M

- 80/62 الطَعَامُ . . . شبه الشيء IV: 239: 9 of 43 S in ŠD
 81/63 الإنفاذ . . . لا توافقه II: 92: 14 of 17 S in M
 82/64 ذاهب . . . كثير حياة المرء I: 33: 11 of 40 S in F
 83A+68M/65 عليها . . . عرفت الليالي IV:244: 8 of 34 P in R
 83M see 68A+83M/83
 84/84 كالحلم . . . هوّن IV: 257: 32 of 39 P in F
 85/85 الرّخم . . . ولا تشكّ IV: 257: 33 of 39 P in F
 86/86 الأله . . . سبحانه خالق نفسي IV: 257: 36 of 39 P in F
 87/98 النقد . . . يُعلّنا هذا الزمان II: 89: 33 of 42 S in M
 88/79 الزلا . . . من يك ذافٍ III: 209: 29 of 46 S in M
 89/87 شفاكا . . . إذا استشفيت III: 173: 19 of 44 P in M
 90/88 الفقر . . . ومن ينفق الساعات II: 123: 10 of 41 S in F
 91/89 كبر . . . واتي رأيت الضرر II: 123: 36 of 41 P in F in MS
 92/90 إجمال . . . إنا لفي زمن III: 215: 45 of 46 S in M
 93/91 أشغال . . . ذكر الفتى III: 215: 46 of 46 S in M
 94/75 شره . . . نحن بنوا لموتى I: 39: 10 of 35 S in H
 95/76 كسه . . . تبخل أيدنا I: 39: 11 of 35 S in H
 96/73 تربه . . . فهذه الأرواح I: 39: 12 of 35 S in H
 97/74 يسه . . . لو فكر العاشق I: 39: 13 of 35 S in H
 98/77 حربه . . . وغاية المفرط I: 39: 17 of 35 S in H
 95B تتقانى . . . ومُراد النفوس IV: 274: 6 of 10 P in ŠD

B. *Maxim-Verse Pairs in Order of Pseudo-‘Ukbarī’s Dīwān Commentary*

- I: 12: 27 of 31 S (*bi-naṣībī*) in R 9/9
 I: 13: 5 of 45 (*wa-l-ġarbā*) S in N 10/10
 I: 13: 33 of 45 (*wa-l-ġarbā*) S in M 11/11
 I: 33: 11 of 40 (*al-ḥabā’ibi*) S in F 82/64
 I: 35: 28 of 47 (*a’ġabu*) S in M 47/44A+100M
 I: 35: 33 of 47 (*a’ġabu*) S in M 62/40
 I: 39: 10 of 35 (*qalbihī*) S in Ḥ 94/75
 I: 39: 11 of 35 (*qalbihī*) S in Ḥ 95/76
 I: 39: 12 of 35 (*qalbihī*) S in Ḥ 96/73
 I: 39: 13 of 35 (*qalbihī*) S in Ḥ 97/74
 I: 39: 17 of 35 (*qalbihī*) S in Ḥ 98/77
 I: 45: 9–10 of 40 (*mawṣūfātihā*) P in N 54/50
 I: 58: 10 of 27 (*Dāwūdi*) S in R 6/8
 I: 59: 32 of 44 (*la-māġidu*) S in M 7/5
 I: 59: 44 of 44 (*la-māġidu*) S in M 8/6
 I: 60: 30 of 42 (*fī l-‘idā*) S in M 23/22
 I: 70: 9 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *ṣayb* 43/58
 I: 70: 14 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *raḥīl* 44/59
 I: 70: 36 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) S in M 45A+78M/60
 I: 71: 16 of 20 (*u’idā*) P in M 58/54
 II: 75: 35 of 37 (*waġdu*) P in F (MS) 70/67
 II: 84: 4 of 48 (*ġunduhū*) S in N 48/97
 II: 84: 9 of 48 (*ġunduhū*) S in Ḥ 49/45
 II: 84: 12 of 48 (*ġunduhū*) S in Ḥ 50/46
 II: 85: 5 of 28 (*al-ḥussādi*) S in M 51/47
 II: 86: 9 of 30 (*taġdīdu*) P in ŠD 67/82 following *ḥamrīya*
 II: 86: 10 of 30 (*taġdīdu*) P in ŠD 68A+83M/83
 II: 89: 33 of 42 (*al-ḥaddī*) S in M 87/98
 II: 92: 14 of 17 (*al-ustādā*) S in M 81/63
 II: 123: 5 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) P in F 71/68
 II: 123: 9 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) S in F 72/69
 II: 123: 10 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) S in F 90/88
 II: 123: 36 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) P in F in MS 91/89
 II: 152: 4 of 43 (*baqī*) S in N 18/18
 II: 152: 9 of 43 (*baqī*) P in N 19/19
 II: 152: 39 of 43 (*baqī*) S in M 20/20
 II: 153: 10 of 47 (*as-sawāqibi*) S in *ḥamrīya* 26/25

- II: 162: 31 of 39 (*al-ma'āqī*) S in M 35/29
 II: 162: 34 of 39 (*al-ma'āqī*) S in M 36/30
 III: 173: 19 of 44 (*illā fadākā*) P in M 89/87
 III: 174: 9 of 17 (*tunīlu*) S in M 22/4
 III: 176: 2 of 52 (*li-l-āqīli*) P in N 3/2
 III: 177: 18 of 28 (*ka-l-qubali*) P in M 4/3
 III: 177: 19 of 28 (*ka-l-qubali*) S in F 5/7
 III: 182: 6 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) P in N 14/14 (*i'tiḏār* ode)
 III: 182: 24 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) S in M 15/15
 III: 182: 41 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) P in M 16/16
 III: 182: 43 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) P in M 17/17
 III: 187: 61 of 66 (*tawīlu*) P in F 21/21
 III: 189: 27 of 43 (*wa-yuṣāḡīlu*) P in F 24/23
 III: 189: 28 of 43 (*wa-yuṣāḡīlu*) P in F 25/24
 III: 190: 25 of 41 (*al-aḡallā*) S in R 27/26
 III: 190: 26 of 41 (*al-aḡallā*) S in R 28/27
 III: 190: 28 of 41 (*al-aḡallā*) S in R 29/34
 III: 191: 16 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M 30/35
 III: 191: 32 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M (*'itāb* of enemy) 32/36
 III: 191: 44 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M 33/37
 III: 197: 3 of 14 (*qā'īlu*) P in F 73/70
 III: 197: 14 of 14 (*qā'īlu*) S in Ḥ 74/94A
 III: 209: 12 of 43 (*awāhīlu*) S in N 53/49
 III: 203: 29 of 46 (*lā l-ḡīmāla*) S in M 88/79
 III: 215: 45 of 46 (*al-ḥālu*) S in M 92/90
 III: 215: 46 of 46 (*al-ḥālu*) S in M 93/91
 III: 219: 6 of 18 (*al-ḡamāmu*) S in M 1/1
 III: 222: 14 of 37 (*saqamu*) S in M (*'itāb*) 12/12
 III: 222: 33 of 37 (*saqamu*) S in M (*'itāb*) 13/13
 IV: 233: 15 of 31 (*limami*) P in F 76/72
 IV: 233: 16 of 31 (*limami*) S in F 77/93
 IV: 237: 22 of 39 (*as-suqmi*) P in M 79/61
 IV: 239: 9 of 43 (*al-lī'āmu*) S in ŠD 80/62
 IV: 243: 3 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in Ḥ 31/80
 IV: 243: 4 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in Ḥ 55/51
 IV: 243: 5 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in Ḥ 56/52
 IV: 243: 6 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in Ḥ 57/53
 IV: 244: 8 of 34 (*ḥilmā*) P in R 83A+68M/65
 IV: 244: 31 of 34 (*ḥilmā*) P in F 69/66

- IV: 245: 9 of 36 (*al-ma'ālimi*) S in ŠD 60/38
 IV: 248: 2 of 9 (*an-nuḡūmi*) S in R 75/71
 IV: 249: 8 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in šayb 37/31
 IV: 249: 11 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in Ḥ (vv. 11–13) 38/32
 IV: 249: 26 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in *hiḡā'* 39/81
 IV: 249: 13 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in Ḥ 40/33
 IV: 252: 10 of 41 (*muyammami*) P in N 52/48
 IV: 252: 35 of 41 (*muyammami*) S in M 61/39
 IV: 253: 16 of 30 (*al-kalāmi*) P in F 66/92
 IV: 257: 32 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 84/84
 IV: 257: 33 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 85/85
 IV: 257: 36 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 86/86
 IV: 262: 4 of 49 (*aṭ-tānī*) S in Ḥ 34/28
 IV: 269: 1 of 42 (*al-fiṭani*) S in Ḥ 41M/57
 IV: 269: 7 of 42 (*al-fiṭani*) S in ŠD 41A+59M/55
 IV: 269: 15 of 42 (*al-fiṭani*) S in Ḥ 42/56
 IV: 273: 5 of 25 (*sakanu*) S in ŠD 46/43
 IV: 273: 3 of 25 (*sakanu*) P in ŠD 63M/41
 IV: 273: 4 of 25 (*sakanu*) S in ŠD 63A/42
 IV: 274: 9 of 10 (*'inānā*) S in ŠD 65M/96
 IV: 274: 6 of 10 (*'inānā*) P in ŠD 42M in B
 IV: 285: 9 of 47 (*amāniyā*) S in ŠD 78A+64M/99

C. *Maxim-Verse Pairs by Poetic Theme*

Sententiae in Hikma

- I: 39: 10 of 35 (*qalbihi*) S in H 94/75 (lament)
 I: 39: 11 of 35 (*qalbihi*) S in H 95/76
 I: 39: 12 of 35 (*qalbihi*) S in H 96/73
 I: 39: 13 of 35 (*qalbihi*) S in H 97/74
 I: 39: 17 of 35 (*qalbihi*) S in H 98/77
 II: 84: 9 of 48 (*ğunduhu*) S in H 49/45
 II: 84: 12 of 48 (*ğunduhu*) S in H 50/46
 III: 197: 14 of 14 (*qā'ilu*) S in H 74/94A
 IV: 243: 3 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in H 31/80 (panegyric ode)
 IV: 243: 4 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in H 55/51
 IV: 243: 5 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in H 56/52
 IV: 243: 6 of 43 (*lā yanāmu*) S in H 57/53
 IV: 249: 11 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in H (vv. 11–13) 38/32
 IV: 249: 13 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in H 40/33
 IV: 262: 4 of 49 (*aṭ-ṭānī*) S in H 34/28
 IV: 269: 1 of 42 (*al-fiṭṭani*) S in H 41M/57
 IV: 269: 15 of 42 (*al-fiṭṭani*) S in H 42/56

Sententiae in ŠD

- IV: 239: 9 of 43 (*al-li'āmu*) S in ŠD 80/62
 IV: 245: 9 of 36 (*al-ma'ālimi*) S in ŠD 60/38
 IV: 269: 7 of 42 (*al-fiṭṭani*) S in ŠD 41A+59M/55
 IV: 273: 5 of 25 (*sakanu*) S in ŠD 46/43
 IV: 273: 4 of 25 (*sakanu*) S in ŠD 63A/42
 IV: 274: 9 of 10 (*'inānā*) S in ŠD 65M/96

Sententiae in N

- I: 13: 5 of 45 (*lā budda*) S in N 10/10
 II: 152: 4 of 43 (*baqī*) S in N 18/18
 II: 84: 4 of 48 (*ğunduhū*) S in N 48/97
 III: 209: 12 of 43 (*awāhīlu*) S in N 53/49

Sententiae in F

- I: 33: 11 of 40 (*al-ḥabā'ibi*) S in F 82/64
 II: 123: 9 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) S in F 72/69
 II: 123: 10 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) S in F 90/88
 III: 177: 19 of 28 (*ka-l-qubali*) S in F 5/7

IV: 233: 16 of 31 (*limami*) S in F 77/93

Sententiae in M

- I: 13: 33 of 45 (*wa-l-ğarbā*) S in M 11/11
 I: 35: 28 of 47 (*a'ğabu*) S in M 47/44A+100M
 I: 35: 33 of 47 (*a'ğabu*) S in M 62/40
 I: 59: 32 of 44 (*la-māğidu*) S in M 7/5
 I: 59: 44 of 44 (*la-māğidu*) S in M 8/6
 I: 60: 30 of 42 (*fī l-'idā*) S in M 23/22
 I: 70: 36 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) S in M 45A+78M/60
 II: 152: 39 of 43 (*baqī*) S in M 20/20
 II: 85: 5 of 28 (*al-ḥussādi*) S in M 51/47
 II: 89: 33 of 42 (*al-ḥaddi*) S in M 87/98
 II: 92: 14 of 17 (*al-ustādā*) S in M 81/63
 II: 162: 31 of 39 (*al-ma'āqī*) S in M 35/29
 II: 162: 34 of 39 (*al-ma'āqī*) S in M 36/30
 III: 174: 9 of 17 (*tunīlu*) S in M 22/4
 III: 182: 24 of 48 (*wa-l-ibīlī*) S in M 15/15 (*i'tidār* ode)
 III: 191: 16 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M 30/35 (panegyric ode)
 III: 191: 32 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M ('*itāb* of enemy) 32/36
 III: 191: 44 of 45 (*a-fa-lā lā*) S in M 33/37
 III: 203: 29 of 46 (*lā l-ğimāla*) S in M 88/79
 III: 215: 45 of 46 (*al-ḥālu*) S in M 92/90
 III: 215: 46 of 46 (*al-ḥālu*) S in M 93/91
 III: 219: 6 of 18 (*al-ğamāmu*) S in M 1/1
 III: 222: 14 of 37 (*saqamu*) S in M ('*itāb*) 12/12
 III: 222: 33 of 37 (*saqamu*) S in M ('*itāb*) 13/13
 IV: 252: 35 of 41 (*muyammami*) S in M 61/39

Sententiae in R

- I: 12: 27 of 31 (*bi-naṣībī*) S in R 9/9
 I: 58: 10 of 27 (*Dāwūdi*) S in R 6/8
 III: 190: 25 of 41 (*al-ağallā*) S in R 27/26
 III: 190: 26 of 41 (*al-ağallā*) S in R 28/27
 III: 190: 28 of 41 (*al-ağallā*) S in R 29/34
 IV: 248: 2 of 9 (*an-nuğūmi*) S in R 75/71

Sententiae elsewhere

- IV: 249: 8 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in *šayb* 37/31
 IV: 249: 26 of 36 (*aslamu*) S in *hiğā'* 39/81

Impersonated maxims in ŠD

II: 86: 9 of 30 (*tağdīdu*) P in ŠD 67/82 following *ḥamrīya*

II: 86: 10 of 30 (*tağdīdu*) P in ŠD 68A+83M/83

IV: 273: 3 of 25 (*sakanu*) P in ŠD 63M/41

IV: 274: 6 of 10 (*‘inānā*) P in ŠD 95B

IV: 285: 9 of 47 (*amāniyā*) S in ŠD 78A+64M/99

Impersonated maxims in N

I: 45: 9–10 of 40 (*mawṣūfātihā*) P in N 54/50

II: 152: 9 of 43 (*baqī*) P in N 19/19

III: 176: 2 of 52 (*li-l-‘āqili*) P in N 3/2

III: 182: 6 of 48 (*al-ağallā*) P in N 14/14 (*i’tidār* ode)

IV: 252: 10 of 41 (*muyammami*) P in N 52/48

Impersonated maxims in F

II: 75: 35 of 37 (*wağdu*) P in F (MS) 70/67

II: 123: 5 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) P in F 71/68

II: 123: 36 of 41 (*aṣ-ṣabru*) P in F in MS 91/89

III: 187: 61 of 66 (*ṭawīlu*) P in F 21/21

III: 189: 27 of 43 (*wa-yuṣāğilu*) P in F 24/23

III: 189: 28 of 43 (*wa-yuṣāğilu*) P in F 25/24

III: 197: 3 of 14 (*qā’ilu*) P in F 73/70

IV: 233: 15 of 31 (*limami*) P in F 76/72

IV: 244: 31 of 34 (*ḥilmā*) P in F 69/66

IV: 253: 16 of 30 (*al-kalāmi*) P in F 66/92

IV: 257: 32 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 84/84

IV: 257: 33 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 85/85

IV: 257: 36 of 39 (*wa-lā qadami*) P in F 86/86

Impersonated maxims in M

I: 71: 16 of 20 (*u’idā*) P in M 58/54

III: 173: 19 of 44 (*illā fadākā*) P in M 89/87

III: 177: 18 of 28 (*ka-l-qubali*) P in M 4/3

III: 182: 41 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) P in M 16/16

III: 182: 43 of 48 (*wa-l-ibili*) P in M 17/17

IV: 237: 22 of 39 (*as-suqmi*) P in M 79/61

Impersonated maxims in R

IV: 244: 8 of 34 (*ḥilmā*) P in R 83A+68M/65

Impersonated maxims elsewhere

I: 70: 9 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *šayb* 43/58

I: 70: 14 of 43 (*at-tanādī*) P in *raḥīl* 44/59

III: 153: 10 of 47 (*as-sawāqibi*) S in *ḥamriya* 26/25

D. Verses Ordered by Incipit and Concordance with aṣ-Ṣāhib's Amṭāl

§ = aṣ-Ṣāhib, Amṭāl

- أبدًا تستردّ . . . بخلا 29/34, §180 p. 181
 إذا استشفيت . . . شفاكا 89/87
 إذا استقبلت . . . بطيب 9/9
 إذا الجود . . . باقيا 64/99, §205 p. 193
 إذا الفضل . . . الشكر 72/69
 إذا اعتاد الفتى . . . الوحول 22/4
 إذا ترحلت . . . هم 13/13, §129 p. 151
 إذا خلعت . . . من الحلل 4/3
 إذا فل عزي . . . عزما 69/66
 أرى أناسًا . . . الكلم 76/72
 أصادق نفس المرء . . . التكلم 52/48, §218 p. 200
 أفاضل الناس . . . الفطن 41M/57, §44 p. 78
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 أمسيت أروح . . . مواعيد 68, A+83M/83
 إنا لفي زمن . . . إجمال 92/90, §251 p. 216
 أنعم ولذ . . . أوائل 53/49, §48 p. 82
 بذى الغباوة . . . بالجعل 5/7, §96 p. 124
 بذنا قصت . . . فوائد 7/5, §119 p. 144
 تبخل أيدنا . . . كسبه 95/76
 خذما تراه . . . رُحل 15/15, §139 p. 157=§293 p. 241
 ذر النفس . . . العمر 71/68
 ذكر الفتى . . . أشغال 93/91, §252 p. 217
 ذل من يغبط الذليل . . . الحمام 55/51, §39 p. 74
 ذوا لعقل يشقى . . . ينعم 37/31, §59 p. 93
 رب أمر أتاك . . . الأفعالا 30/35, §181 p. 181
 سبجان خالق نفسي . . . الأمل 86/86
 عرض . . . المنصوب 2/78
 عرفت الليالي . . . علما 243 p. 296, §83A+68M/65
 غثاة عيشي . . . المأكّل 74/94, A

- فَأَنَّ الْجَرْحَ . . . فساد 45 cf. 78M/60, S#13 p. 47
 فَأَنَّ قَلِيلَ الْحَبِّ . . . فاسد 8/6, S#121 p. 145
 فَحَبَّ الْجَبَانِ . . . الحرباء 11/11
 فَطَعَمَ الْمَوْتَ . . . عظيم 75/71, S#69 p. 101
 فَلَا مَجْدَ . . . مجده 50/46, S#213 p. 197
 فَقَرَّ الْجَهْلُولُ . . . رَسَن 79, S#45 p. 41A+59M/55
 فَمَا تَرَجَّى النُّفُوسُ . . . غَيْرُ مُحَمَّدٍ 6/8, S#107 p. 135
 فَمَا يَدِيرُ سُورُ . . . الحزن 42M in B
 فَهَذِهِ الْأَرْوَاحُ . . . تُرْبِهِ 96/73
 كَأَنَّكَ بِالْفَقْرِ . . . الخلودا 58/54
 كَثِيرَ حَيَاةِ الْمَرْءِ . . . ذاهب 82/64
 كُلَّ حِلْمٍ . . . اللثام 56/52, S#40 p. 75
 لَا تَلْقَ دَهْرَكَ . . . البدن 63M/41
 لَا يَسْلَمُ الشَّرْفُ . . . الدم 38/32, S#62 p. 95
 لَا يُعْجِبُنَّ مَضِيماً . . . الكفن 42/56, S#46 p. 80
 لِأَنَّ حَلْمَكَ . . . كَالْكَحْلِ 17/17, S#142 p. 160
 لَعَلَّ عَتَبَكَ . . . بالعلل 16/16, S#141 p. 159
 لِمَنْ تَطْلُبُ الدُّنْيَا . . . مُجْرِمٍ 61/39, S#224 p. 203
 لَوْ فَكَرَ الْعَاشِقُ . . . يسبه 97/74
 لَوْلَا الْعُقُولُ . . . الإنسان 34/28, S#183 p. 182
 مَاذَا لَقِيتُ . . . محسود 67/82, S#268 p. 227
 مَتَى مَا أَزْدَدْتُ . . . ازديادي 43/58
 مَعَ الْحَزْمِ . . . بالحزم 79/61
 مِمَّا أَضَرَ . . . فطنوا 46/43
 مِنْ أَطَاقِ التَّمَاسِ . . . سؤالا 33/37, S#188 p. 185
 مِنْ الْحِلْمِ . . . المظالم 60/38, S#55 p. 89
 مِنْ لَا تَوَافَقَهُ . . . الإنفاذا 81/63
 مِنْ يَكُ ذَا فِعْلٍ . . . الزلا 88/79, S#31 p. 66
 مِنْ يَهْنُ يَسْهَلُ . . . إيلا 57/53, S#41 p. 75
 نَحْنُ بَنُو الْمَوْتِ . . . شره 94/75
 هُنَّ الثَّلَاثُ . . . تبعاتها 50M in B
 هَوْنٌ . . . كالحلم 84/84, S#288 p. 237

- وأبعد بعدنا . . . البعاد 44/59
 وأتعب خلق الله . . . وجدّه §#212 p. 197, 49/45
 وأتعب من نذاك . . . تُشاكل §#156 p. 168, 24/23
 واحتمال الأذى . . . الأجسام 31/80
 وأحلى الهوى . . . يتقي 18/18
 وإذا الحلم . . . الميلاد §#227 p. 204, 51/47
 وإذا الشيخ . . . ملّا §#178 p. 180, 28/27
 وإذا كانت . . . الأجسام §#85 p. 114, 1/1
 وإذا لم يكن من الموت . . . جباناً §#242 p. 212, 65/96
 وإذا ما خلا . . . الزّلا §#185 p. 183, 32/36
 وأسرع مفعول . . . ضدّه §#211 p. 196, 48/97
 وإطراق طرف العين . . . بمطرق §#146 p. 162, 20/20
 وأظلم أهل الظلم . . . يتقلّب §#236 p. 209, 62/40
 والغني . . . الإملاق §#77 p. 107, 36/30
 والظلم . . . يظلم §#65 p. 97, 40/33
 والفقير في النفس . . . المال 74/944
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 والهجر . . . من البلل §#138 p. 157, 14/14
 وإني رأيت الضرّ . . . كبر 91/89
 وترى الفتوة . . . ضراتها 54/50
 وربّ مال . . . العدم 77/93
 وشبه الشيء . . . الطغام §#17 p. 52, 80/62
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 ولمأر . . . التمام §#258 p. 220, 66/92
 وما انتفاع . . . والظلم §#130 p. 151, 12/12
 وما التيه . . . المتعاقل 25/24
 وما الحسن . . . الخلائق §#168 p. 175, 26/25
 وما كل من . . . يلتقي 19/19
 ومن العداوة . . . يؤلّد §#64 p. 96, 39/81

- وَمِنْ جَاهِلٍ . . . جَاهِلٌ 73/70
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THE PRISON OF CATEGORIES—‘DECLINE’ AND ITS COMPANY

Sonja Brentjes

Historiography of Islamic societies and their secularized successors often suffers under the burden of century-old categories, values, expectations, approaches, and judgments. Despite all the far-reaching changes in the concepts, methodologies, methods, and values introduced by various fields of postmodern engagement, substantial parts of history-writing with regard to Islamic societies have successfully escaped a reflective questioning of the assumptions, tools, values, and goals held or pursued by their practitioners. Categories such as ‘decline’ and judgments such as the suppression of philosophy and other ‘ancient sciences’ by religious orthodoxy and worldly rulers have survived until this day either as accepted truth or as statements to be proved wrong by counter-examples.¹ Nineteenth-century inventions such as the death of philosophy after Ibn Rušd caused by al-Ġazālī’s sharp accusation of being internally incoherent and fundamentally incompatible with revelation continue to be told and believed within and outside the Arab world.² Unanswerable questions such as why there was no

¹ I use the label ‘ancient sciences’ as a short-cut for geometry, number theory, astronomy, astrology, theoretical music, philosophy, medicine, alchemy and other fields of scholarly knowledge appropriated from Greek, Syriac, Pahlavi, and Sanskrit sources.

² Mohammed Arkoun has expressed his belief that philosophy in the Islamic world disappeared after Ibn Rušd’s death in a public lecture at the Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations, Aga Khan University International, London, 2006. Research results of the last two decades have discredited, however, this judgment for Islamic societies in Iran and India. Historical sources such as biographical dictionaries, study programs and historical chronicles leave no doubt that philosophical treatises by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) or Ḡalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawwānī (d. 907/1501) were studied at *madrasas* in Cairo, Damascus or even in cities of northern Africa. See, for instance, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996); Dimitri Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca. 1350,” in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, eds. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 81–97. In his entry “Islamic Philosophy” in the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 2000), q.v., Leaman reformulated the old view of philosophy’s demise by writing that due to al-Ġazālī’s demand to reject philosophy it came to be under a cloud until the nineteenth century. He also affirmed

scientific revolution in Islamic societies are considered relevant and holding the key for today's conflicts and difficulties.³ Concepts outside of time and independent of concrete space such as 'Arabic,' 'Islamic' or 'Arabic-Islamic' science/s dominate the approaches to the study of history of science in Islamic societies.⁴ Creatures of nostalgia such as 'Golden Age' or 'Islamic/Muslim Renaissance' continue to inspire professionals and amateurs alike while glossing over the fact that most localities in the vast realm of the Islamic world in the ninth, tenth, eleventh, etc. centuries were free and empty of any person that practiced the 'ancient sciences.'⁵ Oppositions of all sorts such as 'rationality' versus 'superstition' or 'religion', (Catholic and later Protestant and secular) 'Europe' versus the 'Islamic World', 'Christianity' versus 'Islam', or 'progress' versus 'decline' continue their existence as if immutable and outside of history.⁶ Rarely anyone asks whether the entities set up against each other for the sake of mobilizing the one or the other set of values and gaining a platform for evaluation did exist in the period under debate and if so in which form and with what meaning. The elementary message of postmodernist critiques that there is no narrative about the past independent from our present and that

that philosophy and the religious disciplines always had a rather difficult relationship. Access by <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/H057>.

³ A serious attempt to discuss this question from the perspective of a scientist is Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1991), Chapter 10. Access by http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000104&channel=university%20ave.

⁴ Roshdi Rashed (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997), 3 vols.; Seyyid Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study* (London: World of Islam Festival Trust, 1976).

⁵ <http://www.imarabe.org/temp/expo/sciences-arabes.html>

⁶ A serious attempt to discuss the issue of the decline of science in Islamic societies from the perspective of a modernist historian of science is Ahmad Y. al-Hassan's *Factors behind the Decline of Islamic Science*, 2007, access by <http://www.history-science-technology.com/Articles/articles%208.htm>, a revised version of his earlier Epilogue to *Science and Technology in Islam*, Part II, eds. Ahmad Y. al-Hassan, Maqbul Ahmad and Albert Zaki Iskandar (Paris: UNESCO, 2001). An earlier version was published in *Islam and the Challenge of Modernity*, ed. Sharifa Shifa Al-Attas (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996), 351–89, undertaken with the intention to refute claims made in a series of articles published in *Nature*, 2 November 2006. See the online edition of *Nature*, 1 November 2006, access by <http://www.nature.com/news/2006/061030/full/444035a.html>. A more propagandistic discussion of the issue of decline and various views held by historians of science is Ziauddin Sardar's *Islam and Science: Lecture Transcript* (Royal Society, London, s.d.), access by <http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/page.asp?tip=1&id=5747>. It is the transcript of Sardar's lecture "Islam and Science: Beyond the Troubled Relationship," given 12 December 2006, access by <http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/event.asp?id=5129&month=,2006>.

every set of beliefs about the past, including academic history-writing, is socially constructed has not achieved yet to wash away the categories that dominated throughout the twentieth century the study of Islamic societies in general and their scientific practices, results, practitioners and sponsors in particular. During the last decade, stimulated largely by the results of 9/11 and the so-called ‘War on Terror’, the debate on ‘Islam and Science’, ‘The Golden Age of Islam and Science’ and the impact of scientific achievements by scholars from Islamic societies, mostly reduced to ‘Muslim scientists’, on ‘modern’ science as developed in various Catholic, Protestant and later secular societies of Europe and their colonial extensions in the ‘New World’ has become more intense and widespread as even a cursory *googling* of these key terms shows. Ardent defenders of ‘a glorious past’ populate the Internet as do convinced deniers of any link between Islam and science. Most of the writers have little knowledge of the historical works and little understanding of their scientific content. They rarely ever read a single scientific text of the past, but they are strong believers in their own claims and values whatever they may be.⁷ The latest representatives of this kind of apologetic and academically unsound depiction of the sciences in past Islamic societies are books by Jim Khalili, Nidhal Guessoum or Muzaffar Iqbal. Commercial interests of publishers like Penguin, I. B. Tauris, Ashgate and others outweigh since many years academic solidity and give authors without qualification for history of science in Islamic societies a platform within an academic framework. Other apologists of a glorious Muslim past in science and technology and its impact on today’s world create their own public spaces by lobbying, fund raising, exhibiting, and publishing in print and electronic form. The most successful of them is FSTC (Foundation for Science, Technology and Civilization). The project with the greatest outreach and hence the strongest capacity to influence attitudes and feelings about the past and the present is its exhibition “1001 Inventions—Discover The Muslim Heritage In Our World”. This exhibition emphasizes “1000 years of forgotten Muslim inventions and discoveries”, forgotten because of “Western academia’s Eurocentric history-writing.” It replaces this rejected historiography by an equally ideological message

⁷ These are merely a few examples. Others can be easily added.

See http://www.iht.com/articles/2001/11/13/edlet_ed3__18.php; <http://www.fasebj.org/cgi/content/full/20/10/1581>; http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_401_450/golden_age_of_islam.htm.

of a Muslim invention of 'modern science' which 'Europe' appropriated without admitting its debt to this very day. The sophisticated show started 21 January 2010 in London, Science Museum, moved next to Istanbul (18 August 2010) on invitation by Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan and then to New York (December 2010).⁸ Recently (25 May 2011) it was opened in Los Angeles by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.⁹ Political interests combined with commerce unite here representatives of groups with conflicting beliefs and permit the rise of a new historical myth.

The task of studying the sciences in past Islamic societies according to the interests and need of members of these societies which A. I. Sabra set already more than ten years ago is situated between these two extremes of (steep) "decline" and (breathtaking) "progress", "inferiority" and "superiority."¹⁰ It continues to be an unfulfilled goal. In the sense that most studies are studies of texts and instruments and are considered to have reached their end when the scientific content is identified, commented upon, and situated within a larger history of ideas, this task has not even been taken seriously. There are very few biographies of major or minor scholars of the 'ancient sciences' in addition to those who have become beacons of cultural identity in North African and Asian countries of today such as al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, al-Bīrūnī, Ibn al-Hayṭam, 'Umar al-Ḥayyām, Ibn Ruṣd, or Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī. Equally, there are very few studies of the various forms in which the content of the hundreds of thousands of scientific texts and hundreds of scientific instruments was indeed used at different points in time and space across various Islamic societies.

The context of the specific society in which any of these texts was written and any of these instruments was fabricated is often seen as not particularly relevant except for those areas which are today accepted in David A. King's catch phrase as "science in the service of Islam."

⁸ Jim Khalili, *Pathfinders: The Golden Age of Arabic Science* (London: Penguin, 2010); idem, *The House of Wisdom, How Arabic Science Saved Ancient Knowledge and Gave Us the Renaissance* (London: Penguin, 2011); Nidhal Guessoum, *Islam's Quantum Question* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Muzaffar Iqbal, *Islam and Science* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002); idem, *Science and Islam* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub Group Inc, 2007); idem (ed.), *Islam and Science: Historic and Contemporary Perspectives* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 4 vols; <http://www.1001inventions.com>.

⁹ http://www.1001inventions.com/Hillary_Clinton

¹⁰ A. I. Sabra, "The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement," *History of Science* 25 (1987), 223–43.

Outside of these areas, science continues to be regarded as universal and in no need of a deeper analysis of its local entanglements with one exception—the exchange of ideas across disciplines and cultures. As a result, most of the still very limited efforts to contextualize the ‘ancient sciences’ in Islamic societies focus on their relationship to religion, the *madrassa* or the court.

1. ‘Decline’—An Inappropriate Historiographical Category

For a history-writing that aspires to investigate the ‘ancient sciences’ in Islamic societies within the frameworks of these societies ‘decline’ is an inappropriate category. It is conceptually unsuited since a single category does not suffice for capturing the complexity of an entire society, let alone of several societies. ‘Decline’ as a historiographical category has a place in a cyclical theory of history as the third stage of development of any social organism, culture or civilization.¹¹ Within such cyclical theories, the disappearance of the arts and the sciences is part of the normal course of events, not an aberration from the norm. In theories of history that operate with a linear concept of historical time, as most modernist and postmodernist theories do, ‘decline’ is a negative term, a violation of ‘good behavior.’ It mobilizes emotions of aggression or defense depending on the overall position of the historian who uses this term. Because of its loss of status as a historiographical category within linear theories of history, most twentieth-century’s writers about the ‘decline’ of the ‘ancient sciences’ in Islamic societies felt compelled either to find causes for the phenomenon or to present counter-examples proving its non-existence altogether.¹² The spatial and temporal localization of ‘decline’ was not seriously considered and was in a sense unthinkable due to the problematic status of ‘context’ among the practitioners of the field. The idea of historicizing the term and its use was not seen as an alternative approach due to a lack of interest in historical epistemology and more generally a kind of suspicion towards the application of theories from the humanities and social sciences to a field that was primarily seen as an

¹¹ <http://etext.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-74>

¹² See, for instance, Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Why didn’t the Scientific Revolution happen in Islam?” 23 December 1997, access by http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00000104&channel=university%20ave.

extension of the sciences. In addition to the theoretical incoherence produced by the import of a category from a cyclical into a linear theory of history, the conceptual inadequacy of 'decline' rests in the silent assumptions underpinning it. 'Decline' as an explanatory category presupposes 'advance', 'progress', 'innovation', 'change', 'movement', 'growth', 'expansion' and similar categories as the 'natural', 'desirable' and 'achievable' goals of societal life. In such a belief system, scientific knowledge and practice can only be lost or destroyed due to some major destructive force or event. Examples are the invasion of a powerful enemy such as the Mongols, the Christian conquest of Muslim Spain or British and French colonialism, the occurrence of natural and social disaster such as the plague, the spread of a climate hostile to science such as 'superstition' or 'Islamic orthodoxy' or economic, technological, political and military marginalization.¹³

The temporal absurdity of the category of 'decline' has been pointed out by other writers on the subject.¹⁴ If a society or culture is seen as being in continuous decline for something between five to ten centuries it cannot but raise the suspicion that the analysis is based on wrong assumptions and works with faulty methods. And even if this suspicion could be proven wrong, a negative category that is seemingly a valid description of a society or culture for several centuries obviously misses the forces that allowed this society or culture to survive for such a long time. The notion of 'decline' of the 'ancient sciences' in 'Islam' is also unsuited since it pretends validity for a vast region populated by many different peoples who followed diverse patterns of social organization and were ruled by more than four hundred dynasties of different ethnic origins, forms of social organization and religious beliefs.

¹³ One among the many examples expressing this kind of presuppositions is the following excerpt from a newspaper article written by Tanvir Ahmad Khan, a former foreign secretary and ambassador of Pakistan: "Since the beginning of the 20th century, Muslim analysts have endlessly repeated a litany of causes that led to the decline of their great civilization that once pioneered modern learning. At the heart of this analysis was recognition that the spirit of inquiry ebbed away as their centers of intellectual excellence were destroyed by the vengeful Christian reconquest of Spain and the Mongol invasion of the Arab heartland. Elsewhere, as in the unrelated but similar rejection of modern printing technology by the Ottomans in the heart of the Caliphate and the Mogul emperors in India, dissemination of knowledge beyond the elite was considered suspect." (Tanvir Ahmad Khan, "Struggles for a Muslim Renaissance," *Arab News*, 25 May 2007).

¹⁴ See, for instance, George Saliba, "Seeking the Origins of Early Modern Science?" [review article] *Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies* 1, no. 2 (Autumn 1999), 139–52.

To assume that all these different groups and organizations should have followed one and the same standards, norms, directions, and approaches in regard to the ‘ancient sciences’ presupposes the belief that there must have been similarities strong enough to counterbalance these differences and even outweigh them. Since even today in a much more intertwined world the differences between cultures, forms of social and political organization, economy and scientific activities as well as results remain substantial, it is not very likely that the vast space inhabited by Islamic societies in the past was characterized by a higher degree of harmony and homogeneity.

Moreover, ‘decline’ as a category of history-writing is culturally flawed since the concept is deeply value-laden. It began its career as a concept of diplomats from Catholic societies serving as an element of political rhetoric in the sixteenth century. The diplomats argued on the basis of the cyclical understanding of history that was prevalent in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italian theories of politics and society that the long series of Ottoman sultans proved by virtue of theory that the Ottoman Empire was in the stage of decline and would dissolve within the next few years or decades at most.¹⁵

But it is not only the project to historicize the history of science in Islamic societies put before us in 1987 by A. I. Sabra that we need to take seriously. We need to go further and abandon J. Needham’s project of a universal history of science in which all the separate cultures of past science contribute towards ‘modern’ science, each in its own way.¹⁶ There is only one way in which a universal history of science can be maintained—by the recognition that all science is culturally constructed. As cultural constructs, the sciences of different societies can be measured and compared in terms of their complexity, degree of difficulty, and explanatory and prognostic capability, but also their positive as well as negative impact on society, nature and the universe. But they are not Aristotelian forms which reach their full state in our own sciences. They do not grow in a cumulative manner towards us.

¹⁵ <http://etext.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv1-74>

¹⁶ For a succinct summary of Needham’s position and his rejection of Hossein Nasr’s claim that “science in Islam” was “an unfolding of divine wisdom” see Hans Daiber, “Von der Weisheit Gottes zur Wissenschaft,” *Evangelium und Wissenschaft* 42 (2003), 3–13; English translation: “The Way from God’s Wisdom to Science in Islam. Modern discussions and historical background,” in idem, *The Struggle for Knowledge in Islam: Some historical aspects* (Sarajevo: Nevad Kahteran, 2004), 52–66. I thank Hans Daiber for reminding me of his paper and providing me with a copy.

Our knowledge and our practices do not comprise of all earlier stages of scientific doctrines and activities. Paradigm shifts entail discarding earlier modes of thinking, writing, arguing or analyzing. Treating such abandoned types of knowledge with the respect and appreciation due to them does not presuppose an Aristotelian belief in teleology. Respecting and appreciating past types of knowledge for their own forms, goals, contents and contexts independent of our knowledge and its identity-forging powers rather builds on the assumption of the spatial and temporal locality of all knowledge and the contingency of its traces.

Emancipating history of science in Islamic societies successfully from its old and one-sided categories, which in a sense are remnants of an intellectual colonialism constructed over the course of half a millennium, is, however, only one urgent task of today's historians. This process needs to be accompanied by liberating the field from its Middle Eastern nationalistic as well as Islamic categories and their underlying beliefs. It is not merely wrong to argue like Ernest Renan, Ignaz Goldziher, Gustav Edmund von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis or Bassam Tibi that Islamic 'orthodoxy' was always hostile towards science and philosophy and thus caused their demise. It is equally wrong to argue like Hossein Nasr, Ziauddin Sardar or Muzaffar Iqbal that 'Islam' was always open to science and philosophy because there was no central religious authority or clergy in Islam and because of Qur'ānic invitations to recite or Prophetic sayings that women and men should always acquire *'ilm* even if that meant going as far as China. Not only is *'ilm* in its singular form a specific kind of knowledge, namely the knowledge of *ḥadīth* or more broadly speaking religious knowledge, Muḥammad's goal was not to invite his newly converted followers to study the theories of other cultures. But even if the Prophet would have wished his followers to acquire knowledge of a secular kind outside his own cultural realm, attitudes among Muslims towards such a kind of knowledge varied considerably over time and space. Renan, Goldziher, von Grunebaum or Lewis surely interpreted the sources they worked with in a framework of their own prejudices, but they did not invent the hostile statements of Muslim scholars against philosophy, logic, geometry, algebra or astrology. It is undeniably true that influential Muslim scholars such as Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (450–505/1058–1111), Ibn al-Ġawzī (d. 597/1201), Ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ aṣ-Ṣahrazūrī (577–642/1181–1245), Šams ad-Dīn aḍ-Ḍahabī (672–749/1274–1348) and Ibn Taymīya (661–728/1263–1328) wrote in strong terms against several or even all of the 'ancient sciences.'

Moreover, there was no simple, direct connection between Muḥammad’s *umma* and later Islamic societies. The changes that occurred after Muḥammad’s death were profound. At latest in the tenth century political, administrative and economic decentralization facilitated the emergence of regional cultural identities with particular religious beliefs and practices. Tribal migrations, wars and slave trade changed the ethnic composition of vast parts of the Islamic world and shifted in certain regions the balance between sedentary and nomadic cultures dramatically altering previous kinds of cultural cohesion. New regional blocks emerged which were not necessarily organized according to religious affiliations. Military, commercial, cultural and familial alliances transcended religious identity to a much greater extent than is generally allowed for. It does not make sense to assume that the ‘ancient sciences’ and their practitioners would not have been affected by these deep changes nor that the new societies with their profoundly altered set up should have subscribed to the same attitude towards the ‘ancient sciences’ as did their predecessors.

In the following three sections I present some of my arguments against various theses of marginalization and ‘decline’ of the ‘ancient sciences’ as offered by Goldziher (rejection by Islamic orthodoxy), Makdisi (exclusion from Sunnī *madrasas*), Michot (lack of courtly patronage) and others. In addition, I offer examples for other ways of interrogating the extant source material and reflecting on similarities and differences between some Islamic dynasties in regard to the ‘ancient sciences.’ My observations and interpretations do not lead yet to new categories. This is an important task for the future. But they point out some themes that stand out in the sources I study.

2. *Ancient Sciences at Madrasas*

In 1981, Makdisi claimed in his highly influential book *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* that the “ancient sciences” were excluded from the newly founded Sunnī *madrasas* and remained *ante portas* ever after.¹⁷ Two features of this claim are amazing. First, it is in open conflict with sources. Second, it was accepted by a majority of historians as correct. Two examples for the lasting impact of Makdisi’s distortion of the relationship between the *madrasa*

¹⁷ George Makdisi, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 77–8.

and the 'ancient sciences' are Halm's description of the Fāṭimid *Dār al-ilm* and Hassan's discussion of the relevance of the *madrassa* for debates of 'decline.' Halm claimed that there was no institution in the Islamic world that offered an encyclopedic knowledge in the classical sense and that the *madrassa*, while being "a cultural institution of high quality and standard, ... was always limited" in its teaching "to religious knowledge. The instruction and study of medicine or astronomy, algebra or geometry, took place elsewhere, in the often private circles of authorities in each of the sciences. ... There was one exception. The sixth Fāṭimid caliph and the sixteenth imam of the Ismā'īlīs, al-Ḥākim (386–412/996–1021), founded the *House of Knowledge* (*Dār al-ilm*) in Cairo in the year 1005."¹⁸ Hassan denied that the exclusion of the 'ancient sciences' from the *madrassa* contributed to their 'decline.' By equating the 'ancient sciences' with the 'rational sciences,' a position widespread among historians of science, he extended Makdisi's view to a much larger field of disciplines. Hassan insisted that

the study of the rational sciences in Islam was always undertaken independently, and the theological studies were not usually undertaken under the same teachers or at the same institutions. Astronomy and mathematics were pursued mostly in the observatories, within a community of mathematicians and astronomers, where a specialized library was available and observational instruments were in constant use. The medical sciences were studied, as they should be, in the medical school of a *bīmāristān* (hospital). The other sciences were studied under individual renowned scientists, most often patronized by the rulers, to whom students travelled from the far realms of Islam. The existence of these individual renowned teachers constituted what may be called a college of professors within a certain large city or a region. Let us not forget also the libraries and the academies, like *Dār al-Ḥikma* in Baḡdād, which were devoted to research and to the study of the rational sciences. Most of the *madrassas*, on the other hand, were established by persons in power or by pious and wealthy individuals who endowed a part of their wealth to a waqf which supported the school. The purpose was always religious, and the studies were naturally mainly those of law and theology.¹⁹

The 'ancient sciences' were, however, not identical with the 'rational sciences' nor was either of the two indeed excluded from the *madrassa* or taught by different groups of teachers.

¹⁸ Heinz Halm, *The Fatimids and their Traditions of Learning* (London: I.B. Tauris in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1997), 71.

¹⁹ Access by <http://www.history-science-technology.com/Articles/articles%208.htm>.

It is unclear when the ‘ancient sciences’ began to move into the *madrasas*, mosques, and *ḥānqāhs*. At latest in the late twelfth century some of them can be found in these institutions in Salḡūq Anatolia, ‘Abbāsīd Baḡdād, Artuqid and Zangid northern Iraq, and Ayyūbid Damascus and Cairo. Other areas such as Iran saw a similar development, if not during Salḡūq rule, then under their successors, the Ilḡānids. This move took three forms—copying manuscripts for the library, teaching and studying either within the physical confinement of such an institute or with a *madrasa* teacher elsewhere, and the donation of special chairs for particular disciplines. While the two first formats are documented in substantial numbers in the sources, sponsoring chairs for ‘ancient sciences’ was a much less regular event.²⁰ Chairs for medicine were among the first and most often donated professorships for the ‘ancient sciences’ and were, in addition to hospitals, attached to *madrasas* and mosques in Salḡūq Anatolia, ‘Abbāsīd Baḡdād, and Mamlūk Cairo.²¹ In the fourteenth century, the first chair for *‘ilm al-mīqāt* (science of time keeping) was donated in Mamlūk

²⁰ Scientific texts copied and taught at *madrasas* in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Anatolia and Iran include works of the Banū Mūsā, Abū l-Wafā’, Ibn al-Hayṭam, Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, Quṭb ad-Dīn Šīrāzī, Ibn Sīnā, Uluḡ Beg, Gamāl ad-Dīn al-Marīdānī, Ibn al-Maḡdī, Ibn al-Hā’im, Sibṭ al-Marīdānī, Bahā’ ad-Dīn al-‘Āmilī, Ibn an-Nafīs, Euclid, Ptolemy, Menelaos, Apollonios, Hippocrates and other authors. Examples for copying are: mathematical texts written by as-Siḡzī (fl. late tenth century) and Ibn al-Hayṭam (d. 432/1041) by a great-great-great-grandson of Niẓām al-Mulk in the *Niẓāmiya madrasa* finished in September 9, 1215; Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1036) *al-Qānūn fi ṭ-ṭibb* in the same *madrasa* 68 years later (13 Muḥarram 682/April 13, 1283) and one year later, in the same *madrasa* of Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s *Taḍkira fi ‘ilm al-hay’a*; another copy of this text was written in 853/1448 in the *Davud Paṣa madrasa* in Istanbul; Quṭb ad-Dīn Šīrāzī’s (d. 710/1311) *Nihāyat al-idrāk fi dirāyat al-aflāk* was copied in the *Gök madrasa* of Sivas in 682/1283 and his *at-Tuhfa aṣ-Šāhiya* in the medical *madrasa* of Sivas in 722/1322 and in the *Sahib Ata madrasa* in Konya in 785/1383; al-Kindī’s (d. ca. 256/870) optics in 896/1491 at the *Kāmiliya madrasa* in Cairo; Šams ad-Dīn M. ibn Maḥmūd Amulī’s *Šarḥ al-Qānūn* of Ibn Sīnā’s main medical work in 737/1337 at the *Wazīriya Rāšidiya madrasa* in Sulṭāniya; Uluḡ Beg’s (r. 850/1447–1449) *Ziḡ* in the *Mašḡid-i Ġāmi’-i Ġadīd-i ‘Abbāsi* in Isfahan 1056/1646; Qāḏizāda ar-Rūmī’s (d. 836/1432) *Šarḥ Aṣkāl at-ta’sīs* for Uluḡ Beg in the *Ḥatūniya madrasa* in Erzerum in 1077/1666 and in the *Fatih madrasa* in Istanbul in 1081/1670; ‘Alī Quṣṭī’s (d. 879/1474) *Hay’a* in 1091/1680 in the *Ḥayrābād madrasa* in Lāhiḡān. This list is by no means exhaustive.

²¹ Emilie Savage-Smith, “Medicine,” in *Encyclopaedia of the History of Arabic Science*, ed. Roshdi Rashed (London: Routledge, 1996), vol. 3, 903–62; Gary Leiser, “Medical Education in Islamic Lands from the Seventh to the Fourteenth Century,” *Journal for the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 38 (1983), 48–75; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Islamic Architecture in Cairo* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 138–40; Mehmet Turgut, “Medieval medical schools in the Seljuq and Ottoman empires,” *Child’s Nervous System* 26 (2010), 147–8.

Cairo.²² The Ottomans made the official support for *‘ilm al-mīqāt* and the mathematical sciences a regular component of their policies towards the *‘ilmiyye*. Occasionally, chairs were provided for other fields of knowledge too, such as arithmetic or alchemy.²³ In most cases, the donors came from the ruling military elites. *Madrasas* specializing in teaching medicine were also donated by physicians in Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Damascus and possibly in Salğūq Anatolia.²⁴ In other regions of the Islamic world, teaching medicine remained the prerogative of hospitals and of private tutors.

The move of the ‘ancient sciences’ into the *madrasa* and cognate institutes brought with it several changes in the status and practice of the ‘ancient sciences.’ The broadening of the educational space at *madrasas*, mosques, and *ḥānqāhs* led to a stabilization of teaching and compiling of educational texts in several disciplines of the ‘ancient sciences.’ Libraries were created within these institutions that contained treatises on the different fields of these sciences plus those branches that were newly formed like *‘ilm al-mīqāt* or *‘ilm al-hay’a* (mathematical cosmography). Teachers of these disciplines became well established as members of the educational elite of major cities. They were appointed as *mudarrisūn* at *madrasas*, mosques, or *ḥānqāhs*, although their teaching posts were not explicitly named for the ‘ancient sciences.’ This means that *mudarrisūn*, while officially being teachers of *fiqh*, were free to teach any other subject too. In the case of teachers of the mathematical and astronomical disciplines this often meant that they taught primarily *‘ilm al-farā’id* followed by arithmetic, *‘ilm al-mīqāt*, and algebra. But they also could teach *fiqh*, Arabic, *‘ilm*

²² Jonathan Berkey, *The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 69; David A. King, “On the Role of the Muezzin and the Muwaqqit in Medieval Islamic Society,” in *Tradition, Transmission, Transformation: Proceedings of Two Conferences on Pre-Modern Science Held at the University of Oklahoma*, eds. F. Jamil Ragep and Sally P. Ragep with Steven Livesey (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 285–346; Sonja Brentjes, “Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī on *Muwaqqits*, *Mu’adhdhins*, and the Teachers of Various Astronomical Disciplines in Mamluk Cities in the Fifteenth Century,” in *A Shared Legacy, Islamic Science East and West*, Homage to professor J. M. Millás Vallicrosa, eds. Emilia Calvo, Mercè Comes, Roser Puig, and Mònica Rius (Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, Publicacions i Edicions, 2008), 129–50, in particular 133.

²³ Carl Petry, *The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages: Social Autonomy and Political Adversity in Mamluk Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

²⁴ See footnote 21.

al-hay'a, geometry, and philosophy.²⁵ Others who became influential teachers of *fiqh* or *uṣūl ad-dīn* acquired fame as teachers of *ḥikma*, medicine, theoretical geometry, and astronomy.²⁶ Sabra has termed this change in professional outlook the move from the philosopher-physician and scientist-physician to the jurist-physician.²⁷ The change in professional outlook is, however, more adequately described as the emergence of a *mudarris* with a multidisciplinary training covering the ‘traditional’, ‘rational’, and mathematical sciences. The ‘traditional’ disciplines contain most often the study of the Qurʾān and *ḥadīṭ* plus *fiqh*. The ‘rational’ sciences comprise of the two *aṣls* (*fiqh* and *dīn*), logic, epistemology and other parts of philosophy, *kalām*, rhetoric, and metric. Some writers include also Arabic and grammar. The mathematical sciences as a rule consist of arithmetic, surveying, number theory, Euclidean geometry, *ʿilm al-miqāt*, *ʿilm al-hay'a*, the compilation of astronomical handbooks and ephemerides, and theoretical music. Medicine and alchemy appear either under the ‘rational’ or the mathematical sciences.²⁸ These changes in disciplinary perspectives meant that it were not the practitioners of the ‘ancient sciences’ alone who altered their profile merging it with the study of religious disciplines. The *mutakallimūn* too modified their profiles and integrated parts of mathematics, astronomy, logic, and philosophy into their training and scholarly writing. In the fifteenth century at the latest, most members of the educational elite and several sons of the military elite in Egypt and Syria studied at least some introductory texts of the ‘rational’ and the mathematical sciences. Copying such texts was a standard educational practice. Some members of the elites even composed their own writings on these disciplines, most often in poetic form as a *naẓm*. In Iran and subsequently in Central Asia and India, members of the educational as well as courtly elites delved more deeply into theory, in particular *ʿilm al-hay'a*, a process that began in the thirteenth century.²⁹

²⁵ Brentjes, “Shams al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī,” 144.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁷ Sabra, “The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam,” 125–7.

²⁸ Sonja Brentjes, “The Location of the Ancient or ‘Rational’ Sciences in Muslim Educational Landscapes (AH 500–1100),” *Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies*, 4, no. 1, Amman (2002), 47–71.

²⁹ Commentaries on Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s astronomical works were written by scholars such as Nizām ad-Dīn Nisābūri, Sayyid al-Ġurgāni, Nizām ad-Dīn Birgāndī, Ġalāl ad-Dīn Dawwānī and Šams ad-Dīn Ḥafri who all were leading religious figures.

A further change that took place with the move of the 'ancient sciences' into the *madrassa* and cognate institutes was the spread of these disciplines from centers into the provinces.³⁰

The stabilization of teaching the 'ancient sciences' within the *madrassa* and cognate institutes together with the broadening modification of the educational profiles of the formerly more clearly separated practitioners of the 'ancient' and of the religious sciences is a major cultural innovation that took place in several Islamic societies, in particular those with larger territories and more affluent military rulers and urban elites. Many more people acquired at least some knowledge in these sciences than in the centuries of the exclusive location of the 'ancient sciences' in the spheres of courts. The practitioners of these disciplines became part of the '*ulamā*' and partook in their social reputation. Cultural rituals such as marriages with daughters of high ranking '*ulamā*', employments as ambassadors, attribution of honorific titles and *laqabs*, official mourning ceremonies in mosques, or burials at privileged burial sites in distinguished neighborhoods included all '*ulamā*' independent of their subject of teaching and interest. The price to be paid for this newly available stability and respect was adopting the teaching methods and values of the religious disciplines—memorizing, authority-centered learning versus disciplinary study, and fitting into teachers' chains. Good memory, virtuosity in tricky problems, utility for others, social deference and religious steadfastness are properties that are most often commended in biographical entries. Mathematical texts are listed among those that were learned by heart. Mastering an entire discipline, in contrast, was not seen as the goal of education. Thus, the adoption of the methods and values of teaching religious disciplines by the teachers of the 'ancient sciences' altered not only their format of reproduction, but also the content that was taught and the skills that were advocated. As a consequence, the increase in stability, status, and geographical distribution translated often into a decrease in complexity, degree of difficulty, and comprehensiveness. There were exceptions from this pattern. Some applied

Most of them were closely connected with Ilhānīd, Muẓaffarīd, Tīmūrīd and other princes. Several copies of these texts were nicely written and illustrated.

³⁰ Sonja Brentjes, "The Mathematical Sciences in the Safavid Empire: Questions and Perspectives," in *Muslim Cultures in the Indo-Iranian World during the Early-Modern and Modern Periods*, eds. D. Hermann and F. Speziale (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Tehran: Institut Français de Recherche en Iran, 2010), 325–402.

to specific disciplines, in particular *‘ilm al-hay’a* and some parts of *‘ilm al-mīqāt*. Others are represented by individual scholars such as Ibn aṣ-Ṣāṭir (703–776/1304–1375), Ibn as-Sarrāḡ (719–748/1319/20–1347/8), Ġiyāṭ ad-Dīn Kāṣī (d. 832/1429), or ‘Alī Quṣṣī (d. 879/1474). Additionally, the tastes and preferences of individual rulers differed in their impact upon the appointment of *mudarrisūn* at *madrasas* and cognate institutes. But at large, the ‘ancient sciences’ transformed in outlook and approach into a mirror image of the religious disciplines. It is for the conditions of these fields of knowledge that we have to look in order to understand which forces shaped the practices in the ‘ancient sciences.’

3. Courtly Patronage for the ‘Ancient Sciences’ after 1200

In his paper about Ibn Taymīya, Michot reflects the generally held belief that the fall of the Būyid and Fāṭimid dynasties and the subsequent so-called Sunnī revival led to the abandonment of the practitioners of the philosophical sciences by the elites and in particular the courts when he emphasizes that their fate always depended on this part of Islamic society, and that socio-political conditions led to their demise.³¹ Although scholars like ‘Umar al-Ḥayyām (d. 525/1131) and al-Muẓaffar al-Isfīzārī (d. before 515/1121) were clearly engaged with the philosophical sciences at Salḡūq courts, they were not mere survivors of a bygone period. Dynasties in Iran in particular sponsored a broad range of disciplines from the ‘ancient sciences.’ Standard examples are the Ilḡānids and the Tīmūrīds. Several well-known scholars from Syria, the Maḡrib, and Iran such as Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, Muḡyī d-Dīn ‘Urdī (d. 658/1260), Ibn Abī Šukr al-Maḡribī (d. 682/1283) or Quṭb ad-Dīn Šīrāzī (d. 711/1311) worked as astronomers and astrologers at the Ilḡānid courts of Marāḡa, Tabrīz, and Sulṭāniya, their observatories, and their *madrasas*. The astronomical and mathematical knowledge of the Tīmūrid prince and ruler Uluḡ Beg and his engagement with

³¹ Yahya Michot, “Vanités intellectuelles...L’impasse des rationalismes selon le Rejet de la Contradiction d’Ibn Taymiyyah,” *Oriente Moderno* 19 (2001), 597–617, at 602: “Certes, l’espèce des falāsifah proprement dits est alors éteinte, mais c’est parce que son existence était indissolublement liée au soutien et aux salons de princes, d’émirs, de vizirs et d’autres grands notables. Quand donc de tels appuis vinrent à manquer, du fait d’un changement des conditions socio-politiques, ils ne survécurent point.”

an observatory and a *madrasa* for teaching mathematics and astrology are equally well-known for more than half a century. But other dynasties, Sunnī and Šī'ī alike, such as the Inġu'ids, the Muẓaffarids, the Aq Qoyunlu, or the Şafavids, sponsored several of the 'ancient sciences', in particular medicine, astrology, *'ilm al-hay'a*, geometry, arithmetic, parts of philosophy, and geography. Some of them also patronized the occult sciences such as alchemy or geomancy. Outside of Iran, the Delhi Sultāns, the Quṭbšāhīs, the Muġals, the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks, the Rasūlids, and the Ottomans all supported several of the 'ancient sciences', often including parts of philosophy, in particular metaphysics and ethics, but occasionally also natural philosophy. The veracity of these observations does not have sufficient power yet to alter the deeply held belief among historians and historians of science that courtly patronage for the 'ancient sciences' disappeared in the post-classical period. Hassan's discussion of why the sciences did not develop in Islamic societies in the same manner as at Catholic and Protestant universities of the early modern period rests on this unquestioned belief:

But the universities which appeared in the West and which comprised several colleges for theology, law, arts and sciences, and medicine, did not develop in Islam in the same period. This is due to the fact that the madrasas which were supported by the waqf system, and with them the study of law and theology, continued to exist without interruption, whereas the centers for the study of the rational sciences, which were dependent on the strength and the prosperity of the state, deteriorated and ceased to exist with the decline of the Islamic states, and for this reason scientific knowledge did not keep in line with the quick advances of science in Europe after the Scientific Revolution.³²

This lack of recognition of the continued support of 'ancient sciences' in the spheres of the courts results most likely from the almost exclusive focus of the historians of science on the study of scientific texts and instruments, while ignoring a more systematic exploration of the larger cultural context of these texts. Historians, on the other hand, tend to ignore the sciences in their studies of politics, war, religion, or the arts. Clues and suggestions from social as well as art historians and dedications in scientific manuscripts suggest that the differences between courtly support for the 'ancient sciences' during the

³² Access by <http://www.history-science-technology.com/Articles/articles%208.htm>.

classical period and after the fall of the ‘Abbāsids were less important than previously believed. Courtly patronage of the ‘ancient sciences’ in post-classical Islamic societies was closely connected with modes of gaining, legitimizing, and maintaining power as was the case in classical societies.³³ The major social group the rulers could turn to for this purpose was that of the local landowners. These landowners were very often religious dignitaries. The most powerful part of this group was the overseers of the major shrines and mosques. They were often *sayyids*, i.e. descendants of the Prophet and his family, and the heads of this group, the *naqībs* who controlled and regulated the genealogical documents. A second important part of the local landowners was formed by families who held the offices of a *qāḍī*, a *mudarris*, an *imām*, a *wā‘iz*, or a *mu‘addīn* for centuries. The sons of these families usually acquired their reputation through success based on and derived from education—eloquence, familiarity with *fiqh* and *farā’id*, knowledge of classical Arabic in addition to the spoken language and the local language of literature and poetry and the capability to debate the fine points of faith.³⁴ It is here where courtly patronage and *madrasa* education met each other because, as Hoffmann remarked, the respect that princes had to pay to the religious class was measured in terms of their generosity towards the ‘*ulamā*’.³⁵ Thus, courtly patronage for the ‘ancient sciences’ reflects on this level of power sharing the acknowledgement of tendencies and orientations among the teachers and students of *madrasas* and cognate institutes.

The move of the ‘ancient sciences’ into these educational institutions secured not only their intellectual continuation, but also the continuation of their material existence due to princely funding. As a result, mathematical and astronomical manuscripts with dedications to rulers, princes, amīrs, sons of amīrs and viziers can be found for most of the wealthier and ambitious dynasties after 1200. An exception is the

³³ Hassan’s claim that there was no “demand of the state” for the ancient sciences in later Islamic societies while there had been such a demand in classical societies is not only in conflict with the sources that speak of patronage for medicine, astrology, astronomy, geography, history, arithmetic, and geometry. It is also problematic in a theoretical perspective, because it suggests an identity of court and state. Access <http://www.history-science-technology.com/Articles/articles%208.htm>.

³⁴ Birgitt Hoffmann, “Turkmen Princes and Religious Dignitaries: A Sketch in Group Profiles,” in *Timūrid Art and Culture. Iran and Central Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, eds. Lisa Golombek and Maria Subtelny (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 23–8, in particular p. 25.

³⁵ Hoffmann, “Turkmen Princes,” 25.

Mamlūk dynasty who only promoted medicine via a courtly *diwān*. The absence of astrologers from among the courtly offices and the lack of dedications of mathematical and astronomical treatises to specific Mamlūk sultāns and courtiers does not necessarily mean, however, that this dynasty did not support these disciplines at all or even had a hostile attitude towards them. Mamlūk sultans promoted the office of the *muwaqqit* by religious donations as did, for example, Sultān Ḥasan (r. 748–752/1347–51, 755–762/1354–61) and by appointing famous scholars of ‘ilm al-mīqāt to the post of a *mudarris* at *madrasas* or the head of *ḥānqāhs* as did Sultān Barsbay (r. 825–841/1422–38) in the case of Ibn al-Mağdī (d. 851/1447).³⁶ Descendants of Mamlūk officials and officers did not look down on the mathematical sciences (‘ilm al-mīqāt, ‘ilm al-hay’a or even ‘ilm al-ḥarf), as the writings of Naṣīr ad-Dīn ibn Qurqmas al-Ḥanafī and Ibn al-Mağdī’s career as a *muwaqqit* and *madrasa/ḥānqāh* teacher show.³⁷

Important and fascinating issues of courtly patronage for the ‘ancient sciences’ concern the relationships between patron and scholar, the modes of loyalty established in such relationships, the similarities and differences between patronage for scholarship, patronage for art, literature and architecture as well as patronage for military ranks, the types of patrons, the types of remuneration, the function and frequency of dedications and the shift from the ‘ancient’ to the ‘rational sciences’. In a series of papers written in the last three years, I have discussed the languages of patronage and the problems of interpretation, aspects of relationships between princes and scholars of the ‘ancient’ and ‘rational sciences’ such as long duration, change of ‘patrons’, practices of negotiating rights and duties, or types of remuneration.³⁸ In other papers, I present currently available research and historical evidence for the

³⁶ Šams ad-Dīn as-Saḥāwī, *ad-Daw’ al-lāmi’ fi ahl al-qarn at-tāsi’*, 12 vols. (Beirut: Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāt, s.d.), vol. 1, 300.

³⁷ As-Saḥāwī, *al-Daw’ al-lāmi’*, vol. 1, 300; vol. 3, 115 and 235.

³⁸ Sonja Brentjes, “Patronage of the Mathematical Sciences in Islamic Societies: Structure and Rhetoric, Identities and Outcomes,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Mathematics*, eds. Eleanor Robson and Jackie Stedall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 301–28; idem, “Courtly Patronage of the Ancient Sciences in Post-Classical Islamic Societies,” *Al-Qanṭara* 29 (2008), 403–36; idem, “Ayyubid Princes and their Scholarly Clients from the Ancient Sciences,” in *Court Cultures in the Muslim World: Seventh to Nineteenth Centuries*, eds. Albrecht Fuess and Jan-Peter Hartung (SOAS/Routledge Studies on the Middle East, London: Routledge, 2010), 326–56.

stimulating impact that the arts and their patronage had upon the continuous production of scientific treatises and their canonization.³⁹

4. *An Internal and an External Claim of Scientific ‘Decline’*

One Muslim author who is often quoted in discussions about decline is Ibn Ḥaldūn (d. 808/1406). In developing his theory of society in his famous *Muqaddima*, Ibn Ḥaldūn relies on several ancient Greek concepts and theories, among them the idea of history as cycles of rise, climax, and decline. Ibn Ḥaldūn saw a strong link between economic and cultural prosperity of a society and the rise of the disciplines of knowledge as well as between economic crisis and the decline of the scholarly disciplines.⁴⁰ The basis for these claims is his view about the relationship between the evolution of sedentary city culture and political power on the one hand and his view on the social status of knowledge on the other. He believed that cities and their prosperity or ruin are the consequence of the existence of dynasties, not their precondition or that these elements were independently coexistent.⁴¹ He regarded scholarly disciplines as crafts due to the idea that skill is the result of habit, habits are corporeal, i.e. *sensibilia*, and hence in need of instruction.⁴² In addition to these theoretical perspectives, Ibn Ḥaldūn also talked about concrete historical instances in Islamic societies that would back his theory. He claimed that “the tradition of scientific instruction has practically ceased (to be cultivated) among the inhabitants of the Mağrib, because the civilization of the Mağrib has disintegrated and its dynasties have lost their importance.”⁴³ In contrast, scientific instruction continues to flourish in Ḥurāsān and Mā Warā’ an-Nahr in the East and Cairo in the West; the early centers

³⁹ Sonja Brentjes, “The Interplay of Science, Art and Literature in Islamic Societies before 1700,” in *Science, Literature and Aesthetics. History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, ed. Amiya Dev, general editor D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Volume 15, Part 3 (New Delhi: PHISPC, Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2009), 455–86; idem, “The Mathematical Sciences in the Safavid Empire: Questions and Perspectives,” 325–402.

⁴⁰ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, 3 vols., Bollinger Series XLIII (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), vol. 2, 347–52 and 434–9.

⁴¹ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, vol. 2, 235–7 and 270–6.

⁴² Ibid., vol. 2, 426–33.

⁴³ Ibid., vol. 2, 427.

of scientific instruction, Baġdād, Baṣra, and Kūfa, Ibn Ḥaldūn considered as ruined.⁴⁴ He emphasized the support for scientific instruction given by the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk dynasties and their officials to it in Cairo through religious donations for *madrasas* and other buildings due to a fear of confiscation of property and discrimination of their descendants among the officials, i.e. the Mamlūks. As a result, people from other regions in the Islamic world streamed to Cairo for studying.⁴⁵ Thus, in Ibn Ḥaldūn's view the Maġrib (and al-Andalus) were the prime examples for the nexus of disappearance of scholarly disciplines and the ruin of dynasties, cities, and civilization, while the East (Egypt, Iran, and Central Asia) demonstrated the continuous flourishing of these disciplines due to the continuous prosperity of their civilization. He saw neither a 'decline' of the 'ancient' nor of the 'rational' and 'traditional sciences' in these Eastern regions in the second half of the fourteenth century. Even Tūnis was still a favorable place for scientific instruction.⁴⁶

A look into biographical dictionaries shows that not all of his negative evaluations should be taken at face value. Students and scholars from towns west of Tūnis came to Cairo for study and teaching or passed it as a stop on their way to Medina and Mecca. Some of them had already spent several years with teachers in *madrasas* or *zāwīyas* exploring the 'rational' and 'traditional' as well as mathematical sciences. The extent of their studies in towns such as Tlemcen and Bejaia, but also in small towns such as Basta, testifies that not all higher learning had disappeared from the Western lands. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad az-Zawāwī al-Biġāyī (821–c. 864/1418–ca. 1460), for instance, studied in Tlemcen and Bejaia logic, dialectics, philosophy, geometry, mathematical cosmography, mechanics, number theory, theoretical music, optics, burning mirrors, and the theoretical fields of the religious and philological disciplines.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ibid., vol. 2, 431.

⁴⁵ Ibid., vol. 2, 435.

⁴⁶ Ibid., vol. 2, 430.

⁴⁷ As-Saḥāwī, *ad-Daw' al-lāmi'*, vol. 9, 181–2: "Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad... Abū l-Faḍl... al-Mašdāllī, ... this refers to a tribe in al-Zawāwa, al-Zawāwī al-Biġāyī... and he was known in the East as Abū l-Faḍl and in the West as Ibn Abī l-Qāsim... he memorized the two (texts called) *aš-Šaṭibiya*, al-Ḥirāzī's *Raġaz* on *ar-rasm* and *al-Kāfiya aš-Šāfiya* and *Lāmiyat al-afāl* by Ibn Mālik on grammar and inflection and *Ġālib at-Tashil* and his *Alfiya* and Ibn Ḥāġib's *al-Far'i* and the *Risāla* and at-Tilimsānī's *Urgūza* on *farā'id* and about a quarter of Saḥnūn's *Mudawwana* and *Ṭawālī' al-Anwār* on *uṣūl ad-dīn* by al-Bayḍāwī and Ibn Ḥāġib's *al-Aṣli* and al-Ḥūnaġī's *Jumal* and

The external diagnosis of decline of an Islamic society linked to the state of its sciences was first formulated by Catholic and Protestant visitors to the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸ The background to this diagnosis was first the visitors’ lack of knowledge of the intellectual spaces within the Ottoman Empire and their inhabitants. Second it was the visitors’ inability to navigate between their own cultural forms of scholarship and those in the Ottoman Empire. They were searching for the same, the familiar in a foreign society and when they did not find it they

al-Ḥazrağīya on metric and *Talḥiṣ* by Ibn al-Bannā’ on arithmetic and *Talḥiṣ al-Miftāḥ* and the *Dīwān* of Imrū’ al-Qays, an-Nābīga aḍ-Ḍubyānī, Zuhayr ibn Abī Sulmā, ‘Alqama al-Faḥl and Ṭarafa ibn al-‘Abd. Then he turned towards comprehension and thus studied inflection and metric with Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf ar-Rifī, Arabic, logic, *al-uṣūl* and *al-miqāt* with Abū Bakr at-Tilimsānī and he took *al-miqāt* also with Abū Bakr ibn ‘Isā al-Wanṣarīsī. Then he studied grammar with Ya‘qūb at-Tirūnī, grammar and logic with Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr. Then he researched arithmetic with Mūsā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥasnāwī and again arithmetic together with inflection, grammar, the two *aṣl*, rhetoric and the revealed sciences of *tafsīr* and *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* with his father. Then he studied the two *aṣl* with Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ḥasnāwī, who is the brother of Mūsā, I believe. At the beginning of the year 40 he travelled to Tlemcen and studied there with the famous scholar Muḥammad ibn Marzūq ibn Ḥafid and with Abū l-Qāsim ibn Sa‘īd al-Uqbānī, Abū l-Faḍl ibn al-Imām, Abū l-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Zāgū, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn an-Nağğār, known for the strength of his knowledge in *qiyās* through the butcher’s knife of concluding by analogy. (He also studied) with Abū Rabī’ Sulaymān al-Būzidī and Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf ibn Ismā‘īl and Abū l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Qāsim and Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Būrī and Ibn Afṣūš. He (studied) with the first *tafsīr* and *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* and the two *aṣl* and *adab* in its branches and logic and dialectic and *falsafiyāt* (the philosophical sciences) and medicine and *handasa*. (He studied) with the second *fiqh* and *uṣūl ad-dīn* and with the third *tafsīr* and *ḥadīth* and medicine and the ancient sciences (*al-‘ulūm al-qadīma*) and *taṣawwuf*. With the fourth (he studied) rhetoric and arithmetic and *farā’id* and *handasa* and *taṣawwuf*. With the fifth (he studied) *uṣūl al-fiqh* and rhetoric.... With the sixth (he studied) *fiqh*.... With the seventh (he studied) arithmetic and *farā’id*. With the eighth (he studied) arithmetic and algebra and other (things) from its branches and *hay’a* and the movement of weights. And with the eighth (he studied) ephemerides and *miqāt* in its branches of the arts of the astrolabes and the plates and the sines and *hay’a* and number theory and music and talismans and what resembled them of the science of burning mirrors and optics and the science of the horizons and with the tenth (he studied) medicine. Then he returned to Biğāya.”

⁴⁸ See for a more detailed analysis of these claims and their relationship to conflicting descriptions of Safavid Iran the following two papers of mine: Sonja Brentjes, “Pride and Prejudice: The Invention of a ‘Historiography of Science’ in the Ottoman and Safavid Empires by European Travellers and Writers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Religious Values & The Rise of Science in Europe*, eds. John Brooke and Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2005), 229–54; and idem, “Early Modern Western European Travellers in the Middle East and Their Reports about the Sciences,” in *Sciences, Techniques et Instruments dans le Monde Iranien (X^e–XIX^e Siècle)*, eds. N. Pourjavady and Z. Vesel (Tehran: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran, Presses Universitaires d’Iran, 2004), 379–420.

declared the other as deficient. Thirdly, political and military motifs stimulated a particularly hostile rhetoric about the Ottomans. Accusing them of neglect of the once flourishing sciences of the Arabs and their own lack of interest in such intellectual matters due to their being barbaric warriors of Scythian origin, while extolling the diligence and studiousness in the ‘ancient sciences’ of their Šīī neighbors in Iran served as much the elevation of the visitors’ own societies as it helped to maintain support for wars against the ‘Turk’. Travel literature and diplomatic reports, in particular reports by Venetian ambassadors, abound with remarks or stories about the scientific “underdevelopment” of the “Turks” which are seldom more than prejudices and lack of knowledge. In one case at least, the author made his theoretical beliefs in a cyclical theory of history explicit. In 1592, Lorenzo Bernardo wrote in his report to the Signoria:

Three basic qualities have enabled the Turks to make such remarkable conquests, and rise to such importance in a brief period: religion, frugality, and obedience.

From the beginning it was religion that made them zealous, frugality that made them satisfied with little, and obedience that produced men ready for any dangerous campaign.

In an earlier report I discussed at length these three qualities, which were then and always had been typical of the Turks. Now I plan to follow the same order, but to discuss whether any changes have taken place subsequently that might lead us to hope that that empire will eventually decline. For nothing is more certain than that every living thing (including kingdoms and empires) has a beginning, a middle, and an end, or, you might say, a growth, maturity, and decline.⁴⁹

While the Šafavid elite was portrayed as eager to support the ‘ancient sciences’ financially and institutionally and the inhabitants of Iran as well versed not only in poetry, but also in astrology and other mathematical sciences, many early modern Catholic and Protestant writers declared the Ottomans and their scholars as merely interested in religion, as lacking books and access to ancient and early modern sources in their respective fields and as structurally disinclined towards intellectual pursuits. This rhetoric contradicted not only the scholarly activities in the Ottoman Empire, which did not differ significantly

⁴⁹ J. C. Davis, *Pursuit of Power, Venetian Ambassadors’ Reports on Spain, Turkey and France in the Age of Philipp II, 1560–1600* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 156–7.

in most of the ‘ancient sciences’ from those in Şafavid Iran. *Madrasas* here and there taught arithmetic, surveying, algebra, astronomy, geometry, medicine and parts of philosophy and logic. Students studied Qāḏizāda ar-Rūmī, al-Čaġmīnī, ‘Alī Quşçī, Bahā’ ad-Dīn al-‘Āmilī, Naşīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Tūsī, Uluġ Beg and other authorities. The rhetoric also was in conflict with the activities travelers and envoys from Catholic and Protestant Europe undertook during the seventeenth century in the Ottoman Empire. They met with Jewish, Christian and Muslim scholars to discuss languages, history, religion, the occult sciences, geography, astronomy, and even occasionally the latest scientific news from Europe. They bought manuscripts on a broad range of subjects including the sciences, hunting for ancient historians like Titus Livius and ancient mathematicians like Apollonios, Arabic philosophers and physicians like Ibn Sīnā, and Arabic, Persian, or Turkish writers, historians, geographers, and philologists like Sa’dī, Mīr Ḥwānd, or Abū l-Fidā’. They collected coins, inscriptions and minerals, observed eclipses, comets, and other heavenly events, and measured altitudes and calculated latitudes. They shopped for medical and other drugs, seeds, fruits, and animals, and engaged in trade with almonds and other commodities. Last but not least they eagerly acquired Russian slaves and Greek temporary wives. They turned the Ottoman Empire into a province of their Republic of Letters and acknowledged it as a reservoir for material sources of knowledge, wealth, and pleasure.⁵⁰ In particular during the seventeenth century, Catholic and Protestant scholars were greatly interested in the scholarly resources of the Ottoman Empire as important components for their own scholarly exploits. In certain fields of knowledge such as cartography, geography, and astronomy, this interest continued far into the eighteenth century. The existence of major manuscript libraries in Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain is a direct outcome of these interests as were the maps,

⁵⁰ Brentjes, “Pride and Prejudice: The Invention of a ‘Historiography of Science’;” idem, “‘Renegades’ and Missionaries as Minorities in the Transfer of Knowledge,” in *Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Kostas Chatzis, and Efthymos Nicolaidis (Brepols: Turnhout, 2003), 63–70; idem, “Western European Travelers in the Ottoman Empire and their Scholarly Endeavors (16th–18th centuries),” in *The Turks*, eds. Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Oġuz, and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), 795–803; idem, “On the Relation between the Ottoman Empire and the West European Republic of Letters (17th–18th centuries),” in *International Congress On Learning & Education In The Ottoman World: Istanbul, April 12–15, 1999*, ed. Ali Çaksu (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2001), 121–48.

the herbaria, the medical gardens, the cabinets of curiosity, and the museums of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Daiber, in his paper on the “way from God’s wisdom to science in Islam”, points to discussions about the theme of ‘decline’ which he calls “decadence” in the late nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth centuries among Arab writers that were nourished decisively, as he argues, by debates among French and English authors about the relative superiority or inferiority of their respective countries and contemporary developments in the theory of evolution. His story strengthens my general point against using this concept as a valid category in today’s historiographical practice. A concept with such complex and complicated histories of its own, filled with an immense wealth of mostly negative values impedes any solid investigation of the interests and needs of a concrete Islamic society in any particular scientific practice and the knowledge it created or reproduced. The investigation of these histories is rather an important desideratum to be tackled by such a historiographical approach.

5. *Reflections*

The major conclusion that I drew some time ago from my encounters with historical sources and their ways of talking about or representing the ‘ancient sciences’ in various Islamic societies is that it is high time to abandon some of the main ways in which history of science in these societies is conceptualized on its deepest level. We have to stop assuming that all societies in which a majority of people were Muslims had one and the same attitude towards the ‘ancient sciences’ and hence shared one and one history alone. We rather should assume that different societies had different interests and needs and hence different attitudes. Muslims are as diverse as any other religious group. When it is appropriate to study the sciences and their histories in France, Italy or any other country, province, capital, city or town in Europe and look for their specificities rather than assuming that they were all the same all over Europe, why should we look at Islamic societies from a principally different angle? We need to start studying the sciences in specific Islamic societies. We need to historicize the sciences and put them fully into their local cultural context. This does not mean to abandon larger questions and avoid overarching perspectives. But we should not take the generalities as starting points and basis.

A second concept that I believe we should abandon is the idea that doing justice to the ‘ancient sciences’ in Islamic societies means proving the ‘greatness’ of their practitioners and achievements. Muslims today suffer under an inferiority complex which they try to compensate with, among other things, a constant reference to previous ‘greatness’ in the ‘ancient sciences’. The result of this approach to the past is apology combined with a most serious lack of familiarity with the content as well as the context of these sciences and their practitioners. I do not believe any longer that the race for cultural superiority can be won by pointing to a glorious past which is portrayed as the immediate predecessor or even a fully formed stem-cell of ‘modern’ science, of ‘us’, of the ‘West’ today. I do not believe that such a race can be won at all, whatever means will be applied. Pride built on abusing the past is destructive. We need new ways of dealing with the hurt, trauma and desires of Muslims today. Cultures are different and their peoples believe in different things, see the world with different eyes, pursue different goals and live their lives differently. Squeezing them all into one long chain of predecessors and successors leads to a substantial loss of history, identity and individuality. If we should celebrate anything at all, we should celebrate achievements within their own cultural matrix and we should figure out what people of previous centuries and generations would have celebrated.

The all too easy claim that science is universal and culturally independent overlooks the differences between the cultures and their knowledge. It downplays such differences as irrelevant for the survival of science and its acceptance in different cultures. It is the expectation that science should proceed everywhere in principally the same manner from the lower to the higher, the simpler to the more complex that has brought us into the quagmire where we are finding ourselves in today—the need to explain why only certain societies and not others created the specific forms of science that today rule supreme across the globe. I am convinced today that it is very difficult to explain things that happened because of the discontinuity and contingency both of historical processes and their transmission. But I continue to hear a nagging voice which says it may be possible. In contrast, I am certain that it is impossible to explain things that did not happen. Things that did not happen did not leave traces and cannot leave traces, not even the contingent and discontinuous traces of things that did happen. Hence, there is no access to things that did not happen. All that can be done is to compare things that happened in one society and culture

with things that happened in another and then ask whether the differences between the things that happened can explain the things that did not happen. The problem with such a comparative approach is, however, that it is built on, even if only implicitly, the assumption that certain happenings are normative and hence good or superior, while others are deviations from the norm, for instance 'decline'. Trying to explain things that did not happen through things that happened in a different society inscribes unavoidably the values of the other society unto the society that is studied and seen as lacking. It is a waste of time, time which—as I believe—is better spent in studying the traces that the things which happened in this society have left. The difficulty is to find the questions that are appropriate to these traces and are not merely modified translations of questions asked for the other society.

Hence, we need to take serious Sabra's call for a history of science in Islamic societies that asks questions appropriate to these societies rather than sandwiching the history between the history of science in Antiquity and history of science in the Latin Middle Ages. We could, for instance, study the manner through which certain parts of philosophy and logic became cornerstones of certain religious disciplines such as *uṣul ad-dīn* or the ways through which components of Aristotelian cosmology, physics and meteorology were made acceptable to and accepted by the military as well as administrative and educational elites in certain Islamic societies, but not in others. We also could investigate whether differences in social relationships and behaviors expressed by words such as *ḥadama*, *ṣana'a* or *lāzama* modified the kind of knowledge sought and created within the domain of the 'ancient sciences'. We should take the forms of talking about the 'ancient sciences' as an object of study and find out whether the image presented of these sciences shifted when talked about as a sequence of acts carried out by scholars or by cultural heroes or even those sent to earth by a divine being. Moreover, we should pay serious attention to the religious, literary and visual elements of scientific treatises and situate them in their specific local context. There are many more aspects both of content and context that could and should be studied, but above all we need to take serious Gutas' call for a social and cultural history of the sciences in Islamic societies.⁵¹

⁵¹ Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsīd Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th C.)* (London: Routledge, 1998).

ALSO VIA ISTANBUL TO NEW HAVEN—
MSS. YALE SYRIAC 7–12

Hidemi Takahashi

It was in 2001 that I first met Dimitri Gutas, at the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group hosted by one of the editors of the present volume. That was also my first visit to Yale University, and after the conference I was able, with the kind assistance of that host-become-editor, David Reisman, to pay a visit to the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library¹ to take a brief look at one of the Syriac manuscripts housed there, whose presence at Yale, though not mentioned (for reasons that will become obvious from what follows) in Clemmons' "checklist" of Syriac manuscripts in North America,² had been indicated by Desreumaux.³ My second, longer visit to Yale within the framework of the Todai (University of Tokyo)-Yale Initiative in April–September 2009 has now given me the opportunity both for further pleasant and fruitful meetings with Professor Gutas and for spending some more hours happily ensconced with the Syriac manuscripts in the reading room of the Beinecke. With the exploration of the classical Syriac manuscripts at Yale facilitated in the mean time by the more recent "checklist" of them by Depuydt,⁴ it did not take one long

¹ I am grateful to the staff of the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library for all their kind assistance that has made my visits there such enjoyable experiences. My special thanks are due to Yonatan Moss, with whom I spent a number of fun hours looking at the Syriac manuscripts in the Beinecke and to whom I owe a significant part of the information presented below, as well as to Prof. Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet, Aaron Butts, Jean Fathi, Fr. Peter Hill, Prof. Andreas Juckel, Prof. Hubert Kaufhold, Grigory Kessel, George Kiraz, Kuninobu Sakamoto, Jack Tannous, David Taylor and Linda Wheatley-Irving for their speedy responses to my calls for help, making it possible to put together what follows in the relatively short time available.

² James T. Clemons, "A Checklist of Syriac mss. in the United States and Canada," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 32 (1966), 224–51 and 478–522 (on the collection at Yale, see 485–7).

³ Alain Desreumaux (with the collaboration of Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet), *Répertoire des bibliothèques et des catalogues de manuscrits syriaques* (Paris: CNRS, 1991), 198.

⁴ Leo Depuydt, "Classical Syriac Manuscripts at Yale University: A Checklist," *Hugoye: Journal of Syriac Studies* (access by <http://syrcom.cua/Hugoye/>) 9/2 (July 2006). Texts in classical Syriac are found in at least four further manuscripts in the Beinecke besides those mentioned by Depuydt: (1) Yale Arabic 360, fol. 15r–21r: a



Fig. 1. Photograph of the Monastery of Mor Abhay (courtesy of Linda Wheatley-Irving).

Urhoy, he seems also to have held the see of Gargar-Mor Abhay (see on Yale Syriac 7 below),⁶ and this fact is of some interest in connection with the provenance of his manuscripts, since the area around Gargar (Gerger), just to the south of the old patriarchal monastery of Mor Baršawmo, remained an important centre of scholarly activity among the Syrian Orthodox well into latter half of the second millennium.⁷

to and is mentioned by Patriarch Ignatius Ephrem I Baršawm (Ignāṭiyyūs Afrām al-awwal Baršawm, *al-Lu'lu' al-mantūr fī ta'riḥ al-'ulūm wa-l-ādāb as-suryāniya*, 4th ed. [Holland (Glane/Losser): Bar Hebraeus Verlag, 1987], 137, no. 67; Ignatius Aphram I Barsoum, *The Scattered Pearls*, trans. Matti Moosa, 2nd ed. [Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2003], 158).

⁶ Chabot tells us that Paulos was from Gargar, but Akdemir (see n. 5 above) has him born in Siverek and grow up in Urhoy. He is consistently referred to elsewhere, including by himself, as “Urhoyo.”

⁷ The manuscripts in his collection with positive indications of connection with the area include No. 2 (copied in Mor Abhay in 1590); 3 (copied in Mor Baršawmo [probably the one in this area] in 1574); 6 (notes of ordinations for Vank and Abū Ḡālib, ca. 1624); 7 (copied in Ma'arrat Mor Zakkay in 1590/1). On some of the manuscripts dating from the later period from this area, see Hubert Kaufhold, “Notizen zur späten Geschichte des Baršaumō-Klosters,” *Hugoye* 3/2 (July 2000). We await the doctoral dissertation on the monasteries of Mor Abhay and Pesqin by Linda Wheatley-Irving for further information on the monasteries in the region, which has seen a revival of Syrian Orthodox activities in recent years, resulting in the creation of a new bishopric at Adıyaman in 2006.

Since at least one item in the collection once belonged to the Syrian Orthodox Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Urhoy (Fehim 8 = Yale Syriac 11), other items in the collection may also have been removed from there. There seems, in fact, to be a significant overlap between the manuscripts in the Fehim collection and the items mentioned in a list of sixty-one manuscripts once in one of the two Syrian Orthodox churches in Urhoy, which was communicated to Eduard Sachau some time between 1880 and 1896 and published by him in 1900.⁸ The collection passed from Bishop Timotheos to his son, Peṭros Fehim, alias Fehim Beg,⁹ who seems not only to have acted as an intermediary between the Patriarchate and the Porte, but also to have risen to a position of importance at the latter.¹⁰

The attention of the academic world was drawn to one item in the collection, the unique manuscript of the work that has since come

⁸ Eduard Sachau, "Über Syrische Handschriften-Sammlungen im Orient," *Mittheilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen zu Berlin. Westasiatische Studien* 3 (1900), 43–47. Many of the manuscripts deposited in the Church of Ss. Peter and Paul in Urhoy originally came from the Monastery of Mor Abḥay (Baršawm, *al-Lu'lu' al-manṭūr* [as n. 5 above], 26, no. 23 [trans. 15–16]). While the brevity of the list given by Sachau makes any certain identification impossible, candidates in that list for identification with Fehim manuscripts include nos. 9 ("Book of Moshe bar Kepha"), 17 (Daniel of Ṣalah, *Comm. on Psalms*), 18 (*Cause of All Causes*), 36 ("paradigms"), 37 (*Habbob yad'oto*), 38 ("grammar"), 44 (*Candelabrum*), 46 (*Ethicon*), 47 (*Nomocanon*), 48 ("Chronicle"), 53 ("Lexicon"). Manuscripts today in the Church of Mar Giwargis in Aleppo (most of which come from Urhoy), do, however, include a copy of the *Cause of All Causes* (no. 57, dated 1881; information of Prof. Kaufhold), two of Barhebraeus' *Nomocanon* (nos. 12 and 36), and at least three of his metrical *Grammar* (nos. 26, 95, 103); a further examination of the manuscripts there may exonerate Bishop Timotheos of the charge I am insinuating here.

⁹ The hand-written catalogue by Dolabani (see n. 12 below) gives his names as ܩܝܡܝܐ ܐܪܕܢܘܪ. This is followed by what appears to me to be ܐܪܕܢܘܪ; the name was read as ܐܪܕܢܘܪ (i.e. ܐܪܕܢܘܪ) by the editor of the catalogue (see the introduction there, 32). The name is rendered "Eronur" by Akdemir (see n. 5 above).

¹⁰ See Mustafa Oral, "Mardin'in son süryani kadim patriği Mor İgnatios İlyas Şakir Efendi (1867–1932)," in *Makalelerle Mardin, IV. Önemli simalar, dini topluluklar*, ed. İbrahim Özcoşar (İstanbul 2007), access by <http://www.mardin.gov.tr/turkce/kutuphane/pdfdosyalar/4ciltonemlisimalardinitopluluklar.pdf>, 269–97, here 271, 279–80, where Fehim Beg is said to have been the Sultan's Master of Ceremonies (*teşrifatçı*), as he is also in the caption of the photograph taken on the occasion of his visit with other Turkish officials to the patriarch at Dayr az-Za'farān in 1919, in Hanna Dolapönü [Dolabani], *Tarihte Mardin*, trans. Cebrail Aydın (İstanbul: Hilal Matbaası, 1972), 166 (so also Akdemir [see n. 5 above], 103, etc.). The bishop and his son are no doubt the models for the story told in certain Syrian Orthodox circles in which a bishop "Afram" and his son "Fikri Bek" are said to have engineered the deposition of Patriarch Ignatius 'Abd al-Masīḥ by the Sultan in revenge for a slight that the son had received at the hand of the patriarch.

to be known as the “Chronicle of the Year 1234,” when it was “discovered” in 1899 by the Syrian Catholic Patriarch Ignatius Ephrem II Raḥmani (patriarch 1898–1929) and its contents were partially published by him in 1904–11.¹¹ Twenty-one manuscripts in the collection were then described by Ḥanna Dolabani (later metropolitan of Mardin, 1947–69) in about 1920 in a hand-written catalogue which was published in 1994.¹² The collection was also well known to the Syrian Orthodox Patriarch Ignatius Ephrem I Barṣawm (patriarch 1933–57), who left a note of reading in at least one of these manuscripts on his way home from his European tour in 1914,¹³ helped Jean-Baptiste Chabot with his edition of the *Chronicle of 1234*,¹⁴ and refers to the collection on numerous occasions in his invaluable work on the history of Syriac literature (first published in 1943).¹⁵

Nothing is known to me of the whereabouts of the collection in the years between mid-1920’s and around 1960, but two, it seems, of

¹¹ Raḥmani merely tells us that he found the manuscript “apud quemdam monophysitam episcopum” in Constantinople (*Chronicon civile et ecclesiasticum anonymi auctoris*, ed. Ignatius Ephraem II Raḥmani [Charfeh: Typis patriarchalibus syrorum, 1904], v).

¹² Filuksinōs Yuḥannon Dōlabānī, *Mḥawwyono da-ktobe sriṭe d-botay arke d-day-roto wa-d-idoto suryoyoto da-b-Madnḥo* (*Fihris maḥtūtāt as-suryāniya*), ed. Grigōriyōs Yuḥannon Abrohom [Ibrāhīm] (Aleppo: Mardin Publishing House, 1994), 1–21.

¹³ In Fehim 6 = Paris syr. 395. See Briquel-Chatonnet, *Manuscripts syriaques* (as n. 17 below), 116; cf. Hubert Kaufhold’s review of that catalogue, in *Oriens Christianus* 83 (1999), 249–53, here 250.

¹⁴ Also in 1914, by collating the part published by Raḥmani with the manuscript and providing photographs of the rest; see Chabot, loc. cit. (in n. 5 above), and Andrew Palmer et al., *The Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), 103.

¹⁵ The manuscripts referred to by Barṣawm as being in “Qusṭantīniya” may be identified as follows: *al-Lu’lu’ al-mantūr* (as n. 5 above), 256 with n. 1: Fehim 13; 296 n. 3: Fehim 3 (Meryemana 7), no. 23bis; 346 n. 3: Fehim 3, no. 14bis; 354 n. 12: Fehim 9 (Yale 10); 355 (no. 23): Fehim 3, no. 10; 362 n. 1: Fehim 16 (Paris 396); 381 n. 2: Fehim 3, no. 15; 394 n. 1: Fehim 3, no. 22; 404: Fehim 4; 460 n. 4: Fehim 2 (Yale 7) (trans. 295 with n. 2; 339 n. 6, where, *errore*, in “our church” in C.; 394 n. 2; 403 n. 6; 403 [no. 23]; 410 n. 2; 430 n. 2; 444 n. 1; 455; 513 n. 4). “Qusṭantīniya” at p. 429 no. 34 and 452 n. 10 (trans. 481, 505 n. 2; Barhebraeus, *Laughable Stories*, 1603 A.D.; and David of Homs, *On Repentance*) may refer to the Fehim Collection, but I am unable to find the items mentioned there in Dolabani’s catalogue. At p. 106 and p. 359 n. 1 (trans. 119, 407 n. 6), we find Barṣawm locating liturgical manuscripts specifically “in the/our church” in Constantinople, by which he evidently means the Church of Yoldat Aloho (Meryemana) as opposed to Fehim Beg’s collection. The patriarch’s catalogue of Istanbul manuscripts, which would have thrown more light on his knowledge of the manuscripts there, is unfortunately among those of his catalogues now reported lost (Grigōriyōs Yuḥannā Ibrāhīm, *Maḡd as-suryān* [Aleppo: Mardin Publishing House, 1996], 46).

the twenty-one manuscripts described by Dolabani were seen (and photographed) by Arthur Vööbus, presumably in the 1960's, at the Syrian Orthodox Church of Yoldat Aloho (Meryemana) in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul.¹⁶ Four of them (now BnF syr. 395–398) made their way to Paris, when they were purchased by the Bibliothèque nationale from Mrs. Melâhat Menemencioglu, resident in Besançon, on 1st June, 1966 (for 4,000 francs).¹⁷ One other out of the twenty-one (now Yale Syriac 11) was then sold by the same Mrs. Menemencioglu to Yale in the summer of 1967, along with another manuscript not recorded by Dolabani but evidently coming from the same collection (Syriac 12).¹⁸ The two were followed by four more (Syriac 7–10) in March 1968.¹⁹

¹⁶ On Meryemana 7 (Fehim 3), see Arthur Vööbus, "Die Entdeckung einer neuen Schrift des Möšê bar Kêphâ über das Priestertum," *Ostkirchliche Studien* 23 (1974), 324–27; id., "New Manuscript Discoveries for the Literary Legacy of Möšê bar Kêphâ: The Genre of Theological Writings," *Harvard Theological Review* 68 (1975), 377–84, here 383; cf. Hubert Kaufhold, "Notizen" (as n. 7 above), paragraph 11. Meryemana 4 ("Histories and *mêmre* of the holy fathers"), like Fehim 1 (ܡܝܪܝܡܢܐ ܕܥܝܠܐ), is undated; while there is a discrepancy in the number of folios reported by Dolabani for the latter ("256 folios") and by Vööbus for the former ("226 folios"; *Discoveries of Great Import on the Commentary on Luke by Cyril of Alexandria* [Stockholm: Estonian Theological Society in Exile, 1973], 24), the close similarity of the content (lives of saints and works of Cyril of Alexandria, Severus of Antioch, Jacob of Sarug, John Chrysostom; Vööbus' items no. 34–35 = Dolabani's no. 34–35), as well as the shared location with Meryemana 7, leaves little doubt that we are dealing here with the same manuscript (unless, of course, one is a copy of the other). I thank Aaron Butts, who has been assisting in the cataloguing of microfilms bequeathed by Vööbus, for the information that his microfilms relating to Istanbul include those labelled "7" and "4."

¹⁷ See Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet, *Manuscrits syriaques de la Bibliothèque nationale de France (nos 356–435, entrés depuis 1911), de la bibliothèque Méjanes d'Aix-en-Provence, de la bibliothèque municipale de Lyon et de la Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg* (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1997), 113–26. The identification of the four manuscripts as coming from the collection of Fehim Beg was made by Hubert Kaufhold in his review of that catalogue (*Oriens Christianus* 83 [1999], 249–53, here 250 and 251–2). I am grateful to Prof. Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet (and, through her, to Dr. Annie Berthier of the BnF) for the information on the details of the purchase. The statement that the seller was resident in Besançon helps us to confirm the identity of our Mrs. Menemencioglu as the lady who taught at the Faculté des Lettres de Besançon, edited works of Robert Challe and authored a small collection of poems in French; "un don fait par la Turquie [she too!] aux lettres d'expression française," as she is described by Jean Richer in the foreword to that collection (Melâhat Menemencioglu, *Paroles vivantes* [Paris: Editions Saint-Germain-des-Prés, 1971], 6).

¹⁸ Syriac 11: date of bill: 21 July 1967, sent: 25 Aug. 1967; Syriac 12: date of bill: 6 July 1967, sent: "18 0 [sic] '67," price: \$240.

¹⁹ On the slips accompanying Syriac 7, 8 and 10, we read "\$750 with 3 others". Why these later arrivals have been given smaller numbers than Syr. 11 and 12 is unknown to me.

Given below is a list of the manuscripts in the original collection as described by Dolabani with indications, where known, of their later whereabouts,²⁰ followed by some jottings concerning the six manuscripts now at Yale, which are intended to supplement the information provided by Depuydt.²¹

- Fehim 1 (Dolabani, pp. 1–6) = Istanbul, Meryemana 4: Miscellany (“15th c.” Dolabani; “16th/17th c.” Vööbus)
 Fehim 2 (p. 6) = Yale Syr. 7: Barhebraeus, *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary* (1590 A.D.)
 Fehim 3 (pp. 7–9) = Istanbul, Meryemana 7: Miscellany, incl. works of Bar Šalibi and Bar Kepha (1574 A.D.)
 Fehim 4 (p. 9): *Chronicle of 1234 A.D.* (24 × 16 cm, 846 pp., “perhaps 14th c.”)
 Fehim 5 (pp. 9–10): Bar Šakko, *Book of Treasures*; Bar Šalibi, *Commentary on the “Centuries” of Evagrius* (1697 A.D.); prayer of Abba Isaiah.
 Fehim 6 (pp. 10–13) = Paris syr. 395: Rites of ordination etc. (originally 15/16th c.)²²
 Fehim 7 (p. 13): Barhebraeus, *Chronicon ecclesiasticum* (1590/1 A.D.)
 Fehim 8 (pp. 13–14) = Yale Syr. 11: Barhebraeus, *Nomocanon* (before 1699 A.D.)
 Fehim 9 (p. 14) = Yale Syr. 10: Bar Kepha, *On Paradise*, etc. (1225 A.D.)
 Fehim 10 (p. 15) = Yale Syr. 8: Miscellany (before 1708 A.D.)
 Fehim 11 (p. 16): Jacob of Quṭurbul, *Habbob yad’oto*²³ (1823/4 or 1848/9 A.D.)

²⁰ Only the first three items are numbered in Dolabani’s catalogue; the rest have been numbered here for convenience in the order in which they are described in that catalogue.

²¹ Of the manuscripts discussed here, digital images of Yale Syriac 7–11 have now been made accessible on the website of the Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library.

²² The village name read as “Beit Qanoye” by Briquel-Chatonnet corresponds to what looks like ܩܢܝܘܬܐ in Dolabani’s hand-written catalogue. Given that the church there was dedicated to Mor Iliyo (Prophet Elijah), this must be Bêt Quşṭan in Tur ‘Abdin, a village which, its inhabitants today claim, shares the same eponym as the former imperial capital on the Bosphorus (H. Gabriyel Akyüz and Şabo Aktaş, *Bakıyan (Alagöz) köyü’nün tarihçesi* [Mardin: Mardin Kırklar Kilisesi, 2004], 12; Zeki Joseph, *Beth Qustan. Ein aramäisches Dorf im Wandel der Zeiten* [Glane/Losser: Bar Ebroyo Verlag, 2011], 15).

²³ On this work on Syriac grammar and its author (d. 1783), see Baršawm, *al-Lu’lu’ al-mantür*, (as n. 5 above), 466 (trans. 520).



Fig. 2. Yale Syriac Manuscript 7, page 57 (Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library).

Fehim 12 (p. 16): Barhebraeus, *Ktobo d-ma'alto* (i.e. metrical grammar; “new”)

Fehim 13 (pp. 16–17): Daniel of Ṣalah, *Commentary on the Psalms* (1724 A.D.)²⁴

Fehim 14 (pp. 17–18) = Paris syr. 397: Barhebraeus, *Treatise of Treatises* (1638 A.D.)

Fehim 15 (p. 18): Barhebraeus, *Ethicon* (1880 A.D.)²⁵

Fehim 16 (pp. 18–19) = Paris syr. 396: *Cause of All Causes* (1479/80 A.D.)

Fehim 17 (p. 19): Bar Ṣalibi, *Commentary on the Gospels* (1902 A.D.; exemplar 1716 A.D.)

Fehim 18 (pp. 19–20) = Yale Syr. 9: Syriac-Armenian Lexicon (17th c.?)

Fehim 19 (p. 20) = Paris syr. 398: *Kitāb al-bustān wa-šams al-aḏhān* etc. (Garshuni; 1757 A.D.)

Fehim 20 (p. 21): book of prayers (Garshuni; 1882 [A.D.?.])

Fehim 21 (p. 21): *Epistles* (Turkish and Garshuni; “new”)

Syriac 7 (27 × 18 cm; ix + 395 pp.): The principal work in the manuscript is (1) Barhebraeus’ theological work, the *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary* (which occupies pp. 1–382). The content of the manuscript, including the shorter pieces appended at the end, closely resembles that found in Ms. Berlin, Sachau 81 (copied before 1403 A.D.; with later supplies from 16/17th c. [before 1693]).²⁶ As in Sachau 81, Barhebraeus’

²⁴ The manuscript is mentioned as being in the possession of “Bishop Paul” in Constantinople at Barṣawm, *al-Lu’lu’ al-manṭūr*, 256 (trans. 295; the English translation is misleading in assigning both of the manuscripts dated 1870 and 1724 to Bishop Paul; the manuscript dated 1870 was and is in the Patriarchal collection, Yūḥannā Dōlabānī/René Lavenant, Sebastian Brock and Samir Khalil Samir, “Catalogue des manuscrits de la bibliothèque du Patriarcat Syrien Orthodoxe à Homs (Auj. à Damas),” *Parole de l’Orient* 19 [1994], 555–661, here 562, no. 2/4; David Taylor, “The Manuscript Tradition of Daniel of Ṣalah’s Psalm Commentary,” in *Symposium Syriacum VII*, ed. R. Lavenant [Rome: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1998], 61–9, here 65–6).

²⁵ Possibly to be identified with the manuscript mentioned by L. Delaporte, “Rapport sur une mission scientifique à Charfé (Liban),” *Nouvelles archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires* 17 (1908), 23–50, here 46 (“Un exemplaire plus ancien du même ouvrage se trouve, paraît-il, à l’évêché jacobite de Constantinople”), although Fehim 15 is not older than the manuscript seen by Delaporte, which was dated 1748 (then with the then Syrian Catholic Mgr. Gregory [‘Abd Allāh] Ṣaṭṭūf [later Syr. Orth. Patriarch] in Homs, now Charfeh, fonds Raḥmani 289 [138 Sony]).

²⁶ See Eduard Sachau, *Verzeichnis der syrischen Handschriften der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin* (Berlin: Asher, 1899), 620–4. I thank Grigory Kessel, in the Staatsbibliothek just at the right time, for checking for me that the two excerpts in Sachau 81 relating to the dates of Easter are indeed the same as those in Yale Syriac 7 (items

short work on logic, the *Book of the Pupils of the Eye*, is inserted here into the text of the *Candelabrum* as the second chapter of Base 1.²⁷ The version of the map of the habitable world (p. 57) here resembles that in Sachau 81,²⁸ and the collation of sample passages of the text also reveals a close affinity with the text in Sachau 81. The shorter pieces appended at the end are, in addition to (2) the alphabetical *sugitho* already mentioned by Depuydt (pp. 383–4):²⁹ (3) “on the religion of the Arabs” attributed to St. Cyril (p. 384); (4) a piece entitled “on the investigation of the *chronōn kanōn* (مَدَوْنَةُ السَّانَةِ) or the 532-year cycle (الْمَدْحُ)” by Patriarch Ignatius Ni‘mat Allāh (d. 1587) outlining the reason why the Gregorian calendar reform was necessary and mentioning the role he played in that reform with the solution he reached on 7th July 1579 (pp. 388–9);³⁰ (5) a note on the date of Lent and Easter in 1413 A.Gr. (1102 A.D.) (p. 386): apparently an abridged excerpt from the *Chronicle* of Patriarch Michael I;³¹ (6) an excerpt from Patriarch Michael (here explicitly identified as such) on the date of Easter in 881 A.Gr. (570 A.D.) (pp. 386–7); (7) a drawing with crosses and jottings by a later hand (p. 390);³² (8) part of a lectionary (pp. 394–5, part of the binding).³³

5 and 6) and for the confirmation of what we are told by Sachau about their position, in unused space on fol. 215v, below the piece attributed to Cyril (item 3).

²⁷ Cf. Herman F. Janssens, “Bar Hebraeus’ Book of the Pupils of the Eye,” *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature* 47/1 (1930), 26–49; 47/2 (1931), 94–134; 48/4 (1932), 209–263; and 52/1 (1935), 1–21, here vol. 47, 27–8 and 45.

²⁸ On the maps accompanying the *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary*, see Takahashi, “Observations on Bar ‘Ebroyo’s Marine Geography,” *Hugoye* 6/1 (Jan. 2003): paragraphs 1–2, with nn. 1 and 2. The image of another copy of the map (with later interpolations), Ms. Mingana Syr. 89, fol. 5r, is now readily accessible in the “Virtual Manuscript Room” of the University of Birmingham (<http://vmr.bham.ac.uk/>).

²⁹ Also mentioned, with reference to this manuscript, at Baršawm, *al-Lu’lu’ al-manṭūr*, 222.11–12 (trans. 258).

³⁰ The author is not named in the manuscript and was left unidentified by Sachau (*Verzeichnis*, 624), but was correctly identified by Baršawm, who records the presence of this piece in “Constantinople” (*al-Lu’lu’ al-manṭūr*, 460 with n. 4 [trans. 513, n. 4]). On the role played by Patriarch Ni‘mat Allāh in Gregory XIII’s commission for the calendar reform, see August Ziggelaar, “The Papal Bull of 1583 Promulgating a Reform of the Calendar,” in *Gregorian Reform of the Calendar*, eds. G. V. Coyne et al. (Vatican City: Specola Vaticana, 1983), 201–39, esp. 215–7.

³¹ Corresponding to *Chronique de Michel le syrien*, ed. and trans. Jean-Baptiste Chabot (Paris: Leroux, 1899–1924), IV.588 (= 294v), left (inner) column, l. 6–19 (translation, III.189–190).

³² Including a quotation from John 10:11 and a note apparently indicating the correspondence of dates 2139 A.Gr., 1829 A.D. and 1644 (*lege* 1244) A.H.

³³ The section with number ١٢ and heading مَدَوْنَةُ السَّانَةِ (with reading from Matthew 9:18ff.) starts in the middle of p. 397; the number ٥٥ is visible on p. 398 which is glued to the cover.

The whole manuscript (to p. 387) seems to have been written by the same hand. The text of the *Candelabrum* was completed, as we are told at the end of the list of contents preceding the main text (p. 12), in the Monastery of Mor Abḥay in 1590 A.D. by the priest Mika (Michael) bar Barṣawm of Qastra ʿUrboyš, later metropolitan of Gargar.³⁴

The second excerpt in our manuscript from the *Chronicle* of Michael I (item 6) is of special significance, especially in the light of the identity of the copyist; for it contains ten lines that are omitted due to homoeoteleuton not only in Chabot's edition of that work, but also in the unique pre-modern manuscript of the work now in Aleppo, copied by none other than Mika bar Barṣawm of ʿUrboyš eight years after (the main part of) our manuscript in 1598 A.D.³⁵

On the first unnumbered page of the manuscript are two seal marks (probably identical); within the centre circle of one of them we can make out the words “metropolitan of Urhoy and Gargar” (ܡܬܪܬܡܢܐ ܕܘܪܗܝܐ ܕܓܪܓܪ) and on the outer circle the letters *gryg*.³⁶ On the page before

³⁴ The village name ܘܪܒܝܫ, usually transliterated ʿUrbiš, clearly has a *zqofo* on the *bet* here. We also find Michael referring to himself as ʿUrboyšoyo in the Edessa-Aleppo manuscript of Patriarch Michael's *Chronicle* (cf. n. 35 below; ܘܪܒܝܫܝܐ 295v, ܘܪܒܝܫܝܐ 339v; on some more recent forms of the name, see Ernest Honigsmann, *Le Couvent de Barṣaumā et le Patriarcat jacobite d'Antioche et de Syrie* [Louvain: L. Durbecq, 1954], 82 with n. 1, who mentions: Elbèche, Ölbüş, Ürbüş). A relatively little known manuscript by the same copyist, which might be mentioned here in view of the Todai-Yale connection, is that of the Arabic version (in Arabic script) of Barhebraeus' *Ethicon* now at the University of Tokyo (Institute of Oriental Culture, Daiber Collection, II.43; copied in 1598 A.D., evidently in Aleppo, rather than in Istanbul as I once rashly suggested; with thanks to Jean Fathi for this correction based on the identity of the Ṣafar ibn Maṣṣūr mentioned in the colophon, as well as for his help in reading the following note); a modern note at the end of that manuscript tells us that the copyist died in 1618, “contrary to what is said in *ad-Durr* [= *al-Luʿluʿ*] *al-mantūr*” (fol. 166v–167r; access by http://ricasdb.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/daiber/db_ShowImg.php?m=s&txtno=2086&size=S&page=173; cf. Barṣawm, *al-Luʿluʿ al-mantūr*, 31 [trans., 22]).

³⁵ On the Aleppo manuscript and its copyist, see Jean-Baptiste Chabot, *Chronique de Michel le syrien* (as n. 31 above), I.xxxvi–xxxvii; Dorothea Weltecke, *Die «Beschreibung der Zeiten» von Mör Michael dem Grossen (1126–1199)* (Louvain: Peeters, 2003), 156–8 and 159–83; and now the facsimile edition of the manuscript, *The Edessa-Aleppo Syriac Codex of the Chronicle of Michael the Great*, ed. Gregorios Yuhanna Ibrahim (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2009). The beginning and the end of the excerpt in Yale Syriac 7 correspond to ed. Chabot, IV.336 (= 168v), middle column, l. 1 to end, and IV.337 (= 169r), middle column, l. 1–15 (translation, II.290, beginning of chapter III, to 291.9; and 291.9–292.2). Photographs of the two excerpts from Michael's *Chronicle* in Yale Syriac 7 will be included in the facsimile edition just mentioned.

³⁶ This does not help very much in identifying the individual, since “Gregorios” was the name regularly taken by bishops of Gargar (Jean Maurice Fiey, *Pour un Oriens christianus novus, Répertoire des diocèses syriaques orientaux et occidentaux* [Beirut/Stuttgart: Steiner, 1993], 200). If I am right in seeing the letters *-fws* in the bottom

p. 1, we have a note of reading which originally said: "This book of the *Candelabrum of the Sanctuary* was examined by Timotheos, metropolitan of the see of Mor Abḥay, who is [name erased] of Urhoy, the year 1862 of Christ."³⁷ This was altered by a later hand, so that the name now reads "Timotheos, *bishop* of the see of Mor Abḥay and Urhoy, who is *Paulos* of Urhoy." Below the note is an imprint of the seal of Bishop Timotheos Paulus in which we find his name and the year 1301 (A.H. = 1883/84 A.D.). Someone has drawn pictures of a bearded face (perhaps not altogether without resemblance to a certain Yale professor) in the margins on pages 117, 118, 182, 183, 225, 243, 254, 255, and 358. The same face reappears on p. 15 in Yale Syriac 10.

Syriac 8 (29 × 19 cm; iv + 108 pp.): The manuscript as we have it today begins with the last three words of the *Letter to the Hebrews* (ܡܬܬܝܬܝܠ ܬܝܠܝܬ ܕܠܬܝܠܝܬܝܢ). The notes at the end of the manuscript indicate that Yale Syriac 8 was originally the final part of a larger manuscript containing the New Testament with commentaries including those by Dionysius Bar Ṣalibi. The content of our manuscript is, in fact, identical with that in the last part of Ms. Birmingham, Mingana Syr. 480 (copied in Mardin in 1713 A.D.; fol. 379r–427r), a manuscript that in its earlier part contains the Gospels (Harklean version) with a detailed commentary taken mainly from Bar Ṣalibi, as well as the rest of the New Testament and further material taken from miscellaneous sources.³⁸

half of the circle, a candidate will be Gregorios Pilaṭos (ca. 1638 A.D.; see Kaufhold, "Notizen" [as n. 7 above], paragraph 26).

³⁷ The erased name is likely to be "Abraham"; see Fiey, *Pour un Oriens christianus novus* [as n. 36 above], 200 (cf. *ibid.*, 196).

³⁸ Described in Alphonse Mingana, *Catalogue of the Mingana Collection of Manuscripts*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Heffer, 1933), 863–82. Besides Mingana 480 and the Patriarchate and Amsterdam manuscripts mentioned below, other manuscripts that are likely to be related include Mingana Syr. 105, Manchester, John Rylands Syr. 10 and 11 and, perhaps, Mosul, Syr. Orth. 95/1. The items in our manuscript other than the end of the *Hebrews* correspond to Mingana 480jj–480ww. Some smaller items not mentioned in Mingana's catalogue are found at the corresponding places in both manuscripts, such as a second set of six "questions asked by the Queen of Sheba to Solomon" following the first set of seven such questions (480jj; cf. n. 44 below), and the seven sayings that follow the excerpt from Philoxenus of Mabbug's letter to Patriarch (480kk), including, as already mentioned by Depuydt, four attributed to Evagrius and one to Abba Isaiah. The version of [Ps.]-Philoxenus' *Profession of Faith* in our manuscript (and Mingana 480ll), which was not identified further by Depuydt, is the one discussed at André de Halleux, *Philoxène de Mabbog, Sa vie, ses écrits, sa théologie* (Louvain: Imprimerie orientale, 1963), 177–8 (no. 6, incipit: ܡܬܬܝܬܝܠ ܬܝܠܝܬ ܕܠܬܝܠܝܬܝܢ).

Syriac 10 (26 × 18 cm; 474 pp., including later supplies).⁵⁷ The manuscript contains: (1) Bar Kepha, *On Paradise* (pp. 1–249 = fol. [1r]–124r);⁵⁸ (2) id., *On the Resurrection of the Body* (34 chapters; pp. 250–

⁵⁸ For those who might be interested in trying them out, there are three maps showing different opinions on the location of Paradise on pp. 29–30. Cf. the two similar but simpler maps taken from Paris syr. 299 (manuscript of Bar 'Ali's *Lexicon*), fol.

373; 124v–186v);⁵⁹ (3) id., *Commentary on the Words of Paul Demonstrating the Resurrection of Bodies and the Manner of Resurrection* (pp. 373–411; 186v–205v); (4) id., *Words of Comfort concerning Children* (10 chapters here;⁶⁰ pp. 411–7; 205v–208v); (5) id., *Twelve Chapters on Antichrist* (pp. 418–28; 209r–214r);⁶¹ (6) id., *Admonition for the Sons of the Holy Orthodox Church* (10 chapters; pp. 428–47; 214r–218v); (7) id., *Mysteries of the Tonsure of Monks* (10 chapters; pp. 447–52; 218v–221r); (8) *On the Origin of the Term “Monastery”* [dayro] (p. 453; 221v); (9) Bar Kepha, *Homily on the Tonsure of Monks Spoken by the Abbot to the One Being Tonsured* (pp. 453–59; 221v–224v); (10) Biographical note on Bar Kepha (pp. 459–60; 224v–225r); (11) [Pseudo]-Methodius, *On the End of Times* (pp. 460–82).

The text of *On Paradise* was copied by Joseph, a student of the Monastery of Mor Ḥananyo (Dayr az-Zaʿfarān), who left his name coded in numbers (10, 6, 60, 80) in the colophon (p. 250; 124v). That part of the manuscript was completed on Thursday, 3rd Nisan, 1536 A.G. (1225 A.D.) in the “little monastery” (*dayrunito*) of Mor Barṣawmo in Kfartuto, “between the villages of Bagdāšiya (ܒܥܕܬܝܝܐ) and Ḥašray (ܚܫܪܝܐ) in the region of Merdo (Mardin),”⁶² that is to say, as was noted by Depuydt, in the same monastery as the Vatican manuscript of Bar Kepha’s *On the Soul* (Vat. syr. 147, dated 1234 A.D.).⁶³ In the latter half of the original manuscript we find the name of another copyist, Gabriel, who asks for our prayers for him on p. 411 (205v),⁶⁴ while we find Paul (evidently not our bishop Timotheos) asking the same for

204r, and reproduced in translation at Konrad Miller, *Mappae arabicae* (Stuttgart, 1926–31), V, 167–8.

⁵⁹ The Western page numbering jumps from p. 433 to 444 in the middle of this text.

⁶⁰ The text here stops in mid-sentence just after the beginning of Chapter 10 at the end of p. 417.

⁶¹ The title “On the Trinity” given by Depuydt is due to his mistaking the invocation for the title (... ܡܠܬܐ ܕܬܪܝܢܝܬܐ, ܡܠܬܐ ܕܬܪܝܢܝܬܐ).

⁶² On the location of the monastery and the villages, see Honigsmann, *Le Couvent de Barṣaumā* (as n. 34 above), 44–5, who identifies Bagdāšiya and Ḥašray, respectively, with Tell Bektaschi (modern Bektaş) and Heischeri (Dikmen), approximately 46 km southwest of Mardin, and the site of the monastery with the nearby Dirik (Ülkerköy?).

⁶³ See Stephanus Evodius Assemanus and Joseph Simonius Assemanus, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae codicum manuscriptorum catalogus* I/3 (Rome, 1759; repr. Paris: Maisonneuve 1926), 277; Oskar Braun, *Moses bar Kepha und sein Buch von der Seele* (Freiburg: Herder, 1891), 21–2.

⁶⁴ Gabriel seems to be the copyist of the text from the second column of p. 343 (171r) to the end of p. 416 (208r).

his forebears, both spiritual and in the flesh, in 1905 A.D. on a page of modern supply (p. 345).⁶⁵

Other notes in the manuscript include, as we have come to expect by now, a note of possession (undated and here without seal) by Bishop Timotheos Paulos (p. 1), another note of possession, in what looks like an untrained hand in Syriac, by Bar[š]awm bar Ephrem bar Basil of the village of Maṣṣūriya⁶⁶ (p. 386 [193r]), and, in an idiosyncratic Arabic hand,⁶⁷ what appears to be (a draft of?) words of greeting sent to *maṭrān* ʾĪšūʿ, “the master (*ṣāhib*) of Dayr [aṣ-Ṣalīb?] and of Ḥiṣn Kayf and ‘Aṭāfiya”⁶⁸ (p. 101 [50r]).

Syriac 11 (27.5 × 17.5 cm; 337 numbered pages): The main item in the manuscript is Barhebraeus’ *Book of Directions* (so-called *Nomocanon*; pp. iv–289). This is followed by (1) “Basis for calculation of inheritance according to the laws of the Arabs, manumission of slaves, and all their laws and judgements” (pp. 290–303); (2) “Laws of the victorious Christian emperors” (*Sententiae syriacae*; pp. 303–7); and (3) “Laws of the victorious Christian emperors, Emperor Constantine, and Emperors Theodosius and Leo” (*Syro-Roman Law Book*; pp. 307–37).⁶⁹

A manuscript in which the three additional items occur in the same order as here is Syr. Orth. Patriarchate 8/11 (1204 A.D.); another in which the same three items are appended to Barhebraeus’ *Nomocanon* as here is Mardin, Syr. Orth. 326 (copied in 1657–62 A.D. in the region

⁶⁵ Pace Reinink (see n. 57 above), who, presumably with access only to a microfilm, read the date as “1957.”

⁶⁶ No doubt the Maṣṣūriya just to the north of Mardin.

⁶⁷ Notes by the same hand also on p. 145 (72r).

⁶⁸ The name of the monastery is barely legible, but one of the letters appears to be *šin* (it could just possibly also be *hāʾ* of “Maḥar”). On the Monastery of the Cross, also known as Dayr Maḥar/Muḥr (and to be distinguished from its namesake further east, near Ḥaḥ), and its association with the see of Ḥiṣn Kayf (Hasankeyf), see Baršawm, *al-Luʾluʾ al-maṭnūr*, 511 (trans. 562); Fiey, *Pour un Oriens christianus novus* (as n. 36 above), 214–5. Two Syrian Orthodox bishops of Ḥiṣn Kayf by the name of Yeṣūʿ/ʾĪšoʿ (with the dates 1714 and 1809–1820) are mentioned by Fiey (loc. cit.).

⁶⁹ For item 1, see Hubert Kaufhold, *Syrische Texte zum islamischen Recht* (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1971); id. “Islamisches Erbrecht in christlich-syrischer Überlieferung,” *Oriens Chriatianus* 59 (1975), 19–35; for item 2, Walter Selb, *Sententiae syriacae* (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1990); and for item 3 (as well as for further information relating to 1 and 2), Walter Selb and Hubert Kaufhold, *Das syrisch-römische Rechtsbuch*, 3 vols. (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2002).

of Gargar).⁷⁰ The close affinity of the present manuscript to these two is readily confirmed by a comparison of the arrangement of the sections within each item and by sample collations of the text.

The manuscript has no colophon, but a *terminus ante quem* for its copy is provided by the Garshuni note of its donation to the Church of Saints Peter and Paul in Urhoy in January 1699 (p. 337). Near the beginning of the manuscript (p. vii) is another note of donation to the same Church of Saints Peter and Paul in February 1884 by Bishop Timotheos Paulos (with the same seal as in Yale Syriac 7), a donation which he evidently later revoked.

Syriac 12 (22 × 16 cm; 137 written pages): Although this manuscript is not mentioned in Dolabani's list of Fehim Beg's manuscripts, its provenance is indicated by the record of its purchase from Mrs. Menemencioglu and by the note of ownership by Bishop Timotheos Paulos (page before p. 1, Syriac numbering; with the usual seal). The modern (19/20th c.) manuscript contains: (1) Timotheos Ishāq bar 'Bed Ḥayyo [Ġubayr], Metropolitan of Amid, *Illumination of Beginners* (*Nuhhor sharwoye*, Syriac grammar consisting mainly of paradigms, pp. 1–124);⁷¹ and (2) Maphrian Basiliyos Ishāq bar 'Āzar, "paradigms (*sur'of*) of verbs arranged according to the letters of the alphabet" (pp. 124–37). The first work appears to be complete in our manuscript.

⁷⁰ See Selb and Kaufhold, *Das syrisch-römische Rechtsbuch*, I, 145–50 with the literature cited there; also Kaufhold, "Notizen" (as n. 7 above), paragraph 26; Arthur Vööbus, *Important New Manuscript Sources for the Islamic Law in Syriac* (Stockholm: Estonian Theological Society in Exile, 1975), 15–8.

⁷¹ On the author (1643–1721, later Syrian Catholic maphrian), see Albir Abūnā, *Adab al-luḡa al-ārāmīya*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1996), 529–30; Rudolf Macuch, *Geschichte der spät- und neusyrischen Literatur* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1976), 28–9. (The reference cited by Depuydt in his "index auctorum" [paragraph 11, last item] is off the mark by well over a millennium). The heading of the work in our manuscript, no doubt retaining the original wording of the author, rather unusually and incongruously refers to the work as a "renowned work of the *weak and sinful* servant" as happens also in other manuscripts of this work (so British Library Add. 21211 [1831] and manuscript in private collection of Jean Fathi [copied in 1895, by Tūmā b. Awhān, in the School of Mor Peṭros and Paulos in Urhoy; i.e. a sibling? (cf. n. 8 above)]; without the word "sinful": Mingana Syr. 160 [ca. 1850] and Ms. George Kiraz [copied in 1889 by thirteen-year-old Iṣū' bar Ġriko from Qa'āq in Ṭur 'Abdin]; without "weak and sinful": Paris syr. 300 [1844], Berlin Petermann 17). To the known manuscripts of this work one might add Berlin or. 9890 (uncatalogued).

PART II

CLASSICAL ARABIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

A JUDAEO-ARABIC VERSION OF ṬĀBIT IBN QURRA'S
DE IMAGINIBUS AND PSEUDO-PTOLEMY'S *OPUS IMAGINUM*

Charles Burnett and Gideon Bohak

I. Introduction

Among the many treasures of the Cairo Genizah—the used-paper storage room of a medieval synagogue, used from the eleventh to the nineteenth century—lie many hundreds of astrological and related fragments, in Judaeo-Arabic, Arabic, Hebrew and Aramaic. While a handful of these texts have already been published, the vast majority have never been studied, or even catalogued or identified in a satisfactory manner. In the present paper, we wish to examine four Genizah fragments, belonging to two different manuscripts which clearly were copied by the same scribe, and preserving a Judaeo-Arabic version of (much of) Ṭābit ibn Qurra's *De imaginibus*, and (some of) the *Opus imaginum* attributed to Ptolemy. The significance of these fragments lies in the fact that, while the *De imaginibus* and the *Opus imaginum* are both well known in Latin, and much discussed in modern scholarship,¹ neither of them have hitherto been identified in any Arabic manuscript.²

¹ See Lynn Thorndike, "Traditional Medieval Tracts Concerning Engraved Astrological Images," in *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer* (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l'Université, Bureaux du "Recueil", 1947), 217–74, at 229–38 and 256–9; David Pingree, "The Diffusion of Arabic Magical Texts in Western Europe," in *La diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel Medio Evo Europeo*, ed. Bianca Maria Scarcia Amoretti (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, 1987), 57–102 (see 74–6); and Nicolas Weill-Parot, *Les «images astrologiques» au Moyen Âge et à la Renaissance, Spéculations intellectuelles et pratiques magiques (XII^e–XV^e siècle)* (Paris: Champion, 2002), 63–77. We are grateful for the advice of Paul Kunitzsch and Giuseppe Mandalà. We hope that this article will contribute in a small way to the valuable comprehensive bibliography of Ṭābit ibn Qurra that Dimitri Gutas has been compiling.

² Thus Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, VII: Astrologie—Meteorologie und Verwandtes bis ca. 430 H* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 151–2 and 47. Sezgin (151) suggests that an unidentified text by Ṭābit called *Kitāb fī Ṭabā'i' al-kawākib wa-ta'īrātihā* (of which an abbreviation, *muḥtaṣar*, was made by Abū 'Abd Allāh Marwān ibn Mihrān ibn Bahrām al-Mağribī), may have been the book on talismans cited in the *Ġāyat al-Ḥakīm* (see next paragraph).

Two phrases from the beginning of Ṭābit's *De imaginibus* appear to be quoted in the eleventh-century handbook of magic, *Ġāyat al-Ḥakīm*: "Believe what Ṭābit ibn Qurra says in the book that he composed about talismans: 'The noblest part of astronomy is the science of talismans,' and he maintains 'It is said that no body has life that does not have soul.'"³ However, even these phrases seem to be paraphrases rather than literal quotations.⁴ In contrast, the Arabic text was well known by the twelfth century, when the two Latin translations were made: one by Adelard of Bath, probably in Antioch, in the early twelfth century (*Liber Prestigiorum Thebidis secundum Ptolomeum et Hermetem*),⁵ and the other a little later, by John of Seville and Limia, in Spain (the *Liber Thebit filii Chore De imaginibus*).⁶ The two translations are very different from each other, and there has been some discussion as to which reflects more accurately the original text of Ṭābit.⁷ The principal difference lies in the fact that the *Liber Prestigiorum* includes prayers to the spirits of the planets and the making of rings, which are completely absent in the more "orthodox" *Liber De imaginibus*. The Genizah fragments provide us with the opportunity, for the first time, to see most of the original Arabic text—though written in Hebrew characters—and to compare it with the Latin. The correspondence with John of

³ *Ġāyat al-Ḥakīm*, I.5, ed. H. Ritter (Leipzig: Teubner, 1933), 37: *wa-taḥaqqaq mā ḡā'ala Ṭābit ibn Qurra fī Maqālatihī fī ṭ-Ṭilasmāt: aḡallu 'ilm an-nuḡum 'ilm aṭ-Ṭilasmāt wa-za'ama annahū lā ḥayāt li-ḡism lā rūḥ fihī* = *Picatrix*, I.v.36, ed. D. Pingree (London: Warburg Institute, 1986), 23: "Et ad verificandum quod dixit Thebit ben Corat in libro quem composuit de ymaginibus, qui sic ait: sciencia ymaginum est nobilior pars astronomie. Et subdit: corpus caret vita deficiente spiritu."

⁴ That these may be paraphrases rather than literal quotations is suggested by the equivalent phrases in John of Seville's translation (see below): "quia dignior geometria et altior philosophia est imaginum scientia" and "non est motus corpori anima carenti nec vita animato corpori nisi per cibum" (ed. Carmody [see below n. 6], 180). This opening passage is lacking in the Judaeo-Arabic fragments.

⁵ Edition in progress by Charles Burnett (from three extant manuscripts).

⁶ Edited, in two versions (I and J), in Francis Carmody, *The Astronomical Works of Thabit b. Qurra* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 180–97 (ca. 38 manuscripts altogether). See also Charles Burnett, "Magister Iohannes Hispalensis et Limiensis" and Qusṭā ibn Lūqā's *De differentia spiritus et animae*: a Portuguese Contribution to the Arts Curriculum?, in *Mediaevalia, Textos e estudos* 7–8 (1995), 221–67, reprinted in Charles Burnett, *Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The Translators and their Intellectual and Social Context* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), article V.

⁷ For comparisons between the translation made by John of Seville and that made by Adelard of Bath, see Vittoria Perrone Compagni, "Studiosus incantationibus: Adelardo di Bath, Ermete e Thabit," *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* 80–82 (2001), 36–61; and Charles Burnett, "Ṭābit ibn Qurra the Harrānian on Talismans and the Spirits of the Planets," *La Corónica* 36 (2007), 13–40.

Seville's translation confirms what we already know from other translations made by him, that he translated an Arabic text closely. The possibility still remains that Adelard translated from a variant version of Ṭābit's text which has not yet been identified.

In the case of Pseudo-Ptolemy's *Opus imaginum*, only one Latin translation of the work is known,⁸ but since it follows John of Seville's translation of Ṭābit's *De imaginibus* in many manuscripts and is written in the same style, it has been assumed to be another translation of John of Seville. The Genizah fragments confirm the fact that the two works travelled together.

In the present paper, we wish to edit some of the Judaeo-Arabic text (of which we plan to offer a full edition elsewhere), compare it with the Latin versions, and offer some preliminary thoughts on the significance of this new find. We begin with a brief description of the fragments and their contents, turn to a comparison of the Judaeo-Arabic and the Latin versions, and end with a few general comments on the historical context of these Genizah fragments of two central texts of Arabic astro-magical literature.

II. *The Fragments*

At present, we are aware of four different Genizah fragments of the *De imaginibus* and the *Opus imaginum*, all apparently copied by the same scribe (whose hand was dated by Judith Olszowy-Schlanger to the late-12th or early-13th century, and by Edna Engel to around the 13th century),⁹ and stemming from two different manuscripts, which we here label A and B. The fragments, all of which are found in the Genizah collection of the Cambridge University Library, are as follows.

Manuscript A

T(aylor)-S(chechter) Ar(abic) 29.51: 4 bifolia, paper, measuring 18–18.2 cm (height) × 26.2–26.5 cm (width). When the fragments

⁸ Edited by Jean-Patrice Boudet in "Un traité de magie astrale arabo-latin: le Liber *De imaginibus* du Pseudo-Ptolémée," in *Natura, scienza e società medievali: Studi in onore di Agostino Paravicini Bagliani*, ed. Claudio Leonardi and Francesco Santi (Florence: SISMEL, 2008), 17–35.

⁹ We are grateful for the advice given by these two scholars.




Fig. 3. Taylor-Schechter Ar. 29.51 (ms A), fol. 4v-5r, paralleling paragraphs 50-58 of Carmody's edition of Ṭābit ibn Qurra's *De imaginibus*. Reproduced by courtesy of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.

were preserved in Cambridge, the quire was dismantled into separate bifolia, and the folios were numbered by pencil. The original manuscript seems to have contained no numbering whatsoever. As is often the case, the innermost bifolium in the quire is fully preserved, the second from the inside has some holes, the third has larger holes, and of the outermost only ca. 70% of the original bifolium is preserved. The scribe wrote 19 to 22 lines per page, and the hand is characterized by large letters, only 6 to 8 words per line, and very distinct letter-forms and writing habits, including the use of double slashes (//) at the end of many textual units. This facilitates the identification of additional fragments written by the same hand.

T-S Ar. 30.91: A single folio, paper, measuring 17.8 × 8.1 cm, with 22 lines per page and clearly written by the same hand as Ar. 29.51. As is clear from its contents, this was the first folio of the same quire, which also is why it is the most badly damaged, with less than 60% of the original folio preserved, and no trace of the other half of the original bifolium.

The two fragments thus join to make up nine folios out of the original quire, and as the standard quire of this period was the quinion, we probably are missing only one more folio, the last one, which is likely to have been badly mutilated. Unfortunately, the first line of the recto of Ar. 30.91 is almost entirely missing, but from the contents—which we shall discuss below—it seems quite likely that the text began there, so this was the first quire of the manuscript. On the other hand, the text is likely to have been much longer than twenty pages, so the original manuscript must have contained one or more additional quires.

The manuscript was written in Judaeo-Arabic (i.e., Arabic written in Hebrew letters), with the occasional use of Arabic letters for some words (presumably those which the scribe, working from an Arabic original, could not really transcribe or decided not to). The contents of the preserved sections may be divided in two. From the beginning of Ar. 30.91 to line 7 of fol. 7v of Ar. 29.51 we have a long series of instructions for the production of different talismans, closely paralleling paragraphs 5 to 73 of Carmody's edition of the two Latin versions of Ṭābit ibn Qurra's *De imaginibus*. Thus, it seems that this Judaeo-Arabic version lacked both the prefatory and the concluding sections of the Latin versions (which has altogether 75 paragraphs), and focused only on the talismans themselves. Then, from line 7 of fol. 7v of Ar. 29.51 to the end of the fragment (i.e., the end of fol. 8v), we find

additional talismans, but clearly arranged according to the zodiacal decans, with the preserved section offering three talismans for the first decan of Aries, two for the second decan, one for the third, and one for the first decan of Taurus, after which the text breaks off. It thus seems extremely unlikely that the missing folio of our quire would have covered all the decans of ten more zodiac signs, and so our manuscript probably contained one more quire, and perhaps even more, and covered all thirty-six decans, with one or more talisman per decan. This part of the text is closely paralleled by the Latin text which goes under the name of Ptolemy and which was recently edited by Jean-Patrice Boudet, with the Genizah fragments paralleling paragraphs 1–9 of Boudet's edition, with the omission of paragraphs 7 and 8; as with the Tābit materials, the prefatory materials found in the Latin version of Ptolemy's text are absent from our Judaeo-Arabic copy. Below, we offer a synoptic edition of the Judaeo-Arabic and Latin versions of samples of both parts of this long talismanic text.

While the first folio of our quire is badly preserved, it seems to begin *in medias res*, and does not seem to have provided any indications of the supposed title or author of the entire work, or of the copyist's own identity. Such information is likely to have been provided by the colophon, which may one day be discovered in another Genizah fragment, but which we currently do not have. We thus have no indication as to who our copyist was or what he thought he was copying.

Moreover, the text itself does not contain any references to specific persons, locations, or events, and we therefore cannot tell whether the Judaeo-Arabic text was attributed to Tābit, to Ptolemy, to both or to neither. From the manner of copying, with the second section seamlessly following upon the first (with only the word *bāb*, in Arabic letters, to tell the reader that a new section is about to begin), it is hard to tell whether the copyist saw the two sections of his text as two separate pieces written by two different authors or as a single talismanic text, with its second part ordered according to the order of the zodiacal decans while its first part was less clearly structured.

Manuscript B

T-S Ar. 43.274: A single bifolium, paper, measuring 10.5 × 27.6 cm, and clearly missing its bottom part. The extant part preserves 14–16 lines of text, written by the same hand as the above fragments. Fol. 1v is numbered “11” in Arabic numerals, and fol. 2r is numbered “12”.




Fig. 4. Taylor-Schechter Ar. 43.274 (ms B), fol. 1v-2r, paralleling paragraphs 55b-58 of Carmody's edition of Ṭābit ibn Qurra's *De imaginibus* and paragraphs 1-2 of Boudet's edition of Pseudo-Ptolemy, *Opus imaginum*. Reproduced by courtesy of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library.

The text parallels that of manuscript A, with fol. 1 paralleling Ar. 29.51 from fol. 4v, l. 5 to fol. 5r l. 22, and fol. 2 paralleling Ar. 29.51 from fol. 7v, l. 7 to fol. 8r, l. 7, but with extensive lacunae in both cases. From the size of the missing sections, it seems clear that the original bifolium had up to 27 lines per page. As manuscript A is characterized by up to 22 lines per page, it seems that in manuscript B he used his folios more efficiently than in manuscript A.

T-S Ar. 43.133: A single bifolium, paper, measuring 10.5×27.4 cm, and clearly missing its bottom part. The extant part preserves 13–15 lines of text, written by the same hand as manuscript A but with the lines slightly more crowded together. Fol. 1r is numbered “12” in Arabic numerals.¹⁰ The two bifolia are read consecutively, and the text parallels that of Manuscript A, paralleling Ar. 29.51 from fol. 5v, l. 9 to fol. 7r, l. 19 (paragraphs 60–71 in Carmody’s edition of Ṭābit’s *De imaginibus*), but with extensive lacunae. From the size of the missing sections, it seems clear that the original bifolium had ca. 22–25 lines per page.

When examined together, both fragments seem to be the innermost (Ar. 43.133) and one before innermost (Ar. 43.274) bifolia of a quire. It is clear that the bottom part of the quire was torn off before its bifolia became separate, hence the uniformity of the tear on both bifolia. Thus, if other fragments of this manuscript are ever identified, they are likely to be both torn horizontally, just like these two, and in a worse state of preservation than these two innermost bifolia.

While not much can be said about the contents of manuscript B, of which we have only the top halves of two bifolios, the preserved text is so close to that of manuscript A that one of these manuscripts must have been copied from the other (rather than both being independent transcriptions of the original Arabic text), but it is not yet clear to us which came first. As for the relations between the two talismanic texts, it is clear that in B too the text which in the Latin versions is attributed to Ptolemy follows directly upon the one which in the Latin versions is attributed to Ṭābit ibn Qurra. Here too, the new section opens with the word *bāb*, but this time written in Judaeo-Arabic and found at the very beginning of a new page (Ar. 43.274, fol. 2r). Thus,

¹⁰ There is no doubt that the numbering of the folios is faulty, as the two fragments, when placed one inside the other and folded together according to the order of the text, do not display a coherent numbering of the folios, and two different folios are numbered as “12”.

it is not impossible that the missing bottom part of the previous page (Ar. 43.133, fol. 2v) contained a colophon or a concluding remark for the first text, but this is far from certain. Until that part of the bifolium is identified, we would assume that here too there was a smooth transition from the Ṭābit text to that of Pseudo-Ptolemy.

III. *The Arabic and Latin Texts*

Ṭābit ibn Qurra, *On Talismans*, and Pseudo-Ptolemy, *On the Talismans of the 36 Decans*

To facilitate the analysis of the relationship of the Judaeo-Arabic and the Latin versions, we offer here a synoptic Judaeo-Arabic/Latin edition of two sample texts: a long extract (Ar. 29.51, fol. 4v, l. 5–fol. 5v, l. 18) from the text identified by the Latin versions as belonging to Ṭābit ibn Qurra (paralleling the whole of section VI, consisting of paragraphs 52–61, of Carmody's edition), and a shorter extract (Ar. 29.51, fol. 7v, l. 7–fol. 8r, l. 21) from the text identified by the Latin version as belonging to Ptolemy, and covering the first two decans of Aries (paragraphs 1–5 in Boudet's edition). In editing the Judaeo-Arabic text, we have followed manuscript A, while noting for each paragraph in which manuscripts it is preserved ("B-" means that it is only partly preserved in B, in which case we have marked the points where B begins or breaks off), and indicating the few places where B diverges from A.¹¹ We also used the following sigla: [] lacunae in the text; ? a doubtful reading (of the letter before the question mark). The Latin text of Ṭābit takes into account both Carmody's readings and a fresh reading of MS Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16204, whilst for the Pseudo-Ptolemy text both the same manuscript and Boudet's edition have been taken into consideration. In both cases, the Judaeo-Arabic enables one to choose more likely readings than those provided by the previous editors. Italics indicate divergences in the Latin; bold indicates additions in the Latin text, angle brackets, omissions. For Ṭābit, the section numbers of Carmody's edition are given in bold; for Pseudo-Ptolemy, the numbers are those of Boudet's

¹¹ In manuscript A, there is a proliferation of "diacritical points" over many letters, even those which do not usually take such markings in Judaeo-Arabic, while in manuscript B most of them are omitted. In such cases, we have followed A's readings, without noting the differences in B.

edition. C = Carmody's edition of Tābit (version I);¹² B = Boudet's edition of Pseudo-Ptolemy; P = Paris, BNF, lat. 16204. If the reading of one of these sources is mentioned in brackets it means that the reading of the other source has been adopted.

I Tābit:¹³

טלסם יסתעמל לאתצאל¹⁴ אלסלטאן | ואכ'ד¹⁵ רג'אלה וקואדה
לימיל אליה במודה | ותרפ'ע מנזלתה ענדה.

VI Talisman used for making contact between the ruler and one (*ahad*) of his men and his officers (*caids*) so that he inclines towards him with *friendship*, and his status with (the ruler) is raised.

Latin (title): Imago < > ad *inclinandum* regem ad aliquem (ad gratiam alicui P) virorum *vel* consulum (*consilium* C) ut inclinetur **scilicet** ad eum *ut diligit eum* et (ut C) sublimetur eius sessio apud eum.

Talisman < > for *inclining* a ruler to (*the friendship*) of one of his men or officers, i.e. so that he inclines towards him, to *befriend him*, and so that his status with (the ruler) is raised.

Comment: The Latin does not translate *yusta'amalu*, but otherwise keeps close to the Arabic. The Arabic *quwwād* ("officers") indicates that "*consulum*" (P) should be read in the Latin, rather than "*consilium*" (C).

פאן אחבבת עמלה | פאנך תבתדי אולא פתאכ'ד לה טאלעא
מחקקא | בצ'מיר צחיה תם תנצר הל בין צאחב | אלטאלע וצאחב
אלעאשר אתצאל או קבול.

52 If you wish to make it, you begin first by taking for it the ascendant, confirmed with correct thought (intention). Then you observe whether

¹² Version J seems to be a revision of Version I, within the Latin tradition, and in the following passage is further away from the Arabic text than is Version I.

¹³ One may compare the equivalent text in Adelard of Bath's translation, which is much briefer: "Pro regio autem amore optinendo, securitate etiam ab ira eius, in omni desiderio adimplendo, ymago sic facienda est. Sit ergo dominus horoscopi domino decimi applicans sitque inter illos receptio modo supradicto, set et horoscopus valde beatus eiusque stella minime retrograda vel exusta vel serviens. Sit autem potens, benivola, procedens, in aliqua dignitatum suarum existens, dominus autem undecimi (?) applicans se illi figura prospera, sintque fortunate aliqui horoscopum respicientes, malivole vero nec eum respiciant et in gradibus tenebrosis existant. Set et, si facultas astrologi id habet, sit horoscopi dominus in signo optimo dominusque decimi in signo illud amante, sicque evacuatur ymago. Deinde nomen eius regis vel domini imponatur idemque nomen in summo eius vertice scribatur. Deinde cetera ut de aliis duabus supradictum est, eandem precem replicando, hoc etiam addito, ut ymagines regie aliunde os obscurando (?) loco apto reponantur.

¹⁴ Add: ב'ין

¹⁵ Read: ואחד.

there is between the lord of the ascendant and the lord of the tenth conjunction or reception.

52 Quam cum volueris facere, incipies (incipie C) ei primum accipere ascendens certissimum cum intentione veraci. Postea aspicias utrum sit inter dominum ascendentis et dominum decimi coniunctio vel receptio.

Comment: The Latin follows the Arabic exactly.

(A, B) (53) פאן וגדת צאחב אלטאלע מתצל בצאחב | אלעאשר מן תתלית או תסדיס ובינהמא קבול | תאם והמא גמיעא חסנא אלהאל סאלמון מן | אלמנאחס פאן אלאמר יתם אתך? (אתר B) טלסם | צחיה לה תאתיר עצי'ם.

53 And if you find the lord of the ascendant is joined to the lord of the tenth in trine or sextile (aspect) and there is full reception between them, and they are both in a good condition and unharmed by the malefics, the matter will be fulfilled; immediately (?) (it is) (?) a sound talisman, which has great effect.

53 Quod si inveneris dominum ascendentis iunctum domino decimi ex 3 vel 6 aspectu fueritque inter eos receptio perfecta et fuerint ambo boni esse et (P omits) liberi a malis, perficietur res < > **et** vera erit imago, **apparebitque** a vestigiis [et] opus magnum (P omits the last phrase).

53 And if you find the lord of the ascendant is joined to the lord of the tenth in trine or sextile (aspect) and there is full reception between them, and they are both in a good condition and unharmed by the malefics, the matter will be fulfilled, **and** the talisman will be sound **and** a great effect **will appear** immediately.

Comment: Both the Arabic and the Latin languages have a phrase for “immediately” (respectively على الاثر and “a vestigio”) which contains the word for “trace/effect” (respectively “aṭar” and “vestigium”); this may be the cause of some confusion here. The Latin translator writes “apparebit a vestigiis”, which might be presumed to mean “it will appear immediately,” but later in the text he writes “apparebit vestigium”—“a trace/effect will appear.”

(A, B) (א55) ואן ארדת אלעמל | ולם תגיד שיא ממא דכרת לך וגדת | אלטאלע ואלעאשר סאלמון מן אלמנאחס פאן | אלאמר יתם אן שא אלה | (B //) ואלטלסם יצח | ולה תאתיר עצי'ם.

And if you want to do this and you do not find any of the things that I have mentioned to you and you find the ascendant and the tenth unharmed by the malefics, the matter will be fulfilled, if God wills, and the talisman will be sound and has great effect.

55a *Rursum*, < > si nichil horum que diximus inveneris, *sed* inveneris ascendens et decimum liberos a malis, perficietur res < > **et** vera erit imago **et apparebit vestigium et magnum opus**.

55a Again, < > if you do not find any of the things that I have mentioned < >, but you find the ascendant and the tenth unharmed by the malefics, the matter will be fulfilled < > and the talisman will be sound, the **trace will appear and the effect** < > will be great.

Comment: This Latin sentence follows the next one (the two sentences have been swapped in respect to the Arabic). It omits “if God wills”, and makes two phrases out of the last one.

(54) (A) ¹⁶ ואן לם תגד שיא | מא¹⁷ דכרת לך ווגדת צאחב אלטאלע וצאחבה | ואלעאשר וצאחבה סאלמון מן אלמנאחס | ווגדת צאחב אלטאלע פי אלעאשר (fol. 5r) ואלעאשר פי אלטאלע והו [ינצ]ר צאחב | אלטאלע בנצ'ר גיד פאן אלאמר יתם ועלי | קדר אלנצ'ר מן אלמודה וצדהא יכון אלמזאג | ואלטלסם יפתח אן שא אללה.

54 And if you do not find any of the things that I have mentioned to you and you find {the lord of}¹⁸ the ascendant and its lord and the tenth and its lord unharmed by the malefics, and you find the lord of {the ascendant in the tenth and}¹⁹ the tenth in the ascendant and it is [aspect]ing the lord of the ascendant in a good aspect, the matter will be fulfilled, and the mixture will be according to the aspect of friendship and its opposite (?), and the talisman will be *successful*, if God wishes.

54 Et si nichil inveneris de hiis que dixi tibi et inveneris ascendens et dominum eius et < > dominum decimi liberos a malis, et inveneris dominum decimi in ascendente aspicientem dominum ascendentis, perficietur res < > et *vera* erit imago < >.

54 And if you do not find any of the things that I have mentioned to you and you find the ascendant and its lord and < > the lord of the tenth unharmed by the malefics, and you find the lord of the tenth in the ascendant aspecting the lord of the ascendant < >, the matter will be fulfilled < > and the talisman will be *sound* < >.

Comment: the Latin misses out some phrases in the Arabic, including one whose meaning is not clear.

(55) (A, B-) ואן ווגדת | איצ'א צאחב אלעאשר [י]נחס צאחב | אלטאלע או ינחס אלטאלע או לם תגד ממא²⁰ | וצפת לך שי פלא תצנע לה שיא פאנה | לא יתם לה מראדה ולא יט'הר (inc. B) ללטלסם | תאת'יר אלא

¹⁶ B only preserves the first two words, ואן לם, and, after a lacuna of ca. 7 words, the word וצאחבה, after which it breaks off.

¹⁷ Read: ממא.

¹⁸ The scribe of A has erroneously added “the lord of” here.

¹⁹ The bracketed phrase is redundant (if the lord of the ascendant is in the tenth place and the lord of the tenth in the ascendant, the two planets would be in quartile aspect, which is a bad aspect), and may have resulted from the scribe of A turning the page at this point.

²⁰ The scribe wrote מא, and corrected it to ממא.

במא וצפת לך ואן אלמסלה | דלת עלי אלכון וארדת אסתעמאל אלטלסם
| פאנך תבתדי ותצור צורה אלרגל עלי | חסב מא בינת לך.

And if you also find the lord of the tenth harming the lord of the ascendant or harming the ascendant, or you do not find any of the things I have described to you, then you should not make for him anything, for the desired (result) will not be fulfilled for him, and no effect appears for the talisman except in what I have described for you. And if the question indicates an effect, and you want to use the talisman, then begin and make the image of the man in the way that I have explained to you.

55b Si autem inveneris dominum decimi impredientem dominum ascendentis vel < > ascendens (C omits “vel ascendens”) vel non invenies aliquid ex eis que commemoravi (monstravi C) tibi, non opereris aliquid **quod dixi tibi** (C adds “sed inveneris ascendens et decimum salvos a malis, perficietur adhuc res et vera erit”, repeated from above); non perficietur ei *de eadem re quicquam*, nec apparebit ei vestigium nisi per hoc quod narraui tibi, **si Deus voluerit**. Si autem significaverit interrogatio effectum et volueris *operari* imaginem, incipies faciesque (C omits) imaginem viri secundum quod exposui tibi, **idest** (C omits) **in sculptura forme**.

55b And if you find the lord of the tenth harming the lord of the ascendant or < > the ascendant, or you do not find any of the things I have described to you, then you should not make for him anything of what I have said to you, *and nothing of this matter* will be fulfilled for him, and no effect appears *for it* except in what I have described for you, **if God wills**. And if the question indicates an effect, and you want to *make* the talisman, then begin and make an image of a man in the way that I have explained to you, **namely, in the sculpting of the form** (the mould).

Comment: The Latin adds here “if God wills”. The last phrase of the paragraph may have been added by the Latin translator as a gloss; the sculpting of the mould is described in sections 42–45, which describe the sculpting of the form of a man in detail.

פאדא פֿרֿגֿ'ת מן נקש | אלגאלב עלי אלשראיט אלמקדמה (A, B) (56)
פאפרג | צורה אלרגל מן רצאן או קצדיר או נחאס | איהמא אתפק לך
בטאלע מולד אלרגל | אן עלמתה או טאלע מסלתה

56 And when you have completed the sculpture of the mould (read: *qālib*), according to the aforementioned conditions, complete the form of the man from lead, tin or copper, whichever agrees for you with the ascendant of the nativity (horoscope) of the man, if you know it, or the ascendant of his question.

56 Cumque perfeceris sculpturam forme predictis condicionibus, *fundes* (funde C) imaginem viri de eo quod congruerit tibi sub ascendente nativitatibus viri, si sciveris illud, vel sub ascendente eius interrogationis.

56 And when you have completed the sculpture of the mould according to the aforementioned conditions, *you will cast* the form of the man

from < > that which agrees for you with the ascendant of the nativity (horoscope) of the man, if you know it, or the ascendant of his question.

(57) (A, B) ותסמי (ותסמי B) אלצורה | באסם אלרגל אלמשהור בה או לקבה | אלג'אלב עליה ואסעד אלטאלע בסעד קוי | וליכן אלסעד ג'יר ראגע ולא סאקט ולא | מחתרק וליכן אלטאלע קויא חסן אלחאל | מסתמר אלסיר פי ש'י מן חצ'וצ'ה.

57 And you name the talisman with the name of the man by which he is known, or his cognomen (*laqab*), which is most common(ly used) for him. And benefit the ascendant with a powerful benefic, and the benefic should not be retrograde or falling (from the cardines) or burnt. And the <lord of the> ascendant should be powerful, good in its position, continuous in its course, in one of its dignities.

57 Et nominabis (voca P) imaginem nomine viri famoso vel pronomine eius < > et fortunabis (fortuna P) ascendens fortuna forti, et non sit fortuna retrograda nec cadens nec combusta, et sit **dominus** ascendentis fortis et boni esse cursu directus in aliqua dignitatum suarum.

57 You will name the talisman with the name of the man—the name he is known by, or his cognomen, < >. And you will benefit the ascendant with a powerful benefic, and the benefic should not be retrograde or falling (from the cardines) or burnt. And the **lord of the** ascendant should be powerful, good in its position, direct in its course and in one of its dignities.

Comment: the Latin is very close to the Arabic, omitting only two words which further specify the nature of the name, and adding (correctly) “lord of”.

(58)(A) ויכון | צאחב אלעאשר מתצלא בה מן תתלית (fol. 5v) או תסדיס [] ת'יר²² ויכון צאחב אלעאשר | לט-ע²³ (59) ותפרג אלצורה עלי הדה אלש'ראיט | פא? [ד]א צח לך הדא כלה סלטאנה ימיל אליה | במודה ולא יותר? על'יה ותפר ג' אלצורה עלי | הדה אלש'ראיט פאדא צח לך כלה כאן סלטאנה | ימיל אליה וינעם עליה ויבלג ענדה מבלג²⁴ | עצימא ויכון אקרוב אלנאס אליה ואעזהם | לדיה מא דאמת אלצורה מצורה חתי יפרק | בינהם אלמות.

58 And the lord of the tenth should be joined to it in trine or sextile [...with good ef]fect and the lord of the tenth should be... 59 < > and you cast the talisman according to these conditions. And when all of this is

²¹ B preserves only the words ויכון and מתצלא, after which it breaks off.

²² This is possibly the end of the phrase وله تأثير, or مع تأثير.

²³ As far as we can tell, the Judaeo-Arabic copyist could not read the Arabic original, and therefore merely copied some of the Arabic letters to the best of his ability.

²⁴ Read: מבלגא.

established for you, his ruler will incline towards him with friendship, and will not prefer (anyone) over him, {and you will cast the talisman according to these conditions. And when all of this is correctly established for you, his ruler will incline towards him}²⁵ and bestow favours on him, and he will achieve with him high esteem and will be the man closest to him (the ruler) and the most honoured of them in his presence as long as the formed talisman endures, until death separates them.

58 Et sit dominus decimi iunctus ei ex trino vel sextili **aspectu**, fortunans eum, et sit dominus decimi **ille qui iungitur domino ascendentis recipiens eum**. 59 Et, si quiverit fieri ut sit dominus ascendentis in signis imperantibus et dominus decimi in signis obedientibus, **melius erit**. Et fundes imaginem secundum has condiciones. Cumque verificatum tibi fuerit hoc totum (v.t.f.h.t.) taliter imago perfecta fuerit tibi C), inclinabitur ei rex suus pre nimia dilectione et neminem preponet ei, < > *invenietque apud eum sublimitatem maximam et adipiscetur ab eo quicquid voluerit et venerabitur* (verebitur C) **eum et magnificabit eum**, eritque propior pre ceteris (+ omnibus P) **ac magis diliget eum, apparebitque ex hoc vestigium et opus maximum** (magnum P) et durable (+ semper P) quamdiu duraverit imago imaginata donec separet eos mors.

58 And the lord of the tenth should be joined to it in trine or sextile **aspect**, benefitting it, and the lord of the tenth **should be the one who is joined to the lord of the ascendant, receiving it**. 59 And, if it is possible that the lord of the ascendant is in commanding signs and the lord of the tenth in obedient signs, **it will be better**, and you will cast the talisman according to these conditions. And when all of this is established for you, his ruler will incline towards him with the **greatest** friendship, and **will place no one before him**, < > *and he will find the greatest elevation in his presence, and he will obtain in the presence of (the ruler) whatever he wants, and he (the ruler) will venerate him and will exalt him*, and he will be closer than anybody else to him (the ruler), and **he (the ruler) will love him more, and a trace will appear from this and an effect (which will be) most great and will endure**, as long as the formed talisman endures, until death separates them.

Comment: it seems that there is a lacuna in the Arabic text here.

תם עמלת צורה | תם עמלת צורה (A, B-) פאדא עמלת (inc. B) הדא אלתדביר | תם עמלת צורה
אלסלטאן בטאלע אלברג' | אלעאשר מן אלצורה אלאולא וגעלת אלאאצאל
| ואלקבול וגמיע אלשראית עלי מא וצפ'ת | לך וגעלת יד צאחב אלעאשר
מג'לולה | אלי ענקה לם יסתטיע דלך (דאלך B) אלסלטאן עלי | מצרתה
אבדא

60 And when you have performed this procedure (and) then made the talisman of the ruler in the ascendant of the tenth sign from the first

²⁵ The same phrase has been written twice.

talisman and made the conjunction and reception and all the conditions according to what I described to you, and made the hand of the lord of the tenth fettered to his neck, this ruler will never be able to harm him.

60 Et si feceris **hoc secundum** hanc dispositionem **et** postea feceris imaginem regis sub ascendente signo decimo imaginis prime, et posueris coniunctionem et receptionem et ceteras condiciones secundum quod narraui tibi, et posueris manum *imaginis* (P adds "10") **quasi** iunctam ad collum eius, non poterit rex nocere ei in eternum.

60 And when you have done **this according to** this procedure, **and** afterwards you have made the talisman of the ruler in the ascendant of the tenth sign from the first talisman, and you have made the conjunction and reception and all the conditions according to what I described to you, and you have made the hand of the *image* **as if** joined to his neck, this ruler will never be able to harm him.

וכל סכ'טתה וכל סטותה | א—או—א מן אלסלטאן כל מאלה (A, B) (61)
 (מא לה B) מא קדר | אלסלטאן עלי מצרתה אבדא וכאן מן סכ'טתה |
 וסטותה אמינא וכפי מן כל מחדור (B //)

And all his anger and all his violence...from the ruler all his money (all he has B), the ruler will never be able to harm him, and he will be safe from his anger and violence, and hidden from every danger (مُحْذَر).

et patietur rex quicquid poterit pati mali. **61** Et si peteretur ab eo omne quod peti potest, non posset eum rex impedire quicquid pati potest **et non posset impedire eum**, et liberaretur a timore eius quem timeret, **si Deus voluerit**.

And the ruler will suffer whatever harm he can suffer. **61** And if everything was sought from him which could be sought, the ruler would not be able to hinder him, whatever he may suffer {**and he would not be able to hinder him**}²⁶ and he would be freed from the fear of that man whom he fears, **if God wills**.

II Pseudo-Ptolemy, *Opus imaginum*, first two decans of Aries

Latin (ms Paris, BNF, lat. 16204, p. 539, with B(oudet) variants added)

(A, B) (1) باب (באב B) אדא ארדת אן | [תע]ק'ד (תעקד B) אלסארק
 לילא ידכל דאר רגל מן | [אל]רגאל תצור צורה אלרגל מן נחאס אדא טלע
 | אלוגה אלאל מן אלחמל תם תקול עקדת כל | סארק ען הדה אלדאר
 בהדה אלצורה ותדפנהא | פי וסט אלדאר פאנה לא ידכלהא סארק |
 אבדא //

1 Chapter: When you want to bind the robber so that he does not enter a house of anyone, you should make a talisman of the man from copper when the first decan of Aries is in the ascendant. Then you will say: "I

²⁶ This phrase is probably repeated by mistake in Latin.

have bound every robber away from this house with this talisman". And you will bury it in the middle of the house, and no robber will ever enter it.

De Ariete

1 Cum volueris ligare *latrones* ut non *intrent* domum ⟨ ⟩, figurabis imaginem viri ex ere cum ascenderit prima facies alhamel. Post hec dices: "Alligo omnem latronem ab hac domo per hanc imaginem." Pones (Pone P) eam in medio domus et non introibit in eam latro in sempiternum (P omits "in sempiternum").

1 When you want to bind *robbers* so that *they* do not enter a house ⟨ ⟩, you should make a talisman of the man from copper when the first decan of Aries is in the ascendant. Then you will say: "I bind every robber from this house with this talisman". And you will *put* it in the middle of the house, and the robber will never enter.

Comment: The Latin is very close to the Arabic, to the extent that it keeps *al-ḥamal* ("Aries") in transcription. It makes the robber plural, and 'puts' rather than 'buries' the talisman.

(A, B-) (2) אדא ארדת אן תקים אלבקר | ע[ל]ין חג'ר²⁷ (עלי חגר B) תצור
צורה עג'לה מן נחאס | אדא טלע אלוגה אלאול מן אלחמל ותקול | רבטת
כל בקרה שאכלת (עלי שכל B) הדא אלצורה | אקאמת עליה ווקפת
ולא תזול (des. B) | תם תדפן אלצורה תחת חגרא פי אל[מוצע?]| אלדי
תריד יבון דלך //

2 When you want to make cows stay on a stone you should make a talisman of a calf from copper when the first decan of Aries is in the ascendant. And you will say: "I have bound every cow resembling this talisman (so that) she stays over it and stops and does not leave." Then you will bury the talisman under a stone in the [place] where you want this to happen.

2 Cum volueris ut perseverent vacce *super vitulos* (B adds suos), fiat imago vituli ex ere sub prefato horoscopo. Que *cum fit hec oratio dicatur*: "ligo omnem vaccam *que transierit super*"²⁸ hanc imaginem ut stet et perseveret super eam et non moveatur." Post sepelies imaginem sub lapide ubi volueris ⟨ ⟩.

2 When you want to make cows stay *with their calves* a talisman of a calf should be made from copper under the aforementioned horoscope. And when *this is being done this prayer should be said*: "I bind every cow

²⁷ In the margin of ms A, the scribe added one word, which we cannot decipher, vertically to the main text.

²⁸ The Latin translator probably read *سككت* for *شاككت*.

passing over this talisman that she stays over it and stops and does not leave.” Then you will bury the talisman under a stone where you wish ().

Comment: The Latin again substitutes plural for singular, and makes the instructions impersonal (perhaps for the sake of variation). In the first phrase there is confusion between the similar-looking words عجل (“calf”) and حجر (“stone”): both readings are possible in the context.

אדא ארדת אן [תעקד אלנאר לא תקד] | פי תלך
 אלדאר [ובדאלך אלמוצע צור] | צורה רגל [מן נחאס איצא באלוגה]³⁰ |
 אלאל מן אלחמל [תם תקול עקדת] | אלצורה ועקדת אלנ[אר מן הדא
 אלדאר] | לא תקד א[ב]דא פיה[א תם תדפן? אלצורה?] | פי דלך אלמוצע
 אלדי [תריד]

3 When you want to [bind the fire so that it does not burn] in that house [and in that place, make] a talisman of a man [from copper also in the] first [decan] of Aries. [Then you should say: “I have bound] the talisman and I have bound the fir[e away from this house], so that it does not ever burn in i[t. Then you will bury the talisman] in that place where [you want].

3 Cum volueris ligare ignem ut non accendatur in () domo vel in quolibet alio loco, imago viri cuprina fiat, cuius capud sit sicut capud canis cum quo sit candelabrum. Hec quoque sub primo () figuretur, hac oratione superdicta: “ligavi () ignem ab hac domo ut non accendatur ignis in ea in eternum”. Hiis dictis, sepelies imaginem ubi volueris.

3 When you want to bind the fire so that it does not burn in a house or in some other such place, a talisman of a man should be made from copper, whose head is like the head of a dog, with which there is a candelabrum. This also should be shaped in the first (), when this prayer has been said over it: “I have bound () the fire from this house, so that the fire does not ever burn in it.” Having said this, you will bury the talisman in that place where you want.

Comment: The Latin adds a phrase from Abū Maʿṣar’s description of the constellations rising in the first decan of Aries (*Great Introduction to Astrology*, VI, c. 1, in the translation of John of Seville: “imago capitis eius est caput canis, in eius manu sinistra candelabrum terreum”).³¹

²⁹ A preserves only the right half of each line. B preserves the whole paragraph, except for most words of the last line. We have supplied B’s readings in A’s lacunae.

³⁰ B has one more word here, אל[], which is badly effaced; perhaps he wrote אלחמל, but then realized he wrote it too soon.

³¹ Abū Maʿṣar al-Balḥī, *Liber introductorii maioris ad scientiam iudiciorum astro- rum*, ed. Richard Lemay, 9. vols. (Naples: Istituto universitario Orientale, 1995–6), V, 216, lines 170–1. Jean-Patrice Boudet has already pointed out the correspondences in Pseudo-Ptolemy with phrases in the *Liber introductorii maioris*.

(A) (4) רבט אלנסא פאדא א [] | רגלא ותרי עגבא פי?ה? צור [] | מן נחאס פי טאלע אלוגה אלתאני [] | פי ידהא משיט ותקול עלי אלצורה [] | תכטר אמראה ולא גאריה עלי הדא | אלצורה אלא קעדת תמשט ראסהא [] | תדפן פי מוצע תכטר אלנסא [] | ו?ן לא תכטר עליהא אמראה אלא [] | פת ען ראסהא תחלה

4 The binding of women. When y[ou want]? a man and show a remarkable thing in it?, make [a talisman] from copper in the ascension of the second decan [of Aries] [of a woman] with a comb in her hand. And you should say over the talisman: “[May no] woman or girl step³² over this talisman without sitting down, combing her head.” Then you will bury it in a place where women happen to pass, [] and no woman will pass over it without [taking the veil] from her head [and] untying it.

4 *Delusio mulierum*. < > Fiat mulieris imago cuprina sub *prima* facie alhamel horoscopo existente; in manu vero pecten teneat, **que dum** (cum B) **fit**, hec oratio dicatur: “non transeat super hanc imaginem mulier nec puella nisi sedeat, pectens capud suum”. Post sepelies eam in loco transitus mulieris et probabis eam quod non transeat super eam aliqua que non discooperiet capud suum, **fricans illud, et cum fricaverit** cadent capilli eius.

4 The *deluding* of women. < > May a talisman be made from copper in the ascension of the *first* decan of Aries of a woman; she should hold a comb in her hand, and **when this is being done**, this prayer should be said: “(May no) woman or girl step over this talisman without sitting down, combing her head.” Then you will bury it in a place where *a woman* passes, and **you will prove it (the talisman)**, because no woman will pass over it without uncovering her head, **combing it; and when she combs it, her hair will fall down**.

Comment: Here the phrase “a woman combing her head” is shared by the Arabic of Pseudo-Ptolemy and Abū Maʿṣar’s description of the constellations rising in the second decan of Aries: “mulier pectens caput suum”.³³

(A) (5) פאדא בָּאב | [רב]ט אלחיאא אדא ארדת אן [ת]רבט | [אלחי]את לא יודי³⁴ פצור צורה מן נחאס | [פי טא]ל?ע? אלוגה אלתאני מן אלחמל תם [תקול?] עלי אלצורה עקרב אלא תאדי³⁵ | [] | תדפן פי דלך אלמוצע בקואס... []

³² The scribe apparently read a و as a ر since مَظْطُور (“she passes”) is required here rather than مَظْطَر (“she walks in an affected way”).

³³ Abū Maʿṣar al-Balḥī, *Liber introductorii maioris*, V, 216–7, lines 187–8.

³⁴ Read: תודי.

³⁵ Read: תודי.

5 Chapter on [the bindi]ng of snakes: And when you want to bind [snak]es so that they do not harm, then make a talisman from copper in the ascension of the second decan of Aries. Then you should say over the talisman: ‘Scorpion, do not harm!’ [Then] you should bury it in that place with the support of...

5 ⟨ ⟩ Cum volueris ut non impediāt **te** serpentes, fiat imago **serpentis** enea sub secunda facie alhamel horoscopo existente. Post hec **subhumetur**, dicendo: “*ligavi omnem serpentem per hanc imaginem ut non impediāt aliquem*”. Postea sepelies eam in eodem loco, **loco tamen in 4 diviso recte, et non remanebit ibi serpens quin fugiat**.

5 ⟨ ⟩ When you want to bind snakes so that they do not harm **you**, a talisman **of a snake** is made from copper in the ascension of the second decan of Aries. Then **it should be buried**, while you say: “*I bind every snake through this talisman so that it should not harm anyone*”. Then you will bury it in that same place—the place, however, is **divided precisely into four—and no snake will remain there, but it will flee away**.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Important as the new fragments surely are, it must be stressed that at present we are only seeing the tip of the iceberg for, in spite of sporadic publications and discussions of the astrological texts from the Cairo Genizah, only a handful of such texts, out of many hundreds, have received any scholarly attention.³⁶ Moreover, while the magical texts from the Cairo Genizah have received far more scholarly attention, that

³⁶ For the most important publications, see B.R. Goldstein and D. Pingree, “Horoscopes from the Cairo Geniza,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 36 (1977), 113–44; id., “The Astronomical Tables of al-Khwarizmi in a Nineteenth Century Egyptian Text,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 98 (1978), 96–9; id., “Astrological Almanacs from the Cairo Geniza,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 38 (1979), 153–75, and 231–56; id., “More Horoscopes from the Cairo Geniza,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 125 (1981), 155–89; id., “Additional Astrological Almanacs from the Cairo Geniza,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 103 (1983), 673–90; J.C. Greenfield and M. Sokoloff, “Astrological and Related Omen Texts in Jewish Palestinian Aramaic,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 48 (1989), 201–14; S. Shaked, “A Palestinian Jewish Aramaic Hemerologion,” *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 15 (1992), 28–42; Y. Tobi, *Poetry, Judeo-Arabic Literature, and the Geniza*, Jewish Culture in Muslim Lands and Cairo Geniza Studies, IV (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 2006), 51–5 (Heb.); R. Leicht, *Astrologumena Judaica: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Astrologischen Literatur der Juden*, Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism, 21 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), esp. Chapter 3. The only broader survey of the Genizah astrological fragments is by P. Fenton, “Les Manuscrits Astrologiques de la Guénizah du Caire,” in J. Halbronn, *Le monde juif et l’astrologie* (Milano: Arché, 1985), iii–xvii.

attention was devoted mostly to the early, and predominantly Aramaic and Hebrew, magical texts, while the rich collections of Judaeo-Arabic and Arabic magical texts from the Cairo Genizah have thus far been almost entirely ignored.³⁷ But these Genizah fragments are of great importance for the study of the transmission of the occult sciences in the Middle Ages, especially because they are more likely to date from the period when the translations into Latin were being made, whereas in the past we have usually had to rely on much later Arabic manuscripts. Thus, a careful reconstruction of the astrological and magical library of the Jews of medieval Cairo remains a burning, but elusive, desideratum. For the time being, we may make the following points. (a) More fragments of manuscripts A and B might be discovered in the future, if not in Cambridge (where we have examined all 140,000 Genizah fragments, and have thus far not identified any additional pieces of these two manuscripts) then in other Genizah collections; (b) that the scribe who copied manuscripts A and B apparently copied other magical texts as well,³⁸ a fact which might help us reconstruct his own personal library of different types of magical texts and practices; (c) that interest in talismanic magic is evident in other Genizah fragments as well;³⁹ and (d) that the Jewish interest in talismanic magic is well known outside the Cairo Genizah, and has already received some

³⁷ For a few important exceptions, see N. Golb, "Aspects of the Historical Background of Jewish Life in Medieval Egypt," in *Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, ed. A. Altman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, 1–18, at 12–8; S. Shaked, "The Jewish Magical Literature in the Lands of Islam: Notes and Examples," *Pe'amim* 15 (1983), 15–28 (Heb.); id., "Medieval Jewish Magic in Relation to Islam: Theoretical Attitudes and Genres," in *Judaism and Islam: Boundaries, Communication and Interaction (Essays in Honor of William M. Brinner)*, eds. B. H. Hary, J. L. Hayes and F. Astern (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 97–109. For a fuller survey of the magical, astrological, divinatory and alchemical fragments from the Cairo Genizah see Gideon Bohak, "Towards a Catalogue of the Magical, Astrological, Divinatory and Alchemical Fragments from the Cambridge Genizah Collections," in *From a Sacred Source: Genizah Studies in Honour of Stefan C. Reif*, eds. Ben Outhwaite and Siam Bhayro (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 53–79.

³⁸ As far as we can tell, T-S AS 142.207 (which contains magical recipes, including some in Aramaic and Hebrew), T-S NS 228.20 (with magical recipes to drive away bed-bugs, etc.), and one folio of T-S NS 246.32 (with magical recipes, mostly in Aramaic, and published by Joseph Naveh and Shaul Shaked, *Magic Spells and Formulae: Aramaic Incantations of Late antiquity* [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1993], as no. G28), were all copied by the same scribe.

³⁹ We note, for example, that T-S Ar. 40.149 also provides instructions for talismanic magic, but is written in Arabic, not Judaeo-Arabic. Note also the appearance of a "book with talismans" (כתאב פיה//כנאש//טליסמאת), in a thirteenth-century Genizah booklist published by Nehemiah Allony, *The Jewish Library in the Middle*

scholarly attention.⁴⁰ Needless to add, the study of all these issues, and of the possible contribution of the Genizah materials to the historical reconstruction of the transfer of Arabic magic, astrology, divination and alchemy to medieval Europe is bound to keep scholars fruitfully busy for many years to come.

Ages: Book Lists from the Cairo Genizah, Oriens Judaicus I, III, ed. by Miriam Frenkel and Haggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi, 2006), [Heb.], 46.

⁴⁰ See esp. Dov Schwartz, *Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought*, (tr. by David Louvish and Batya Stein), The Brill Reference Library of Judaism, 20 (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Leicht, *Astrologumena Judaica* (as in n. 36, including a discussion, on p. 323, of a Renaissance Hebrew version of Pseudo-Ptolemy, probably translated from a Latin original).

IBN SĪNĀ'S *TA'LĪQĀT*: THE PRESENCE OF PARAPHRASES
OF AND SUPER-COMMENTARIES ON THE
ILĀHĪYĀT OF THE *ŠIFĀ'*

Jules Janssens

In the prologue to the *Šifā'*, Ibn Sīnā writes:

Then I thought it appropriate that I should write another book to follow this one [*The Cure*]. I have called it Appendices, and it will end with my life, finding its termination in whatever will have been completed every year. It is like a commentary to this book, Providing Corollaries to its Fundamental Principles and elaborating on its briefly expressed concepts.¹

Unfortunately no work by Ibn Sīnā has been preserved under the explicit title of *Lawāḥiq*, Appendices. But there exist instead two collections of material that meet Ibn Sīnā's description, i.e., the *Ta'liqāt*, Notes, and the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, Discussions, but the transmission of both works is extremely complicated, as Dimitri Gutas has rightly observed.² In the present study, I will exclusively concentrate on the former of the two works. Even if an exhaustive study of its transmission remains a major desideratum, I cannot provide it here since it clearly exceeds the limits of a paper. My aim is much more modest: to show that several passages—sometimes short, sometimes relatively long—are directly related to the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'*, and, as such, reveal it to be a kind of super-commentary on it. Let me note that I will do so according to what in all likelihood is the oldest version, i.e., the one present in the manuscript Cairo, Ḥikma 6M on which Badawī based his edition.³

¹ Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifā'*, *al-Madḥal*, eds. G. C. Anawati, M. Khodeiri and F. Ahwani (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Amīriya, 1952), 10.8–10; I quote the English translation of D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 51–2.

² Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 142. Regarding the transmission of the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, one may now consult the pioneering study of D. Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition, The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā's al-Mubāḥaṭāt (The Discussions)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

³ See J. Janssens, "Les *Ta'liqāt* d'Ibn Sīnā, Essai de structuration et de datation," in *Langages et philosophie*, eds. A. de Libera, A. Elamrani-Jamal and A. Galonnier (Paris: Vrin, 1997), 109–22, especially 109–11. Let me simply add that the version,

Let me moreover observe that the *Ta'liqāt* offers super-commentaries not only on the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'*, but also on the *ʿIlm Ilāhī* of the *Dāneš-Nāmeḥ*.⁴ Moreover, one finds also a rather long fragment, covering pp. 88.15–96.6, which deals with the categories of quantity and relation and includes clear references to the *Maqūlāt* of the *Šifā'*, more particularly to chapter 4 of book three and to the chapters 1–4 of book four.⁵

Before paying attention to more or less extensive fragments, I would like first to concentrate on explicit quotations, introduced by *qawluhū*, “his saying” (or *ma'nā qawlihī*, “the significance of his saying”), or, more rarely, *qawlunā*, “our saying” (or *qulnā*, “we have said”). This variation in the affixed pronoun renders things rather complicated. The former variant seems to indicate that someone is commenting positively on Ibn Sīnā's text. The second rather presupposes that Ibn Sīnā himself is developing ideas taken from his own text, whereas the last one seems to point in the direction of someone who somehow distances himself of the saying of the *Šayḥ ar-Ra'īs*. But if the *Ta'liqāt* is based on Ibn Sīnā's oral teaching—which might well be the case as

which contains a table of contents and numbers the notes, and which is directly linked with the names of Bahmanyār and al-Lawkarī in at least two manuscripts, shows substantially the same order (and is certainly also old, since it is conserved in the manuscript Aya Sophia 2390, dated 521/1127), whereas the version that has arranged the notes according to subject matter (logic-physics-*De Anima*-metaphysics) appears less coherent than one might at first sight expect and, moreover, seems to have only been preserved in rather late Iranian manuscripts (this version is now available in print, see Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. H. M. al-'Ubaydī (Baghdad, 2002,² Damascus: at-Talwin, 2008). As to Badawī's edition, see Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. 'A. Badawī (Cairo: GEBO, 1973)—in what follows all references are to this edition, unless indicated otherwise.

⁴ For the presence in the *Ta'liqāt* of passages corresponding to chapters of the *Metaphysics* of the *Dāneš-Nāmeḥ* (what I have qualified as ‘the latter's probable Arabic original’), see J. Janssens, “*Dāneš-Nāmeḥ* d'Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?,” *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 28 (1986), 164–5. The parts not covered by these correspondences appear at first sight to be super-commentaries, but a closer systematic examination is needed to decide this issue. I hope to deal with this in a later publication.

⁵ I plan to publish the details of the correspondence in a later publication. It is worthwhile to note that the actual order of the *Ta'liqāt*, as present in Badawī's edition, as well as in the second version, do not always respect the order of the exposé as present in the *Šifā'*. Nevertheless, the inner coherence of the totality of the fragment is rather great with the exception of two smaller passages, i.e., 89.18–21, where a particular emphasis is laid on the receptive character of matter, and 93.4–6, dealing with the relationship between ‘animal’ and ‘man’ (lines 3 and 5) and affirming that the diaphonous is without color (l. 4). Moreover, the lines 25–8 of p. 96, dealing with relation, might have had their natural place inside the present exposé, but this deserves further investigation.

I have tried to show elsewhere⁶—this variation could also result from a lack of consistency in the recording of the auditor. In this respect, it is undoubtedly significant that the very first “quotation”, introduced by “his saying” (p. 24.23), i.e. “you would know, however, through some argument, that the eclipse will be a certain specific one,” is not completely faithful to the original.⁷ If the replacement in the Arabic of *li-ḥuḡḡatin* by *bi-ḥuḡḡatin* may be considered as an accidental, and, anyhow, minor variant, this is certainly not the case with the omission of the restrictive formula *lā (...) illā*, “only”, which in the original qualifies the verb (*an*) *yakūna*, will be. That formula implies a particular emphasis on the fact that in the given case the concerned eclipse cannot be otherwise than specific, an emphasis that is no longer present in the version of the *Ta'liqāt*.⁸

Besides the just mentioned quotation, the following ones,⁹ all introduced by “his saying”, are related to the *Ilāhiyāt* of the *Šifā'*:

(1) p. 27.10: “the four of them [i.e., the ultimate causes for all the existents], not only (*illā*) the one of them which cannot be¹⁰ the subject

⁶ See Janssens, “Les *Ta'liqāt* d'Ibn Sīnā,” 116–8.

⁷ See Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifā', Ilāhiyāt*, eds. G. C. Anawati, S. Zayed, M. Musa and S. Dunya (Cairo: OGIG, 1960), VIII, 6, 360.17; English translation of M. Marmura, *Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 289.10–1 (in what follows I will always quote this translation, unless indicated otherwise).

⁸ There is no difference regarding this quotation in the three (complete) versions of the *Ta'liqāt*, as far as I could control (the two printed editions and the ms. Aya Sophia, 2390, f. 23r.).

⁹ I will quote the sayings in English translation and only refer to the Arabic when strictly necessary. Moreover, I use the abbreviations *Il* for the Cairo edition of the *Ilāhiyāt* of the *Šifā'* and *M.* for Marmura's English translation; pagination follows the editions referred to in note seven above. Of the quotations introduced by “his saying,” five have, as far as I can see, no basis in the *Ilāhiyāt* of the *Šifā'*, i.e., p. 31.12–3: “the rule of the differentia specifica is that of the quiddity” (*wa-faṣl ḥukmuḥi ḥukma l-māhiya*); p. 31.26: “in the individuals, there is no priority nor posteriority” (*laysa fī l-ašḥāsi taqaddum wa-lā ta'akhḥur*); p. 57.26: “joined and successive” (*muḡtama'a wa-muta'āqiba*) in the context of the celestial bodies, referring to their forms, respectively their motions; p. 77.3: “soul (fully) possesses its essence” (*an-nafs dātuhā lahā*) in the context of presenting it as a separate substance; p. 141.19: “the search is directed towards it” (*ilayhi tuḡāwwihu ṭ-talab*) in the context of looking for the major in a syllogism. I have thus far not been able to identify the precise source of these “quotations”. As to the “quotation”, 152.3–4 “from another side” (*min ḡānib āḥar*) it seems to refer to the same words expressed just before at line 2.

¹⁰ Reading *lam yumkin* instead of *lam yakun* in the printed edition of the *Šifā'*. However, the variant *lam yumkin* is attested in several manuscripts, as well as in the lithograph of Tehran (although the critical apparatus of the Cairo edition does

of this doctrine (*al-qawl bi-hi*)” = *Il.*, I.1, 7.8–9.¹¹ The present quotation refers to the last part of a sentence in which Ibn Sīnā wonders whether the four ultimate causes, i.e., agent, final, material and formal, can be accepted as the proper subject of metaphysics. The final part of the affirmation is not very clear, but it is specified in the *Taʿl.* (27.10–1) that the one cause evoked there has to be identified with God-Creator as the agent cause, who in no way can be the proper subject of this science.¹²

(2) p. 36.3: “the rest of the divisions are not intended” = *Il.*, VIII.2, 337.1 (M., 266.20–1). In *Il.* it had been specified that in order to explain the subsistence of things, only two divisions had been withheld, i.e., from contrariety or towards perfection. *Taʿl.* only specifies that the judgment in this respect is finite—a rather laconic affirmation;

(3) p. 73.1–2: “...the quiddity of substance is substance in the sense that it is existent in external things, not in a subject. This description exists for it”¹³ = *Il.*, III.8, p. 140.9–10 (M. 107.22–4). *Il.* explains that the existence of an intellectually apprehended substance in the mind does not imply that it does not exist in a subject in external reality. In *Taʿl.*, p. 73.2–16, the very same idea is stressed in a kind of paraphrase of *Il.*, pp. 140–143.8. Most striking here is a brief reference to the example of the magnet and the palm of the hand in the *Taʿl.*, without any further explanation. Hence, it is almost certain that the more detailed elaboration of *Il.* (p. 141.9–14) is supposed to be known.

(4) p. 76.24: “that which, together with¹⁴ different, is [also] similar” = *Il.*, VII.1, p. 309.8 (M. 242.13–4). In the *Il.*, the subject of this affirmation is the mean between two contraries. *Taʿl.* (76.24–5) illustrates this by offering the example of the color green: although it is a medium between black and white, it is not contrary to one of both. In *Il.* (309.9) green is mentioned among other colors as being mediate between black and white.

not mention this), see A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Sifā', A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 489.

¹¹ My translation differs substantially from that of Marmura, who reads (p. 5): “the four of them—not one being excluded from the discussion.”

¹² This explanation strongly confirms the way Amos Bertolacci has understood this passage, see his *Avicenna, Libro dell guarigione, Le cose divine* (Torino: UTET, 2008), 146, n. 31.

¹³ *Taʿl.* has *lahū* instead of *li-māhiyat al-ḡawāhir al-maʿqūlat* (“for the quiddity of intelligible substances”) in *Il.*

¹⁴ *bi-mā* instead of *maʿa annahū* (“even though”) in *Il.*

(5) p. 99.16: “and, inasmuch as in one respect [its intellection is applied] specifically to itself, [there follows necessarily from it]¹⁵ the first multiplicity” = *Il.*, IX.4, p. 407.1 (M. 331.15–7). The intellection involved is that of the First Intellect as being possible in itself and necessary with respect to its cause. *Ta'ī.* insists that the intellection of itself as “purely possible” gives rise to the generation of the matter of the (outermost) sphere, while its intellection of itself as “being necessary by the First” gives rise to the existence of the latter’s soul. In the preceding lines (p. 99.5–15), it had already been stressed that from the first Intellect another Intellect emanates (cp. *Il.*, IX, 4, pp. 406.19–407.1); that in it there is a triple understanding, i.e., of its cause, of itself as possible *in se* and of itself as necessary due to the First cause; and that the form of a sphere brings its matter to act just as God brings the Intellects into act. This last point is offered (*Ta'ī.*, p. 99.12) as the explanation of an almost literal quotation of *Il.*, p. 407.2–3: “just as the possibility of existence [*Ta'ī.* adds ‘in them’] is actualized by the actuality that [*Ta'ī.* reads *allaḍī huwa* instead of simple *allaḍī*] parallels the form of the sphere” (M. 331.19–20). It is striking that this quotation is not preceded by *qawluhū*—this might be due to a scribal error, but might also indicate that in the other instances one has to do with an element of redaction.

(6) p. 99.20: “if [*in* instead of *fa-in* in *Il.*] one posits for every celestial sphere something within its sphere from which there emanates a thing, i.e., an influence without the essence [of the former] being absorbed in the being busy of that body with that influence [*Ta'ī.* reads *biḥī* instead of *wa-biḥī* (in and by the work of that body)]” = *Il.*, IX, 4, p. 408.10–1 (M. 332.32–3, slightly modified). Both *Ta'ī.* and *Il.* specify in almost identical terms that the concerned something is the pure Intellect, *al-‘aql al-muğarrad*.

(7) p. 121.23: “they [i.e., attributes intellectually apprehended by God] are attributed to individual things” = *Il.*, VIII, 6, p. 360.6 (M., 288.25). The truth of this affirmation is limited in both *Ta'ī.* and *Il.* (p. 360.5) to those beings which are unique in their species. The following paragraph in the *Ta'ī.* (pp. 121.24–122.2, being in several respects close to *Il.*, pp. 359.3–360.10), insists that individual corruptible beings

¹⁵ The words in square brackets above are explicit in *Il.*, hence they are in all likelihood implicit in *Ta'ī.*

can be only object of sensation or imagination. Nevertheless, as far as their species is concerned, they indeed can be intellectually known.¹⁶

(8) p. 124.9: “in His [i.e. God’s] being, in Himself [*Ta’l.* reads *bi-dātihi* instead of *li-dātihi*], a cause of goodness and perfection in terms of what is possible” = *Il.*, IX, 6, p. 415.4 (M. 339.16–7). In *Il.* this affirmation forms part of the definition of God’s providence. The explanation of *Ta’l.* (124.9–11) concentrates on what is meant by “in terms of what is possible”. It is insisted that there is a fundamental difference in goodness and perfection between super- and supra-lunar beings, although each of them receives what is in its reach.

(9) p. 131.18: “the posteriority of all what is [*Ta’l.* reads *kull mā takūnu ba’dīyatuhū* instead of *fa-takūnu ba’dīyatuhū*—so that [the effect’s] posteriority)] is not [*Il.* would not be] a posteriority existing with the priority but differs [*Il.* would differ] from¹⁷ it in existence” = *Il.*, VI, 2, p. 267.1–2 (M. 203.34–6). In *Il.* this makes part of an interrogation, i.e., whether the term *muḥdaṭ* has not to be limited to what has been temporally originated. According to Ibn Sīnā’s view this is not necessarily the case, since origination is valid for everything that is after having not been (266.16). This latter idea seems to prevail in the explanation of *Ta’l.* (131.8–10), where it is stressed that the universe is originated after a nullity (*buṭlān*), which may be qualified in this case as having the meaning of a “priority”.

(10) p. 139.17: “in terms of one state but not the other, and¹⁸ regardless of whether one is prior or posterior [to the other]” = *Il.*, IX, 1, 381.8 (M. 307.5–6). The reference in *Il.* is to the hypothetical case where God would be able to create a body other than the one terminating at the creation of the world, and where there is a difference in their possibilities. Ibn Sīnā states that this would imply that one has to accept *ad infinitum* the possibility and non-possibility of creating a

¹⁶ The most authoritative study on Ibn Sīnā’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars remains M. Marmura, “Some Aspects of Avicenna’s Theory of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” *JAOS* 72 (1962), 299–331, now reprinted in M. Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy, Studies in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali and Other Major Muslim Thinkers* (Binghamton, New York: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 71–95.

¹⁷ Badawī reads *bi-mā narāhu*, but both the MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 87 v and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta’līqāt*, ed. al-‘Ubaydī, 439, § 686, present the same reading as the one of *Il.*, i.e., *mumā’iza*.

¹⁸ *Ta’l.* reads *wa-waqa’a* instead of *waqa’a* in *Il.*, but this variant is attested in the lithograph of Tehran, as well as in four manuscripts, see Ibn Sīnā, *aš-Šifā’, Ilāhiyāt*, 381, apparatus of variants l. 8.

thing in the state of nonexistence, which is absurd; hence the universe has to be eternal. As to *Ta'l.* (139.17–23), it first specifies that 'state', *ḥāl*, has to be understood in terms of time.¹⁹ Then it specifies that the celestial spheres are not in time or motion, but with (*ma'a*) them. Finally, it observes, almost literally quoting *Il.*, IX, 1, 379.11–2, that past is either in terms of itself time, or in terms of time motion, and that what belongs to the latter is subject to change.

(11) p. 149.7: "a syllogism whose required [conclusion] is necessary" = *Il.*, I, 8, 49.6 (M. 39.22–3). With *Il.* (49.6–50.4), *Ta'l.* (149.5–11) underlines that a syllogism in its most proper sense is based on true premises and a valid composition, whereas a purely formal syllogism (*qiyās bi-l-qiyās*)²⁰ is based on premises accepted by the interlocutor in a debate as well as a valid composition.

(12) p. 155.1–2: "becoming imprinted in either one of the two [faculties] of²¹ soul or intellect, when the First apprehends these forms", a somewhat reworded version of *Il.*, VIII, 7, 365.1–2, which literally states: "or [to examine them (=the intelligibles)] with respect to there existing in an intellect or soul, becoming imprinted in either one of the two when the First apprehends these forms" (M. 293.12–4). The broader context is God's knowing in a single act of intellection all things (see *infra*), but regarding the present quotation *Ta'l.* puts a particular emphasis on the fact that it does not mean that God knows these forms as being imprinted in intellect or soul. Rather God knows them based on the fact that in His self-knowledge is included the knowledge of His being the principle of them. To substantiate this view, another quotation is taken from *Il.*, i.e., 365.11–12, introduced by *qāla*, "he has said" (*Ta'l.*, 155.4–6). In this case the "he" quite obviously refers to Ibn Sīnā, so that one gets the impression that one has to do with a third person, who either comments on his writings, or, at least, is reporting a saying of him. But whatever the case, the lack of accuracy in the quoting gives the strong impression that Ibn Sīnā's very work was not at hand and is evoked "by heart". Indeed, the "quotation" runs as follows: "[if] they [i.e., the things impressed in either intellect or soul]

¹⁹ Marmura, *Avicenna, The Metaphysics*, 418, n. 13, judiciously remarks that *ḥāl* can also mean 'time', or 'moment of time'.

²⁰ Marmura, *ib.*, 388, Book One, Chapter Eight, note 3 stresses that this is a peculiar wording and hence that there is uncertainty as to how it should be translated.

²¹ Instead of the preposition *fī* of Badawī's edition, I read the preposition *min* with MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 100v and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'līqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 264, § 265.

are included among the things of which the First intellectually apprehends His essence to be the principle, then their proceeding from Him would not be in accordance with what we have said—namely, that, if He intellectually apprehends them [*Ta'l.* reads *'aqalahā* instead of *'aqala ḥayran*, “He intellectually apprehends a good”], they come to be—because they are identical with His very intellectual apprehension of them [*'aqlahū lahā* instead of *'aqlahū li-l-ḥayri* in *Il.*], or else it [*Ta'l.* omits *al-amr*—the matter] would regress [infinitely].”

(13) p. 155.18–19: “these things only come to exist because He [i.e., God] intellectually apprehended them, and He only intellectually apprehends them because they came to be from Him—[from this] would follow that they came to exist because they came to exist, or that they were intellectually apprehended because they were intellectually apprehended.” Still more than the preceding “quotation”, the present affirmation does constitute a free rewording. In fact, in the source (*Il.*, VIII, 7, 365.11–3), the wording is as follows: “If, then, we say that, when He intellectually apprehended them, they came to be without there being with them another act of intellectual apprehension—their existence being nothing other than acts of intellectual apprehension—this would be as though we have said, ‘Because He apprehended them intellectually, He apprehended them intellectually’, or, ‘Because they came to exist from Him, they came to exist from Him’.” (M. 293.38–294.5) (but these two later formulations are present in the preceding lines, i.e., 15–16, of *Ta'l.*). Certainly, the basic idea remains the same, but one remains nevertheless far from a literal quotation. Whereas *Il.* (366.1–7) brings especially to the fore that there is an identity in God knowing and causing, *Ta'l.* (155.20–156.3) not only confirms this but also adds a particular emphasis on the fact that God’s self-knowledge is absolutely one, even if we humans do distinguish between His absolute self-knowledge and His knowing Himself as principle of all things (note, moreover, that before the present quotation *Ta'l.* [155.7–17] had already stressed the necessity of accepting an identity between God’s knowledge and His causal action).

(14) p. 159.26:²² “He [i.e., God] intellectually apprehends them [i.e., the existing beings—*Ta'l.* reads *ya'qiluhā* instead of *ya'qiluhū*—the

²² Although Badawi’s edition gives *qawluḥa*, one has in all likelihood to read *qawluhū*, see MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 103v and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta’līqāt*, ed. al-‘Ubaydī, 456, § 747.

affixed pronoun, the *hū* referring to the just before mentioned notion of ranking] as order and as good [the two terms are inversed compared to *Il.*]” = *Il.*, VIII, 7, 363.13 (M. 291.36). Besides the idea that God knows all things according to an intelligible order, which is also present in *Il.*, *Ta'l.* puts a much greater emphasis than *Il.* on the fact that God's essence, which is at once intellect, intellectual apprehender and intelligible (= *Il.*, VIII, 7, 368.1), is the cause of that order (*Ta'l.* 159.6–26), and adds moreover that the existence of each of the existing things is appropriate to it (*Ta'l.* 159.26–160.11).

As to “quotations” introduced by *qawlunā* (or *ma'nā qawlinā*) or *qulnā*, two of them are directly based on the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'*:²³

(15) p. 44.23: “neither light nor heavy” = *Il.*, VII, 1, 309.12 (M. 242.21–2). According to both *Il.* (309.11–3) and *Ta'l.*, (44.23–5), no real mean, as e.g. luke-warm, is expressed in this way, but for *Ta'l.* the concerned qualification has to be understood as an absolute negation.

(16) p. 133.24: “the differentia does not confer on the genus its true nature”, a slightly reworded version of *Il.*, I, 7, 45.3–4: “differentiae (...) do not confer on the genus its true nature” (M. 36, 2–3). In both texts (*Il.*, 45.4–6; *Ta'l.*, 133.24–6), immediately afterwards the role of the differentia specifica is directly linked with the actual existence, and, more particularly, subsistence of the thing it characterizes.

The above survey shows clearly that the author of the *Ta'līqāt* was very familiar with the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'*. However, it is also striking that he most of the time does not really worry about the precise wording of the text he is referring to. Most of his “quotations” include modifications—it is true, most of the time minor ones and, certainly, they never contradict the original text. It is moreover striking that in many cases the author of the *Ta'līqāt* adds elements of explanation or

²³ As to the others, three of them refer to something expressed a few lines earlier: p. 44.12 → 44.6; p. 51.2–3 → p. 50.24–5; p. 51.8 → beginnings same line; p. 85.14 → preceding line; for five others, I was unable to identify their source: p. 37.25: “change in its blackness” (*tağayyur fī sawādiyatihī*); p. 43.13: “when and where” (*matā wa-ayna*); p. 50.24: “that He [=God] is free to choose and powerful” (*innahū muhtār wa-innahū qādir*); p. 145.3: “that He is ‘He’” (*innahū huwa*) [this affirmation and its surrounding context reminds one of the beginnings of Ibn Sīnā's commentary on *sūrat al-Ihlās*; see my “Avicenna and the Qur'an: A Survey of His Qur'anic Commentaries,” *Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain du Caire* 25–6 (2004), 187–8; and p. 145.20: “this position and this time” (*hādā l-waḍ' wa-hādā z-zamān*); finally, p. 38.7–8 one has three instances of *qawlunā* in two lines, but in this case the only intention is to distinguish between different ways of speaking about “totality”.

precision that were absent in the source text. It is finally abundantly clear that most of the given explanations reflect a genuine Avicennian way of thought and that none is in flagrant contradiction with the basic doctrine of the Šayḥ ar-Ra'īs. But it remains far from easy to determine their precise author (Ibn Sinā himself or a disciple?) as well as origin (teaching, commentary, marginal notes in a copy of the *Ilāhīyāt*?). Some further clarification in this respect might come from a presentation of several passages that have an outspoken basis in the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'*.²⁴

(17) p. 36.22–8: it is stressed that 'necessary being' (*wuḡūb al-wuḡūd*) constitutes the true essence of God. This is undoubtedly based on *Il.*, I, 7, all the more that in both texts there is an evocation of the notion of assuredness of existence (*ta'akkud al-wuḡūd*) (45.9), as well as the idea that necessary being cannot be a common generic notion (46, 1) and does only offer the explication of God's name—the knowledge of His true essence belonging only to the latter (47.7).²⁵ Besides, *Ta'l.* affirms that God's quiddity is no other than His individual existence (*annīya*), in full accordance with *Il.*, VIII, 4, 344.10.

(18) pp. 38.5–39.3: numbers do not possess an actual infinity or a separate existence. *Il.*, VII, 3, 317–321.9 constitutes its immediate source of inspiration. *Ta'l.* starts with an idea that comes at the end of the fragment of *Il.*, 321.7–9, i.e., the impossibility of an actual infinity of numbers, but in an outspoken affirmative form instead of by way of a rhetorical question. One further easily recognizes common elements as far as the idea of a separated number and the problem of its relation to matter is concerned (*Ta'l.* adding that composition and division necessarily imply a mixture with motion), as well as the evocation of two theories, one concerning the generation of number through repetition, the other making the first unity other than the one in the first duality, and so on (the order of these two theories has been inversed compared to *Il.*).

(19) pp. 39.10–41.1: essential causes are finite, but an infinity of individuals can accidentally be the cause of a species—this causality

²⁴ Further analysis might bring to the surface still other passages, but I am confident to offer a substantial survey, which is enough so in order to permit a good insight and correct evaluation.

²⁵ In what follows, ciphers between brackets always refer to the Cairo-edition of the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā'* (see *supra*, note 7), unless preceded by *Ta'l.*; they indicate the existence of a resemblance both verbally and doctrinally, not an identity (however the concerned resemblance is beyond any serious doubt).

being a preparatory one as in the case of motion, and hence implying a temporal, not an essential priority. Inspired by *Il.* VIII, 1, the following affirmations are almost directly based on it: the finite thing existing in actuality does not have infinite parts, whether in terms of measure or meaning (331.11–2) (*Ta'l.* adds the specification that with respect to meaning this is the case when there does exist an order between the parts, but that there might be an infinity, although only in potency, when an order in actuality lacks); the ultimate caused thing is in no way cause itself (328.1–2); the co-existence of (true) cause and what is caused by it (327.11; cp. VI, 2, 264.11) (*Ta'l.* adds that generable and corruptible beings need a cause extraneous to them, i.e., the Giver of Forms, and puts a more outspoken emphasis on the essential, not temporal character of the priority of a cause over its effect, but see nevertheless already 329.16–7); the example of a boy moving toward perfecting himself implies only in potency an infinity of intermediaries (329, 18–9, but in *Il.*, the example illustrates only one way of essential priority, and no mention of intermediaries is made); water has no greater claim to be the material cause of air than air to be the material cause of water (331.3); a totality of infinite individuals can only be accidentally the cause of a species (331.5–7); essential causes are (always) finite (331.8). *Ta'l.* concludes that motions are preparatory causes in the sublunary world, the Agent Intellects being the essential causes of the existence of the beings therein.

(20) pp. 42.6–16 and 20–24: the forms of wholes are sometimes included in the definition of parts, as is the case with e.g., finger and acute angle or segment of the circle; species has no parts except with respect to composed substances and quantities, and the obtuse and acute angle has to be defined by the right one. All these ideas are present in *Il.*, I, 9, 249.12–5 (almost literally), respectively 248.6–8 (slightly reworded) and 251.12–7. Before, *Ta'l.* (lines 6–10) had evoked the notion of 'substantial differentia', *faṣl ḡawharī*, a *terminus technicus* which I have not found in any text by Ibn Sīnā, but which might correspond to what the latter, in his *Madḥal*, calls the differentia in the sense of *ḥāss al-ḥāss*, 'the specific of the specific', in other words the proper differentia specifica.²⁶ Located between the two separated fragments, one finds (lines 17–19) a somewhat reworded "quotation" of *Il.*, VII, 3, 318.16–8: the line is in no sense whatsoever cause of the body.

²⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *aṣ-Ṣifā'*, *al-Madḥal*, 74.11.

On the contrary, the perfect body is the final and efficient cause of the body. Given that this passage is in clear rupture with the surrounding fragments, one may wonder whether it presents a casual remark, or rather results from misplacement by a copyist.

(21) pp. 45.10–46.21: with *Il.*, VI, 2; it is insisted that the true cause is always with its effect. Many similarities come to the fore: a temporally originated thing cannot be the ultimate cause of another temporally originated thing, otherwise there would be a succession of ‘now-moments’ duplicating one another, or there would be a “togetherness” in one time, and both cases are impossible (→265.11–6); true causes coexist with their effect contrary to helping or accidental causes (→265.6–8); examples for distinguishing accidental from essential causes: the builder and the building, the father and sperm, fire and heating (264.9–265.2); real fire is essentially acting, instrumental fire only through a power (268.4–7); the question “why?” does not pertain to particular things (265.9–11). *Ta’l.* moreover adds that the Giver of Forms conserves the nature of the Earth and is the cause of the formation and conservation of earthly beings, as e.g., animals, whereas God is the cause of the conservation of the order of the celestial spheres.

(22) pp. 48.13–49.22: God’s emanation of things is by means of His intellection of them, this intellection being identical with the actualization of their existence. Inspired by *Il.*, VIII, 7, the passage insists with it (365.8–15) that if the latter were not the case, one would inevitably have to accept a *regressio ad infinitum*. Further elements based on *Il.* are the absence of any goal-searching in the divine act of emanating the order of the Universe (366.8–13); the unity of the divine essence in spite of the multiplicity of His attributes (368.11–2), and the distinction between the emanation from a thing of an intelligible form (as such) and of a form whose nature it is to be intellectually apprehended (366.4–5).

(23) pp. 55.12–56.18:²⁷ the corporeality of bodies is receptive to connection and separation. This basic affirmation is derived from *Il.*, II, 2, 67.6–8. Before, *Ta’l.* 55.6–12, has rejected the atomistic conception of body that Democritus had defended. In what follows, it is stressed that matter as such is a preparatory factor (67.14–7 and 68.9–10); that corporeality, contrary to measure, number or color (69.2–71.2, *passim*)

²⁷ In view of MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 41v and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta’līqāt*, ed. al-‘Ubaydī, 179, § 64, a new paragraph has to be started with the last word, i.e. ‘inda of line 6 of p. 55 of Badawī’s edition.

(*Ta'l.* adds also animality), has a realized meaning in itself (70.1 and 71.3); the absence of difference between bodies in their being corporeal, there being no need to distinguish between a body in need of matter and one not in such a need (71.4–6).

(24) p. 59.15–23: possibility for our intellects to apprehend infinite things one after one. The exposé is evidently inspired by *Il.*, V, 2, 211.1–8—it contains a literal reproduction of the lines 1–2 (partial). *Ta'l.* adds that if there is a maker of these intelligibles, who is in full act (in other words God), he will apprehend them at once, hence these meanings will be limited from one side, infinite from another side, as he (referring to Ibn Sīnā?) has mentioned.

(25) pp. 64.27–65.11: “unity” is an equivocal name and is one of the necessary concomitants of beings, both ideas present in *Il.*, III, 2–3, respectively p. 97.4 and p. 109.10. The development of this basic affirmation is exclusively based on III, 3: that, to substance and accident the common notion of unity is that of being indivisible (308.15–309.9) (*Ta'l.* 65.5–6 repeats in a summary way 64.28–65.4—a fact that indicates that the text has not been carefully revised and was in all likelihood not intended for publication); being one in something cannot be compared to being a color in whiteness (110.1–3); and the impossibility for a unity to separate from its subject cannot be compared to that of a differentia specifica to its genus (109.11–6).

(26) p. 70.4–25: the true essence of God as necessary Being. Having its ultimate source in the first part of *Il.*, VIII, 4, *Ta'l.* nevertheless starts with a formulation that is not present there, i.e., God's essence is His ‘necessary being’ (*wāğibīya*) and being taken absolutely belongs to the necessary concomitants of His essence (this implies the idea of a transcendental analogy of being, which I believe was held by Ibn Sīnā).²⁸ Then it stresses, with *Il.*, that God is Truth (344.17); that no demonstration exists of Him, who is uncaused (348.5–6); and that His quiddity is identical with his individual existence (*annīya*) (344.10). Furthermore, it insists that He is no substance (348.7, but affirmed by Ibn Sīnā with more emphasis in *Dāneš-Nāmeḥ*, *‘Ilm ilāhī*, § 25). *Ta'l.* concludes that the necessary being cannot partake in a quiddity since it realizes its existence in itself, almost verbatim copying *Il.*, 345.16–346.12.

²⁸ See my (unpublished) Ph.-D. thesis, *Avicenna: tussen Neoplatonisme en Islam* (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1984), 133–39.

(27) pp. 73.17–75.3: accidentally of measures, based on *Il.*, III, 4. Several sentences are almost literal quotations from *Il.*, although showing some minor modifications: “it is not a condition for the thing existing in another that it should coincide with its entity (*dātahū*)”²⁹ (*Taʿl.*, 73.17→ *Il.*, 112.16–7); “the one body may be subject to the differing dimensions that occur successively to it in actuality” (*Taʿl.*, 74.5→ *Il.*, 113.10); “(the surface) ceases to exist through connection, disconnection, difference in shapes, and intersections” (*Taʿl.*, 74.10→ *Il.*, 113.6–7) “in surface there is a consideration which [renders it] a limit and a consideration which [renders it] a measure” (*Taʿl.*, 74.14→ *Il.*, 112.3); “it is possible to hypothesize³⁰ for the point a contiguity that transfers [from place to place]” (*Taʿl.*, 74.22→ *Il.*, 115.6–7); “If contiguity ceases through motion the point will not remain, and neither the line of which the point is a starting point” (*Taʿl.*, 74.27–8→ *Il.*, 115.10–1). Also the affirmation, occurring twice (*Taʿl.*, 73.20 and 75.1), that the point is a quality in the line, in a similar way as “squareness” is a quality, can be directly linked with a specific passage in *Il.*, i.e., 116.7–9. Finally, the idea that every measure has a specific position (*waḍʿ ḥāṣṣ*) might have been inspired by *Il.*, 114.16. Specific to *Taʿl.* seem to be the insistence on the fact that the point, in spite of its not being a measure, has a position, and the comparison between point/line and now/time.

(28) p. 75.4–8: the quiddity of number. *Il.*, III, 5 forms the source of inspiration. “What is meant by number is that which has discrete [components] and contains a one” reproduces literally *Il.*, 123.13. “Ten (*ʿašrīya*), then, in being ten, does not divide into two tens, each of them being a ten, i.e., having the property of being ten” is in turn an almost literal quotation from *Il.*, 120.9–10. The idea that the first number is not composed and has not a half can be related to *Il.*, 123.3–4.

(29) pp. 75.9–76.19: the exact nature of relation.³¹ A large part of the passage (*Taʿl.*, 75.9–76.7) reveals to be a summarizing paraphrase of a

²⁹ Marmura, *Avicenna, The Metaphysics*, 393, n. 9, insists that *dāt* in this context means “entity” rather than “essence”.

³⁰ Badawī reads *yaʿriḍu*, reading also present in MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 53v, but Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Taʿlīqāt*, ed. al-ʿUbaydī, 86, § 41, in full accordance with *Il.*, presents the reading *yafriḍu* (the confusion between both verbs occurs often).

³¹ For Avicenna’s conception of relation, see H. Zghal, “La relation chez Avicenne,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 16 (2006), 237–86; see also Jos Decorte, “Avicenna’s Ontology of Relation: A Source of Inspiration to Henry of Ghent,” in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, eds. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 2002), 202–6.

major part of the chapter on relation in *Il.*, i.e., III, 10, 154.9–160. It has something of a patchwork, which includes many literal, or almost literal derivations (parts of 154.9–10, 11–2, 15–6; 155.1–2; 156.14; 157.15–158.3; 158.8–9; 159.8–9, 13–4). The final part of the exposé of *Ta'l.* puts a particular accent—but one fully in line with Ibn Sīnā's doctrine in *Il.*—on the fact that two relative beings are not identical in existence, even if their quiddity is intellectually apprehended in relation to one another.

(30) p. 80.19–24: God has no genus and there is no reason for His action.³² This passage seems to have its ultimate support in *Il.* VIII, 4, 348.6–8. *Ta'l.* specifies that God is a unique Being, purely intellectual and that His action is due to His essence, not to any request.

(31) p. 83.1–3: (psychological) motion is either intellectual or imaginary, and in the latter case becomes either haphazard or trivial, a very brief summary of *Il.*, VI, 5, 286.3–287.3.

(32) pp. 84.11–29 and 85.2–86.12:³³ the link between the agent cause and origination, *ḥudūt*. *Il.*, VI, 1, and VI, 2, constitute the source of inspiration. It is stated that origination is an accidental qualification of a thing, not the cause of its existence (otherwise non-being would be a cause) (260.5–11 and 262.15–6); that the real cause of existence is an agent, who cannot be receptive to his action or to the existence it is giving (259.11–12); that the being of an originated thing is after a non-being is necessary (*ḍarūriyyan*) (260.14); that the notion 'originated' signifies that a thing has existence after non-existence (*aysa ba'da laysa*), either temporally or not (266.17–267.2—partly almost literal); that what is originated always needs always a cause (261.5–262.5, summarized and 263.17–8). *Ta'l.* adds with a particular emphasis that temporal priority is not the cause of the link of the originated things with their cause, and that in this sense the Necessary Being is the cause of the Universe according to an essential, not a temporal priority (time itself not being originated).

(33) p. 98.6–14: the cause of sublunary elemental bodies is Intellect, but multiplicity in them is moreover due to celestial motions. The

³² One has to read *limaya* with MS Aya Sophia 2390f. 57r and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'līqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 300, § 325, instead of *kammiya*. This reading is moreover confirmed by Ibn Sīnā, *al-Mubāḥaṭāt*, ed. M. Bidārfar (Qom, 1992), 305, § 853, but regarding the status of this passage in the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, see Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition*, 247, note 115.

³³ The passage 84.29–85.1 is in all likelihood an accidental insertion.

whole passage reveals to be a free rewording of *Il.*, IX, 5, 410.5–411.4. With *Il.* (410.5; 411.3; 410.12–3, and 15–6) *Ta'īl.* partakes the ideas that elemental bodies are generable and corruptible, that there is a general and a particular influence; that what causes a genus or a species in the material world, does not cause directly individuals; and that there is a participation of the celestial movements in the generation of these beings. With *Il.* (410.15), it also affirms that the ultimate cause of the generation is an Intellect, but, contrary to it, it does not specify this latter as being identical with the Intellect, which is close to us, i.e., the Agent Intellect.

(34) p. 98.14–8:³⁴ a triple way of understanding is concomitant to the Higher Intellects. This is a well-known Avicennian doctrine. *Il.*, IX, 4, 405.17–406.4 forms its immediate source.

(35) pp. 100.5–101.5: from the One only one emanates, an idea essential in *Il.*, IX, 4. The first caused thing, having to be utterly one, is a pure Intellect, hence not a material form or something material (404.4–11). *Ta'īl.* adds that there is for us no way to understand why other beings necessarily follow from the First, this implying no multiplicity nor intention in His essence, as is the case with our actions (this might have been inspired by 403.9–15). It is furthermore stressed that the possibility of the first caused being is not by something else, but belongs to its own essence (403.15–7), and that the necessary being is one in all respects (403.14–5). Moreover, *Ta'īl.* pronounces the famous principle “Ex uno nisi unum” (in terms almost identical to 406.6) and affirms that the first emanated being is possible in itself, and necessary by the First (406.1–2). It has to be noted that at the end, it strongly distinguishes between the possibility of the first Intellect and that proper to sublunary bodies, a remark that is absent in *Il.*, at least in the present context.

(36) pp. 101.6–102.22: celestial spheres, their nature and their perfection. Inspired by *Il.*, IX, 3, the following major ideas are developed: the goodness of the spheres is the cause of the goodness of what emanates from them, but it does not imply a search for auto-perfection (396.11–397.2);³⁵ celestial spheres seek for a natural, not a specific place

³⁴ In view of MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 68r and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 329, § 396, a new paragraph starts with the word *al-awwal* on line 14 of Badawī's edition.

³⁵ In the wording of *Ta'liqāt*, it is unambiguously said that the very fact of ‘intending’ the goodness of what is lower would constitute a deficiency. This confirms the explanation offered by Marmura, *Avicenna, The Metaphysics*, 419, note 2.

and position, otherwise their motion would be compulsory (399.15–8—note that *Ta'l.*, 101.15–6 is almost identical to *Il.*, 399.16–7);³⁶ the celestial spheres move for a rational end,³⁷ i.e., to imitate a separate intellect that belongs specifically to it and intellectually apprehends the First Good (399.17–401.7—*Ta'l.* insists moreover that this intellectual apprehension is not instrumental but from the very essence); the imitation of the First is a basic intention, while the emanation of lower existents is a second intention (397.11–2) celestial motion is akin to permanence, and, as such, already a perfection in itself (398.1–8); perfection of celestial spheres is not related to God's own perfection, but to the imitation of Him (497.11–9), since 'the good bestows the good but not by way of intent' (= 396.11–2); and, finally, since the celestial souls have the imitation of the First as a common intention they act according to one order (as far as I can see, no direct correspondence to this is present in *Il.*).

(37) pp. 106.27–107.2: liberality, contrary to moral actions, is free of any motive. This passage is in close agreement with *Il.*, VI, 5, 298.15–8 (*Ta'l.*, 107.1–2 is almost literally identical with *Il.*, 298.15–7).

(38) p. 107.23–5: celestial spheres are perfect, except with respect to position and place. These lines offer a paraphrase of *Il.*, IX, 2, 389.13–390.3).

(39) pp. 108.26–109.8: infinity of generated individuals. By way of a paraphrase of *Il.*, VI, 5, 289.16–291.3, it is stated that the essential end of this infinity is not the individual, but the species.

(40) pp. 115.18–116.29: God knows particular things in a creative and universal manner by means of their causes. One easily detects a direct inspiration from *Il.*, VIII, 6, 359.3–361.7. Contrary to us, humans, who know even universal phenomena as e.g., eclipses only in a changeable way (360.11–361.7), God knows universally everything, since he knows the principles of all beings (359.15–6). Related to their causes, He knows out of His essence individual states, moments and places of the things to which the causes lead (360.1–2) (but *Ta'l.* insists that this does not imply any change in Him). In this sense, God intellectually apprehends each individual eclipse (360.1–5). However, a thing to

³⁶ Note that on line 17 of Badawī's edition one has in all likelihood to add after the word *aynan* the expression *wa-waḍ'an maḥṣūṣan*, as confirmed both by MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 70r and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 349, § 452.

³⁷ In view of the context as well as Ibn Sīnā, *aṣ-Ṣifā', Ilāhiyāt*, 401.6 and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 350, § 455 one has to read on line 23 of Badawī's edition *li-ḡarḍ* instead of *li-'araḍ*.

which one points (*mušār ilayhi*) cannot be intellectually apprehended, but only sensed or imagined (359.9–11), unless it is unique in its species, as, for example, the sun (360.8–9). *Ta'l.*, 116.22–9, concludes that God's knowledge is not related to the existing things but to His essence, hence is creative (also the human being possesses a creative knowledge, e.g., the planning of an house before its construction—this example might have been inspired by *Il.*, VIII, 7, 363.7–8).

(41) p. 117.1–24: God's being "living". Based on *Il.*, VIII, 7, it is affirmed that "living" means "apprehending" and "acting" (368.5–6); that in God knowledge and will are identical (367.8); that God wills essentially the order of the good which is not incompatible with His essence (366, 6–8); that knowledge implies a being pure of matter (368.1–2) and that God's attributes are to be understood relationally and/or negatively (367.12–5). While only very briefly referred to in *Il.*, i.e., 366.11, *Ta'l.*, on the contrary, pays particular attention to the difference between divine and human will.

(42) pp. 119.3–120.16: corruptible beings cannot be intellectually apprehended. The whole passage can be related to *Il.* VIII, 6, 359.7–361.7. The first two lines offer a literal quotation from *Il.*, VIII, 6, 359.7–8 (but containing an explicative insertion). In what follows, one detects many other derivations: the changeable particular being can only be sensed or imagined (359.9–10); an individual eclipse can be object of sensation in us, but not in God (361.1–7); a dispersed particular being cannot be intellectually apprehended, but only a being that is unique in its species (360.8–10); God knows in an universal manner at once His essence and what is concomitant to it (359.15–360.3) (*Ta'l.*, 119.27–120.1, emphasizes in an additional remark that this concomitancy has to be conceived as being inside, not outside the divine essence). The final paragraph repeats the essential ideas by way of what may be qualified as a direct paraphrase of *Il.*, 360.1–10 (including literal, or almost literal quotations: *Ta'l.*, 120.3 → *Il.*, 360.4; *Ta'l.*, 120.7 → *Il.*, 360.5; and *Ta'l.*, 120.11–2 → *Il.*, 360.8–9).

(43) pp. 124.23–125.18: God's intelligible relation to the Universe is a specific active relation. The whole shows several affinities with *Il.*, VIII, 7, 362.17–365.7: things emanate from God as intelligibles (363.2); God's knowledge of things does not follow their existence, but is included in that of His own essence (363.5–9); the divine knowledge includes the knowledge of the manner in which the good comes to be in all things (363.10—in this context, God is called pure intellect and pure good—both names being present in *Il.*, VIII, 6, 356.16 and 12);

the distinction between being intellectually apprehended by an intellect and being intellectually apprehended by the soul (364.4—but *Ta'l.* specifies that the former implies simplicity, while the latter involves a change); God's intellectual relation to the intelligibles is not a relation to the way how they exist (364.7, almost literal),³⁸ since he intellects Himself as being their principle because it is of His nature that all existence emanates from Him (364.12—*Ta'l.* stresses in a particular way that the concerned relation has to be characterized as active, not at all as receptive).

(44) pp. 128.17–129.3: the final cause (*al-ġāya*). The passage includes different elements inspired by *Il.*, VI, 5, i.e., the priority in “thingness”³⁹ of the final cause over the other causes (292.6–10 and 293.8–10); the not being caused of the final cause by one of the other causes (293.12–3); the distinction between ends that are a form or an accident in a patient and those which are not (294.8–15 and 295.8–15—*Ta'l.* adds in an outspoken way that a form can in some cases be identical with the end (maybe based on 295.11–2?), whereby the example given of health seems to have been taken from *Il.*, VI, 4, 282.13).

(45) pp. 132.24–133.5: two beings necessary in themselves cannot co-exist together. The fragment highly summarizes the long argument developed in *Il.*, I, 6, 39.17–42.1.

(46) pp. 134.6–135.20: generated individuals cannot be a proper cause because the latter presupposes an essential priority over what is caused. At the background of the exposé, one easily detects *Il.*, VI, 3. There is the emphasis on the essential priority of the cause (266.15–267.10—highly summarized in *Ta'l.*), the absence of any existential or intentional equality between cause and effect, contrary to what is the case with generated individuals (269.17–270.10), and the clear affirmation that the two species of cause and effect have to be different (270.14–8). But *Ta'l.* also insists that one individual fire cannot be the cause of the existence of another individual fire, which seems to be in contradiction with *Il.*, 271.5, where it is said that “this fire” can be the cause of “that fire.” Since *Ta'l.* develops a long argumentation

³⁸ My interpretation of this line differs substantially from Marmura, *Avicenna, The Metaphysics*, 292. 26–8, but is in full accordance with the specification given by *Ta'l.*, 125.7: “i.e., the relation of the Creator to these intelligibles.”

³⁹ For the notion of thingness in Ibn Sīnā, see Th.-A. Druart, “Res as Concomitant of Being,” *Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione Filosofica Arabe* 12 (2001), 125–42 and R. Wisnowsky, “Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10 (2002), 181–221.

in order to show that this kind of causal actions of particular beings, which are not unique in their species, is impossible, the negation is clearly not due to a scribal error. But it is on the other hand striking that being cause is defined in the present context as being essential cause (*Ta'l.*, 134.25) and that it is said that the “nature” of a given fire cannot be the cause for the “nature” of another given fire (135.12). So, one may wonder whether *wuğūd* in the present context is not rather referring to the “very being” than to the “existence” of the other fire?⁴⁰ As to the idea that the Necessary Being is the ultimate cause of everything (*Ta'l.*, 135.6) it can be related to *Il.*, 278.5–6. However, one looks in *Il.* in vain for the affirmation that the Giver of Forms is the agent cause of the first individual fire, which on his turn becomes the auxiliary cause for the second individual one, and so on (*Ta'l.*, 135.18–20). It is however striking that the first individual fire is here qualified as the auxiliary cause for the existence of the second. This strongly suggests that the above evoked affirmation of *Il.*, 271.5 regarding the possibility that a particular fire is cause of another particular one, remains in fact valid.

(47) pp. 152.18–157.5: the guiding idea is that God knows causes and effects in a single act of intellection and, unsurprisingly, incorporates several elements of, or, at least, inspired by *Il.*, VIII, 7: the characterization of God as a simple intellect (*al-'aql al-basīt*) that intellectually apprehends all things at once (362.17–363.1) according to an order of cause and caused thing (365.7); the identity of the existence of things emanated out of God with their being intellectually apprehended by Him (363.2–4); the qualification of the order of the intelligibles to God as purely intellectual relation, not obtaining in whichever way they happen to exist (364.7–9, all almost literally quoted, but with small interpolations); the affirmation that the emanation of what is concomitant to His essence is His intellectually apprehending it (366.5–7); the absence of a faculty of soul or intellect in God's self-knowledge, which is the principle of the existence of the things (see supra, *qawluhū* 155.1–2); the need to avoid the tautology that God intellectually apprehends things because they come to exist and that they come to exist because He intellectually apprehends them (see supra, *qawluhū* 155.18–9). There does exist a long addition (154.2–155.1) that somehow repeats

⁴⁰ The Arabic word *wuğūd* is in this respect fundamentally ambiguous. It has to be noted that Ibn Sīnā in the *Dāneš-Nāmeḥ*, clearly distinguishes between *wuğūd*, existence and *ḥastī*, being.

ideas already expressed, but nevertheless is not devoid of any significance since it explains into great detail God's being a simple intellect. It specifies above all that God does not know twice His essence, i.e., once as being in itself, and once as being the principle of the existent things (only our limited human intellect distinguishes between these two aspects of the one divine essence). At the end (156.4–157.5), two possible objections are refuted:

The first (156.4–5) is related to God's knowledge of things: is He knowing them before their existence, while they are in a state of non-being, or at the very moment of their existence so that His knowledge derives from their existence? In the reply, the familiar ideas are formulated that God's knowledge of them is identical with their realization and that it is out of His essence, its concomitants, and the concomitants of its concomitants, in other words according to an order of cause and effect;

The second (156.13–4) wonders whether God can know that there is an outside existence facing His knowledge, given that this latter is out of His essence? Based on the fact that God's knowledge is according to a causal order of concomitants, it is pointed out that "outside existence" is one of the concomitants of things and it is once more stressed that the divine knowledge is utterly simple, implying no repetition whatsoever. Regarding this latter aspect, it is stated that God knows each essence—essences being limited, finite, whereas relations are infinite—at once with all the implied relations, being in no need to know in a first moment one relation, and in second another one.⁴¹ This may be compared to our knowledge of someone by different attributes (son of x, long, etc.), although in our case, contrary to that of God, there is a multiplication of relations.

(48) p. 157.6–23: on divine providence as the auto-intellection of God that emanates the order of the good. A basic inspiration undoubtedly comes from *Il.*, IX, 6, 415.3–7, but *Ta'l.* adds that God also loves Himself, which at once expresses that all things are willed by an unchanging will⁴² (*Il.*, VIII, 7, 363.14–7 might have inspired this idea). Moreover, *Ta'l.* stresses that the divine providence regarding things

⁴¹ Instead of *fa-yaḥtāju* in Badawī's edition (156.26) one has to read *fa-lā yaḥtāju* with MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 87r and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 270, § 273.

⁴² Also in the present case, Badawī's edition (p. 157.11) has to be corrected: *wa-lā irāda* instead of *fa-l-irāda*, as attested in both MS Aya Sophia 2390, f. 87r and Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb at-Ta'liqāt*, ed. al-'Ubaydī, 302, § 330.

is the providence as present in His essence, whereas the ‘providence’ of the celestial spheres toward the sublunary beings consists in imitating the First (maybe inspired by *Il.*, IX, 3, 393.16–394.4).

(49) p. 166.1–5: attributes in God are negative or relational. *Il.*, VIII, 7, 367.13–4, inspires the basic idea. The basic affirmation is exemplified by the notion of God’s being one, which has to be understood negatively as expressing the absence of a companion to Him (367.17–8).

It is hoped that the present survey, in spite of possible lacunae, clearly shows that many pages of the *Ta’līqāt* are intimately linked with the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā’*. From the doctrinal point of view, they certainly do not contain very innovative ideas. Nevertheless, they show up interesting elements of emphasis as well as useful explanations. But it has to be noted above all that most of them concern what Gutas has called the “natural theology” of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, which mainly includes the study of the First Principle and of cosmology, while largely disregarding the part labeled by him as the “metaphysics of the rational soul.”⁴³ Striking as well is that a same idea is several times repeated, but each time the wording shows up to be somewhat different. This is obvious in the case of the fragments 115.18–116.29 and 119.3–120.16, which both relate to almost the very same part of chapter six of book eight, but nevertheless are quite different on the level of expression. Finally, there are many indications that the very text of the *Ilāhīyāt* of the *Šifā’* was not carefully checked, but rather quoted by heart, a fact that strongly confirms the same conclusion arrived at when discussing the “quotations.” Hence, I believe that one definitely can exclude the hypothesis of marginal notes to a copy of the *Ilāhīyāt*. For the same reason one may almost certainly exclude to consider these fragments as parts of a larger commentary by a (first or second generation) disciple, all the more at the doctrinal level one has overlapping parts. All this is certainly not enough to attribute the text once and for all to Ibn Sīnā himself, but it suffices in my view not to exclude this possibility.⁴⁴ So, it becomes somewhat more likely that it, or, at least, parts of it, were part of the *Lawāḥiq*, Appendices, a possibility already evoked by Gutas years ago.⁴⁵

⁴³ Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 238–61.

⁴⁴ Let me stress however that even if one accepts the attribution to Ibn Sīnā, it remains an open question whether he has intended the concerned fragments for publication.

⁴⁵ Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 142.

THE INVENTION OF ALGEBRA IN ZABĪD: BETWEEN LEGEND AND FACT

David A. King

Zabid...is said to be the birthplace of algebra.*

And in Zabid, almost a millennium ago, the scholar Ahmad abu Musa al-Jaladi dazzled students from the new enquiring world of Islam with the resurrected intricacies of 'al-Jabr' or algebra.**

Ces légendes ne méritent pas qu'on s'y arrête.***

Currently over 400 websites contain a statement to the effect that algebra was "invented" in Zabid. You will also hear this if you go there, as I heard it several times during a visit to the Yemen in 1974. Inevitably no sources are cited in any of these statements; one is merely confronted with the information in a single sentence. One website, however, the second of the two cited above, relates a connection to one "Ahmad Abu Musa al-Jaladi" and refers to a book that he wrote on the subject. This individual, with his dubious name, is unknown to the scholarly literature on the history of mathematics; nevertheless, when we correct his name, we can identify him and pinpoint the source of that particular legend.

Over 100 surviving Yemeni astronomical and mathematical manuscripts and two surviving Yemeni astrolabes attest to continued interest in the exact sciences in the Yemen from the time of the famous scholar al-Hamdānī in the 10th century until the 19th and even the 20th century.¹ Various Rasūlid Sultans (13th–15th centuries) were

* From the article on Zabid in the Hutchinson Encyclopedia, access by <http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/Zabid>.

** Erlend Clouston, "Lost in the Desert", in *The Guardian* (Sept. 1, 2001), access by www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2001/sep/01/yemen.guardiansaturdaytravelsection.

*** R. Rashed, *al-Khwārizmī, Le commencement de l'algèbre—texte établi, traduction, commentaire* (Paris: Albert Blanchard, 2007), 5.

¹ The manuscripts are surveyed in D. King, *Mathematical Astronomy in Medieval Yemen* (Malibu, CA: Undena, 1983). Mathematical manuscripts are treated in an appendix there. These sources are of interest to the history of science not least because some of them contain earlier Iraqi and Egyptian material not preserved in its original form. On the two Yemeni astrolabes, one made by the Rasūlid Sultān al-Ašraf himself, see King, *In Synchrony with the Heavens, Studies in Astronomical*

themselves seriously interested in the sciences, particularly in astronomy, as witnessed by their imposing works on the subject. Nevertheless, algebra was certainly not invented in Zabīd, an important centre of learning particularly in Rasūlid times,² but at least in the 13th century there was a surge of interest in it there, marked by the appearance of a substantial treatise on the subject by a local scholar named al-Ḥuzāʿī (see below). An interest in both serious arithmetic and the algebra of inheritance in the Yemen is attested already by two popular treatises of Abū Yaʿqūb Ishāq ibn Yūsuf aṣ-Ṣardaḡī (d. 504/1111).³ Yemeni interest in algebra was not on account of the delights of solving quadratic equations, but rather because of the complicated algebra involved in the application of Islamic inheritance laws.⁴

A connection between algebra and Zabīd seems to be nowhere documented in the scholarly literature, save for a short article that I published in 1988 and which presents evidence of a connection that is not quite what proponents of the legend would be seeking.⁵ I now feel that that study needs to be resurrected and brought up to date, not least on account of potential interest in the subject.

It is generally assumed that Abū ʿĀfar Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Ḥwārizmī in Baġdād (d. 235/849–50) was the first to write in Arabic on the subject of algebra, although, in fact, Greek and Indian algebra were already considerably more advanced than early Islamic algebra.⁶ The earliest known Islamic works on algebra are indeed those of

Timekeeping and Instrumentation in Medieval Islamic Civilization, 2 vols., (Leiden: Brill, 2004–05), XIVa.

² See the article “Zabīd” by Noha Sadek in EI2, vol. 11, 370.

³ King, *Mathematical Astronomy in Yemen*, 53–4 (no. A1). His treatise on arithmetic is studied in U. Rebstock, “The Kitāb al-Kāfi fī Mukhtaṣar (al-Ḥisāb) al-Hindī of aṣ-Ṣardaḡī,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften* 13 (1999–2000), 189–204.

⁴ See S. Gandz, “The Algebra of Inheritance,” *Osiris* 5 (1938), 319–91; the article “Farāʿid” by Th. G. Juynboll in EI2, vol. 2, 783; and U. Rebstock, *Rechnen im islamischen Orient, Die literarischen Spuren der praktischen Rechenkunst* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992).

⁵ D. King, “A Medieval Arabic Report on Algebra before al-Khwārizmī,” *Al-Masāq—Studia Arabo-Islamica Mediterranea* 1 (1988), 25–32. (The curious punctuation in that article was inserted by the editors.)

⁶ On early Islamic algebra see Willy Hartner’s article “Al-Djabr wa-ʿl muḳābala” in EI2, vol. 2, 360, and the sources there cited, especially Ruska, “Zur ältesten arabischen Algebra und Rechenkunst,” *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-hist. Kl. (Heidelberg: Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1917, S. Gandz, “The Sources of al-Khowarizmi’s Algebra,” *Osiris* 1 (1936), 263–77, and id., “The Origin and Development of the Quadratic Equations in Babylonian, Greek and Early Arabic Algebra,” *Osiris* 3 (1938), 405–557. A survey of the problem

al-Ḥwārizmī⁷ and his contemporary Ibn Turk,⁸ both dating from the first half of the 9th century, and there is as yet no direct evidence of any Muslim activity in this field before that time. In 1975 Fuat Sezgin argued, with considerable justification, that there was a tradition of Islamic algebra that developed before the time of al-Ḥwārizmī and Ibn Turk;⁹ I would agree with this, though I concede that positive evidence is still lacking.

A medieval Arabic report purports to place the beginnings of Islamic algebra in the early 7th century. Here I propose simply to present the text of the report together with a translation and to make some preliminary observations on its veracity. The report was first found in an anonymous commentary on the *Algebra* of al-Ḥwārizmī, partially extant in a Yemeni manuscript copied around 1600 and preserved in Hyderabad (MS Salar Jung 2178-mathematics 20).¹⁰

of the early history of Islamic algebra is in Fuat Sezgin, *GAS*, V, 28 and 228–38; see also the useful studies by A. Anboubā, “L’algèbre arabe aux IX^e et X^e siècles : aperçu general,” *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* (Aleppo) 2:1 (1978), 66–100, and G. Saliba, “The Meaning of al-jabr wa-’l-muqābala,” *Centaurus* 17 (1972–73), 189–204, and, most recently, R. Rashed, *al-Khwārizmī, Le commencement de l’algèbre, texte établi, traduction, commentaire* (Paris: Albert Blanchard, 2007).

⁷ On al-Ḥwārizmī and his works see the penetrating study by Gerald Toomer in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, 14 vols. and 2 supp. vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970–80), q.v., and the EI2 article “al-Kh^wārazmī, Abū Dja’far,” vol. 4, 1096, by Juan Vernet. On the algebra of inheritance as dealt with by al-Ḥwārizmī see Gandz, “The Algebra of Inheritance,” (see note 4). Some minor astronomical works associated with him and rediscovered in the 1980s are described in D. King, *Al-Khwārizmī and New Trends in Mathematical Astronomy in the Ninth Century*, Occasional Papers on the Near East, no. 2 (New York: Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, 1983), with detailed studies now in F. Charette and P. Schmidl, “Al-Khwārizmī and Practical Astronomy in Ninth-Century Baghdad, The Earliest Extant Corpus of Texts in Arabic on the Astrolabe and Other Portable Instruments,” *SCIAMVS* 5 (2004), 101–98; see also King, *In Synchrony with the Heavens*, (see note 1), I, 233–5, II, 213–8 and 240–6. On the manuscript sources for his treatise on algebra see Sezgin, *GAS*, V, 240 and 401, and VII, 404, to which add the sources in King’s review of Sezgin, *GAS*, V in “Notes on the Sources for the History of Early Islamic Mathematics,” *JAOS* 99 (1979), 450–9, at 455 (the two manuscripts preserved in Medina are available on microfilm at the Institute of Arabic Manuscripts in Cairo; nos. 173 and 174 of manuscripts microfilmed in Saudi Arabia). We have already mentioned Roshdi Rashed’s new edition and French translation of al-Ḥwārizmī’s *Algebra*. The influence of his work in the Islamic world, particularly in the field of the algebra of inheritance, perhaps still needs to be studied. Judging by the Hejazi and Yemeni provenance of many of the available copies, it was in these regions that his work was most influential, this mainly because of his treatment of inheritance.

⁸ On Ibn Turk see Sezgin, *GAS*, V, 241–2, and the 1962 edition of his algebra by Aydın Sayılı.

⁹ Sezgin, *GAS*, V, 28–9.

¹⁰ The first page of the anonymous commentary is contained on fol. 2r, copied in an elegant *nashī* hand ca. 1600; the remainder of the manuscript from fols. 2v to 52r

A second manuscript containing the same text (MS Istanbul Yeni Cami 803) is attributed to the 13th-century Yemeni scholar Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Ḥuzā'ī.¹¹ I have no biographical information of any consequence on al-Ḥuzā'ī save that he lived in Ḡibla, was in charge of the local government (*walā dīwān al-miḥlāfa*), and died in Zabīd in 680/1281–82.¹² His commentary on the *Algebra* of al-Ḥwārizmī is also extant in MS Istanbul Şehit 2706, 6, which I have not consulted (MS Oxford Hunt. 214, 3 should also be checked). Further investigation into all the Yemeni commentaries on al-Ḥwārizmī's *Algebra* would be worthwhile.

The extent to which the report can be regarded as historical is, and will remain, a matter of debate, since it involves the Imām 'Alī (r. 35–40/656–61),¹³ the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muḥammad, about whom not a few fabulous legends have been related, especially amongst the Šī'ites.¹⁴

appears to be a fragment from the same work, copied in a different hand but also datable ca. 1600, but this could only be established with certainty by comparing the text with the manuscripts of al-Ḥuzā'ī's commentary preserved in Istanbul and Cairo: see note 12 below.

¹¹ Rashed, *al-Khwārizmī*, (see note 6), 3–4.

¹² All available information on al-Ḥuzā'ī is in H. Suter, "Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke," *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der mathematischen Wissenschaften* 10 (1900) [repr. Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1982], no. 367; 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Ḥibšī, *Maṣādir al-fikr al-'arabī al-islāmī fi l-Yaman* (Sanaa: Markaz ad-Dirāsāt al-Yamaniya, 1979), 492 (with biographical references); King, *Mathematical Astronomy in Medieval Yemen*, (see note 1), Appendix, no. 3 on pp. 54–5; and B. A. Rosenfeld & E. İhsanoğlu, *Mathematicians, Astronomers and Other Scholars of Islamic Civilisation and their Works (7th–19th C.)* (Istanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 2003) [hereafter MAIC], no. 604 on p. 211. His writings on algebra are also preserved in MSS Istanbul Şehit 2706,6 and Cairo Ṭal'at maḡāmī' 207, 4, copied in 734/1333–34. On the latter, a fragment not dealing with algebra *per se* but only with inheritance problems, see my *A Survey of the Scientific Manuscripts in the Egyptian National Library* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1985) [hereafter *Cairo Survey*], no. E6 on pp. 131–2; also n. 22 below. Another Yemeni manuscript that has come to my attention recently is MS Oxford Bodleian Hunt. 214, copied in 743/1342–43: it contains the following works: (a) al-Ḥwārizmī's *Algebra*; (b) the *Muqaddima* on arithmetic of al-Ḥuzā'ī; (c) an anonymous *Kitāb al-Murāsala fi l-ḡabr wa-l-muqābala*; and (d) *al-Muqaddima al-kāfiya fi uṣūl al-ḡabr wa-l-muqābala* by Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad.

¹³ On 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, see the article by L. Vecchia Vaglieri in EI2. For some Šī'ite views on him see the articles in *Shiite Encyclopedia*, ed. Hasan al-Amin (Beirut, 1968), I, 96–208, and III, 5–193.

¹⁴ Sezgin, GAS, VII, 8 and 260, mentions some astrological material attributed to 'Alī. The following additional material has come to my attention, and readers should bear in mind that this cannot be exhaustive. (1) A short treatise on the geographical climates in MS Cairo Ṭal'at miqāt 72, 2, fols. 14r–15. (2) a rule for finding the *notae* of the beginnings of the Muslim months in MS Cairo Taymūr riyāda 321, 1, p. 1. Both

It is doubtless significant that al-Ḥwārizmī did not relate this story himself in his *Algebra*; in the introduction to his work he mentioned none of his sources, stating only that he had been encouraged to write the treatise by the ‘Abbāsid Caliph al-Ma’mūn (r. 189–218/813–833). However, in his introduction to his treatise (MS Hyderabad, fol. 2v and MS Istanbul, fol. 1v)¹⁵ al-Ḥuzā’ī remarks:

حدَّثني الفقيه الأجلّ أبو بكر ابن محمد اليفرشي بزبيد قال يروى أنّ
قوماً من فارس وصلوا في خلافة عمر بن الخطّاب بعلم الجبر والمقابلة
فأشار علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه على عمر بأن يجري لهم نفقة من
بيت المال ويعلمون الناس فأجابه إلى ذلك فيروى أنّ علياً رضي الله
عنه أدرك ما معهم من الجبر والمقابلة في خمسة أيّام ثم كان الناس بعد
ذلك يتداولون هذا العلم بالسنتهم من غير أن يوضع في كتاب حتى
انتهت الخلافة إلى المأمون وقد اندرس على الناس فذكر ذلك للمأمون
فسأل عن من له خبرة بذلك فلم يوجد من له خبرة غير الشيخ أبي
بكر محمد بن موسى الخوارزمي فطلب منه المأمون وضع كتاب في الجبر
والمقابلة ليحي به ما درس منه فأجاب إلى وضع هذا الكتاب ليقيد به
أصول الجبر والمقابلة ويقاس عليه ...

these manuscripts were copied ca. 1900. Each is featured in *Cairo Survey*, no. B1 on p. 31, and the second is illustrated in pl. XLIVa on p. 264 with a caption on p. 205. (3) In the treatise on folk astronomy *Kitāb al-Yawāqīt fī ‘ilm al-mawāqīt* by the 13th-century Yemeni astronomer Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Ġanādī al-Aṣḥabī. There are numerous references to ‘Alī and astronomy; see Petra Schmidl, *Volkstümliche Astronomie im islamischen Mittelalter, Zur Bestimmung der Gebetszeiten und der Qibla bei al-Aṣḥabī Ibn Raḥīq und al-Fārisī*, 2 vols. (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2007), II, 408. For example, a series of shadow lengths at different times of the year in Basra is attributed to him—see also King, *In Synchrony with the Heavens*, I, 477. (4) In the same work a pronouncement linking the ‘aṣr prayer to the beginning of the 10th seasonal hour of daylight is attributed to ‘Alī—see also King, *ib.*, I, 477, 480 and 555. (5) The Indian mathematician ‘Iṣmat Allāh ibn ‘Aẓamat Allāh Saharanpūrī (fl. ca. 1650) in his commentary on the *Ḥulāṣat al-ḥisāb* of Bahā’ ad-Dīn al-‘Āmilī (fl. ca. 1600) records several anecdotes that reflect ‘Alī’s ability in arithmetic. See further C.A. Storey, *Persian Literature, A Bio-Bibliographical Survey*, 5 vols. (London 1958, repr. 1972), II:1, no. 24 on pp. 11–4 (commentator not specifically mentioned), and M.G. Zubaid Ahmad, *The Contribution of India to Arabic Literature* (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1946, repr. 1967), 159–60.

¹⁵ See also Rashed, *al-Kwārizmī*, 4, on the text that appears in MS Istanbul Yeni Cami 803, fol. 1v. But for minor variants, Rashed’s version of the text is identical to the one that I reproduce here, except that the former begins with the word *yrwā*, thus omitting the source of the legend.

The most venerable legal scholar Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad al-Yafrāʾī told me in Zabīd [the following story]: It is related that a group of people from [the province of] Fārs with a knowledge of algebra arrived during the caliphate of ʿUmar ibn al-Ḥaṭṭāb. ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib—may God be pleased with him—suggested to ʿUmar that a payment from the treasury be made to them and that they should teach [this subject to] the people, and ʿUmar consented to that. It is related that ʿAlī—may God be pleased with him—learned the algebra they knew in five days. Thereafter, the people transmitted this knowledge orally without it being recorded in any book, until the caliphate reached al-Maʾmūn and the knowledge of algebra had become extinguished amongst the people. Al-Maʾmūn was informed of this and he made inquiries after someone who had experience in [algebra]. The only person who had [such] experience was the Ṣayḥ Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Ḥwārizmī, so al-Maʾmūn asked him to write a book on algebra to restore what had been lost of [the subject]. [Al-Ḥwārizmī] consented to write such a book in order to record the foundations of algebra and to be taken as a model.

ʿAlī visited the Yemen in the year 9/630–31, and during the caliphate of ʿUmar (13–23/634–644) he was active mainly in Mecca and Medina. It was probably in one of these two cities that his encounter with algebra would have been supposed to have taken place.

It is worthy of note that the group of people in this story hailed from al-Fārs. This could be taken as support for the theory first proposed by S. Gandz that there existed a “native Syriac-Persian tradition” of algebra to which the Muslims were heirs.¹⁶ Of particular interest in this account is surely the statement that “the people transmitted this knowledge orally (*yataḍāwalūna ḥaḍā l-ʿilm bi-alsinatihim*) without its being recorded in any book.” However, the likelihood that the story is historical is small, and the report should not be taken seriously unless other supporting evidence turns up in some new texts.

The report is more probably a fabrication. However, although it centres on ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the story does not appear to be a Šīʿite fabrication. The fact that no such story is recorded in the 11th-century Šīʿite compilation entitled *Nahḡ al-balāḡa*, which is a collection of discourses, sermons, letters, and wise sayings attributed to ʿAlī, may indicate that it is specifically of Yemeni provenance. This notwithstanding, the individual who transmitted the story was probably not a Šīʿite. I have no information on the legal scholar (*faqīh*) Abū

¹⁶ See Gandz “The Sources of al-Khowarizmi’s Algebra,” (see note 4) and “The Origin and Development of Quadratic Equations,” (see note 6).

Bakr ibn Muḥammad al-Yafraṣī, if such was indeed his *nisba*,¹⁷ other than that he related this story to our anonymous author in Zabīd. The fact that his *kunya* was Abū Bakr suggests that he was not a Šīʿite, and the same holds for al-Ḥuzāʿī: even the Zaydis who accepted the first three caliphs rarely adopted their names.¹⁸ Also, the benediction *raḍīya Allāhu ʿanhu* for ʿAlī is Sunnite rather than Šīʿite.¹⁹ Al-Yafraṣī gives al-Ḥwārizmī's *kunya* as Abū Bakr instead of the correct Abū Gaʿfar. The confusion possibly results from the fact that there was a well-known 10th-century writer named Abū Bakr (Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAbbās) al-Ḥwārizmī (fl. Iran, d. 393/1002–03).²⁰ The same error is found, for example, on the title-pages of the Oxford manuscript of al-Ḥwārizmī's *Algebra*²¹ and of the Cairo fragment of al-Ḥuzāʿī's commentary on that work.²²

In passing we note that the theologian Ibn Taymīya (d. 728/1328)²³ stated that:

The science of *ğabr wa-l-muqābala* is an ancient science.... Certain persons relate of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib—may God be pleased with him—that he spoke concerning [algebra] and that he learned of it from a Jew. But this is a lie told about ʿAlī.

I do not doubt that there are other references to ʿAlī and algebra in the medieval literature.

Let us now return to the improbable “Ahmad abu Musa al-Jaladī” mentioned in the quote at the beginning of this paper. He is surely none other than Aḥmad ibn Mūsā ibn ʿAlī al-Gallād al-Nahli (?) al-Faraḍī, who was born in 700/1300–01 and died in 792/1390.²⁴ He

¹⁷ The orthography of this unusual *nisba* appears secure, although the copyist may be at fault.

¹⁸ I forget where I heard this, but it was not in Zabīd.

¹⁹ Ditto.

²⁰ On this al-Ḥwārizmī see the EI2 article “al-Khʿārazmī, Abū Bakr,” vol. 4, 1096, by Charles Pellat.

²¹ Illustrated Ahmed Djebbar, *L'algebre arabe, Genèse d'un art* (Paris: Vuibert and ADAPT-SNES, 2005), 24.

²² Illustrated in *Cairo Survey*, pl. LXXXVI on p. 306, with caption on p. 212.

²³ Rashed, *al-Khwārizmī*, 4, mentions this reference in passing, citing the Bombay 1949 edition (p. 256) of Ibn Taymīya's work *Fī r-Radd ʿalā l-mantiqiyīn*.

²⁴ King, *Mathematical Astronomy in the Yemen*, 55–6 (no. A5), citing O. Löfgren and R. Traini, *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana* (Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 1975), vol. 1, 143. This al-Gallād is not mentioned in MAIC. Al-Gallād means “leather worker”.

studied inheritance and arithmetic under ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Faraḍī al-Zayla‘ī, who was a student of the Imām Aḥmad ibn Mūsā al-‘Uḡayl. He is perhaps related to the Ibrāhīm ibn Mamdūd al-Ġallād who was a teacher of the Sultan al-Ašraf (r. 694–696/1295–1296) and who inspected various astrolabes made by the Sultan.²⁵ He apparently wrote on inheritance, arithmetic and geometry for the Sultan al-Ašraf Ismā‘īl (r. 778–803/1377–1400),²⁶ but only one of his works is extant, namely, *al-Muqaddima ad-durriya fī stinbāt aṣ-ṣinā‘a al-ḡabriya*, a nicely rhyming title meaning “An introductory pearl concerning the invention of the arts of algebra”. Of this work, I have seen only MS Hyderabad Osmania University Library 1549/520-J-MD, copied in 1061/1650, which fills but four folios. No other copies are mentioned in the bibliographical literature. His son ‘Alī, born in 732/1331–32, wrote on the algebra of inheritance in 30 folios.²⁷ In any case, it might be thought that one word, *istinbāt*, “invention or discovery”, in the title of the father’s work that has given rise to our legend. However, my good friend Professor Ahmed Djebbar has consulted a copy of this work in an unnumbered manuscript in the Great Mosque in Sanaa, and found something remarkable in it which is—curiously—not attested in earlier or later Arabic works on algebra.²⁸

Al-Ġallād discusses the relationship of the roots of a quadratic equation to its coefficients. What he writes is equivalent to the following (after Djebbar). Starting with two positive numbers a and b (such that $a < b$), he calculates ab , $a+b$ and $b-a$. Then he shows that:

- (1) a is the (positive) solution of the equation $x^2 + (b-a)x = ab$,
- (2) a and b are the solutions of $x^2 + ab = (b+a)x$, and
- (3) b is the (positive) solution of $x^2 = (b-a)x + ab$.

²⁵ King, *Mathematical Astronomy in the Yemen*, 27–9 (no. 8), and id., *In Synchrony with the Heavens*, II, 643–6.

²⁶ One of the Sultan’s interests was astronomy: see King, *Mathematical Astronomy in the Yemen*, 38.

²⁷ Ibid., 56 (no. A6), citing Löfgren & Traini, *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana*, 143.

²⁸ Ahmed Djebbar, “La circulation des mathématiques entre l’Orient et l’Occident musulmans: Interrogations anciennes et éléments nouveaux,” in *From China to Paris: 2000 Years Transmission of Mathematical Knowledge*, eds. Dold-Samplonius et al. (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag), 230–1, and id., *L’algèbre arabe*, (see note 21), 72 and 138.

The reader should keep in mind that these three equations are the standard forms of medieval algebra. Djebbar found traces of this kind of innovation in the independent writings of the Egyptian scholar Ibn al-Mağdī a century later, but not in other later works on algebra.²⁹ Nevertheless, in brief, it can be asserted that al-Ğallād did indeed make a modest contribution to the development of algebra even if this was not appreciated before about a decade ago.

There are several manuscripts that I have mentioned, as well as the Yemeni biographical dictionaries, which I have not pursued and which might be of use in clarifying some of the issues raised in this study.³⁰ Perhaps some younger scholar will eventually turn his or her attention to them. For sure, the legend of the invention of algebra in Zabīd is not going to go away.³¹

²⁹ Djebbar, "La circulation des mathématiques," 230–1, and id., *L'algèbre arabe*, 71–2.

³⁰ I refer to the various unstudied manuscripts mentioned in n. 12 above.

³¹ There is also a legend that the alphabet was invented in Zabīd. I am grateful to Dr. François Charette and Professor Ahmed Djebbar for useful information and for their critical comments. Any new legendary information circulated in this paper is my own responsibility.

MEDIEVAL AND MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF AVICENNA'S MODAL SYLLOGISTIC

Tony Street

Over the years there have been many attempts to understand the modal syllogistic of Avicenna (d. 428/1037). Avicenna himself modified the way he set out his syllogistic, and through the course of his career shifted on matters of substance. The early commentators responded to his works in various ways, but broadly speaking Avicennan logic was under attack by the end of the sixth/twelfth century. It only came to be widely accepted in the seventh/thirteenth century after substantial revision. The most important pro-Avicennan intervention in this process was by Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 672 /1274) in his *Solving the Problems of Pointers and Reminders*.¹

Even though Ṭūsī needs no introduction to scholars working on Arabic philosophy, it is worth noting that the way he worked in his commentary on *Pointers* gives it special value as a guide to understanding Avicenna. Ṭūsī responded to his contemporaries' attacks on Avicenna by going back over what Avicenna had to say in his other works on logic and bringing the material to bear on disputed issues in *Pointers*. Ṭūsī's distillation is probably the finest medieval interpretation of Avicenna's logic that we have.

The modern interpretation of Arabic modal syllogistic began about forty years ago, and the best contribution to the specific problem of understanding Avicenna's position on the subject is Paul Thom's "Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna's Modal Syllogistic."² At points, however, his analysis reflects the malign influence of an overview

¹ Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, *Ḥall muškilāt al-iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, at bottom of page of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Iṣārāt wa-t-tanbihāt*, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971). Henceforth I will refer to Ṭūsī's commentary and Avicenna's *Pointers* as such, and by way of the paragraph numbering of the translation in the appendix.

² P. Thom, "Logic and metaphysics in Avicenna's modal syllogistic," in *The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions*, eds. S. Rahman, T. Street, and H. Tahiri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 361–76. [Hereafter Thom (2008)]

I wrote of Avicenna's syllogistic.³ Let me first, therefore, correct a mistake I made in that study.

Throughout my description, I assumed Avicenna was setting out the same syllogistic in *Salvation*, *Syllogism* and *Pointers*.⁴ As a result, I filled in gaps and obscurities in the *Salvation* account by importing material from the other two works. I still think that all three accounts take the same syllogisms to be productive, but I no longer think that Avicenna in *Pointers* takes the same syllogisms to be perfect that he took to be so in *Salvation* and *Syllogism*. This has consequences for the way the syllogistic is developed in *Pointers*, and the nature of the proofs given. More generally, my approach to the three accounts encouraged an unwarranted mix-and-match interpretation of Avicenna's syllogistic. In his analysis of Avicenna's proofs, Thom follows such an approach.

None the less, Thom's article remains extremely valuable for a number of reasons. It begins by distinguishing carefully a logical theory's syntax and semantics from the theory's application. He notes that Avicenna's modal syllogistic includes an explicit semantics, and he offers a rendition—which he calls the combined *de dicto/de re* analysis—for the semantics of the propositions deployed in the syllogistic (a rendition which makes sense of the syllogisms Avicenna accepts and rejects). Thom concludes his paper by reflecting on the application of the theory's propositions:

We may conclude that necessity-propositions on the combined *de dicto/de re* analysis...have an application to metaphysical propositions in which the predicate is put forward as being constitutive of the subject.

Similarly, possibility propositions on the combined *de dicto/de re* reading state that it's necessary that every *j* is a possible *b*; and statements to this effect within an essentialist metaphysics state a natural or essential capacity of the subject-term. So we may also conclude that possibility-propositions on the combined *de dicto/de re* analysis have an application to metaphysical propositions in which the predicate is put forward as expressing a potentiality of the subject.⁵

As for the absolute proposition, Thom observes that Avicenna gives as an example "all who sleep wake." This states a truth about essential

³ Tony Street, "An outline of Avicenna's syllogistic," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 84 (2002), 129–160. [Hereafter Street (2002)]

⁴ *Salvation*: Avicenna, *Kitāb an-Nağāt*, ed. M. Kurdī (Cairo, 1331 AH, first edition); *Syllogism*: Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Qiyās* (from *aš-Šifā'*), ed. S. Zayed (al-Maṭba'at al-Amīriya, Cairo, 1964).

⁵ Thom (2008), 372.

accidents of animals; “[t]wo essential accidents are linked by a true absolute proposition only when those accidents are naturally alternating states.” (The absolute proposition here would be a special, or two-sided, absolute: “all who sleep are awake at least once and not awake at least once.”) Thom goes on to note that statements of natural contingency (“every man goes grey”) and statements of final causality (“every man makes distinctions”) in Aristotelian metaphysics could also be given as true absolute propositions (though in this case, as general or one-sided absolutes, e.g. “every man goes grey at least once”).

Avicenna's notion of an absolute proposition therefore applies to at least three classes of metaphysical statement—statements linking naturally alternating states, statements of natural contingency and statements of final causality.⁶

As I've mentioned, problems arise in Thom's study when he offers an analysis of Avicenna's proofs. These proofs use a move called “upgrading”; the move occurs in both *Salvation* and *Syllogism*.⁷ Thom's analysis incorporates two further moves, one of which is designed to represent in some way a passage in *Pointers* in which Avicenna claims that “the possibly possible is possible.” One of the things I hope to show in this paper is that Thom's understanding of this phrase in Avicenna is wrong, or at any rate at odds with how Ṭūsī understands the phrase; and further, that a move associated with the phrase is out of place in an analysis of the *Salvation* and *Syllogism* proofs. In fact, by *Pointers*—if we are to believe Ṭūsī—“Avicenna deserted the method [of *Salvation* and *Syllogism*] and proved” these syllogisms in a different and better way (Commentary §7.2). The move in *Pointers* is meant to replace rather than augment the earlier proofs. And it's worth mentioning that Ṭūsī was not the only thirteenth-century logician who thought the *Pointers* method was superior to the earlier ones.⁸

⁶ Thom (2008), 374. Cf. H. Lagerlund, “Avicenna and Ṭūsī on Modal Logic,” *History and Philosophy of Logic* 30 (2009), 227–39, second section, for remarks on the absolute proposition and the exegetical problems Avicenna resolved with these truth-conditions.

⁷ See references in Street (2002), 141–2; proofs are given, 150–2.

⁸ That at least is how I read the passages in Afḍal ad-Dīn al-Ḥūnāḡī, *Kaṣf al-asrār ‘an ḡawāmiḍ al-afkār*, ed. with introduction by K. El-Rouayheb (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies, Free University of Berlin, 2010), 272.4 and following, and especially the third proof (273.3 et seq) which I take to be the *Pointers* proof; Ḥūnāḡī's evaluation of it relative to earlier proofs is given 274.pu et seq. (The *Syllogism* proof is the first (272.8–u).) Ḥūnāḡī also talks about problems

In this paper I give a rapid sketch of the modern interpretation of Avicenna's modal syllogistic. I note a lemma in *Pointers* (§8 in the appended translation) to which reference is made by Thom, and which gives rise to an interesting passage in Ṭūsī's commentary (especially §8.3). In the following section I sketch some important aspects of Thom's interpretation. I go on to consider Ṭūsī's commentary on the lemma along with a parallel passage (specifically, §10.5), and the context for both passages. I close with a few words on, first, how the medieval logicians talked about truth-conditions for Avicenna's modal propositions and, secondly, what Ṭūsī means by "suppose that possible actual." As an appendix, I present a translation of the whole of the relevant stretch of Ṭūsī's commentary. My overall aim in this paper is to suggest aspects of Thom's interpretation of Avicenna's logic which might be suppressed or highlighted as a result of considering Ṭūsī's interpretation of the logic of *Pointers*.

1. *Interpreting Avicennan Syllogistic*

The modern interpretation of Arabic logic begins with Rescher's studies on the modal syllogistic of Naǧm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1277).⁹ On Rescher's model, Kātibī's absolute proposition *every J is B* (*kullu ġīm bā' bil-iṭlāq*) is read as "there is a J and whatever is at least once J is at least once B"; the possibility proposition *every J is possibly B* (*kullu ġīm bā' bil-imkān*) as "there is a J and whatever is at least once J is possibly B"; and the necessity proposition *every J is necessarily B* (*kullu ġīm bā' biḍ-ḍarūra*) as "there is a J and whatever is at least once J is necessarily B." Each term is modalized either temporally or alethically (e.g. at least once J, possibly B, necessarily B), but the proposition as a whole is not. In consequence and following Thom we may refer to this as the simple *de re* interpretation.¹⁰

in perfecting syllogisms with possibility-proposition as minor premise by referring to second-figure mixes at 278. (I've only recently obtained a copy of this important text, so I've not given as much time to it as it so clearly deserves. I would note that—while I agree with El-Rouayheb that it's an influential text of capital importance—Ṭūsī never refers to it.)

⁹ N. Rescher and A van der Nat, "The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy," in *Studies in Modality*, eds. N. Rescher et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 17–56; this is the most developed statement of his interpretation.

¹⁰ Thom (2008), 362 et seq.

The simple *de re* interpretation works fine for Kātibī and for the vast majority of medieval Arabic logicians. With it Rescher was able to set out a system that gives all and only the syllogisms that Kātibī indicated were productive. Even though Kātibī's syllogistic is closely related to Avicenna's, however, the simple *de re* analysis fails to provide a good fit for Avicenna.¹¹ It is particularly in respect of the three mixes in Avicenna's syllogistic that have a possibility proposition as minor premise (*every J is possibly B*)—all rejected in the syllogistic of Kātibī—that the simple *de re* model is least convincing.

The two most important passages from Ṭūsī's commentary that are discussed in this paper (that is, §8.3 and §10.5) come up in treatment of the stretch in *Pointers* at which Avicenna considers these three first-figure syllogisms with possibility propositions as minor premise (translated below as the appendix). These mixes are, in a sense, the moment at which Avicenna's syllogistic becomes characteristically *his* syllogistic. The syllogisms which Avicenna argues are productive are:¹² every J is possibly B, every B is possibly A, therefore every J is possibly A (Barbara *MMM*); every J is possibly B, every B is at least once A, therefore every J is possibly A (Barbara *XMM*); and every J is possibly B, every B is necessarily A, therefore every J is necessarily A (Barbara *LML*). He further claims that, though not perfect, these syllogisms are nearly perfect (*Pointers* §§7–8). He has, as noted above, shifted from his position in *Salvation* and *Syllogism*. In *Salvation* he takes a first-figure with two possibility propositions as premises as “like the syllogism with two absolute [premises] in every respect.”¹³ In *Syllogism* his position is more nuanced, but here too he takes the mix as perfect.¹⁴

The passages in Ṭūsī's commentary on which I focus seemingly develop the proof towards which Avicenna gestures in arguing for

¹¹ In Street (2002), I approached Avicenna's logic in terms of Rescher's model, and in consequence could not see how certain proofs could work (see esp. 141–2), nor how certain unAvicennan syllogistic mixes could be excluded (see 154–5). P. Thom, *Medieval Modal Systems* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), also presents a simple *de re* model.

¹² Note that I use the Western mnemonics for the syllogisms, which encode the premises as major, minor, conclusion. Modalities are noted after the mnemonic in that order, so that e.g. *LML* means the minor is a possibility proposition, the major is a necessity proposition, and the conclusion is a necessity proposition. In the full statement of the syllogism, however, I follow the Arabic order: minor, major, conclusion, which makes apparent the perfection or imperfection of the syllogism.

¹³ *Salvation*, 60.9–10.

¹⁴ *Syllogism*, 181.9. Some of the subsequent comments here about second-figure mixes sit uneasily with *Pointers*, at least on Ṭūsī's interpretation.

Barbara MMM. First Avicenna notes that the absolute minor premise, *every J is B*, clearly middles with other premises like *every B is actually A*, *every B is possibly A*, and *every B is necessarily A*, but goes on to worry about the case of the possibility proposition (*every J is possibly B*) as minor premise:

7. That is so if *every J is B* actually, however that may be. If, however, *every J is B* by a possibility, then the judgment may not pass (*yata'addā*) clearly from B to J.
8. But if the judgment on B is by possibility (*bil-imkān*), then there is a possibility of a possibility (*imkānu imkān*). And the mind nearly knows that it is a possibility (*wa-hwa qaribun min an ya'lama d-dihnu annahu imkān*), for what is possibly possible (*mā yumkinu an yumkina*) is by nature near (*qaribun 'inda t-ṭab'*) the judgment that it is possible (*mumkin*).

One way of understanding Avicenna in this passage is that in the course of the proof, the modal operators somehow come to iterate (“possibly possible”), and that these iterated modal operators may be resolved by reference to natural insight into a single modal operator. This is how Thom reads it. I return in the next section to his interpretation, but here I note one thing. In assessing his new interpretation against the simple *de re* alternative which simply makes Barbara MMM perfect, Thom finds that it gives a better fit with §8 (which he quotes in Inati’s translation) and remarks: “By contrast, the combined *de dicto/de re* analysis makes this syllogism valid but not perfect, at the same time making its validity depend upon the principle that the possibly possible is possible (P5).”¹⁵

P5, given earlier in the paper, is referred to by Thom as the S4 principle; it is joined by a principle that the possibly necessary is necessary, referred to by Thom as the S5 principle.¹⁶

Ṭūsī dwells on the phrase “the possibly possible is possible”, but he understands it differently from Thom. In the second of Ṭūsī’s passages that I consider in this paper (§10.5), given in discussion of Barbara LML, Ṭūsī calls on a principle that the possibly necessary is necessary. Once again, however, I doubt that Ṭūsī is assuming that modalities may iterate. I think the proofs Ṭūsī offers are in sympathy with *Pointers*. The passages in Ṭūsī make me worry about the propriety of

¹⁵ Thom (2008), 368–9.

¹⁶ Thom (2008), 366 (for P5), and 367 (for P6).

interpreting Avicenna's modal syllogistic by using principles like the S4 and S5 principles.

2. Thom on Avicenna

Before turning to the texts of Ṭūsī, I set out the context for Thom's alternative understanding of Avicenna's phrase, "the possibly possible is possible." To do this, I give in greatly compressed form the most relevant sections of his interpretation.

On considering the examples Avicenna gives of the propositions for which his syllogistic is set up, Thom proposes embedding a *de re* proposition within the scope of a propositional modal operator.

The metaphysical statement that humans are necessarily corporeal is before all else a statement of *de dicto* necessity. It is supposed to hold under all imaginable circumstances. True, it has a *de re* predicate: each possible human is supposed to have a necessary property, that of being corporeal. But the logical form of the whole statement is different from that of an accidental *de re* predication such as "All (actually existing) possible animals are (as it happens) necessarily human", which is true merely under the supposition that for a time no other animals exist. What it states is that it's necessary that every human is necessarily corporeal.¹⁷

On this interpretation, the absolute proposition *every J is B* (*kullu ġīm bā' bil-iṭlāq*) is now read as "it's necessary that whatever is J is at least once B"; the possibility proposition *every J is possibly B* (*kullu ġīm bā' bil-imkān*) as "it's necessary that whatever is J is possibly B"; and the necessity proposition *every J is necessarily B* (*kullu ġīm bā' biḍ-ḍarūra*) as "it's necessary that whatever is J is necessarily B." I should also note how Thom reads universal negative propositions, because it is a convention I adopt. The universal negative necessity proposition *necessarily no J is B* (*biḍ-ḍarūrati lā šay'a min ġīm bā'*) is read as *no J is possibly B*, and the universal negative possibility proposition *possibly no J is B* (*mumkinun an lā yakūna šay'un min ġīm bā'*) as *no J is necessarily B*.¹⁸ That is to say, making the *de dicto* operator explicit, the negative necessity proposition is *it is necessary that no J is possibly*

¹⁷ Thom (2008), 371–2, at 372.

¹⁸ Avicenna is casual about the Arabic of these propositional forms, and here I follow his usage in *Pointers* 317 et seq.

B, and the negative possibility proposition is *it is necessary that no J is necessarily B*.

A cardinal virtue of this combined *de dicto/de re* analysis of the propositions is that it makes productive all the syllogisms Avicenna accepts, and excludes mixes he rejects.

2.1 *The Iteration of Modal Operators*

In the proof for Barbara *MMM*, Thom begins by setting out a rule and two principles, one of which has been mentioned above.

Rule 1: When premises entail a conclusion the premises' necessity entails the necessity of the conclusion.

P4. If it's necessary that whatever is *X* is *Y*, then it's necessary that whatever is possibly *X* is possibly *Y*.

P5. It's necessary that whatever is possibly possibly *X* is possibly *X*.¹⁹

The proof for Barbara *MMM* is then shown to be valid

...by supposing (1) it's necessary that whatever is *j* is possibly *b*, and (2) it's necessary that whatever is *b* is possibly *a*. (2) implies (3) it's necessary that whatever is possibly *b* is possibly possibly *a* (by P4). Finally we suppose (4) it's necessary that whatever is possibly possibly *a* is possibly *a* (P5). Now, (1), (3) and (4) entail (5) it's necessary that whatever is *j* is possibly *a*. Why does this entailment hold? Because it follows from a simple Barbara by Rule 1. So the syllogism is valid. But it is far from being perfect.²⁰

Step 4 is what makes the syllogism's validity depend on the principle that the possibly possible is possible.

For his proof for Barbara *LML*, Thom introduces an extra principle which he refers to as the S5 principle; for this one there is no text in Avicenna to which it may be related.

P6. It's necessary that whatever is possibly necessarily *X* is necessarily *X*...

The proof supposes (1) it's necessary that whatever is *j* is possibly *b*, and (2) it's necessary that whatever is *b* is necessarily *a*. By P4, (2) entails (3) it's necessary that whatever is possibly *b* is possibly necessarily *a*. Finally, the proof supposes (4) it's necessary that whatever is possibly necessarily *a* is necessarily *a*. Now, (1), (3) and (4) entail (5) it's necessary

¹⁹ Thom (2008), 366.

²⁰ Thom (2008), 366–7.

that whatever is *j* is necessarily *a*. This entailment is generated by applying Rule 1 to a simple Barbara.²¹

As mentioned, Ṭūsī makes a move that looks like step 4, though what he means when he says “the possibly necessary is necessary” will be examined in section 3 below.

2.2 Upgrading

Thom's analysis of Avicenna's modal propositions also allows the interpreter to deal with a crux in Avicenna's logic, a move in some of his proofs at which Avicenna says “let us suppose that possible actual” or words to that effect.²² I summarize here how Thom uses his new analysis of the proposition to understand upgrading.

Since the universal propositions are embedded in necessity operators, the particular propositions are embedded in possibility operators: it is possible that some *J* is necessarily *B*, and it is possible that some *J* is not possibly *B*. Thom introduces a second rule:

Rule 2: If *r* follows from *p* and *q* then possibly *r* follows from necessarily *p* and possibly *q*.²³

This rule can be invoked to give a proof for Barbara *LML* by upgrading.

Suppose Barbara *LML*'s premises and the opposite of its conclusion. On our reading, this is to suppose that while (1) it's necessary that every *j* is a possible *b*, and (2) it's necessary that every *b* is a necessary *a*, it's not necessary that every *j* is a necessary *a*, i.e. (3) it's possible that not every *j* is a necessary *a*. What we want to show is that from (2) and (3) we may infer (4) it's possible that not every *j* is a possible *b*. Now, this inference is indeed valid, because if we suppose (5) not every *j* is a necessary *a*, and (6) every possible *b* is possibly a necessary *a*, then it follows that (7) not every *j* is a possible *b*—given that we can assume that whatever is possibly necessarily *a* is necessarily *a*. Given this inference, our desired inference must be valid—by virtue of Rule 2.²⁴

²¹ Thom (2008), 367.

²² See Street (2002), 141–2, where all the texts I could find on the move are gathered; I have also recorded there my bafflement at how anything like this move could be validly applied to simple *de re* propositions.

²³ Thom (2008), 369.

²⁴ Thom (2008), 369. Because of an editorial error, this is not how the proof appears in the article; the proof should read as given here.

So (3) has been upgraded to (5) by losing its *de dicto* operator (“it’s possible that”), and with (6) implies (7), not every J is a possible B. (Note that (6) results from applying P4 to (2) and dropping the *de dicto* operator.) By Rule 2 the inference of (7) from (5) and (6) allows us to infer (4) from (2) and (3).

There is no doubt Rule 2 is a promising rule to help interpret what is going on in the proofs in *Salvation* and *Syllogism* that use the phrase “suppose that possible actual.”²⁵ The text in *Pointers* and Ṭūsī’s commentary (both given in the appended translation) may however push us to look for an analysis that does not use upgrading or P5 and P6.

3. Ṭūsī on Avicenna

I concentrate here on the two passages from Ṭūsī’s commentary which have to do with the seemingly iterated modalities. I return to Ṭūsī’s use of the move “suppose that possible actual” in section 4.2. In what follows, I first present the passages which present the claims that superficially resemble Thom’s P5 and P6, and then material from Avicenna’s treatment of the second figure to provide context for the passages.

3.1 *The Two Passages*

Ṭūsī picks up on Avicenna’s claim in the consideration of Barbara MMM, “for what is possibly possible (*mā yumkinu an yumkina*) is by nature near (*qaribun ‘inda ṭ-ṭab’*) to the judgment that it is possible (*mumkin*).”

8.3 The aspect [of this argument] regarding the fact that the judgment is not present in the mind but nearly present (*wa-qaribun mina l-mawḡūd*) is that it is validated by contraposing (*in’ikās*) the proposition, everything which is not possible is impossible to be possible (*kullu mā laysa bi-mumkinin yamtani’u an yakūna mumkinan*). This is primary in the mind (*awwaliyun fī l-adhān*), and contraposes to everything which is not impossible to be possible is possible (*kullu mā lā yamtani’u an yakūna mumkinan fahwa mumkin*), which is what is sought.

I take it that Ṭūsī intends us to understand “everything which is not impossible to be possible is possible” as equivalent to Avicenna’s “the possibly possible is possible.”

²⁵ See Street (2002), 150–3; see *Salvation*, 61–2, *Syllogism*, 202.

Before considering what Ṭūsī might mean by this phrase, or why he thinks that its contrapositive is primary in the mind, I turn to the second passage which I regard as parallel to the first, though directed towards proving Barbara *LML*.

10.5 ...The construction (*al-iḥtimāl*) leading to this problem is only rejected under the head of mixing the possible with the necessary by contraposition of our claim (*fī bābi ḥalṭi l-mumkini biḍ-ḍarūriyi bin-ikāsi qawlinā*), everything that is not necessary by the essence is impossible to be necessary by it. It is a necessity [leading] to: everything which is not impossible to be necessary is necessarily necessary, by way of contraposition (*‘alā ṭarīqi ‘aksi n-naqīd*).

Again, I take it that we are to understand “everything which is not impossible to be necessary is necessarily necessary” as “the possibly necessary is necessary.” And so at first glance it would seem that Ṭūsī provides a text that lends the same kind of support to Thom’s P6 that Avicenna’s “the possibly possible is possible” lends to P5.

Before we can go any further, however, we need to ask why Ṭūsī believes that the contrapositives from which he derives these claims are “primary in the mind”, or a “necessity”. The claims come without any introduction or discussion, and any answer will have to be speculative. None the less, I think we can identify exactly what Ṭūsī has in mind.

3.2 Avicenna on Second-Figure Mixes

Avicenna seems to regard certain second-figure syllogisms as obvious in themselves or at least obvious after some reflection. He may even regard them as perfect, though whether he is strictly justified to do so is another matter. Consider Camestres *LML*: (1) it is necessary that no J is necessarily B and (2) it is necessary that every A is necessarily B, therefore (3) it is necessary that no J is possibly A.²⁶ Avicenna invites us in *Pointers* to the following line of reflection.

²⁶ To line up my example with Avicenna’s discussion, which is directed to two-sided possibility propositions, I have made (1) a universal negative one-sided possibility premise; this preserves the point he is asking his readers to consider. Note that a one-sided or “general” (to use the Arabic term) possibility proposition is *every J is possibly B*, as opposed to a two-sided or “special” possibility proposition, *every J is possibly B and possibly not B*. Absolutes can also be two-sided.

You know that if J is such that B is true of it in its totality affirmatively without necessity (so B is non-necessary for everything which is J, or non-necessary for what is the exposit part of J), while A differs from this (since of everything that is A, B is necessary for it), then the nature of J (*fa'inna ṭabr'ata ġim*), or the exposit part of it, is disjoined from the nature of A (*mubāyanatun li-ṭabr'ati alif*), neither of them entering under the other, not even possibly... You likewise know that the conclusion is always necessary negative...²⁷

Since the conclusion is a negative necessity proposition, it converts; in short, there are even more inferences derived from this insight than directly indicated in the text. One of them is this: J is said of things which, by their nature, are not essentially B, whereas A is said of things which are by contrast essentially B. So J and A are said of things which are essentially different, a truth which is recorded in Avicenna's logic as a universal negative necessity proposition: it is necessary that no J is possibly A.

It may be, as Thom notes,²⁸ that on a proper logical analysis these are valid syllogisms that can only be proved to be so as substitutions in non-modal second-figure moods, and are in consequence not perfect. But I think Avicenna—at least as read by Ṭūsī—is claiming that we have intuitions about Natures (*ṭabā'i*) and the essential differences that separate them. So we should know (it should be “primary in the mind” or a “necessity”) by the reasoning given above that whatever is not necessarily B is not possibly what is necessarily B. If we accept contraposition, then a few moments further reflection should convince us that we also know that whatever is possibly what is necessarily B is necessarily B. And this looks very much like the claim that Ṭūsī makes in the second passage, got by the same path he follows to make the claim.

Perhaps an example will make the reasoning clearer. It is the case that no animal is necessarily moving, but by contrast every celestial body is necessarily moving. That is to say, animals do not have a necessary property that celestial bodies must have, so we know that animals and celestial bodies are essentially different.²⁹ In short, we know

²⁷ Avicenna, *Pointers*, 421–2.

²⁸ Thom (2008), 365.

²⁹ This and the example for the next mix use terms from Ṭūsī's commentary on 422, so they are at least in sympathy with what he thinks is at issue.

that natures which do not share what is a necessary property for one must be essentially different.

We can continue in this way and consider Camestres *MLL*: (1) it is necessary that no J is possibly B, and (2) it is necessary that every A is possibly B, therefore (3) it is necessary that no J is possibly A. J is said of things which are such that their natures essentially exclude B, while A is said of things which may be B; so necessarily the Js and the As are essentially different. Put another way, whatever is not possibly B is not possibly what is possibly B. By contraposition, we have: whatever is possibly what is possibly B is possibly B. And this looks like the claim that Ṭūsī makes in the first passage, and the claim that Avicenna makes.

Again, an example may make the reasoning clearer. Every animal is possibly still, but no celestial body is possibly still. That is to say, one nature does not have a potentiality the other has, and so the two are essentially different.

One may go beyond these two passages to consider Camestres *XLL*: (1) it is necessary that no J is possibly B, and (2) it is necessary that every A is at one time B, therefore (3) it is necessary that no J is possibly A. Rephrased as before, whatever is not possibly B is not possibly what is once B. This has the contrapositive, whatever is possibly what is once B is possibly B. This will underwrite Barbara *XMM* (it is necessary that every J is possibly B, it is necessary that every B is at least once A, therefore it is necessary that every J is possibly A).

It should be stressed that Avicenna is not iterating modal operators on Ṭūsī's analysis. It is not that the possibly possible B is a possible B, but rather whatever is possibly what is possibly B is possibly B. This is most obvious from the stretch of Ṭūsī's commentary following on from the claim that the possibly possible is possible (*mā yumkinu an yumkina yakūnu mumkinan*), talking about the premises every J is possibly B and every B is possibly A:

8.2 The proof of this is that the possible is that from the supposition of which no impossibility follows (*al-mumkinu huwa mā lā yalzamu min farḍi wuḡūdihi muḥāl*). Take for example J, which is possibly that which is possibly A (*ḡim alladī yumkinu an yakūna mā yumkinu an yakūna alif*), and suppose that it goes from the first possibility to existence; the first possibility has fallen away, and it will thereupon have become that which is possibly A, according to the supposition...

That at least is how I think Ṭūsī understands Avicenna's proofs. He takes Avicenna to be making a shorthand reference back to the way

one nature excludes another by reference to the potentialities or necessary properties they either have or lack. This is a reminder of insights that all should have on a moment's reflection. From a strictly logical point of view, it may be that Ṭūsī has accomplished nothing by this line of reflection beyond showing (as was obvious already) that proofs for first-figure syllogisms are at hand if second-figure syllogisms are available. But I think he is trying to say something more significant. I think he is claiming that the modal syllogistic is to be built at least in part on metaphysical theses.

4. *Further Observations*

Two other aspects of Ṭūsī's interpretation of Avicenna invite further reflection in light of the analyses of Rescher and Thom, and in light of logical works of other medieval Arabic logicians who were part of Ṭūsī's intellectual world. Does Ṭūsī have a distinction which captures the difference between Thom's analysis (which fits Avicenna) and Rescher's (which fits Kātibī and others who reject Avicenna's syllogisms with possibility propositions as minor premises)? And what is Ṭūsī's understanding of the move "suppose that possible actual"? I take up each point briefly.

4.1 *Avicenna's Modal Propositions*

At the end of the twelfth century we find two logicians—both students of Mağd ad-Dīn al-Ğilī—looking for ways to state truth-conditions for modal propositions that are clearly designed to rule out Kātibī's understanding of the modals. One attempt is by Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (ex. 1191) in *Ḥikmat al-işrāq*. In his earlier work, *Manṭiq at-talwihāt*, Suhrawardī gives truth-conditions for propositions in the same laconic fashion Avicenna does.³⁰ In *Ḥikmat al-işrāq*, however, Suhrawardī takes a different tack:

³⁰ Suhrawardī, *Manṭiq at-talwihāt*, ed. A. A. Fayyād (Tehran: University of Tehran Publications, 1955). This is a straight-forwardly Avicennan account: for [1] rejection of second-figure syllogisms with two absolutes, see 56.14–18 and more straightforwardly 50.9–10; [2] Barbara *MMM*, see 53.6; Barbara *XMM*, see 53.8–11; Barbara *LML*, see 53.16–54.1; [3] Barbara *XLL* valid with *waşfi* minor, see 53.11–13. For Avicenna's account of each of these aspects, see Street (2002): for [1] see 146–7, for [2] 149–53, for [3] 153.

Since the contingency of the contingent, the impossibility of the impossible, and the necessity of the necessary are all necessary, it is better to make the modes of necessity, contingency, and impossibility parts of the predicate so that the proposition will become necessary in all circumstances...³¹

He goes on to give the modals as follows:

Necessity proposition: Every man necessarily must be an animal (*kullu insānin biḍ-ḍarūratī huwa yağību an yakūna ḥayawānan*), or: necessarily, every J is a necessary B;

Possibility proposition: Every man necessarily may be a writer (*kullu insānin biḍ-ḍarūratī huwa mumkinun an yakūna kātiban*), or: necessarily, every J is a possible B;

Absolute proposition: Every man necessarily must breathe at some time (*kullu insānin biḍ-ḍarūratī huwa mutanaffisun waqtan mā*), or: necessarily, every J is at one time B.

It is worth noting that the “necessarily” (*biḍ-ḍarūra*) only sits in the middle of the Arabic for stylistic reasons; on negating the proposition, Suhrawardī pulls it out to the front of the proposition (*laysa biḍ-ḍarūra*).³²

At roughly the same time, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) was providing technical terms to make the same logical point in a different way. This is the distinction between reading the subject term either according to actual reality (*bi-ḥasabī l-ḥārīğ*) or according to the essence (*bi-ḥasabī l-ḥaqīqa*).³³ The canonical statement of the distinction is given by Kātibī as follows:

Our statement *every J is B* is used occasionally according to the essence (*bi-ḥasabī l-ḥaqīqa*), and its meaning is that everything which, were it to

³¹ Suhrawardī, *Philosophy of Illumination*, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq: a new critical edition of the text of Hikmat al-ishrāq*, with English translation, notes, commentary and introduction by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1999), 17–8.

³² For an extended treatment, see T. Street, “Suhrawardī on Modal Syllogisms,” in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Translation and Transmission in Honour of Hans Daiber*, eds. A. Akasoy and W. Raven (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 163–78. I think Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd al-Madā'inī in *Šarḥ al-Āyāt al-bayyināt*, ed. M. Djebli (Beirut: Dar Sader Publications, 1996), (a commentary on Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's *al-Āyāt al-bayyināt*) is stating truth-conditions in the same way at 241.

³³ T. Street, “Faḥraddīn ar-Rāzī's critique of Avicennan logic,” in *Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, eds. D. Perler and U. Rudolph (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 99–116, at 115; I quote it there from Rāzī's *Šarḥ al-Isārāt*, so this is probably the earliest text Rāzī wrote using the distinction; he seems to be taking it from earlier writers.

exist, would be a J among possible individuals would be, in so far as it were to exist, a B; that is, everything that is an implicant of J is an implicant of B. And occasionally [it is used] according to actual existence (*bi-ḥasabi l-ḥāriğ*), and its meaning is that every J actually (*fī l-ḥāriğ*), whether at the time of the judgment or before it or after it, is B actually (*fī l-ḥāriğ*)...

The distinction between the two considerations is clear. Were there no squares actually (*fī l-ḥāriğ*) it would be true to say *a square is a figure* under the first consideration and not the second; and were there no figures actually other than squares, it would be correct to say *every figure is a square* under the second consideration but not the first.³⁴

It became standard to differentiate a propositional reading as either according to actual reality (*bi-ḥasabi l-ḥāriğ*) or according to the essence (*bi-ḥasabi l-ḥaqīqa*). The assumption was that Avicenna's propositions are *bi-ḥasabi l-ḥaqīqa*, whereas those of the majority of logicians after the middle of the thirteenth century were *bi-ḥasabi l-ḥāriğ*.

Ṭūsī is aware of the distinction, and condemns the majority of logicians for reading *bi-ḥasabi l-ḥāriğ*;³⁵ the analysis Thom proposes for Avicenna's propositions would probably also work for Ṭūsī's. Though Ṭūsī uses one side of the distinction, it must however be noted that he does not think that the *ḥaqīqī* reading represents Avicenna's propositions accurately (particularly when glossed as "everything that is an implicant of J is an implicant of B").³⁶

4.2 Ṭūsī and "suppose that possible actual"

In the translation appended to this paper, Ṭūsī makes the move of supposing a possible actual four times. He does so twice in §8.2:

Take for example J, which is possibly that which is possibly A, and suppose that it goes from the first possibility to existence (*idā furiḍa anna ġim... ḥarağa mina l-imkāni l-awwali ilā l-wuğūd*); the first possibility will have fallen away, and it will thereupon have become that which is possibly A, according to the supposition. Then if it is supposed once again that it is existent (*idā furiḍa marratan uḥrā annahu mawğūd*), the second possibility has also fallen away...

³⁴ Nağm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī, *ar-Risāla aš-Šamsiyya* (with a commentary by Qutb ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī at-Taḥṭānī), ed. A. S. 'Alī (Cairo: Ḥalabī and Sons, Cairo, 1948), 91.1–4, 96.12–14.

³⁵ See Ṭūsī's commentary 282, and the commentary on Pointer Five of Path Four generally.

³⁶ See P. Thom, "Abharī on the Logic of Conjunctive Terms," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 20 (2010), 105–17.

He makes the move once in §9.1:

That is because, if a possible is supposed to exist (*li'anna l-mumkina idā furiḍa mawḡūdan*), then the mix comes to be of two absolutes...

And he makes the move once again in §10.2:

The rule here is that if a possible is supposed to exist (*anna l-mumkina idā furiḍa mawḡūdan*), there comes to be a mix of an absolute and a necessary...

In each of these four moves, Ṭūsī is dealing with a universal proposition, almost always, *every J is possibly B*. This is not upgrading, which only applies to particular propositions which are embedded in a possibility operator. When Ṭūsī supposes a possible actual, he is supposing actual something which, on Thom's analysis, is governed by a *de re* possibility operator, so that *it is necessary that every J is possibly B* becomes *it is necessary that every J is B*. In the one concrete example given in the text translated (in §9.2), he supposes that a potentiality had by every member of a species (in this case, writing as had by men) is an actuality (as, for example, breathing for all men), and then examines how that assumption affects our ability to see the perfectibility of the inference under consideration.

5. Concluding Remarks

The material considered in this paper goes first and foremost to how we might analyse Avicenna's modal syllogistic in *Pointers*, particularly if we allow ourselves to be guided by Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī. The Thom interpretation proposes an application of the sentences of the syllogistic to claims about natural constituents and potentialities that belong to the subject. Ṭūsī's comments would push us to foreground this application even more; he assesses the productivity of syllogisms by focusing on Natures and their properties. This is particularly apparent in his use of the canons, the possibly possible is possible, and the possibly necessary is necessary; both go to the essential separation of Natures in terms of what constitutes them and what potentialities they have. The focus on Natures and their potentialities seems also to lie behind his use of "suppose that possible actual."

We need also bear in mind that the account of syllogisms in *Pointers* is likely different from (and in Ṭūsī's opinion, a development of) Avicenna's earlier views. It is better not to mingle elements of the proofs

in *Pointers* with those in *Salvation* and *Syllogism* in an interpretation of Avicenna's logic.

It might be argued that relying on Ṭūsī to guide us in understanding Avicenna's modal syllogistic could lead to anachronism; we will understand Avicenna as a thirteenth-century commentator understood him. That may be. But at least we will be led by Avicenna's most erudite and passionate defender, and be given a chance to appreciate Avicenna's logic from the perspective of those on whom it had most impact.

*Appendix: Translation of Ṭūsī on Pointers*³⁷

[First-figure mixes with a minor premise that is actual are perfect.]

7. That is so if *every J is B* actually (*bil-fi'l*), however that may be. [391]
If, however, *every J is B* by a possibility, then the judgment may not pass (*yata'addā*) clearly from B to J.

7.1 What Avicenna means is that it is only clear that these connexions (*al-qarā'in*) produce, and that [the modality of] the conclusion follows [that of] the major premise in the modalities mentioned, if the minor term [J] enters under the middle term [B] actually. This is [the case] in actual minor premises, whether affirmative, or negative [of the kind] that imply an actual affirmative.³⁸ But if the minor premise is by possibility (*bil-inkān*), then the judgment does not pass from the middle term to the minor term clearly (*ta'addiyan bayyinan*); rather, it only passes to it potentially (*bil-quwwa*) and requires a proof (*bayān*). So the rule (*ḥāṣil*) is that the syllogisms of this figure are perfect (*kāmila*) if the minor premise is actual (*fi'līya*) [391], and imperfect if [the minor premise] is possible.

7.2 Now the minor premise in which the judgment is in potentiality may be combined either [1] with a major premise which is also in potentiality, or [2] with <75 recto> an actual but non-necessary major, or [3] with a necessary major. These are three mixes that require proof (*al-bayān*). It was the custom of logicians to prove these by indirect reduction, and to reduce them to mixes of actual premises in the other two figures. There is not much clarity in [this procedure], along with its involving a lot of nonsense and bad ordering of material. So in this book Avicenna deserted the method and proved them with three proofs of the reasoned fact.³⁹

8. [391] But if the judgment on B is by possibility (*bil-inkān*), then there is a possibility of a possibility (*inkānu inkān*). And the mind nearly knows that it is a possibility (*wahwa qaribun min an ya'lama d-dihnu*

³⁷ From Avicenna, *Pointers*, 390–6, with Ṭūsī's commentary; corrected against British Library codex Or. 10901, ff. 74 verso line 14 to 76 verso line 2. References to pages of the edited text are in square brackets, to folios of the manuscript, in corner brackets.

³⁸ That is, a two-sided absolute, which in the case of *no J is B* will be taken as *every J is at one time not B and at one time B*; in the syllogism the one-sided absolute it implies will be used, that is, *every J is at least once B*.

³⁹ Reading *bayānāt limmīya* for *bayānāt ṭalāṭa*, following Or. 10901, 75r4.

annahu imkān), for what is possibly possible (*mā yumkinu an yumkina*) is by nature near (*qaribun 'inda t-tab'*) the judgment that it is possible (*mumkin*).

8.1 [391.11] This is the proof of the first mix, which is a mix of two possibility premises. Avicenna thought it enough that the mind easily knows that what is possibly possible is possible (*mā yumkinu an yumkina yakūnu mumkinan*). This is because Avicenna inclines to the view that this mix is perfect, and not in need of more proof.

8.2 The proof of this is that the possible is that from the supposition of which no impossibility follows (*al-mumkinu huwa mā lā yalzamu min farḍi wuḡūdihi muḥāl*). Take for example J, which is possibly that which is possibly A, and suppose that it goes from the first possibility to existence; the first possibility has fallen away, and it will thereupon have become that which is possibly A, according to the supposition. Then if it is supposed once again that it is existent, the second possibility has also fallen away, and J has come to be [392] A in existence with no impossibility having followed. And everything which comes to be existent by supposition with no impossibility following, is possible (*kullu mā yaṣīru bil-farḍi mawḡūdan min ḡayri luzūmi muḥālīn fa-hwa mumkin*). Therefore J is possibly A.

8.3 The aspect [of this argument] regarding the fact that the judgment is not present in the mind but nearly present (*wa-qaribun mina l-mawḡūd*) is that it is validated by contraposing (*in'ikās*) the proposition, everything which is not possible is impossible to be possible (*kullu mā laysa bi-mumkinin yamtani'u an yakūna mumkinan*). This is primary in the mind (*awwalīyun fī l-aḍḥān*), and contraposes to (*yu'kasu n-naqīḍu ilā*)⁴⁰ everything which is not impossible to be possible is possible (*kullu mā lā yamtani'u an yakūna mumkinan fa-hwa mumkinun*), which is what is sought.

9. [392] But if it is *every J is B* by a real special possibility, and *every B is A* as an absolute proposition, then it may be that *every J is A* actually, or perhaps just potentially; and what is necessary [for the conclusion] is general possibility which is general for both.

9.1 [392.9] This is the proof of the second mix, that is, of a possibility premise with an absolute. It produces a possibility proposition. That is because, if a possible is supposed to exist (*li'anna l-mumkina idā*

⁴⁰ The text in *Dunyā* at 392.6 is probably wrong, but the text in Or. 10901 75 recto line 14 is unclear; it is either *b'-k-s* or *y'-k-s*. The meaning, however, is clear.

furiḍa mawḡūdan), then the mix comes to be of two absolutes, the production of which is clear, and from which no impossibility follows. So [the conclusion] is possible.

9.2 It is not necessary that [the mix] produce an absolute, because the judgment on the minor term [J] may only be actual on its being a middle actually, yet it may be among those things which are never actual, as in: *Possibly, every man is a writer* and *Absolutely, every writer is using a pen*, from which it does not follow that *Absolutely, every man is using a pen*; rather, [that proposition follows] by possibility. Or [the conclusion] may be actual, as in <75 verso> *Possibly, every man is a writer* [393] and *Absolutely, every writer is moving*, therefore *Absolutely, every man is moving*.

9.3 The “general possibility” (*al-imbkân al-‘āmm*) in Avicenna’s statement “and what is necessary [for the conclusion] is general possibility which is general for both” should not be construed as what covers the necessary and the non-necessary according to the terms of the trade. Rather it should be construed as that which is general for the actual and the potential, which is “general” according to normal usage (*bi-ḥasabi l-luḡa*). That is because “possible” may apply to what is actual, like existential propositions; and it may apply to what is not actual but only as yet in potentiality, like the future (*al-istiqbālī*) as we stipulated it.⁴¹ Then if the mix is of a possible in pure potentiality (*min mumkinin bil-quwwati l-maḥḍa*) and an absolute, the conclusion is a possibility proposition by a possibility covering both [actuality and potentiality], and not necessarily in pure potentiality. This is as in *Zayd may be writing* by that possibility, and *Absolutely, everyone writing uses a pen*, which produces *Possibly, Zayd uses a pen*. [This is] not in pure potentiality because he may actually be using a pen at other than the time of writing (which is still in potentiality). Rather [it has to be] a possibility which covers both actuality and potentiality. This is what is appropriate [to the lemma], and Avicenna made it clear elsewhere.

9.4 If “general possibility” (*al-imbkân al-‘āmm*) is construed as what covers the necessary and the non-necessary, and “absolute” in his statement “every B is A as an absolute proposition” is also⁴² taken as general, as Rāzī held, it is correct. It is however not appropriate to the

⁴¹ See *Pointers*, 272–6 at 275–6 and commentary thereto.

⁴² Read *ayḍan* as outside quote from Avicenna; *Com.* 393.17.

discussion at hand. Nor would it be correct to say that what covers the actual and the potential is the general possible; because the special possible may also be general for them from another aspect.

10. [393] And if *every B is necessarily A*, then the truth is that the conclusion is necessary. [394] In proof of that, let us set down a consideration nearly [self-evident] (*waḡhan qarīban*), namely: If J becomes B, it comes to be judged as having A predicated of it necessarily. The meaning of this is that A does not separate from it at all as long as it exists (*mā dāma mawḡūda d-dāt*), and not that [A] does not separate from it only as long as it is B. Had it⁴³ been judged as A only while B and not while not B, then [395] *every B is necessarily A* would be false, according to what you have learned. This is because the meaning [of the proposition used in this inference] is that everything described as B, whether perpetually or not, is described necessarily as A while it exists (*mā dāma mawḡūda d-dāt*), whether or not it is B.

10.1 [393.pu] This is the proof of the third mix, and it is the mix of a possible with a necessary. [394] A number of logicians have claimed that it produces a possible, but Avicenna proved that it produces a necessary, and his words are clear.

10.2 The rule (*hāṣil*) here is that if a possible is supposed to exist (*anna l-mumkina idā furiḍa mawḡūdan*), the mix comes to be <76 recto> of an absolute and a necessary, and the conclusion is necessary, as above. But everything which is necessary is necessary at all times, so the conclusion will also have been necessary before our supposition. The middle term in this syllogism does not convey its being necessary as things are in themselves (*fī nafsi l-amr*), but conveys the knowledge of it.

10.3 So by this discussion it is validated that the necessary major with all actual (*fī'līya*) and non-actual minors produces a necessary conclusion. The non-necessary major, if it and the minor are both actuals, produce an actual. If one of [the premises], or both, are possible, a possible is produced. A major which may be either [in actuality or potentiality] produces something which may be actual or non-actual. So some conclusions happen to follow the major, like what results from an actual minor with whatever major, so long as it is not descriptive (*waṣfiya*). [395] Some of them happen to follow the minor, like what results from a possible and an absolute, be they two generals or

⁴³ Reading *law kāna* for *wahwa kāna* after Or. 10901 75 verso 17.

two specials (*‘āmmatayn aw ḥāṣṣatayn*).⁴⁴ And some of them differ from both [major and minor], like what results from a possible and an absolute, one of which is general and the other special. Then the conclusion is like the minor in possibility, and the major in generality or speciality.⁴⁵

10.4 Production from a possibility proposition as minor premise joined to other propositions calls for reflection. If we judge every B in a given way, as A or as not A, then we mean that judgment to apply to everything that is actually B, not everything which might be B (*kullu mā yumkinu an yakūna bā’*), as we stipulated before. If J in the minor is possibly B (*yumkinu an yakūna bā’*), yet not one of [the Js] becomes B at any time, but rather B is always denied of every one of them, though not necessarily, then the judgment on B will not cover (*yatanāwalu*) [the Js] in any respect at all, whereupon the judgment on [the Js] may differ from the judgment on B. That is because what is possibly B may be divided into [1] what is actually described as B, and [2] what is never described as B, though not necessarily. The first division either has a judgment necessary due to the essence (*aḍ-ḍāt*), or a non-necessary judgment. The second division has a judgment which contradicts (*munāqīḍ*) that judgment. It does not follow from our judgment on what is actually B that what is possibly but perpetually not actually B enters under that judgment.

10.5 This problem only follows on the claim of the possibility of the existence of a perpetual non-necessary universal judgment.⁴⁶ The construction (*al-iḥtimāl*) leading to this problem is only rejected under the head of mixing the possible with the necessary by contraposition of our claim (*fī bābi ḥalṭi l-mumkini biḍ-ḍarūriyi bin-ikāsi qawlinā*),⁴⁷ everything that is not necessary by the essence is impossible to be necessary by it. [396] It is a necessity [leading] to: everything which is not <76 verso> impossible to be necessary is necessarily necessary, by way of contraposition (*‘alā ṭarīqi ‘aksi n-naqīḍ*).

⁴⁴ From here to the end of this paragraph, understand “general” and “special” as respectively “one-sided” and “two-sided”; I adopt Rescher’s terminology here.

⁴⁵ Avicenna in *Pointers* discusses modal syllogisms by way of a critique of the rejected Theophrastan rule that the modality of the conclusion follows the weaker of the two premises. In this paragraph Ṭūsī summarizes the upshot of the discussion.

⁴⁶ Street, “Faḥraddīn ar-Rāzī,” (see note 33), speculates as to the passage Ṭūsī has in mind here at 107–9.

⁴⁷ Reading *biḍ-ḍarūriyi* instead of *aḍ-ḍarūriyi*, following Or. 10901 76 recto apu.

THE DISTINCTION OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA'S METAPHYSICS: THE TEXT AND ITS CONTEXT*

Amos Bertolacci

In his groundbreaking monograph *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* and in many other magisterial essays, Dimitri Gutas has underscored the key role that metaphysics plays in Avicenna's philosophical system.¹ Gutas' account of metaphysics (as well as of the other main philosophical disciplines), in Avicenna's *œuvre* is based on a full fledged methodology resulting from the critical evaluation of the assumptions of previous scholarship, an insightful analysis of the fundamental texts, and a thorough reconstruction of their doctrinal and historical context. All scholars interested in Avicenna's metaphysics (not to say of his psychology, noetics and epistemology) and Arabic metaphysical speculation in general, can only be thankful to Gutas' pioneering research for having explored and mapped what had been, to a large extent, virgin territory and for having provided a solid, brilliant and comprehensive outline of the whole, thus paving the way to subsequent, more specific investigations.

As a sign of personal heartfelt gratitude and in the footsteps of Gutas' masterly approach outlined above, the present contribution wishes to provide the analysis of a crucial issue of Avicenna's metaphysics. The

* Earlier versions of the present article have been presented in the following meetings: the seminar "La *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne," Centre d'histoire des sciences et de philosophies arabes et médiévales (CNRS-UMR 7062), Ecole Normale Supérieure-Ulm, Paris (November 2006); a research meeting organized at the Scuola Normale Superiore of Pisa in December 2006; and a Forschungskolloquium held at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität of Freiburg in May 2007. I wish to thank the organizers of these meetings (Dr. A. Hasnaoui, Prof. M. Rashed, Prof. F. Del Punta, Dr. G. Galluzzo, Prof. M. Hoenen, Dr. N. Germann), as well as all the participants, for their valuable remarks. My sincere gratitude goes also to Prof. D. Twetten for his insightful comments on content and style.

¹ D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Cf. Id., "Ibn Ṭufayl on Ibn Sīnā's Eastern Philosophy," *Oriens*, 34 (1994), 222–41; "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca. 1350", in *Avicenna and His Heritage*, eds. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 81–97; "The Logic of Theology in Avicenna," in *Logik und Theologie, Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter*, eds. D. Perler and U. Rudolph (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 59–72.

issue in question is the famous doctrine of the distinction of essence and existence, as expressed in Avicenna's masterpiece on metaphysics, the *Ilāhīyāt* (*Science of Divine Things*) of the *Kitāb aṣ-Ṣifā'* (*Book of the Cure*). The present paper will discuss the state-of-the-art, the most relevant textual evidence, and the main features of this doctrine in its context. Avicenna's distinction of essence and existence in created beings is well known: a triangle or a horse, for example, have a determinate essence (to be a three-sided geometrical figure, to be a four-legged solid-hoofed animal with flowing mane and tail, respectively), regardless of their existence in external reality or in the human mind. In the *Ilāhīyāt*, the doctrine in question represents the core element of the more general treatment, in chapter I, 5, of the primary concepts "existent" and "thing", and of their mutual relationship. Since "existent" and "thing" are *grosso modo* equivalent to the notions of "item having existence" and "item having essence" respectively, the account of their distinction (and connection) in this chapter encompasses, in its turn, the distinction of essence and existence.

1. *The Distinction of Essence and Existence: The Current State of Research*

The scholarship on this doctrine is abundant and has a long history, which cannot be accounted for in detail here.² Previous studies, however, show similar methodological and doctrinal assumptions worthy to be recalled briefly. With regard to method, the texts of Avicenna dealing with the distinction at hand have not been properly classified: in a few instances (the main texts on the issue), Avicenna deals with the distinction as such (there is one such case in metaphysics and

² The major study is now R. Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, henceforth: Wisnovsky [2003]). Among recent studies, see also Th.-A. Druart, "'Shay' or 'res' as Concomitant of 'Being' in Avicenna," *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001), 125–42 (henceforth: Druart [2001]); P. Porro, "Universaux et *esse essentiae*: Avicenne, Henri de Gand et le «troisième Reich»,", in *Le réalisme des universaux*, Cahiers de philosophie de l'université de Caen, 38–39, (Caen: Presses universitaires de Caen, 2002), 10–50; O. Lizzini, "Wujūd-Mawjūd/Existence-Existent in Avicenna: A key ontological notion of Arabic philosophy," *Quaestio* 3 (2003), 111–38; M. Rashed, "Ibn 'Adī et Avicenne: sur les types d'existants", in *Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici. Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe*, Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma, 19–20 ottobre 2001, eds. V. Celluprica, C. D'Ancona, and R. Chiaradonna, Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2004, 107–71 (henceforth: Rashed [2004]).

one in logic); elsewhere, on the contrary, he applies the distinction to specific topics (these further texts constitute additional or complementary evidence). Now, the hierarchy between primary and secondary texts has often been overlooked, with the effect that primary texts are read in the light of the secondary ones, rather than the other way round. Thus, the main text on the issue that is available in metaphysics has been investigated only cursorily, as if it were a complementary text; and so its structure and overall context have not been properly considered.³ Likewise, the interrelated discriminations that Avicenna draws on this topic have often been effaced. Avicenna's distinction of essence and existence runs parallel to and grounds other distinctions, like that of "thing" and "existent", and that of a nature both in itself (like horseness *qua* horseness) and in its universality. Albeit interconnected, these distinctions are not equivalent to one another and should not be confused.⁴ Finally, not all the available texts by Avicenna have been investigated; texts translated into Latin during the Middle Ages have been preferred to other, equally important texts, which (like the main text on the issue that is available in logic) still await being considered in order to get a complete picture of Avicenna's position.

Three main doctrinal outcomes are the result of such methodologies. First, among the concrete applications of the distinction of essence and existence, Avicenna's doctrine of universals has been selected as the vantage point for observing the distinction at hand. Now, since in the *locus classicus* of Avicenna's doctrine of universals, existence is mainly canvassed as external to essence, with much less emphasis on its stable link with this latter, Avicenna's *distinction* of essence and

³ In *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5, for example, the pericope translated below as Text 1 has received the lion's share of attention.

⁴ Confusion occurs, for example, if elements belonging to different distinctions are equated (taking for example essence as equivalent to "thing" and existence as equivalent to "existent"), or, more importantly, if a certain reading of the distinction of essence and existence in one of its specific occurrences is applied to the distinction of "thing" and "existent" in general. See, for example, A.-M. Goichon *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937) (henceforth: Goichon [1937]), 141, n. 2: "C'est donc seulement au sens qui vient d'être précisé qu'Ibn Sina admet une distinction entre *la chose* et l'être, en d'autres termes entre *l'essence* et l'existence" (emphasis added); see also below, n. 28. The term "thing-ness" (*ṣay'īya*) that Avicenna adopts in order to assimilate the concepts of "thing" and essence (see Wisnovsky [2003], 161–72) presupposes the distinction of these latter two concepts: meaning "the fact of having an essence", "thing-ness" reduces the conceptual difference with regard to essence, that, on the contrary, "thing" (meaning "item having an essence") conveys.

existence has been taken as a doctrine of the *separation* between these two items, leaving aside the equally important aspect of their mutual *connection*. Adopting E. Gilson's expression, Avicenna's doctrine is commonly characterized as a theory of the "neutrality" or "indifference" of essence with respect to existence, or as a theory of the "pure essence" before its acquisition of existence.⁵

Second, since in Avicenna's doctrine of universals existence is not only external to, but also dependent on, essence, being occasionally described as an attribute of the latter, essence has been considered also as prior to existence, and existence conversely as posterior to essence.

Third, the ascription of priority to essence with respect to existence has affected the understanding of the related distinction of the primary concepts "thing" and "existent". The distinction of these two concepts has been interpreted in two main ways. (a) According to the majority of scholars, "thing" and "existent" have different intensions and the same extension, that is to say, they convey distinct meanings, but they refer to the same set of entities.⁶ (b) According to other scholars, on the contrary, the intension of "thing" would not only be different from the intension of "existent", but also logically prior to it, insofar as "thing" functions as the subject of which "existent" represent some sort of attribute. Likewise, "thing" would have an extension wider than the extension of "existent", since it would apply to items (the pure essences before they receive existence) to which "existent" does not apply.⁷

⁵ See E. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence* (Paris: Vrin, 1948, repr. 1972), 122; cp. A. De Libera, *L'arts des généralités, Théories de l'abstraction* (Paris: Aubier, 1999), 501. A. Hasnawi, "Aspects de la synthèse avicennienne," in *Penser avec Aristote*, ed. M. A. Sinaceur (Toulouse: Erès, 1991), 227–44, regards the distinction as an instance of what he calls "principe de clôture eidétique" (236–7).

⁶ Goichon [1937], 141–2, n. 2: "Ailleurs, celui-ci [i.e. Avicenne] égale expressément l'extension du concept *shay'* à celle du concept *mawjūd*" (with reference to two passages of I, 5); Druart [2001], 125: "'being' and *shay'* are convertible... their meanings are distinct"; Wisnovsky [2003], 153: "thing and existent are identical extensionally but different intensionally: things are always existents, and existents are always things; to be a thing and to be an existent have different meanings (Avicenna)"; Rashed [2004], 110–1: "Avicenne souligne... la co-implication des statuts de 'chose' et d' 'existant'... l'existence effective... est à la fois inseparable et notionnellement distincte de la choséité."

⁷ F. Rahman, "Essence and existence in Avicenna," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958), 1–16 (henceforth: Rahman [1958]): "...the concept of 'thing' or 'something'... has a much wider use. It is applicable not only to existent objects but

The doctrine at hand is certainly one of the most difficult found in Avicenna, whose understanding is hindered not only by its theoretical depth, but also by the imperfections of the Arabic edition of the *Ilāhiyāt*, and by the peculiarities of Avicenna's philosophical terminology.⁸ In what follows, I underscore some aspects of this doctrine that scholarship just described has not sufficiently brought out. My first point is that the main text on the relationship of essence and existence in metaphysics is *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 (doctrine of the primary concepts or transcendentals) rather than *Ilāhiyāt* V, 1–2 (foundation of the theory of universals): within I, 5 Avicenna considers this relationship as such and in detail, whereas in V, 1–2, as well as elsewhere, he considers it cursorily in one of its particular applications. The texts dealing with the distinction of essence and existence that can be found outside metaphysics (like the main text on this issue in logic), confirm the priority of *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 over the other textual evidence available in metaphysics. Thus, *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 has to be considered before and independently of *Ilāhiyāt* V, 1–2, as well as of the other particular instances of the doctrine.

Second, in *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 Avicenna emphasizes with equal insistence not only the distinction but also the connection of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence. Thus speaking of “neutrality” or “indifference” of

also to essences...the word ‘something’ has the widest possible use...‘something’ itself is allied to a most general notion of being or ‘is-ness’” (p. 7). According to Wisnovsky [2003], position (a) applies to *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 (“thing” and “existent” are intensionally different and extensionally equivalent), whereas position (b) is typical of other parts of the *Ilāhiyāt* and other works of Avicenna (“thing” is logically prior and extensionally wider than “existent”, insofar as it functions as subject of predication of “existent”, and, contrary to this latter, is applicable also to pure essences). Thus, Wisnovsky remarks that in *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5, “thing and existent are identical extensionally but different intensionally” (151–3), but also that “there are several discussions of essence and existence elsewhere in the *Ilāhiyāt* and in other works from Avicenna’s middle period, which suggest that *shay’*...is at the very least logically prior to *mawjūd*, and perhaps even a broader category than *mawjūd*” (158–60).

⁸ In the Cairo standard edition of the *Ilāhiyāt*, momentous confusions of similar terms like “existent” (*mawjūd*) and “existence” (*wuġūd*), as well as many other incorrect readings, are frequent (see below, nn. 11–14, 26, 31–35, 42, and the list of corrections in A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifā’*: A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought [Leiden: Brill, 2006], 483–558, (henceforth: Bertolacci [2006]). Moreover, Avicenna uses the same terms in both a non-technical and a technical sense: terms like *šay’* and *dāt* sometimes are used in a generic way, with the meaning, respectively, of “something” and “self”, whereas some other times they are employed in the specific sense of “thing” as primary concept and “essence”. I employ quotation marks to distinguish the technical from the non-technical use of terms.

essence with regard to existence may be appropriate (with some qualifications, as we shall see) for the relationship of essence and existence that underlies the doctrine of universals in *Ilāhīyāt* V, 1–2, as well as other metaphysical doctrines elsewhere, but it is less suitable for the relationship of essence and existence *tout court* expounded in chapter I, 5. In V, 1–2, Avicenna deals with the ontological underpinnings of universality, which is the effect of the mental existence of an essence: an essence is universal only when it exists in the mind, abstracted from the many individuals that possess this essence. But mental existence is only one of two types of existence that Avicenna envisages, the other type being extra-mental existence. This being the case, the relationship of essence and existence in the doctrine of universals is primarily the relationship between essence, on the one side, and only one of the two particular modes that existence can assume, namely mental existence (vs. extra-mental existence). It is quite reasonable, therefore, that in V, 1–2 Avicenna approaches the issue from a different perspective from the above and stresses the external character of existence with respect to essence, since he is mainly considering existence according to one of its particular modes, namely mental existence, not existence *tout court*. In I, 5, on the contrary, he deals with existence generally taken and provides us with a more comprehensive and balanced account.

Third, together with the attestations of the priority of essence over existence that are proper to chapters V, 1–2, one finds in chapter I, 5 also hints of a different scenario. This chapter in a way confirms that essence is prior to existence, since no ordinary conceptual item can be known without knowing its essence, whereas it can be known independently from the consideration of its existence; in another way, however, it also indicates that existence is logically prior to essence, insofar as the notion of the latter can be assimilated to that of former, and that “existent” is logically prior to “thing”, since the former is a more “nuclear” concept than the latter. Likewise, chapter I, 5 does not only attest that “thing” and “existent” have the same extension on account of their universality, thus substantially confirming the view (a) mentioned above; it also offers evidence, if read at the light of other parts of the *Ilāhīyāt*, of the fact that “existent” functions in Avicenna’s metaphysics, contrary to view (b), as a concept more extensive than “thing”, since God can be considered as an “existent” which is not a “thing”.

The following pages will provide, first, a detailed analysis of Avicenna’s account of the distinction of essence and existence, in the context

of the parallel distinction of “thing” and “existent”, in chapter I, 5 of the *Ilāhīyāt* (section 2). Two main results will emerge: first, “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, are not only distinct from one another, but are also intimately connected with one another (section 3); second, “thing” and essence are not only prior to “existent” and existence, but also, in a way, posterior to them. On closer scrutiny, in fact, chapter I, 5 evidences a way of regarding existence as logically prior to essence (section 4), and of taking “existent” as more extensive than “thing” (section 5). After the analysis of chapter I, 5, other instances of the distinction in other passages of the *Ilāhīyāt* will be considered, pointing to their difference with respect to the main text (section 6). This survey will be complemented by the analysis of the distinction in other parts of the *Šifā'* and in other works by Avicenna, with special attention to the main text on the issue that can be found in the logic of the *Šifā'*: this text substantially confirms the picture emerging from the *Ilāhīyāt*, adding however some important qualifications (section 7).

2. The Main Text in Metaphysics: *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5

That *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5 is the main text of Avicenna on the relationship of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, is evident from several points of view. In terms of content, in this chapter these two pairs of notions are not simply touched upon or applied to a certain theme, as happens elsewhere, but are also analyzed in detail, so that the exposition here is much more extensive than in the other texts. In terms of position within the overall work, moreover, this chapter occurs at the beginning of the *Ilāhīyāt* and precedes the resumptions of the same topic in the following portion of the work, so that many of the subsequent *loci* refer back explicitly to it. The main topics of chapter I, 5 can be outlined as follows:⁹

⁹ *Aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhīyāt* (1), eds. Ğ. Š. Qanawāti and S. Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Āmma li-Šu'ūn al-Maṭābi' al-Amīriya, 1960); *aṣ-Šifā'*, *al-Ilāhīyāt* (2), eds. M. Y. Mūsā, S. Dunyā, and S. Zāyid (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Āmma li-Šu'ūn al-Maṭābi' al-Amīriya, 1960). The division of the chapter into sections, and the titles given to each section, are mine (see *Libro della Guarigione, Le Cose Divine di Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)*, a cura di A. Bertolacci [Turin: UTET, 2007], 181–195). For a cursory analysis of this chapter, see Rahman [1958], 4–9; its overall English translation and systematic commentary is available in M. E. Marmura, “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his *al-Šifā'*,” in *Logos Islamikos*, *Studia Islamica in Honorem G. M. Wickens*, eds. R. M. Savory and D. A. Agius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,

Outline 1: Contents of *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5

- [1] The primary concepts in general (pp. 29.5–30.2)
 - [1.1] “Existent”, “thing” and “necessary” as primary concepts (p. 29.5–6)
 - [1.2] The primary concepts as the first principles of the activity of conceptualizing (pp. 29.7–30.1)
 - [1.3] Proof of the necessity of the primary concepts (p. 30.1–2)
- [2] “Existent” and “thing” (pp. 30.3–32.5)
 - [2.1] “Existent” and “thing” cannot be defined: examples of pseudo-definitions of “existent” and “thing” (pp. 30.3–31.2)
 - [2.1.1] “Existent”, “thing” and “one” as primary and universal concepts (p. 30.3–4)
 - [2.1.2] The primary concepts cannot be defined (p. 30.4–6)
 - [2.1.3] Examples (pp. 30.6–31.2)
 - [2.2] Distinction between “existent” and “thing” (pp. 31.2–32.2)
 - [2.2.1] First formulation (p. 31.2–9)
 - [2.2.2] Second formulation (pp. 31.10–32.2)
 - [2.3] “Existent” is an inseparable concomitant of “thing” (p. 32.3–5)
- [3] Criticism of the opinion according to which “thing” can be absolutely non-existent (pp. 32.6–34.9)
 - [3.1] A “thing” cannot be non-existent both in the mind and in the external reality (p. 32.6–11)
 - [3.2] The absolutely non-existent cannot be enunciated (pp. 32.12–33.11)
 - [3.2.1] First argument (pp. 32.12–33.1)
 - [3.2.2] Second argument (p. 33.1–11)
 - [3.3] The absolutely non-existent cannot be known: only the non-existent that does not exist in external reality but exists in the mind can be known (p. 33.12–5)
 - [3.4] Explanation of the adversaries’ error (pp. 33.16–34.9)
- [4] Rejection of the opinion according to which “existent” and “thing” are not equivalent to their synonyms, and the attribute of a thing can be neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing (p. 34.9–14)

1984), 219–39 (henceforth: Marmura [1984]); see also Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing, A parallel English-Arabic text translated, introduced, and annotated by M. E. Marmura* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 22–9.

- [4.1] Recapitulation (p. 34.9–10)
- [4.2] Exposition of the opinion and criticism (p. 34.11–4)
- [5] “Existent” is predicated according to priority and posteriority, and can be taken into account by a science (pp. 34.15–35.2)
- [6] “Necessary”, “possible”, “impossible” (pp. 35.3–36.6)
 - [6.1] “Necessary”, “possible” and “impossible” cannot be defined properly: mutual circularity of their definitions (pp. 35.3–36.3)
 - [6.2] Priority of “necessary” with regard to “possible” and “impossible” (p. 36.4–6)
- [7] Criticism of the opinion according to which what has ceased to exist can be brought back to existence (p. 36.6–19)
 - [7.1] Exposition of the opinion (p. 36.6–8)
 - [7.2] First criticism (p. 36.8–11)
 - [7.3] Second criticism (p. 36.11–9)

Avicenna's view on the relationship of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, is contained *in nuce* in parts [2.2] and [2.3] of the chapter, whose translation is provided in Text 1. Part [2.2] deals with the distinction of these concepts, part [2.3] with their connection. In part [2.2], “existent” and “thing” are distinguished by showing that each of them conveys a different notion, according to two consecutive formulations. Avicenna's general strategy is to clarify the meaning of “existent” and “thing” by associating them, respectively, with the notion of “existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality]” and the notion of “essence”, stated to be different from each other (main point of the first formulation, [2.2.1]); and then to argue for the distinction of these two notions by means of the analysis of propositions: since statements connecting essence (as subject) with real existence (as predicate) are informative (“synthetical” in a Kantian sense), these two entities must be distinct from one another (main point of the second formulation, [2.2.2]). The two formulations differ from one another not only in content, as we are going to see, but also in emphasis: the first gives precedence to “existent” over “thing”, whereas the second focuses primarily on “thing”, leaving “existent” in the background. Section [2.3], finally, affirms that, notwithstanding their distinction, “existent” is inseparable from “thing”, since things always exist in some way or another, and are always, therefore, existents.

Text 1: Avicenna, *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5, pp. 31.2–32.5 [pp. 34.50–36.83]¹⁰
(= Outline 1 [2.2–3])

[2.2 *Distinction between “existent” and “thing”, 2.2.1 First formulation*]

[a] We say that the notion (*ma’nā*) of ‘existent’¹¹ and the notion of ‘thing’ are conceptualized in the soul as two [distinct] notions.

[b] ‘Existent’, ‘established [in reality]’ (*mutbat*) and ‘realized’ (*muḥaṣṣal*) are synonyms [that signify] a single notion. We have no doubt that their notion is already present in the soul of the reader of this book.

[c] With ‘thing’ and its equivalents another notion is signified in every language. For every entity (*amr*) has an essence (*ḥaqīqa*) by means of which it is what it is. Thus the triangle has as [its] essence the fact of being triangle, and the whiteness has as [its] essence the fact of being whiteness.

[d] This is what we call sometimes ‘proper existence’ (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ*). We do not mean by it the notion of existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality] (*wuḡūd iṭbātī*). For also by means of the term ‘existence’ many notions are signified, one of which is the essence according to which a thing is. That according to which [a thing] is, therefore, is like its proper existence.

[2.2.2 *Second formulation*]

[a] Let us go back [to the beginning]. We say to be clear that every thing has a proper essence, which is its quiddity (*māhiya*). Now, it is known that the proper essence of every thing is other than the existence that is synonymous with ‘being established [in reality]’ (*iṭbāt*).

[b] For, if you say: ‘The essence so-and-so is existent in the concrete objects, or in souls, or absolutely (including [in this last case] the [previous] two¹²),’ this [statement] has a meaning that is ascertained and comprehensible. If, on the other hand, you said: ‘The essence so-and-so is the essence so-and-so,’ or: ‘The essence so-and-so is an essence,’ you would have a useless redundancy speech. If you said: ‘The essence so-and-so is a thing,’ [this] would be again a statement that does not inform regarding what is unknown (even less informative would be your statement: ‘The essence is a thing’), unless you mean by ‘thing’ ‘existing [thing],’ as if you were saying: ‘The essence so-and-so is an existing essence.’

[c] When you say: ‘The essence A is a thing, and the essence B is another thing,’ this [statement] is correct and informative only because

¹⁰ Numbers between square brackets refer to pages and lines of the critical edition of the Latin translation of the *Ilāhīyāt*: Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, I–IV. Édition critique par S. Van Riet. Introduction par G. Verbeke (Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1977); *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, V–X. Édition critique par S. Van Riet. Introduction par G. Verbeke (Louvain-Leiden: Peeters-Brill, 1980).

¹¹ *mawḡūd* (*wuḡūd* ed.)

¹² *yahummuhumā* (*yahummuhā* ed.)

you assume in your mind that [the essence B] is another determinate thing, different from this other thing [i.e. the essence A], as if you said: 'The essence A is a [certain] essence,¹³ and the essence B is another essence.' Without, at the same time, this assumption [of difference], and this conjunction [of the essence B with the essence A], [this statement] would not be informative.

[d] With 'thing', therefore, this notion is meant.

[2.3 'Existent' is an inseparable concomitant of 'thing']

[a] The concomitance (*luzūm*) of the meaning of 'existent'¹⁴ does not separate itself (*lā yufāriqu*) from it [i.e. from the notion of 'thing'] at all (*al-battata*). On the contrary, the notion of 'existent' always (*dā'imān*) accompanies it inseparably (*yalzamu*), since it [i.e. 'thing'] is either an existent in the concrete objects, or an existent in the estimative faculty and the intellect.

[b] Were it not so, it would not be a thing.

In the first formulation ([2.2.1]), Avicenna argues for the distinction between "existent" and "thing", announced in section [a], by adducing some synonyms of "existent" which are not synonyms of "thing", and connecting "thing" with a notion (having an essence) to which "existent" is unrelated. In section [b], "existent" is said to be a synonym of "established [in reality]", and "realized". Avicenna says that its meaning, as well as the meaning of its synonyms, is well-known, but he does not clarify the matter further. In section [d], however, he introduces the notion of "existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality]," a notion that is certainly related to "existent", insofar as it is the combination of "existence" and one of its synonyms. I call it "existence"¹⁵. In the case of "thing" on the other hand, the synonyms do not receive special attention, since they have been already taken into account in the previous section of the chapter (see above, Outline 1 [2.1]).¹⁵ Rather than being explained by means of synonyms, the notion of "thing" is analyzed and related in section [c] to the idea of having an "essence".¹⁶ In section [d], however, the essence is named "proper existence" (*wuğūd ḥāṣṣ*), according to one of the many senses of existence, in distinction from the "existence regarding the fact of

¹³ *inna ḥaqīqatan ā ḥaqīqatun (inna ḥaqīqatan ā ed.)*

¹⁴ *mawğūd (wuğūd ed.)*

¹⁵ Only one of them ("entity", *amr*) is mentioned *en passant* in section [c].

¹⁶ The example of the triangle to elucidate the possess of an essence by the "thing" echoes the example chosen by Aristotle in *An. Post. A, 1* to explain the necessity of a preliminary knowledge of the meaning of the expressions indicating the objects of teaching and science.

being established [in reality]” typical of “existent”. I call it “existence²”. By “proper existence” Avicenna apparently means the concrete way of existing proper to a determinate species of realities, conveyed by their distinctive essence. Avicenna thus affirms a fundamental distinction within existence:

Outline 2: The two meanings of existence in *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5 [2.2.1d]

existence¹ = existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality]
 existence² = proper existence = essence

This distinction of two meanings of existence can be found exclusively in the first formulation. The choice of linking both “existent” and “thing” with two senses of the same notion (existence) is apparently awkward and counter-productive, since it compromises the intended distinction of the two concepts and makes a second, more straightforward formulation of the issue necessary; however it is surely intentional, given its background in Aristotle and previous Arab philosophers¹⁷ and the widespread presence of the notion of “proper existence”, and similar expressions, within the *Ilāhīyāt*.¹⁸ As we are going to see, it is highly significant (cf. below, section 4).

The second formulation ([2.2.2]) equates the distinction between “thing” and “existent” to that between essence and existence¹, clarifying

¹⁷ Both the idea that existence is said in many ways, and the denomination of essence as “proper existence”, have a remote background in Aristotle’s doctrine of being and essence (see, respectively, *Metaph.* Γ, 2, 1003a33: “Being is said in many ways”, and 1003b32–33: “the essence of everything... is from its very nature something that is”; cf. Bertolacci [2006], 378. A link between essence, on the one hand, and being or existence, on the other, was affirmed by al-Kindī (d. after 256/870)—see the idea that an essence has its own being (“being of essence”, *kawn dāt*) in *Falsafa Ūlā, Rasā’il al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, ed. M. ‘A. Abū Rida (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1950–1953), vol. I, 41.3—and was neatly assessed by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d. 363/974)—see the expression “essential existence” (*wuḡūd dātī*), which is regarded as typical of his “Platonization of Farabism”, i.e. his failure to distinguish spatio-temporal existence from entitative subsistence, and the ascription to essence of a kind of spatio-temporal existence (Rashed [2004], 146–7). What is peculiar of Avicenna is the denomination of essence as “proper existence” (a denomination possibly directed against Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s Platonism).

¹⁸ I, 1, p. 9.1 (*wuḡūd alladī yaḥuṣṣu*); I, 6, p. 37.18 (*wuḡūd alladī yaḥuṣṣu*); p. 41.16 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ*); p. 41.16–7 (*wuḡūd alladī yaḥuṣṣu*); II, 3, p. 74.14, 15 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ muta-qawwim*); p. 75.3 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ yataqawwamu bi-hī*), p. 75.6 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ*); p. 75.7 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ yataqawwamu bihī*); III, 10, p. 159.17 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ*); VIII, 5, p. 350.2 (*wuḡūd ḥāṣṣ*); VIII, 6, p. 356. 9 [p. 413.84] (*ḥuṣūṣiyat wuḡūd*). The expression “proper essence” is comparatively rare in Avicenna’s works.

this second distinction with a more coherent terminology. In section [a], Avicenna calls the essence “proper *essence*” and “quiddity”, and maintains that proper essence is different from existence¹—this latter being named by means of an expression (“existence synonymous with ‘being established [in reality]’”) that is equivalent to the one already employed in the previous section to denote the concept “existent”. The different terminology (“proper essence” instead of “proper existence”) is probably meant to avoid any confusion between essence and existence¹, even though the fact that existence¹ is specified as the existence that is synonymous with “being established [in reality]” implies that a wider notion of “existence” is still implicitly present.

The distinction between essence and existence¹ is argued for by means of the analysis of five propositions in section [b]. Both this section and the following one ([c]) have no parallel in the first formulation:

Outline 3: Propositions in Text 1 [2.2.2b]

- (1) “The essence so-and-so is existent in the concrete objects, or in the souls, or absolutely [i.e both in the concrete objects and in the souls, or: either in the concrete objects or in the souls]” = informative statement
- (2) “The essence so-and-so is the essence so-and-so” = tautology
- (3) “The essence so-and-so is an essence” = tautology
- (4) “The essence so-and-so is a thing” = not informative, unless “thing” is meant as “existing [thing]” → (4a) “The essence so-and-so is an existing thing” = informative
- (5) “The essence is a thing” = even less informative [unless “thing” is meant as “existing [thing]” → (5a) “The essence is an existing thing” = informative]

The distinction of essence and existence¹ is attested by the comparison of proposition [1] with propositions [2]–[3]. In proposition [1], the essence is said to be existent according to at least one of the two modes of existence¹, namely existence in external objects or in the mind, and this predication of existence results in being informative. This is so because the notion of the predicate (“is existent”, namely “has existence”) is not already contained in the notion of the subject (“essence”). In propositions [2]–[3], on the other hand, the notion of the predicate is identical, either completely or partially, with the notion of the subject, and these statements are therefore tautological. Propositions

[4]–[5] present the same opposition with regard, respectively, to the stated proposition [4a] and the unstated proposition [5a]; in these latter “existent” is not the entire predicate, as in proposition [1], but an adjective attached to it (“existing essence” or “existing thing”).

In section [c] Avicenna adds a sixth proposition, which—albeit directly relevant neither to the distinction of essence and existence, nor to the clarification of the meaning of “thing”—aims at countering the possible objection that there are informative statements in which “thing” is predicated of “essence”, without including existence.

- (6) “The essence A is a thing, and the essence B is another thing” = informative, if “another” is understood not simply as “distinct”, but as “different”, and as expressing difference with regard to the previously mentioned “thing” → (6a) “The essence A is a [certain] essence, and the essence B is another essence.”

Although in propositions [4]–[6] the terms “thing” and “essence” are sometimes used interchangeably,¹⁹ these propositions also attest that “thing” and “essence” are, according to Avicenna, two distinct concepts. The very presence of proposition [4] as distinct from proposition [3] implies that “thing” and “essence” have, according to Avicenna, different meanings, since otherwise the former proposition (“The essence so-and-so is a thing”) would be identical to the latter (“The essence so-and-so is an essence”). Accordingly, Avicenna states that proposition [3] is a mere tautology, whereas he says that proposition [4] is not informative (“it does not inform about what is unknown”).

In section [2.3], Avicenna goes back to the relationship between “existent” and “thing”. He makes clear that, despite the different meanings of these two concepts, and despite the distinction between existence¹ and essence, the concept of “existent” accompanies inseparably the concept of “thing”. The infinitive *luzūm* and the verb *lazīma* in section [a] attest that Avicenna regards “existent” as a *lāzīm* of “thing”, namely a notion that, albeit not being part of the essence of something is also not a bare accident, but something approaching the

¹⁹ In proposition [4a] (“The essence so-and-so is an existing *essence*”), for example, the term “essence” takes the place of the term “thing” in proposition [4] (“The essence so-and-so is a *thing*”), which it modifies. Likewise, in the modified proposition [6a] (“The essence A is a [certain] *essence*”), “essence” takes the place of “thing” in proposition [6] (“The essence A is a *thing*”).

status of a property.²⁰ In this section Avicenna strongly emphasizes the stability of the connection of “thing” and “existent”. He says that this connection is not interrupted under any circumstance (“at all”), and that it is permanent (“always”, section [a]). He also contends that, if a “thing” didn’t exist, it wouldn’t be a “thing” (section [b]). This suggests that existence (i.e. the fact of being an “existent”) is a very peculiar inseparable concomitant of essence (i.e. the fundamental ingredient of a “thing”) and approaches the status of a constitutive element.

3. “Thing” (Essence) and “Existent” (Existence) Are Distinct from, but Inseparably Related to, One Another

In chapter I, 5, Avicenna insists not only on the difference and the distinction, but also, with equal emphasis, on the connection between “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence. *Prima facie*, Text 1 gives a different impression, since its two main sections argue extensively for the distinction of these items, whereas only the final, much shorter, section points at their connection. Moreover, the relationship of concomitance that Avicenna affirms between “thing” and “existent” in the third section is in a way uneven, since it implies that “existent” inseparably follows “thing”, without entailing a similar concomitance of “thing” with regard to “existent”. This unidirectional, rather than bidirectional, link might suggest a sort of unbalanced relationship between the two concepts.

This impression, however, is misleading. First of all, section [2.3] is not just an appendix of Text 1, as it might seem. It is rather the

²⁰ Further remarks on the concept of *lāzim* in general and on existence as *lāzim* of things can be found in the *Madḥal*, the reworking of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in the *Šifā’*. See *aš-Šifā’, al-Mantiq, al-Madḥal*, eds. Ğ. Š. Qanawātī, M. al-Ḥudayrī and A. F. al-Ahwānī (Cairo: al-Maṭba’a al-Amīriya, 1952), I, 11, p. 64, 4–9: “As under a *species specialissima* (*naw’ al-anwā*) there are universal subjects, although they are not species, like “secretary”, “sailor”, and “Turk” under “man”, likewise it is not impossible that, above a *summum genus* (*ġins al-aḡnās*) there are predicates that are not genera, but notions that are inseparable concomitants (*ma’ānin lāzima*) shared by some of the *summa genera*, like existence and accidentality [*wa-l’araḍiya*; some mss. have instead *wa-l-waḥda* “and unity”, see apparatus ad I. 9], and like some entities that are predicated of a certain number of highest genera (*aḡnās ‘āliya*), as you will understand later”. The reference at the end (“as you will understand later”) is to the reworking of the *Categories* (*Maqūlāt* II, 4), where Avicenna discusses the status of motion as an entity external to the categories and common to three of them (quality, quantity and space).

beginning of the lengthy discussion that Avicenna offers in the following part [3]. The view that Avicenna expounds and rejects in this part is tightly connected with section [2.3]: by postulating a disconnection between “existent” and “thing”, this view represents the denial of the main tenet of section [2.3]. The same applies to the view discussed and rejected by Avicenna in part [7], according to which a same “thing” or essence can cease to exist at some point and start to exist again at a later point, namely, it can be brought back into existence or resuscitated. In other words, Avicenna continues to deal with the topic of section [2.3] in the following dialectical portion of chapter I, 5, which functions as a kind of *destructio*, up until the very end of the chapter, of some relevant opinions that go against the doctrine established in this section. Thus, from the point of view of extension, the treatment of the connection between “thing” and “existence”, and essence and existence, in section [2.3] and in its continuation afterwards is in no way shorter than the treatment of their distinction in sections [2.1–2].²¹

Secondly, in a later passage of chapter I, 5 Avicenna contends that “thing” and “existent” are mutually concomitant, using a reciprocal form of the same verb *lazima* that he has employed to express the concomitance of “existent” with regard to “thing” in Text 1 [2.3a]:

Text 2: *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5, p. 34.9–10 [p. 39.37–9] (Outline 1 [4.1])

Now you have understood in what [the concept of] ‘thing’ differs from the concept of ‘existent’ and of ‘supervening’, even though [‘thing’ and ‘existent’] accompany each other inseparably (*mutalāzimāni*).

This means that, in Avicenna’s opinion, the relationship of concomitance does not simply apply to “existent” with respect to “thing”, but also to “thing” with respect to “existent”. The relationship between these two concepts emerges therefore as perfectly balanced, so that “thing” (and essence) cannot reclaim, in this respect, any priority over “existent” (and existence).

In other words, in chapter I, 5, the main text on the topic, Avicenna stresses, together with the separation, also the link between “thing”

²¹ Section [2.3] is pivotal in the structure of chapter I, 5 in two respects. On the one hand, it connects to each other the two most extensive parts of this chapter, namely the second and the third. On the other hand, it marks the transition from the expositive portion of the chapter (parts [1]–[2]) to dialectical portion (parts [3]–[4] and [7]).

and “existent”, and, implicitly, between essence and existence. The two aspects—distinction and connection—appear to be equally important for Avicenna. To pay exclusive attention to, or emphasize the relevance of, the former over the latter seems to be a patent transgression of Avicenna's explicit pronouncement on the issue.

4. *The Issue of Logical Priority*

The second formulation of the distinction of essence and existence¹ in Text 1 discloses an obvious sense in which essence is logically prior to existence: if I cannot know a triangle without knowing its essence, whereas I can know it without knowing its existence¹, it seems evident that essence possesses some kind of logical priority over existence¹. The first formulation of the distinction, on the other hand, seems to envisage a more equal logical status both of essence with respect to existence¹, and of “thing” with respect to “existent”, and even points to the priority of the latter concepts with respect to the former from the logical point of view. Let us therefore consider both formulations together.

What chapter I, 5 says about the intension (i.e. the conceptual content) of “existent” and “thing”, existence and essence, can be summarized in the following table.

Table 1. Avicenna's Remarks on the Intension of “Existent” and “Thing” in *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5

	“Existent”	“Thing”
synonymous with	“established” (<i>muṭbat</i>), “realized” (<i>muḥaṣṣal</i>) [2.2.1b] “supervening” (<i>hāṣil</i>) [3.2.1] (p. 32.18)	“entity” (<i>amr</i>), “what” (<i>mā</i>), “that which” (<i>alladī</i>) [2.1d]
conveys the notion of	existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality] (= existence ¹) [2.2.1d]	essence = proper existence (= existence ²) ≠ existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality] (= existence ¹) [2.2.1d]
	existence synonymous with “being established [in reality]” (= existence ¹) [2.2.2a]	proper essence = quiddity ≠ existence synonymous with “being established [in reality]” (= existence ¹) [2.2.2a]

Two features are noteworthy. First, the meaning of “existent” is clarified only by means of synonyms in the first formulation (section [2.2.1b]; another synonym of “existent” is mentioned in section [3.2.1]). The cognate notion of existence¹ makes its appearance in the context of the explanation of the meaning of “thing”, both in the first and in the second formulation (sections [2.2.1d], [2.2.2a]), but is not directly linked to “existent”, although it is obviously related to it. The meaning of “thing”, on the contrary, is not explained by means of synonyms (which are taken into account earlier in section [2.1d] to explain the impossibility of defining “thing”), but by reference to a different notion, that of “essence” and the synonyms of this latter ([2.2.1d], [2.2.2a]). In this regard, “existent” appears to be a concept “more primary”, so speak, than “thing”, since it is less amenable to being explained by different notions.

Second, in the first formulation of the distinction, essence is identified with a second meaning of existence, i.e. “proper existence” or existence² ([2.2.1d]; see above, section 2, Outline 2). This implies that, according to Avicenna, the concept of essence can be intensionally assimilated to the concept of existence¹, insofar as it also conveys the idea of existence. True, the notion of existence (= existence²) conveyed by the essence is not the same notion of existence (= existence¹) conveyed by the concept “existent;” nonetheless, essence is reducible to the general concept of existence, of which existence¹ represents another instance. The concept of existence¹, on the contrary, is introduced by Avicenna with involvement of one of the synonyms of “existent” (“existence regarding the fact of being established [in reality]”, [2.2.1d]; “existence synonymous with being established [in reality]”, [2.2.2a]), but totally independently of the concept of essence.²² In this regard, also existence appears to be a concept “more primary” than essence given that it is not assimilated to other alien notions.

How explain this ambivalent perspective within one and the same text? Two different senses of logical priority may be involved. Essence may be taken as prior to existence with respect to our knowledge of a knowable item like the triangle, since it is more fundamental than existence from the cognitive point of view. Absolutely speaking,

²² Likewise, the intension of “existent” cannot be reduced or assimilated in any way to the intension of “thing”; see *Ilāhiyāt* III, 2, p. 103.8–9 [p. 114.19–20]: “[“One” and “existent”] coincide, insofar as none of them signify the substance (*ḡawhar*) of anything, as you know.” In this text, the term “substance” is obviously synonym of “essence”.

however, i.e. independently from the role played by essence and existence as cognitive tools in the human mind, the domain of essence is not necessarily prior to the domain of existence, and this latter might even be assumed as more primary than the former.

5. *The Issue of Extension*

The extensional relation of “existent” and “thing” in the *Ilāhīyāt* is sufficiently clear. In section [1.3] of chapter I, 5, as well as elsewhere, both concepts, together with the other primary notions, are portrayed as universal:²³ their common universality seems to imply that they have the same extension. The co-extensionality of “existent” and “thing” is confirmed by passages like Text 2, where Avicenna states their co-implication. In the present section, I would like to emphasize two points: first, negatively, that “thing” is not more extensive than “existent” according to Avicenna; second, positively, that “existent” might be even viewed by Avicenna as more extensive than “thing”. Chapters of the *Ilāhīyāt* other than I, 5 provide valuable indications in both these directions.

As to the first point, Avicenna in this work expressly declares that no concept is more universal than “existent”:

Text 3: *Ilāhīyāt* I, 2, p. 14.6 [p. 14.55]:

There is nothing more common than ‘existent’.

A statement like this clearly rules out the possibility of assigning to “thing” an extension greater than “existent”.

Even more—and this is my second point—it would seem that, according to Avicenna, whereas every “thing” is an “existent” (i.e. it exists either in reality or in the mind, as we have seen), not every existent is a “thing”. The reason is that for Avicenna there is at least a being (i.e. God, the Necessary Existent) that is properly an existent, without however being a “thing”. But if this is the case, then “existent” is more extensive than “thing”. Let us see more precisely why.

By gathering together Avicenna’s scattered remarks in chapter I, 5, one gets the following description of “existent”:

²³ Cp. I, 8, p. 54.13–4 [pp. 63.10–64.11]: “...since ‘existent’ is a nature that can be predicated of everything”; II, 2, p. 68.3–4 [p. 78.64–6], where Avicenna states that the fact of being an “entity” (*amr*)—a synonym of “thing” (see above, Table 1)—is “common” (*‘amm*), i.e. universal.

Existent_{descr.}: “The established [in reality] (/“The realized”) according to some kind of existence¹⁹”

Likewise, on the basis of the aforementioned evidence, one can formulate the following description of “thing”²⁴:

Thing_{descr.}: “That which (/Entity that /What) has an essence (/a quiddity).”

According to the distinction of essence and existence¹ established in Text 1, the description of “thing” proposed by Avicenna can be rephrased as follows:

Thing_{descr.a.}: “That which has an essence *distinct from existence*¹.”

According to these descriptions, one can safely contend that, according to Avicenna, God is an “existent” but is not a “thing”. God is an “existent” since God fully instantiates the aforementioned description of this concept.²⁵ But God, in Avicenna’s view, does not have an essence distinct from existence¹, and therefore is not a “thing”. The relevant statements on the matter occur in *Ilāhiyāt* VIII, 4. It is not clear whether in this chapter Avicenna endorses the thesis that God has no essence distinct from existence (in the sense of existence¹), thus assuming a sort of coincidence of essence and existence in God, or the much stronger position that God has no essence at all.²⁶ Regardless

²⁴ See the similar descriptions in D. L. Black, “Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings,” *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 8 (1997), 425–53 (at 450), and Druart [2001], 132.

²⁵ The concept “existent” is applied to God, for example, in VIII, 1, p. 327.5 [p. 376.6]; VIII, 3, p. 342.8–9 [p. 396.21–2].

²⁶ The issue is debated: see Goichon [1937], 177, 343–54; E. M. Macierowski, “Does God have a quiddity according to Avicenna?” *The Thomist* 52 (1988), 79–87; J. P. Rosheger, “Is God a ‘What’? Avicenna, William of Auvergne, and Aquinas on the Divine Essence,” in *Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, ed. J. Inglis (London-New York: Routledge, 2002), 277–96; R. Acar, *Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions*, (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2005), 81–3. Avicenna’s own words support both alternatives. Text 8 below, for example, supports the first alternative. Likewise, in a later passage of the same chapter VIII, 4 (p. 347.10–12 [p. 402.48–51]), Avicenna contends that the First has no quiddity at all, and opposes It to the other things having quiddities. That God has no essence whatsoever is congruent with Avicenna’s subsequent contention in the same chapter that He has no genus, differentia and definition (*Ilāhiyāt* VIII, 4, pp. 347.17–348.5 [pp. 402.61–403.70]), and is repeated *expressis verbis* also later on in the *Ilāhiyāt* (IX, 1, p. 373.5 [p. 434.5]), and in other works by Avicenna (*Ta’līqāt*, ed. ‘A. Badawī [Cairo: Al-Hay’a al-Miṣriya al-‘Āmma li-l-Kitāb, 1973], 37.4–7: “Don’t you see that those who truly verify things (*al-muḥaqqiqīna*), in order to get the knowledge of the Necessary Existent by Itself, and of the fact that It is not a body, follow a different procedure? They say: The Necessary Existent by Itself does not have

of Avicenna's precise conception of the relationship of essence and existence in God, it seems clear that, in his perspective, God cannot be a "thing". For, according to the description of this concept provided before, a "thing" must possess an essence, and its essence must be distinct from existence¹. Now, Avicenna's God does not meet at least one of these two requirements, namely the second, possibly even the first. God, therefore, is not a "thing" in Avicenna's view.

But, if this is so, then the extension of "existent" is greater than the extension of "thing". Having a broader scope than "thing", and being a more universal concept, "existent" is therefore prior to "thing" in extension. Thus, the universality in extension that Avicenna ascribes to both "existent" and "thing" in chapter I, 5 and elsewhere, and their co-implication that he maintains in Text 2, do not seem to entail an absolute extensional equivalence.²⁷ In other words, according to Avicenna, the concept of "thing" would be universal in comparison to all the other non-transcendental concepts, but less universal, so-to-speak than "existent"; conversely, the concept of "existent" would be co-extensive with the concept of "thing" in the majority of cases, but not in all.

6. "Thing" and "Existent", *Essence and Existence in Other Chapters of the Ilāhīyāt*

In the *Ilāhīyāt* Avicenna applies systematically the doctrine of the relationship of "thing" and "existent", essence and existence, to many

a quiddity (*māhiya*); but every body has a quiddity and receives [its] existence from outside; therefore, the Necessary Existent is not a body"). Elsewhere in the *Ilāhīyāt*, on the contrary, Avicenna describes God's nature with expressions that seem to imply His possession of an essence: see, for example, *ḥaqīqat wāḡib al-wuḡūd* ("the essence of the Necessary Existent") in *Ilāhīyāt* VIII, 5, p. 349.11 [p. 405.7] (*ḥaqīqat* is replaced by *dāt* in the following lines), p. 349.17 [p. 405.18–9]; p. 350.3 [p. 406.23] (reading *ḥaqīqatu l-wāḡibi l-wuḡūdi* instead of *ḥaqīqatu l-wāḡibi l-wuḡūdu*).

²⁷ The relationship of unidirectional concomitance that Avicenna affirms between "existent" and "thing" in Text 1 [2.3b] is compatible with a scenario in which "existent" has a greater extension than "thing". What Avicenna says in this passage is that the status of "thing" implies the concomitance of "existent", since every "thing" is in fact an "existent", insofar as it possesses some kind of existence¹ either in the mind or in external objects. He does not contend, however, the reciprocal point, namely that the status of "existent" implies the concomitance of "thing", so that every "existent" would in fact possess an essence and be therefore a "thing". This leaves the possibility open that, whereas all "things" are "existents", not all "existents" are "things".

different metaphysical areas, like the theory of substance, of universals, of causality, and of God's nature. Thus, the doctrine introduced and expounded in its complete and "pure" form in chapter I, 5 recurs in several other *loci* of the *Ilāhiyāt* in which it is summarized briefly, within a precise context and with a specific aim. To assess the extent of its resumption, the context in which it occurs, and the aim that Avicenna pursues is, of course, crucial. In general, of the two main points established in chapter I, 5—the distinction, on the one hand, and the connection, on the other, of "thing" and "existent", essence and existence—Avicenna insists in these passages particularly on the former, namely on the distinction between these items, for specific theoretical reasons that differ from case to case. In addition, he omits the hints as to the logical equivalence of "existent" and existence with "thing" and essence that can be found in chapter I, 5, and he adopts the perspective according to which "thing" and essence result in being prior to "existent" and existence. Accordingly, when he takes into account the relationship of "thing" and "existent", essence and existence, he treats it mostly as a unidirectional relationship linking "thing" and essence, as first element of the relation, with "existent" and existence as second element.²⁸

²⁸ According to Wisnovsky [2003], 158–60, in *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 Avicenna contends that neither "existent" nor "thing" is logically prior to the other, whereas in other passages of the *Ilāhiyāt* and in his other works he takes "thing" as logically prior to "existent". In this regard, Wisnovsky points to the fact that in some passages of the *Ilāhiyāt*, *Madḥal*, and *Ḥikma 'arūḍiyya/Nağāt*, "thing" is portrayed as "a universally applicable subject of which one and existent may be predicated", and is "elevated above considerations of existence" (p. 159; see above, n. 7). Although one can envisage differently the doctrine of chapter I, 5 (see above, section 4), Wisnovsky is certainly right in stressing this doctrinal shift. It is worth noticing that in the texts discussed by Wisnovsky the term "thing" appears often with a non-technical, rather than technical, sense: it occurs either in the plural (*ašyā'*, "things"), in indeterminate expressions (*šay' min al-ašyā'*, lit.: "one among the things", i.e. "something"), or in correlative clauses (from a certain point of view, x is "a [certain] thing", from another point of view, it is "a [different] thing"), being occasionally replaced by terms like "notion" or "intentional object" (*ma'nān*). See *Ḥikma 'arūḍiyya*, Ms. Uppsala, Or. 364, f. 2v8–10 = *Nağāt* I, 9, p. 514.16–9 (Text 1 in Wisnovsky [2003], p. 158): "But the nature of 'one' is among the accidents that accompany things (*al-ašyā'*) inseparably, and "one" does not constitute the quiddity of anything (*šay' min al-ašyā'*). On the contrary, the quiddity is a [certain] thing (*šay'*), either a man, or a horse, or an intellect, or a soul; then this [thing] is described as being one and existent (*mawğūd*)". *Madḥal* I, 12, p. 65.8–12 (Text 3 in Wisnovsky [2003], p. 158): "We say...that each of the entities (*al-umūr*) that serve as an example of one of these five [predicables] in itself is a [certain] thing (*šay'*), whereas insofar as it is a genus, or a species, or a differentia, or a property, or a common accident, it is a [different] thing (*šay'*). Let us take an example of this from [the case of] the genus and say: 'animal' in itself is a [certain] notion (*ma'nān*), regard-

Not all the passages of the *Ilāhīyāt* in which the doctrine in question is taken up will be discussed here.²⁹ Four of them will be selected, since they show better than others the limitations of the doctrine in its concrete applications. The first of these is the famous pericope of chapter V, 1, in which Avicenna focuses on the distinction between essence and existence within his general introduction to the discussion of universals. In this text, Avicenna aims at distinguishing the nature or essence as such from the nature or essence as universal concept; universality attaches to a nature or essence only when the latter exists in the mind, for the mind is capable of connecting this nature with the many individuals that instantiate it. Thus the resumption of the doctrine of essence and existence from chapter I, 5 is quite minimal, pointing solely to their distinction.

Text 4: *Ilāhīyāt* V, 1, p. 196.7–16 [pp. 228.24–229.42]

[a] The universal *qua* universal is something (*šay'*), whereas, *qua* thing to which universality is consequent (*talḥaḡuḥū*), it is something [else] (*šay'*).³⁰

[b] The universal *qua* universal is what is signified by one of these definitions [i.e. the definitions of “universal” mentioned before Text 4].

[c] If it [i.e. the universal] is a man or a horse, there is another notion, different from the notion of universality, namely horseness. For the definition (*ḥadd*) of horseness is not the definition of universality, nor does universality enter into the definition of horseness. For the definition of horseness does not require universality.³¹ Rather, universality occurs [accidentally] (*ta'riḡu*) to it.

[d] For [horseness] in itself is nothing other than horseness. In itself, it is neither one nor many, neither existent (*mawḡūd*) in the concrete objects nor in the soul, neither one of these [things]³² in actuality nor [one of them] in potentiality, so that they would enter in [the notion] of horseness. *Qua* horseness, it is only horseness.³³

less whether it is existent in the concrete objects or conceptualized in the soul, and in itself it is neither common nor proper”. One may wonder, therefore, whether in these texts Avicenna is dealing with the primary concept “thing”, or is referring generically to “items” or “entities” in a non-technical sense.

²⁹ Besides the texts discussed in the present section, see also *Ilāhīyāt* I, 2, p. 13.8–12 [pp. 12.30–13.36]; I, 7, p. 45.9–11 [pp. 51.92–52.95]; II, 2, p. 70.5–8 [p. 81.19–22]; II, 4, pp. 82.1–2 [p. 94.69–71]. The proof of the fact that God is not a substance (VIII, 4, pp. 348.6–349.6 [pp. 403.74–404.1]) is based, among other tenets, on the idea that substantiality, taken as a genus, implies a distinction of essence and existence that cannot be found in God (pp. 348.17–349.6 [p. 404.90–01]).

³⁰ Noteworthy is the non-technical use of “thing” in this section.

³¹ *al-kullīya* (*ḥadd al-kullīya* ed.)

³² *wa-lā šay' min ḡālika* (*wa-lā fī šay' min ḡālika* ed.)

³³ *min ḡayṡu huwa farasīya farasīya faḡaṡ* (*min ḡayṡu huwa farasīya faḡaṡ* ed.)

[e] Rather, unity is an attribute that is joined (*taqtarinu*) with horseness, so that horseness, with this attribute, is one. Likewise,³⁴ together with this attribute, horseness has many other attributes that supervene on it (*dāhila ‘alayhi*). Thus, horseness, insofar as it corresponds in definition to many things, is common [i.e. universal], whereas, insofar as it³⁵ is taken with ostensible properties and accidents, it is proper [i.e. particular]. But horseness in itself is only horseness.

The distinction of essence and existence surfaces in section [d]. The specific essence taken into account here is horseness,³⁶ whereas existence (in the sense of existence¹) is mentioned according to its two main types, namely existence in the concrete objects, i.e. in external reality, and existence in the soul. Avicenna insists on the separation of essence and existence, and contends that existence in external objects or in the mind, together with other extrinsic features like oneness and multiplicity, does not enter into the notion of horseness, i.e. it is not constitutive of this latter. Avicenna gives no indication as to what kind of connection takes place between essence and existence. In particular, he uses in section [d] none of the verbs employed in sections [a], [c] and [e] to characterize the relationship between essence, on the one hand, and universality and unity, on the other (“to be consequent”, “to occur accidentally”, “to be joined with”, “to supervene”).³⁷

Further aspects of the relationship of essence and existence can be gained from the other texts dealing with the issue. Thus, the same point of Text 4 is repeated, with additional details, in a shortly posterior passage of chapter V, 2.³⁸

Text 5: *Ilāhīyāt* V, 2, p. 207.10–2 [p. 239.68–71]

[a] To the nature (*ṭabī‘a*) of man, insofar as he is a man, is consequent (*yalḥaquhā*) the fact of being existent (*mawǧūda*), although being an existent is neither [identical to] being a man, nor does it enter in it.

[b] Together with existence (*wuǧūd*), to [the nature of man] is sometimes consequent (*qad talḥaquhā*) this universality [about which we are speaking], although this universality does not exist except in the soul.

³⁴ *wa-kaḍālika* (*kaḍālika* ed.)

³⁵ *wa-bi-annahā* (*wa-li-annahā* ed.)

³⁶ Although terms like *ḥaqīqa* or *māhīya* (used in Text 1) do not occur in Text 4, the fact that horseness is regarded as an essence is attested by the presence of the term *ḥadd* (“definition”), i.e. the formula expressing the essence or quiddity, in section [c].

³⁷ None of these verbs was used in Text 1.

³⁸ See Goichon [1937], 90.

The particular essence (called "nature", *ṭabīʿa*) considered in this text is humanity. This text complements the previous one, insofar as Avicenna mentions the type of relation occurring between essence and existence by means of the verb "to be consequent" (*laḥiqa*), one of the four verbs used to express the relationship of essence with universality and unity in Text 4.³⁹ What is more, Avicenna stresses the separation between essence and existence, saying that the fact of being an existent is neither identical to nor constitutive of humanity. The case of universality taken into account in section [b] is only partially similar to that of existence, since universality, as Avicenna remarks, regards only one type of existence, i.e. mental existence.

The relationship of "thing" and "existent" is taken into account in a passage of chapter VI, 5, dealing with the doctrine of causality. Avicenna uses the distinction of these two concepts, and of essence and existence, to answer the question how the final cause can be, at the same time, the first among the four causes in the order of importance, and the last among them in the order of the concrete realization. He contends that the final cause is first in the order of essence (it is the first of the causes, if these latter are regarded simply as causes), but last in the order of existence (it is the last of the causes, if these latter are regarded as existents).

Text 6: *Ilāhīyāt* VI, 5, p. 292.2–5 [p. 336.85–7]

[a] There is a distinction (*farq*) between 'thing' and 'existent' (although 'thing' is not but an 'existent'), as there is a distinction (*farq*) between an entity (*amr*) and its inseparable concomitant (*lāzim*).

[b] You have already learnt and verified this [distinction].

[c] Consider it again in the case of man. For man has an essence (*ḥaqīqa*), which is its definition (*ḥadd*) and quiddity (*māhīya*), regardless whether [his] existence is proper [i.e. particular] or common [i.e. universal], in the concrete objects or in the soul, and whether it is one of these in potentiality or in actuality.

Avicenna stresses in this text the distinction more than the connection of "thing" and "existent", essence and existence, as section [a] declares from the very outset. In section [a], the connection of "thing" and "existent" is alluded to parenthetically by its saying that "thing" is not

³⁹ Marmura [1984] translates this verb as "to be attached". Among the aforementioned verbs, *laḥiqa* is the most similar in meaning to *lazima*, occurring in Text 1 and Text 6.

but an “existent”, a statement that calls to mind “Were [the thing] not [an existent], it would not be a thing” in Text 1 [2.3b]. In the same section, the status of “existent” as inseparable concomitant (*lāzim*) of “entity” (*amr*), one of the synonyms of “thing” (see above, Table 1), is also recalled. Section [b] is an explicit reference to Text 1. The distinction of essence and existence in section [c] is argued for by pointing at the extraneousness of existence in each of its possible manifestations (particular or universal, extra-mental or mental, potential or actual) with regard to “essence”, “definition” and “quiddity”.⁴⁰ It is important to notice that in this regard Avicenna does not say that essence is independent from existence *tout court*, but only from the given manifestations that this latter can assume.

Finally, in chapter VIII, 4, Avicenna wants to show that the First Principle (the Necessary Existent)⁴¹ has no quiddity, namely essence, other than that-ness (*annīya*), namely existence (no essence at all). In order to do so, he points out that the distinction of essence and existence in the things to which this distinction applies requires the presence of a cause that “mediates” between essence and existence by conferring existence to essence. However, since the First Principle has no cause, It cannot rely on a cause conferring existence to Its essence, and cannot therefore be affected by any distinction of essence and existence.

Text 7: *Ilāhīyāt* VIII, 4, pp. 344.10–1 ([a]); 346.13–347.2 ([b])
[pp. 398.83–399.84; 401.33–6]

[a] The First has no quiddity (*māhiya*) other than that-ness (*annīya*). You have already known, at the beginning of this our clarification, the notion of “quiddity”, and that by which it is distinct (*tufāriqu*) from that-ness in the things in which it is distinct from it. [...]

[b] We say: that-ness and existence are two things that occur accidentally (*‘āridāni*) to the quiddity.⁴² Therefore, either they accompany it inseparably (*yalzamuhā*) on account of [the quiddity] itself, or on account of something external. But it is impossible that this happens on account of the quiddity itself, since what follows [something else] does not follow except [something] existent; in this case, therefore, quiddity would have an existence before its existence, which is impossible.

⁴⁰ The “existence that is proper” mentioned by Avicenna here is not the “proper existence” of Text 1, namely the essence; it is rather the existence that is particular, as opposed to the existence that is common, i.e. the universal existence.

⁴¹ VIII, 4, p. 343.9 [p. 397.53–4].

⁴² *al-annīya wa-l-wuḡūd ‘āridāni li-l-māhiyati* (*al-annīya wa-l-wuḡūd law šārā ‘āridayni li-l-māhiyati* ed.)

[Therefore they accompany inseparably the quiddity on account of something external, i.e. a cause].

[c] We say: everything having a quiddity other than that-ness is caused. For you know that that-ness and existence, with regard to the quiddity that is external to that-ness, do not have the status of a constitutive entity, but are among the inseparable concomitants (*lawāzim*).

Text 1 is recalled in section [c] ("For you know that..."), and possibly also in section [a] ("You have already known...").⁴³ Of Text 1, section [a] recounts the distinction between essence and existence, named respectively "quiddity" (*māhīya*) and "that-ness" (*annīya*). In section [b], the connection of essence and existence is described by means of the participle of the verb "occur accidentally". The accidentality mentioned here, however, has to be understood as logical, rather than metaphysical, as its immediate replacement with the idea of inseparable concomitance in sections [b] and [c] makes clear.⁴⁴ Section [c] explains the logical accidentality of existence with respect to essence, stressing the status of that-ness and existence as other, external, and non-constitutive with respect to quiddity and essence, and their condition of being inseparable concomitants of the quiddity and essence.

If we compare these other texts of the *Ilāhīyāt* on the relationship of "thing" and "existent", essence and existence, with the main text on the issue, namely chapter I, 5, we notice three important points. First of all, Avicenna is expounding in all cases the *same* doctrine, i.e. a coherent and already established theory, as witnessed by the references to chapter I, 5 in Texts 6 and 7. This attests to the consistency of his overall account and corroborates the status of I, 5 as the main text on the topic. Second, in all these other texts Avicenna recounts only *a part* of chapter I, 5: the texts discussed here repeat various aspects of

⁴³ The terminology of section [a], and the expression "the beginning of this our clarification" occurring at its end, might refer to the beginning of the *Šifā'*, i.e. to its logical part, rather than to the beginning of the *Ilāhīyāt*. See *Madḥal* I, 5, p. 29.11–3, where Avicenna opposes "quiddity", on the one hand, and "individual that-ness" (*annīya šaḥṣīya*), namely the concrete existence of an individual, on the other (the term *annīya* here, however, might also be read as *ayyīya*, "distinctive quality"). See also the passages of *Burhān* discussed by A. Hasnawi, "Anniya ou Inniya (essence, existence)," in *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, Publié sous la direction d'A. Jacob*, vol. II: *Les notions philosophiques* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 101–2 (at 101b).

⁴⁴ "To occur accidentally" is one of the verbs employed in Text 4 (see above, n. 37). The Arabic of Text 7 [b] presents many variants in the manuscripts. In the reading adopted in the Cairo edition (see above, n. 42), the status of that-ness and existence as entities that occur accidentally to the quiddity, is an hypothesis to be discarded ("were that-ness and existence two things occurring accidentally to quiddity").

chapter I, 5 (significantly the *locus classicus* of chapter V, 1 is the more scanty in this regard), but none of them reproduces all the motives of this chapter. Thus, Avicenna summarizes the second formulation of the distinction in Text 1 [2.2.2] (in all texts), and the brief account of the relationship of “thing” and “existent” in section [2.3] (in some texts), whereas he skips the first formulation of the distinction in section [2.2.1], and the additional considerations on the relationship of “thing” and “existent” after Text 1. Consequently, all hints to the logical priority of existence and “existent” with respect to essence and “thing” in the first formulation are neglected. As in the second formulation, the distinction between these two pairs of concepts, rather than their intimate connection, is underscored; where their relationship is discussed, “existent” and existence are invariably characterized as attributes of “thing” and essence, not vice versa. This happens because Avicenna’s specific goal in these passages is to distinguish a certain nature from its universality (Texts 4–5), to distinguish the rank of importance of the causes from the rank of their concrete existence, in order to explain the peculiar status of the final cause (Text 6), and to distinguish God as the only being, in which essence is identical to existence from all the other caused beings, in which essence is other than existence (Text 7). Thirdly, these texts do not disprove the features of chapters I, 5 that they do not recount, namely the suggestion that Avicenna in *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5 would be alluding to the dependence—both intensional and extensional—of essence and “thing” on existence and “existent”, and would be assuming a reciprocal, bi-directional connection of these two pairs of concepts. These features far from being contradicted, simply lie outside the limited scope of investigation proper of these texts.

7. *The Main Text in Logic: Maqūlāt II, 1*

The distinction of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, occurs in many other *loci* of the *Šifā’*, as well as in other works by Avicenna. Scholars regard Avicenna’s position in these different works as substantially coherent, although signs of evolution in Avicenna’s understanding of the distinction are detected.⁴⁵ This wide and multiform

⁴⁵ Goichon [1937], 131, sees an increasing importance ascribed by Avicenna throughout his career to the distinction, this latter remaining however substantially unmodified. The evolution that Wisnovsky [2003], 173–80, traces in Avicenna’s standpoint on essence and existence regards, on the one hand, the late application of the

textual evidence cannot be analyzed in detail here. A pericope of Avicenna's reworking of the *Categories* (*Maqūlāt*) in the *Šifā'*, however, deserves special attention. On account of its doctrine and terminology, this text can be regarded as the anticipation in logic of Text 1, and thus as the first comprehensive formulation of this topic in the concrete arrangement of the *Šifā'*. Despite its importance, this text has never been perused or even noticed, to the best of my knowledge, before. It resembles Text 1 in many respects and thus confirms the priority of *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5 over the other textual evidence available in Avicenna's metaphysics.

Text 8: *Maqūlāt* II, 1, pp. 61.2–62.4

[a] Even if [existence] were univocal, it would not be a genus, since it does not signify a notion intrinsic to the quiddities of things, but an inseparable concomitant (*lāzim*) of them.

[b] Therefore, when you conceptualize the notion of triangle, and relate it to shape-ness (*šakliya*) and existence, you find that shape-ness is intrinsic to the notion of triangle, so that it is impossible to comprehend that triangle is triangle without [thinking] beforehand [that] it is necessarily a shape. When you conceptualize the notion of triangle, therefore, you cannot avoid conceptualizing that it is a shape first of all; on the contrary, it is not necessary that you conceptualize, at the same time, that it is existent. In order to conceptualize the quiddity of triangle, you don't need to conceptualize that it is existent, as you need to conceptualize that it is a shape. The shape belongs to triangle insofar as it is a triangle, and enters into its constitution. Triangle, therefore, is constituted by it [also] externally, in the soul, and in every other condition. As to existence, it is an entity by which the quiddity of triangle is not constituted. Hence you can comprehend the quiddity of triangle, while being uncertain about its existence, until you get the demonstration that it is an existent, or a possible existent, in the first figure of Euclid's book.⁴⁶ You cannot do the same with shape-ness. What is like shape-ness is one of the notions that constitute the quiddity, whereas what is like the existence does not constitute the quiddity.

[c] Even if existence did not separate itself from triangle in your mind either, it would nonetheless be an entity consequent (*lāḥiq*) on the triangle externally.

[d] Therefore, it is impossible to seek what is the thing that makes triangle a triangle or a shape, whereas it is not impossible to seek the

distinction to the context of causality, and, on the other hand, the shift in the designation of the essence from "thingness" in the *Šifā'* and *Naḡāt* to "quiddity" in the *Iṣārāt* (see also, above, nn. 7, 28).

⁴⁶ See *Elements*, book I, where the triangle is the first geometrical form taken into account.

thing that makes triangle existent in the mind or externally. What is essential to something does not belong to it in virtue of a cause external to its essence. What occurs in virtue of an external cause is neither constitutive [of the quiddity] nor essential (although also an accidental [item] sometimes takes place not in virtue of a cause external to the quiddity, but is necessitated and entailed by the quiddity). What is not necessitated by the quiddity, and can occur on account of something external providing it, is not constitutive of the essence.

[e] The genus is among the notions that resemble the form, insofar as, by means of it, the notion [of something] becomes a notion, and the quiddity [of something becomes] a quiddity. Existence, on the contrary, is an entity that is consequent (*yalḥaqu*) upon the quiddity, sometimes in the concrete objects, sometimes in the mind.

Significantly, the example used here to indicate the item having quiddity or essence is the same as in Text 1 (the triangle). The distinction of essence and existence is expressed by the idea that existence is external to, and not constitutive of, the essence of triangle (sections [a]–[b], [d]), and by the idea—original with regard to chapter I, 5—that the existence of triangle is caused, whereas its essence is not (section [d]). This reference to causality represents a new ontological/metaphysical argument in support of the priority of essence over existence, otherwise expressed by saying that existence “accompanies inseparably” (*lazima*, section [a]) and “is consequent upon” (*laḥiqa*, sections [c], [e]) essence. Considerations on the extension of essence and existence are absent. Noteworthy also is Avicenna’s reference to mental states (the acts of “conceptualizing”, “comprehending”, “to be uncertain”), in order to argue for the distinction of essence and existence in sections [b]–[c].⁴⁷ Thus, in comparison with Text 1, the distinction is defended here by means of an epistemological approach, quite appropriate to the logical context, rather than by the linguistic method adopted in the *Ilāhīyāt*. This might indicate that according to Avicenna the distinction is “mental” rather than “real”. Avicenna’s general aim also in this case, as in the other passages of the *Ilāhīyāt*, is a distinction, namely the proof of the fact that existence is not a genus (this latter being part of essence). As in the other passages of the *Ilāhīyāt*, therefore, he mentions both the distinction and the connection, but he insists on the distinction, more than on the connection, of essence and existence.

⁴⁷ One may wonder how essence can be distinguished from existence in the unreal case envisioned in section [c]. One may think of two distinct conceptual acts, like the ones by means of which we understand the concepts of “soul” and “body”.

Conclusion

The aim of the previous pages was to contextualize more precisely Avicenna's doctrine of essence and existence, in order to show its complexity and elucidate its constituents. Avicenna's actual account of this doctrine appears to be multifaceted and more complex than it is usually described in secondary literature. In particular, I have tried to supplement the scholarship on this doctrine in three main respects. First, I have strived to redirect attention to the most important text by Avicenna on the distinction at hand, namely chapter I, 5 of the *Ilāhiyāt*. A careful examination of this chapter discloses two further aspects in which secondary literature appears unbalanced: it too harshly portrays the distinction of essence and existence as a sort of radical separation between these two items; and it is one-sided in ascribing to essence priority over existence, while also attributing to the concept of "thing" an analogous priority, both intensional and extensional, with regard to the concept of "existent". In all these respects, scholarship to date relies on Avicenna's doctrine of universals in *Ilāhiyāt* V, 1–2, paying relatively less attention to his doctrine of the primary concepts or transcendentials in *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 (section 1 above).

The analysis of *Ilāhiyāt* I, 5 provided here (section 2 above) discloses a different scenario. The distinction of essence and existence, "thing" and "existent", in this chapter does not appear as a sharp dichotomy. On the contrary, Avicenna stresses and defends against opposite views the inseparable connection between "thing" and "existent", essence and existence, portraying this link as mutual and as required for the status of "thing". This being the case, essence can hardly be said to be "neutral" or "indifferent" towards existence in general, although it may be loosely linked to particular instances of existence, such as its existence in the mind as a universal concept. On account of this, Avicenna's doctrine deserves to be labelled "*relationship* of essence and existence", rather than "*distinction* of essence and existence", as it is usually called (section 3 above). Essence and existence, "thing" and "existent", have different intensions, and essence and "thing" are surely prior to existence and "existent" from a cognitive point of view; according to an absolute consideration, however, existence and "existent" are intensionally *prior* to essence and "thing", since the meaning of essence is expressed also by a particular sense of existence ("proper existence" or existence²), and "existent" is not susceptible to being explained by means of a different notion, such as by the notion of

essence in the case of “thing” (section 4 above). Moreover, “thing” and “existent” are *grosso modo* co-extensive, but do not have exactly the same extension, insofar as the extension of “existent” encompasses an item that the extension of “thing” does not include; every “thing” is also an “existent”, but not every “existent” is also a “thing”, since God, not having an essence distinct from existence, is an “existent” without being a “thing” (section 5 above). Avicenna’s view of the relationship of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, expounded in *Ilāhīyāt* I, 5 is recounted in many other *loci* of this work (section 6 above), as well as elsewhere (section 7 above). All the available textual evidence points at a single, coherent doctrine, although the distinctive aspects of chapter I, 5 are not recounted in the additional texts; these texts thus ground and corroborate the aforementioned *versio vulgata*.

In chapter I, 5 (the main text on the issue), in other words Avicenna’s discussion of the relationship of “thing” and “existent”, essence and existence, appears to be motivated by a peculiar intention: to stress that “existent” and existence are, at least in some respects, logically prior and more universal than “thing” and essence, and to safeguard this tenet in the context of a doctrine that, in fact, points in the opposite direction. This emphasis on the primacy of “existent” and existence represents a unique case among the various treatments of essence and existence in Avicenna’s *œuvre*. If we consider that in the previous chapters of the *Ilāhīyāt* Avicenna has proved that “existent” is the subject-matter of metaphysics, and that in the same context he is equally subordinating to “existent”, in different ways and respects, also the other primary concepts taken into account in the *Ilāhīyāt* (“necessary” is defined in term of “existence” in I, 5; both “necessary” and “one” are described as properties of “existent” in I, 2), this tendency to underscore the priority of “existent” with respect to “thing” appears to be part of a general strategy that aims at showing that “existent” is the first and most universal among the primary concepts, and that hence it solely deserves to be the subject-matter of the first and most universal science.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ See A. Bertolacci, “‘Necessary’ as Primary Concept in Avicenna’s Metaphysics”, in *Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale*, eds. G. Fioravanti and S. Perfetti (Pisa: ETS, 2008), 31–50. A thorough account of Avicenna’s doctrine of the primary concepts in the *Ilāhīyāt*, as well as of its Latin reception, will be provided by the author in *The Arabic Sources of Albertus Magnus’ Commentary on the Metaphysics: Avicenna and Averroes* (in progress).

HÖFISCHER STIL UND WISSENSCHAFTLICHE RHETORIK: AL-KINDĪ ALS EPISTOLOGRAPH

Gerhard Endress

Gott schütze Dich, löblicher Bruder, durch Sein Walten und bringe Dich auf den rechten Weg durch Seine Gunst, Er behüte Dich durch Seine Güte vor allem Straucheln und lasse Dir gelingen durch Seine Langmut das reinste Werk, und Er lasse Dich gelangen zur Kenntnis Seiner beständigen Gunst und verdienten Wohltat! Ich habe verstanden, daß Du mich aufgefordert hast abzufassen, was Du mich in Worten erklären hörtest. [...] Also bitte ich den Spender der Wohltaten und den Verleiher der Güter, diese [Antwort] Deinem Verlangen entsprechend zu fügen, und hierdurch Dir treffliches Geleit auszurichten auf die Straße der Rechtleitung, fernab von den Schrecken der [Höllenstrafe] des Jenseits.¹

Mit solchen Worten überreicht al-Kindī, der erste Protagonist der griechischen Wissenschaften aus arabischem Stamm, einem erfolgreichen Kollegen und Würdenträger seine Abhandlung über die Endlichkeit der Welt—Philosophie im Dienste der Šarī'a.² Ob Araber, ob Perser, ob Griechen, ob *mawlā* oder *mawlā bi-hī*: die Kultur des klassischen Islams ist die Kultur der Rede; in der Kanzlei, in der höfischen Poesie, in den Wissenschaften des Korans wie in der Buchführung des Dīwān, in den Überlieferungen der 'Arab wie der 'Ağam, der Muslime wie der *ahl ad-dimma* beweist jeder, der mitreden will, seine Kompetenz durch Sprachbildung, *adab*. Mit höfischen Positionen mußten sich die Fachgelehrten auch den höfischen Stil aneignen. Der Epistolarstil der Kanzlei mit seinen wohlgesetzten Parallelismen und kunstreichen

¹ Die vom *Faylasūf al-'Arab* ausgebrachten Wünsche und Huldigungen seien zugleich dem Jubilar dargeboten—in Erinnerung an vergangene, gute Zusammenarbeit und mit Glückwünschen für zukünftiges, erfolgreiches Wirken—*ad multos annos*!

² Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī, „Riṣālat Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī ilā Muḥammad [vol. 1, ed. Abū Rīda: 'Alī] ibn al-Ğahm fī waḥdāniyat Allāh wa-tanāhī ġirm al-'ālam,“ ed. Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Hādī Abū Rīda, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafīya* (Kairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1950–3), vol. 1, 201–7, Zitat S. 201; ed. Roshdi Rashed & Jean Jolivet, in *Ceuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 1: L'optique et la catoptrique, vol. 2: Métaphysique et cosmologie (Leiden: Brill, 1997–8), vol. 2, 135–47, Zitat S. 137.

Synonymenreihen dringt in die Dedikationen und Vorreden auch der trockensten und technischsten Traktate ein—die Eintrittskarte gleichsam in die Konzilien und Diskussionsrunden der Mächtigen.

Nicht die Araber, sondern die Byzantiner der Umaiyyaden- und die Perser der Abbasidenkanzlei waren es gewesen, welche die Kunst des eleganten Ausdrucks, der klingenden Alliteration und Anapher und des Spiels mit Synonym und Paronomasie als den Inbegriff der sprachlichen Form feiner Bildung stilisierten—*adab*. Nach dem *mawlā* Abū l-ʿAlāʾ Sālīm, Kanzleichef unter dem Umaiyyaden Hišām und an den Rhetorikübungen der hellenistischen Epistel orientiert, schuf dessen Nachfolger unter Marwān, der Araber ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā (mit dem Kalifen gefallen 132/750), den eleganten Epistolarstil nach dem Vorbild der sasanidischen Kanzlei, gefolgt von seinem Schüler, dem Iraner Ibn al-Muqaffaʾ unter dem Abbasiden al-Manšūr. Als *Faylasūf al-ʿArab* konkurrierte al-Kindī mit den *mawālī* iranischer Abstammung und Affiliation in Wissenschaft, Sprachgewalt und Islam.

1

Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq ibn aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ stammte aus einer Familie des altarabischen Stammes der Kinda. Die Biographen führen seinen Stammbaum lückenlos bis auf Qaḥṭān zurück. Der Urgroßvater des Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq ibn aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ ibn ʿImrān ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Aṣʿat ibn Qays, der Prophetengenosse al-Aṣʿat ibn Qays, spielte eine gewisse Rolle in der frühislamischen Geschichte.³ Im Milieu der von iranischen und christlich-aramäischen Gelehrten getragenen Wissenschaftsüberlieferung ist die arabische Genealogie der Adelstitel des *Faylasūf al-ʿArab*, der im Dienste des Abbasidenhauses die Wissenschaften der Griechen überlieferte, erklärte und vor allem auch praktisch anwandte, der zugleich höfische Bildung (*adab*) in fachlicher wie literarischer Anwendung der ʿArabīya beanspruchte.

Nach der ältesten biographischen Notiz des Ibn Ǧulǧul⁴ stammte er aus Basra, wo schon sein Großvater Domänen der Banū Hāšim

³ Ibn Saʿd, *Ṭabaqāt*, ed. E. Sachau (Leiden: Brill, 1904–40), vol. 6, 13; Ḥalīl ibn Aybak aṣ-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi bi-l-wafayāt*, vol. 9, ed. J. van Ess (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1974), 274.

⁴ Sulaymān ibn Ḥassān ibn Ǧulǧul, *Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ* (verf. 377/987), ed. Fuʾād Saiyid, *Les générations des médecins et des sages* (Kairo: Publications de l'Institut français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, 1955), 73–4.

verwaltet habe und wo er selbst ein Landgut besaß, bevor er nach Bagdad aufbrach. Nach allen übrigen Biographen kam er aus Kūfa; hier jedenfalls war sein Vater Ishāq ibn aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ ein hoher Beamter der abbasidischen Administration, der im Wechsel mit anderen unter den Kalifen al-Mahdī und ar-Rašīd (also zwischen 158 und 193/775 und 809) das Gouvernement von Kūfa versah. Aber der Weg zum Erfolg führte nach Bagdad, endlich—wir wissen nicht, wann und über welche Stationen—an den Hof des Kalifen al-Muʿtaṣim (reg. 218–27/833–42).

In diesem Milieu gehörte es zum guten Ton, mit anderen höfischen Künsten auch das Handwerk des Literaten zu üben—Gelegenheitsgedichte bezeugten Ehrgeiz und bescheidene Kunstfertigkeit des Philosophen auch auf diesem Gebiet.⁵ Hier auch war nicht so sehr hohe Spekulation, sondern es waren angewandte Wissenschaft und praktische Künste gefragt. Zwei Seiten finden sich so in jedem seiner Kompetenzgebiete, Prinzipienlehre und Anwendung, *ilm* und *adab*. Für die Fachgelehrten der Mathematik, der Naturlehre und der Philosophie entwickelte al-Kindī den arabischen Diskurs der Deduktion, die technische Terminologie und die Phraseologie der Apodeixis.⁶ Für die Aristokratie und ihre Entourage bot er Wissenschaft für die höfische Praxis, marktgängige Themen in gefälliger Form, entwickelte er zugleich die literarische Form wissenschaftlichen Schreibens. Die Themenvielfalt der höfischen Künste, zu denen der Gelehrte aus dem von ihm und von seinen Übersetzern für ihn erschlossenen griechischen Quellen vielfach die ersten Originalbeiträge in arabischer Sprache leistete, umfassen ein breites Spektrum, das von der hochpolitischen Mundanastronomie über Handbücher der Pharmazie bis zur Mineralogie und Fertigungstechnik von Schwertern reichte. Auch in seiner Philosophie steht spekulative Metaphysik, in der Fortsetzung des alexandrinischen Aristotelismus und Neuplatonismus, neben populärer Ethik, nicht die Fürstenethik der griechischen und iranischen Vorgänger in der umayyadischen und abbasidischen Kanzlei, sondern

⁵ Franz Rosenthal hat die Zeugnisse aus Biographen und Historikern des *adab* vor mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert nach den damals bekannten Quellen zusammengestellt: „Al-Kindī als Literat,“ *Orientalia*, N.S. 11 (1942), 262–88.

⁶ Dazu G. Endress, „The Language of Demonstration: Translating Science and the Formation of Terminology in Arabic Philosophy and Science,“ *Early Science and Medicine* 7, 3 (2002), 231–54.

die Paränese der stoischen und platonischen Enchiridia auf der Basis gnostischer Seelenlehre.⁷

Freilich trat neben die Bewunderung für sein großes und vielseitiges Œuvre auch Eifersucht und Ressentiment. Der große Verteidiger der Suprematie arabischen Geistes, al-Ġāḥiẓ, verspottet in einer eigenen Schmähschrift „Die maßlose Ignoranz des Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī.“⁸ Solche Attacken spiegeln auch die Animosität zwischen den maßgeblichen Intellektuellenkreisen der klassischen Abbasidenzeit. Al-Ġāḥiẓ selbst gehörte zu den Lehrern des *kalām*, der rationalistischen, spekulativen Theologie; ihnen nahe—und gleichfalls durch den Ġāḥiẓ repräsentiert—standen die Sekretäre der neuen, iranisch geprägten Administration, in der Literatur die Vertreter einer aus indigenen und fremden Quellen gespeisten, enzyklopädischen, höfischen Bildung. Auf der anderen Seite finden wir die Sammler und Interpreten der Prophetenüberlieferung, Ideologen einer zusehends oppositionellen Rechtswissenschaft und Sprecher einer geistigen und politischen Wende, die im Jahre 232/847 auch einen Machtwechsel im Kalifat herbeiführt.

Aber auch unter den Gelehrten der iranischen und hellenistischen Wissenschaftstraditionen selbst gab es Futterneid und Richtungsstreit. Je größer die Summen, mit denen Kalifen und hohe Beamte sich die Machtmittel der kultischen und fiskalischen Zeitmessung, der astrologischen Prognose, der Geodäsie, der hydraulischen Technik und der ärztlichen Expertise verfügbar machten, um so eifriger wurde der Wettlauf nach Quellentexten und das Werben um tüchtige Übersetzer. Der Kalif Hārūn ar-Rašīd, dessen Hofbibliothek—Arbeitsstelle der Hofhistoriker wie auch der Hofastronomen—ein Zentrum für die Sammlung dieser Quellen wurde, und sein Sohn und Nachfolger al-Ma‘mūn, der dieses ‚Haus der Wissenschaft‘ (*Bayt al-ḥikma*) zu einem Zentrum vor allem der astronomischen Forschung ausbaute, waren nur die potentesten Förderer dieser Aktivität. Wesire, Gouverneure und wohlhabende Notabeln traten ihnen mit der Stiftung von Bibliotheken und Stipendien zur Seite, und die Gelehrten selbst, auf diese Weise wohlhabend geworden, beschäftigten ihrerseits Übersetzer mit üppigen Salärs. Fachwissen in Astronomie, Mathematik und

⁷ Cf. G. Endress, „Building the Library of Arabic Philosophy: Platonism and Aristotelianism in the Sources of al-Kindī,“ in *The Libraries of the Neoplatonists*, ed. Cristina D’Ancona (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 319–50.

⁸ *Risāla fi Farṭ ḡahl Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī*, in Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍā Taḡaddud (Teheran: Amīr Kabīr, 1971), 211.19.

Medizin versprach reiche Pfründe und hohe Stellungen. Jede der konkurrierenden Schulen zog eigene Equipen von Übersetzern und anderen Hilfstruppen, namentlich Kopisten und Buchhändlern heran. Während man bei Hofe und bei den Astrologen, Geometern und Leibärzten der Dynastie zunächst mit den Iranern und den aus Iran gebürtigen nestorianischen Gelehrtenfamilien kooperierte, hält es der Kindī mit der griechischen Fraktion (die freilich seit dem Kalifat des Hārūn auch in Astronomie und Mathematik mit den ungleich reicheren Pfunden der griechischen Quellen wucherte): Johannes (Yūḥannā, meist Yahyā) ibn al-Bīṭrīq—Sohn eines byzantinischen Patrikios—lieferte arabische Versionen der aristotelischen Naturphilosophie und Kosmologie, Ibn Nāʿima aus Emesa (Ḥimṣ) bot Plotins Geistmetaphysik als Theologie des Aristoteles, während Eustathios (Uṣṭāṭ) ihm die authentischen *Metaphysica* des Aristoteles übertrug.⁹

Die Schule, aber vor allem die Sprache der wissenschaftlichen Werkstatt des Kindī provozierte die schärfste Kritik des Ġāḥiẓ. Einer der scharfsinnigsten Beobachter der intellektuellen Auseinandersetzung seiner Zeit, verfaßte er ein großes Werk über „Beredsamkeit und klaren Ausdruck“ (*al-Bayān wa-t-tabyīn*) mit keinem anderen Ziel, als gegen die neue, polyethnische Elite der Perser und Hellenisten die überlegene Gabe und Kompetenz der Araber in Sprache und Wortkunst zu demonstrieren. Auch die Übersetzer hat er mit polternder Kritik bedacht.¹⁰ Nicht nur die Kalām-Feindlichkeit des Philosophen nahm ihn gegen ihn ein, sondern er sieht in ihm einen Verräter am geistigen Erbe und am Ethos der Araber. Darum hat al-Ġāḥiẓ in einem „Buch der Geizigen,“ das den Geiz der Fremdlinge und Fremdgänger anprangerte—nur eine Facette der Eifersucht zwischen der alten arabischen und der neuen polyethnischen Elite—, den Araber al-Kindī in die Sippe der chorasaniischen *mawālī* ausdrücklich einbezogen.¹¹

⁹ G. Endress, „The Circle of al-Kindī: Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy,“ in *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies... dedicated to H. J. Drossaart Lulofs*, eds. G. Endress & R. Kruk (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 43–76.

¹⁰ Al-Ġāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Hayawān*, ed. ʿAbd as-Salām M. Hārūn (Kairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938–45), vol. 6, 280, 3–11; vgl. auch vol. 1, 75–8 (S. 78 werden die beiden Übersetzer Abū Qurra [Theodor] und Ibn al-Bīṭrīq kritisiert) und vol. 6, 19.

¹¹ Al-Ġāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Buḥālāʾ*, ed. Ṭāḥā al-Ḥāğirī (Kairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Miṣrī, 1958), 17 (die Anekdote über al-Kindī „betrifft nicht die Chorasaniervon Merw, gehört aber hierher“), 81–93 u.ö.

2

In den Vorhöfen der Macht mußten die Astrologen, Ärzte und Philosophen—so wie die Hofdichter mit ihren Qaṣiden um Zutritt zu den *mağālis*—mit der Dedikation von wissenschaftlichen Traktaten um die Gunst der Mäzene, auch die Vermittler gelehrter Aufträge aus den Kreisen der Leibärzte und Hofastrologen, werben. Es sind al-Kindī eigene Zeugnisse, die uns seine Stellung im Kreis der Machthaber signalisieren: Die Adressen seiner Episteln, *rasā'il*, an die Mitglieder der Bagdader Aristokratie und die Höflinge ihrer Umgebung. Der Erfolg ließ auf sich warten. Aber endlich wurde al-Kindī einer der Lehrer des Prinzen Aḥmad, eines Sohnes des Kalifen al-Mu'taṣim, dem er ebenfalls—nach dem Kalifen selbst—eine ganze Reihe seiner Werke widmete.

Ein Autor des 10. Jahrhunderts, der selbst höfischen Kreisen nahestand und mit seiner Sammlung philosophischer Lehrsätze und Weisheitssprüche *Šiwān al-ḥikma* die höfische Popularphilosophie von al-Kindī bis Abū Sulaymān as-Siğistānī vermittelte, hat die Entwicklung der *risāla* als literarische Form des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses geradezu dem Kindī zugeschrieben:

Er [sc. al-Kindī] war Lehrmeister (*ustād*) des Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Mu'taṣim, und in dessen Namen verfaßte er die meisten seiner Bücher, und ihm widmete er die meisten seiner Episteln und Antworten auf seine Fragen. Al-Kindī war der erste, der diesen Stil (*ṭarīqa*, sc. des wissenschaftlichen Schreibens) schuf, in dem ihm dann die islamischen Autoren folgten, die nach ihm kamen, wenngleich so manche namhaften und hochgestellten Persönlichkeiten ihm hierin vorausgingen in den Tagen des Ma'mūn, von denen aber die meisten Christen waren und deren Schriften nach der antiken Manier gestaltet waren.¹²

Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim ist nicht Abū l-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, der Enkel al-Mu'taṣims und spätere Kalif al-Musta'in, sondern ein in der historischen Literatur nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Thronwechsel von 227/842 (al-Wāṭiq) und dem von 232/847 (al-Mutawakkil) genannter Sohn des Mu'taṣim.¹³

¹² *Šiwān al-ḥikma* [dem Abū Sulaymān as-Siğistānī zugeschrieben], Ausz. ed. D. M. Dunlop: *The Muntakhab Šiwān al-ḥikmah of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 113 § 239; ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, *Šiwān al-ḥikma wa-ṭalāt rasā'il*, ta'līf Abū Sulaymān as-Siğistānī (Teheran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1974), 283.

¹³ F. Rosenthal („Al-Kindī als Literat,“ 265f.) verweist auf al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīḥ*, ed. M. Th. Houtsma (Leiden: Brill, 1883), vol. 2, 584 [so richtig!] und 591 und gibt weitere Beispiele der später mehrfach begegnenden Verwechslung.

Dem Kalifen selbst gilt die berühmteste Dedikation: al-Kindī *Kitāb ilā l-Mu'tašim bi-Llāh fī l-Falsafa al-ūlā*¹⁴—ein würdiger Adressat, denn es ist dies das philosophische Werk al-Kindī, in dem er sein Programm präsentiert: die Legitimation der Philosophie vor der islamischen Staatsgemeinde. Der Autor zeigt, daß die Philosophie der Alten nicht nur mit anderen Mitteln, sondern weitaus besser als der Kalām der zeitgenössischen Theologie—von der Miḥna des Ma'mūn und seiner Nachfolger als Basis ihrer Imamatsauffassung durchgesetzt—den *tawḥīd*, das fundamentale Einheitsbekenntnis des Islams, absolut und universal zu begründen vermag. Aber die Widmung ist weitaus kürzer als die manch kleinerer Traktate:

Lang lasse Gott Dich leben, o Sohn der höchsten Herren und der Stifter höchster Glücksgaben—ein jeder, der an ihrer Führung festhält, wird beglückt sein im Hause des Diesseits und im Hause der Ewigkeit—, und Er schmücke Dich mit allen Ornaten der Tugend und reinige Dich von jeglichem Schmutz des Lasters!

—kurz, doch mit klangvollen Wortfügungen—*yā bna ḍurā s-sādātī wa-urā s-sa'ādāt!*

An einen Kalifen, *amīr al-mu'minīn*, hier ohne persönliche Namensnennung richtet al-Kindī seine optische Dissertation über die Ausbreitung der Sonnenstrahlen, *Kitāb aš-Šu'ā'āt (aš-šamsiyya)*,¹⁵ auch diese mit wenigen einleitenden Worten:

Lang lasse Gott leben den Fürsten der Gläubigen, und Er lasse dauern seine Autorität, seinen Beistand und seine Verdienste, Er vollende seine Glückseligkeit und vernichte seinen Feind!

In einer dem Kalifen selbst überreichten Auftragsarbeit „Über die Arten [oder: Substanzen] der Schwerter“ wird dieser nicht direkt angeredet, sondern in der dritten Person als Auftraggeber genannt.¹⁶

Nicht nur philosophische Spekulation, sondern auch, ja weit eher praktische Wissenschaft mußte der Gelehrte in den Dienst des Hofes

¹⁴ Ed. Abū Rīda, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafīya*, vol. 1, 97–162/²1978, vol. 1, 25–107; ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 2, 8–99.

¹⁵ Ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 1, 359–419.

¹⁶ *Risāla fī Ġawāhir as-suyūf*, A treatise on swords and their essential attributes... of al-Kindī, ed. Rānā M. N. Iḥsān-Ilāhī (Ehsan Elahie) (Lahore: University of the Panjab, 1962); ed. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Zakī [u. d. T.]: „Risāla fī s-suyūf wa-aḡnāsīhā“ *Mağallat Kulīyat al-Ādāb* (Ġāmi'at al-Qāhira) 14 (1952), 1–36.

stellen. So schrieb er für den Prinzen Aḥmad eine Einführung in die Kryptographie.¹⁷

Ich habe verstanden—und Gott mache Dein Verständnis rein und Dein Wissen reich—daß Dein Befehl erging, in einem Buche aufzuschreiben, mit welchen Stratagemen sich entschlüsseln läßt, was in verrätselten Schriften aufgezeichnet wird, und dies in konzisen Ausführungen kurzgefaßt darzustellen. Nun sei Gott gelobt,....

Auch in der Philosophie war freilich der Kalifensohn sein Schüler, auch ihm demonstrierte er, wie seine Philosophie die Glaubenslehre des Islams bestätigt, so in einer „Epistel zur Erläuterung der Prostration des äußersten Körpers und seines Gehorsams gegenüber Gott dem All-mächtigen“ (*Risāla ilā Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim fī l-Ibāna 'an suġūd al-ġirm al-aqṣā wa-ṭā'atihī li-Llāh 'azza wa-ġalla*):¹⁸

Lang lasse Gott Dich leben, o Sohn der namhaften Imame, der Führer und Richter, o Leuchte der Religion und Adel der Welten, Erwählter Gottes unter allen Geschöpfen—Er lasse andauern Dein Heil durch Seine Obhut und gebe Dir Beistand durch Seine Rechtleitung und Seinen Schutz, Er lasse Dich zu denen gehören, deren Taten Sein Wohlgefallen finden und im Glück leben! Ich habe verstanden—und Gott lasse Dich verstehen alles Gute und gebe Dir Beistand im rechtschaffenen Tun— daß Du von Deiner Neigung sprachst—und Gott mache Dich geneigt zum rechten Weg in allen Deinen Werken—eine Auslegung zu finden für das Wort Gottes, des Erhabenen, geheiligt sei Sein Name: „Das Gestirn und der Baum werfen sich nieder“ [*Qur'ān* 35: 6] mithilfe rationaler Schlußfolgerungen. Ja, bei meinem Leben, das Wort Muḥammads des Wahrhaftigen, Gottes Segen sei über ihm, und alles was er von Gott dem Allmächtigen her überbracht hat, besteht insgesamt durch rationale Schlüsse, die niemand abweisen kann unter allen Menschen außer denen, die der Form des Verstandes beraubt und mit der Form der Unwissenheit vereint sind.

Demselben Prinzen widmet er eine mathematisch-kosmologische „Demonstration der sphärischen Form der Elemente und des äußersten Körpers;“¹⁹ an denselben wohl auch richtet er, wenngleich nicht

¹⁷ „Kitāb al-Kindī ilā Abī l-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim fī l-Ḥila fī stiḥrāġ al-mu'ammā min al-kutub,“ eds. Muḥammad Marāyātī, Muḥammad Ḥassān aṭ-Ṭaiyān, und Yahyā Mīr 'Alam, in *Ilm at-ta'miya wa-stiḥrāġ al-mu'ammā 'ind al-'Arab, ġuz* 1 (Damaskus: Maġma' al-Luġa al-'Arabiya, 1987), 204–59 (MS Aya Sofya 4832), Text S. 213.

¹⁸ Ed. Abū Rida, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, vol. 1, 244–61; ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 2, 175–99.

¹⁹ Ed. Abū Rida, in *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, vol. 2, 48–53.

mit namentlicher Dedikation, doch mit ganz ähnlichen Worten der Anrede an „den Sohn der erwählten Fürsten und der rechtschaffenen Imame, Leuchte der Religion, wertvolles Juwel, Quintessenz der Welten, Erwählter Gottes unter allen Menschen“ seine „Epistel zur Erläuterung der nächsten Wirkursache für das Werden und das Vergehen“ (*Kitāb al-Ibāna ‘an al-‘illa al-fā‘ila al-qarība li-l-kawn wa-l-fasād*).²⁰

Mit den iranischen Astrologen, den christlichen Ärzten und vielen anderen Fachgelehrten stand al-Kindī im Spannungsfeld von Brotneid und Ehrgeiz der konkurrierenden Gelehrten und Schulen. Notorisch ist seine Feindschaft mit den Brüdern Muḥammad und Aḥmad ibn Mūsā al-Munaḡḡim, bedeutenden Mathematikern, deren Verbindung mit den iranischen Astronomen der Hofbibliothek (des *Bayt al-ḥikma*) sie wohl in Gegensatz mit dem Parteigänger der arabischen und graeco-arabischen Gelehrten und Überlieferer bringen mochte. Al-Kindī war es, der das iranische Weltjahrmodell—den Persern diente es dazu, das baldige Ende des arabischen vorauszusagen—dazu benutzte, aus den Konjunktionen der oberen Planeten die, wenn nicht tausendjährige, so doch mehrhundertjährige Dauer des *Mulk al-‘Arab* zu berechnen. So gehören auch ihre Zuarbeiter aus persischen und mesopotamischen Gelehrtenfamilien durchweg zu anderen Zirkeln als jene, die mit und für al-Kindī arbeiteten, wie Ibn al-Bīṭrīq und Ibn Nā‘ima.²¹ In anekdotischer Ausgestaltung berichten die Bagdader Hofhistoriker Ibn ad-Dāya (gest. 330/941 oder 340/951)²² und aṣ-Ṣūlī (gest. 335/947),²³

²⁰ Ibid., 1: 214–37. Auch der edelsten der höfischen Künste, der Musik, widmete er eine an Aḥmad gerichtete Abhandlung „Über die Komposition der Melodien und die Stimmung der Laute,“ (Aḥmad ibn al-Qāsim ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’*, ed. A. Müller (Königsberg, 1884), vol. 1, 210.23, ferner eine Einführung in das „Indische Rechnen,“ d.h. die dekadische Arithmetik (ibid., vol. 1, 210.11).

²¹ Ein Ergebnis solcher Konkurrenz mag auch die Existenz zweier unabhängiger Übersetzungen griechischer Mechaniktexte sein: Während Qusṭā, der dem Kindī nahestand, im Auftrag des Prinzen Aḥmad ibn al-Mu‘taṣim Herons *Mechanica* übertrug, übersetzte ein anderer (Ṭābit ibn Qurra?) die *Mechanica* des Pappos; s. David Edward Pritchett Jackson, „Scholarship in Abbasid Baghdad with Special Reference to Greek Mechanics in Arabic,“ *Quaderni di Studi Arabi* 5–6: 1987–88 (1988), 369–90; *Heron von Alexandria Mechanik und Katoptrik*, hrsg. und übers. von L. Nix & W. Schmidt (Leipzig, 1900) [Heronis Alexandrini Opera quae supersunt omnia, vol. II, fasc. 1], incipit S. 3.

²² Ibn ad-Dāya, *Kitāb Husn al-‘uqbā*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Ṣākīr (Kairo: Maṭba‘at al-Istiḳāma, 1940, repr. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiya, c. 1983), 130–1; Ausz. in aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīḥ al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. de Goeje et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1902/1951), vol. 3, 1002.

²³ Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā aṣ-Ṣūlī, *Aḥbār Abī Tammām* (Kairo: Maṭba‘at Laḡnat at-Ta’līf wa-t-Taḡama wa-n-Naṣr, 1356/1937), 230ff.

danach Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa in seiner Ärztegeschichte²⁴ von den Intrigen der Banū Mūsā gegen al-Kindī. Die Rivalität um Ruhm und Gunst verschärfte sich, als al-Muʿtaṣim nicht einen von ihnen, sondern eben al-Kindī als Tutor des Prinzen Aḥmad engagierte. Nach dem Tode des Muʿtaṣim (227/847) verleumdete die Brüder den Kindī beim neuen Kalifen al-Mutawakkil und vermochten es, seine Privatbibliothek konfiszieren zu lassen und an sich zu bringen. Der Astronom Sanad ibn ʿAlī, obschon Klient der Banū Mūsā und selbst Konkurrent des Kindī, habe dies als so skandalös empfunden, daß er die Brüder unter Druck setzte, um sie zur Rückgabe der Bücher zu bewegen: Obwohl die Banū Mūsā Meister im Ersinnen mechanischer Spielereien und Instrumente waren, versagten sie bei der Durchführung eines ehrgeizigen Kanalisierungsprojekts und hätten sich beinahe um Kopf und Kragen gebracht; Sanad warnte sie vor der drohenden Katastrophe und bot ihnen Rettung vor der Ungnade des Kalifen an, aber nur unter der Bedingung, daß sie die Bücher al-Kindīs dem rechtmäßigen Eigentümer zurückgäben.²⁵ Nach der Ermordung des Mutawakkil sollen sie gegen die Nachfolge des Aḥmad ibn al-Muʿtaṣim intrigiert haben mit dem Argument, dieser habe sich bereits gegen al-Mutawakkil das Amt angemaßt—in Wahrheit aber, weil sie den Schüler des Kindī haßten.²⁶ „Zwischen den Banū Mūsā ibn Šākīr und Yaʿqūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī war so viel Haß und Abneigung,“—so weiß noch al-Bīrūnī in seiner Geschichte der Astrolabienkonstruktion zu berichten—„daß einem Jüngling vor Kummer darüber die Haare ergrauen könnten. Ja, dies war sogar eine der Ursachen dafür, daß das Kalifat nicht an Aḥmad, den Sohn des Muʿtaṣim gelangte.“²⁷

3

Insbesondere den Fachgenossen (*iḥwān*), von denen er wohlwollende Förderung erwarten durfte, legte sich der Autor in elaborierten

²⁴ Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, *ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ*, vol. 1, 207.

²⁵ Friedrich Hauser, „Über das *kitāb al-ḥijāl*—das Werk über die sinnreichen Anordnungen—der Benū Mūsā,“ *Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Medizin* Heft 1 (Erlangen 1922), 185–7.

²⁶ Aṣ-Šūlī, *Aḥbār Abi Tammām*, 230ff; danach Hauser, „Über das *kitāb al-ḥijāl*,“ 187–8.

²⁷ Abū l-Raḥān al-Bīrūnī, *Istīʿāb al-wuḡūh al-mumkina fī ṣanʿat al-aṣṭurlāb* [Auszug], eds. E. S. Kennedy, P. Kunitzsch & R. P. Lorch, *The Melon-Shaped Astrolabe in Arabic Astronomy* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1999), 184–5.

Vorreden mit wohlkalkulierter Ehrerbietung zu Füßen. Mit dem Proömium einer philosophischen Epistel, gerichtet an den Dichter und Gelehrten Muḥammad ibn al-Ġahm, suchte er zugleich die Gunst eines erfolgreichen Höflings und vermögenden Statthalters. Es ist die Epistel „Über die Einsheit Gottes und die Endlichkeit des Weltkörpers“ (*Risāla fī Waḥdānīyat Allāh wa-tanāhī ġirm al-‘ālam*), mit der wir oben begannen und deren einleitende Adresse nun vollständig wiedergegeben sei.²⁸

Gott schütze Dich, löblicher Bruder, durch Sein Walten und bringe Dich auf den rechten Weg durch Seine Gunst, Er behüte Dich durch Seine Güte vor allem Straucheln und lasse Dir gelingen durch Seine Langmut das reinste Werk, und Er lasse Dich gelangen zur Kenntnis Seiner beständigen Gunst und verdienten Wohltat! Ich habe verstanden, daß Du mich aufgefordert hast abzufassen, was Du mich in Worten erklären hörtest. [...] Also bitte ich den Spender der Wohltaten und den Verleiher der Güter, diese [Antwort] Deinem Verlangen entsprechend zu fügen, und hierdurch Dir treffliches Geleit auszurichten auf die Straße der Rechtleitung, fernab von den Schrecken der [Höllenstrafe] des Jenseits. Bei meinem Leben, dieser schwierige Gegenstand könnte wohl langer und weitschweifiger Ausführungen nicht entraten, gälte er nicht einem Adressaten Deines Ranges in Studium und trefflicher Erfahrung, dem eine Einsicht wie die Deinige zuhülfe ist und den vor der Neigung zu niedrigem Verlangen eine Entschlossenheit wie die Deine bewahrt.²⁹

Der Barmakide Muḥammad ibn al-Ġahm³⁰ war für den aufstrebenden Philosophen ein idealer Vermittler am Kalifenhof.³¹ Muḥammad und

²⁸ Ed. Abū Rīda, in: *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, vol. 1, 201–7.

²⁹ Ibid., vol. 1, 201f.; ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in: *Ceuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 1, 137.

³⁰ G. Lecomte, „Muḥammad b. al-Ġahm, gouverneur philosophe,“ *Arabica* 5 (1958), 263–71; ders., „Muḥammad ibn al-Djahm,“ in: *EP*, s.n.; (mit weiteren Quellenreferenzen v.a. bei al-Ġāhiz); 'Alī ibn Yūsuf al-Qiftī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamā'*, ed. A. Müller & J. Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1903), 284; Sezgin, *GAS*, vol. 7, 124.

³¹ Der Name des Adressaten der Epistel wird so von Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a (*'Uyūn*, vol. 1, 212.25) und einer späteren iranischen Handschrift bezeugt, während die Handschrift Aya Sofya 4832 und danach der Herausgeber Abū Rīda seinen berühmteren Bruder, den Dichter 'Alī ibn al-Ġahm nennen. 'Alī kam früh nach Bagdad und gewann ersten Ruhm schon unter al-Ma'mūn, sodann auch eine Pfründe als Richter der *mazālim* in Hulwān unter al-Mu'taṣim, und wurde an dessen Hofe einer der *ġulasā'* und Favoriten unter den Dichtern. Seine orthodoxe Gesinnung und seine Sympathien für die *ahl al-ḥadīṭ* um Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal bereiteten ihm auch bei al-Mutawakkil den Weg zur *nadāma* mit dem Kalifen, aber ob seines scharfen *hiġā'* ohne dauernden Erfolg, mit wechselndem Glück, zwischen Gunst und Rivalität zerrieben, auf Augenhöhe mit den Dichtern seiner Zeit—sei es in Freundschaft (so mit Abū Tammām), sei es in Feindschaft (so mit al-Buḥturī wegen seiner Parteinahme gegen die Aliden (cf. *Dīwān al-Buḥturī*, ed. Ḥasan Kāmil as-Ṣairafī [Kairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1963–4], vol. 1, 25 Anm.).

sein Bruder, der berühmte Dichter ʿAlī ibn al-Ġāhm (gest. 249/863) stammten aus einer arabischen Familie von den Banū Sāma ibn Luʿaiy im transoxanischen Merw, wo ihr Vater Ġāhm Ämter unter al-Maʿmūn und al-Wāṭiq bekleidete. Der als Dichter, aber vor allem als Intellektueller mit Konnexionen zur Muʿtazila und zu den *falāsifa* sowie als Astrolog bekannte Höfling wirkte unter dem Kalifen al-Maʿmūn, schrieb für ihn ein Katarchen Handbuch³² und wurde von ihm mit einem wichtigen Gouvernement in Ġibāl belehnt; er starb in den ersten Regierungsjahren des Muʿtaṣim.

Aufbau, Stil und Vokabular der Vorrede stehen den Einleitungen anderer Traktate von al-Kindī nahe, insbesondere seiner *Risāla fī Māhiyat an-nawm wa-r-ruʿyā*;³³ knapper gehalten ist die Einleitung der *Risāla fī l-ʿAql*,³⁴ ähnlich elaboriert, aber anders formuliert die seiner *Risāla fī Kammīyat kutub Aristūṭālīs*³⁵—wir werden einige davon im einzelnen vorstellen: Der Verfasser richtet seine Segenswünsche an den Adressaten, nimmt Bezug auf dessen Frage, verspricht, angemessen, doch in aller Kürze zu antworten, und betont, daß dieses Verfahren im Hinblick auf den wissenschaftlichen Rang und die Kompetenz des Adressaten geboten sei.

Von den genannten *rasāʿil* trägt nur eine Minderzahl eine persönliche Widmung. Die anderen richten sich an nicht namentlich genannte Adressaten; wir müssen nicht einmal annehmen, daß sie einem einzelnen Notablen oder Gelehrten überreicht wurden. Die gelehrte *risāla* wird in der Hand von al-Kindī und seinesgleichen (auch das oben zitierte Zeugnis des *Šiwān al-ḥikma* impliziert das) literarische Form, Adressat ist nun der „geneigte Leser,“ „die Fachwelt.“ Dieselbe Entwicklung nehmen die Episteln der Kanzleibeamten, die als Glanzstücke des *inšāʿ* veröffentlicht und als Literaturwerke überliefert werden.

All dies läßt ihn nicht zum Förderer des Kindī prädestiniert erscheinen—doch gerade deshalb mag er ihm seine philosophische Verteidigung des *tawḥīd* und des koranischen Weltbildes gewidmet haben, aber zweifellos stand Muḥammad nach seiner geistigen Orientierung dem Kindī näher als der ganz anders gesinnte ʿAlī. Siehe auch ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in: *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques dʿal-Kindī*, vol. 1, 135; dazu F. Rosenthal, „al-Kindī als Literat,“ 280, Anm. 5; Sezgin, GAS, vol. 2, 580; EI², s.n.

³² Al-Qifṭī, *Tārīḥ al-ḥukamāʾ*, 284.

³³ Ed. Abū Rida, in: *Rasāʿil al-Kindī al-falsafīya*, vol. 1, 293–311.

³⁴ Ibid., vol. 1, 353–8.

³⁵ Ibid., vol. 1, 363–84; ed. Michelangelo Guidi & Richard Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindī*, vol. 1: *Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele* (Rom: Reale Accademia nazionale dei lincei, 1940), 375–419.

An einen anonymen, wenngleich respektvoll angeredeten Philosophen richtete sich al-Kindī Epistel „Erklärung, was der Seele in Erinnerung bleibt von dem, was sie in der Welt des Geistes hatte, wenn sie in die Welt der Wahrnehmung gelangt, und was ihr in Erinnerung bleibt von dem, was sie in der Welt der Wahrnehmung hat, wenn sie in die Welt des Geistes gelangt“ mit ihrem elaborierten Proömium:³⁶

Gott führe Dich zum Ergreifen des Guten und behüte Dich vor dem, was [nur] scheinbar gut, und Er führe Dich zu den Zielen des eigentlich Wahren. Deine Frage, so habe ich verstanden—und Gott lasse Dich verstehen alles, was Ihm wert, und gebe Dir Zuflucht vor allem, was Er verwehrt—gilt der Erklärung (der Frage), was der Seele in Erinnerung bleibt von dem, was sie in der Welt des Geistes (*‘ālam al-‘aql*) hatte, wenn sie in die Welt der (Sinnes-) Wahrnehmung (*‘ālam al-ḥiss*) gelangt, d. h. wenn sie zum Gebrauch der Wahrnehmung kommt, und was ihr in Erinnerung bleibt von dem, was sie in der Welt der Wahrnehmung hatte, wenn sie in die Welt des Geistes gelangt, wenn sie also den Gebrauch der Wahrnehmungsorgane aufgibt beim Vergehen des Gesamtorgans (*al-āla al-kullīya*).

Wenn ich nun darüber in Form von Frage und Antwort handle, so nur deshalb, weil diese Form die erstrebte Einsicht erleichtert und dem Verständnis hilft, die Sache ganz zu begreifen. Indessen habe ich nur so viel ausgeführt, wie ich es für Dich, entsprechend Deinem Rang im theoretischen Studium, genügend hielt; denn hier genügen wenige knappe Worte, Deinem Wunsche nachzukommen, ohne wortreiche Weitschweifigkeit. Wohl bedürfte es, um das Thema Deiner Frage einem andern, Dir im Range theoretischer Einsicht nachstehenden verständlich zu machen, vieler Worte, umständlicher und ausführlicher Erklärung—denn Du fragtest nach einer Sache von hoher Stufe und Würde in der Wissenschaft, und es ist schwierig, die Wahrheit in dieser Sache dem Verständnis genau auseinanderzusetzen. Ich habe einem Deiner Brüder die Frage vorgelegt, wie es um das wissenschaftliche Niveau bei der Erforschung derartiger Fragen bestellt sei, Fragen, die Männern mit subtilem Geist, tiefer Einsicht (*bu’d al-ḡawr*) und der Kraft zu intensivem Nachdenken und schöner Offenheit für Innovation (*ḥusn al-ittisā’ fī mawḍi’ al-ibdā’*) zur Untersuchung aufgegeben sind—und er hatte Mühe, Worte zu finden (*fa-ḡadḡa?*, leg. *fa-qaḡā?*) für Deine durchdringende Einsicht im Meistern solch tiefschürfenden Diskurses, ja (so meinte er), Deine Intelligenz eröffne Dir unerhörte Wunder: subtile Geheimnisse des Geistes, die allen verborgen sind außer dessen Adepten, welche in den Minen

³⁶ *Risāla fī mā li-n-nafs ḡikruḡū mimḡā kāna laḡā fī ‘ālam al-‘aql*, Facs.-Ed. und Übersetzung in G. Endress: „Al-Kindī über die Wiedererinnerung der Seele: arabischer Platonismus und die Legitimation der Wissenschaften im Islam,“ *Oriens* 34 (1994), 174–221.

der Wahrheit wohnen und die Früchte der Lauterkeit ernten. Gott lasse Dich unter denen sein, die teilhaben an Seiner Hoheit und Beistand finden in Seiner Stärke, Er helfe Dir zu allem, was nützt, und bringe es Dir nahe, wenn es fernliegt.³⁷

Die klassische Strukturierung eleganter Prosa durch die Balance des Parallelismus membrorum (arab. *muqābala*), Isokolon (*izidiwāḡ*) und Antithesis (*ṭibāq, muṭābaqa, takāfu*), ist das sinnfälligste Stilmittel des Autors, mit dem er sich an eine bereits zweihundertjährige Geschichte der altarabischen Kanzelrede und der abbasidischen Kanzleiepistel anschließt.³⁸

Insbesondere den Fachgenossen (*iḥwān*)—und ein solcher wird wohl auch in der vorgenannten Einleitung angeredet—legte sich der Autor in ausgefeilten Vorreden mit Bescheidenheit und Ehrerbietung zu Füßen. So auch in der thematisch verwandten „Epistel über das Wesen von Schlaf und Traum“ (*Risāla fī Māhīyat an-nawm wa-r-ru'yā*):³⁹

Gott mache Dir das Verborgene kund, und Er mache Dich glücklich im Hause des Lebens und im Hause des Todes! Du hast mich gebeten—und Gott leite Dich zu den Zielen der Wahrheit und helfe Dir, sie zu erlangen—daß ich Dir darlege, was Schlaf und was Traum ist. Es gehört dies—Gott sei Dir zuhilfe!—zu den subtilen Naturwissenschaften, zumal insofern als diese Frage zur Lehre von den Kräften der Seele hinführt. Wer eine solche Wissenschaft studieren will, bedarf des Grades von Scharfsinn, durch den Du Dich auszeichnest; denn wenn es einem daran mangelt, mangelt es ihm auch an Verständnis dieser Wissenschaft und an Einsicht in unsere Darlegung gemäß der Evidenz der Naturphänomene.

Die typische Antithese (arab. *muqābala*) des ersten Satzes findet sich auch in der kurzen Einleitung der berühmten *Risāla fī l-'Aql*:

Lasse Gott Dich verstehen, was nützt, und mache Er Dich glücklich im Hause des Lebens und im Hause des Todes! Ich habe verstanden, daß Du mich gebeten hast, die Lehre vom Intellekt darzulegen in knapper, referierender Form nach der Meinung der anerkannten Autoritäten von den alten Griechen....⁴⁰

³⁷ Ṣāsī'a: šā'i'a codd. ?

³⁸ Alfred F. L. Beeston, „Parallelism in Arabic Prose,“ *Journal of Arabic Literature* 5 (1974), 134–46; ders., „The Rôle of Parallelism in Arabic Prose,“ in: *Arabic Literature to the End of the Umayyad Period, The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 180–5.

³⁹ Ed. Abū Rida, in: *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-falsafīya*, vol. 1, 293–311.

⁴⁰ Ibid., vol. 1, 353–62.

Der Verneigung gegenüber dem Empfänger der Antwort, der Antwort auf eine Frage, als deren kongenialer Anreger er sich auszeichnet, entspricht die abschließende Schlußfloskel, so am Ende der Abhandlung über Schlaf und Traum mit einem paronomastischen Spiel um die Wurzel *kafā*, genügen‘:

Dies sei als Antwort auf Deine Frage genügend—entsprechend Deiner Stellung im spekulativen Denken (*naẓar*)—und genüge Dir Gott in allem, was nottut! Gelobt sei Gott, der dem Lob zunächst und seiner würdig—ein Lob, das Seinen Wohltaten für alle Seine Kreatur genügt!⁴¹

Namentlich genannt, aber nicht mit Sicherheit nachweisbar ist ein anderer Adressat des Kindī, auch er wohl ein Fachgelehrter, *aḥ mahmūd*, eher denn ein Hofbeamter: Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥurāsānī, an den seine *Risāla fī Ḍāḥ tanāḥī ġirm al-‘ālam* „Über die Erklärung der Endlichkeit des Weltkörpers“⁴² gerichtet ist—der verlockende Gedanke, daß es sich um Kindīs Schüler Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Marwān ibn aṭ-Ṭaiyib as-Saraḥsī (aus Saraḥs in Ḥurāsān, gest. 286/899) handeln möchte, läßt sich nicht erhärten, ist aber nicht ganz abzuweisen.⁴³ Die ausführlichen Elogen fehlen hier ganz; der Autor kommt gleich zur Sache, um ein Exempel logischer, oder vielmehr mathematischer Beweisführung zu statuieren und so eine Kardinalfrage der philosophischen Kosmologie zu beantworten.⁴⁴

Ein geometrisches Problem, das Verhältnis von Kreisumfang und Durchmesser, löst al-Kindī im Anschluß an Archimedes’ *De mensura circuli* für Yūḥannā ibn Māsawayh (gest. 243/857), Sproß einer Ärztefamilie aus Gondēšāpūr, Leibarzt der Kalifen in Bagdad und Samarra, so auch des Mu‘taṣim,⁴⁵ in seiner „Epistel über die Näherung [der Proportion] zwischen Kreisumfang und Sehne“ (*fī Taqrīb ad-dawr min al-watar*):⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibid., vol. 1, 311.

⁴² Ibid., vol. 1, 186–92/²1978, vol. 1, 139–46; ed. Rashed & Jolivet, in: *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 2, 157–65.

⁴³ F. Rosenthal, *Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭaiyib as-Saraḥsī*, (New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1943); die hier gegebene Werkliste verzeichnet zahlreiche Titel, die mit denen der Abhandlungen des Kindī übereinstimmen.

⁴⁴ Zur Sache s. D. Gutas, „Geometry and the Rebirth of Philosophy in Arabic with al-Kindī“, in *Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea*, eds. R. Arnzen & J. Thielmann (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 195–209; G. Endress: „The Language of Demonstration.“

⁴⁵ M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 112.

⁴⁶ Ed., mit engl. Übers., von Roshdi Rashed: „Al-Kindī’s Commentary on Archimedes’ ‘The Measurement of the Circle’,“ *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 3 (1993), 7–53, Text S. 42ff.

Gott führe Dich zur Wahrheit, welche alle Blindheit aufhebt, und behüte Dich vor der Verwirrung, welche auf den Irrweg zum Erwerb allen Übels führt. Ich habe verstanden, daß Du um Auslegung der Darstellung des Archimedes bittest über die Annäherung der Proportion zwischen der Kreisperipherie und seinem Durchmesser, soweit, daß Du zu dessen Verständnis kommst.

In Kürze, aber mit den üblichen Floskeln beginnt die „Epistel an einen seiner Brüder über die schweren Krankheiten, welche das Phlegma betreffen“ (*Risālat al-Kindī ilā baʿḍ ihwānihi fī l-amrād al-balḡamiya al-ʿiẓām*):⁴⁷

Gott behüte Dich (*ḥāṭaka*) im Wohlergehen und gebe Dir Seine Gunst (*waffaqaka*) auf dem Wege dahin, Er helfe Dir zum Erreichen der Wahrheit und zum Nießbrauch ihrer Früchte!—Du hast mich gebeten—leite Gott Dich recht zu allem, das nützt —, daß ich Dir die Ursache der Fallsucht (*ṣarʿ*) genannten Krankheit darlege. Deren Hauptursache ist mehr als (nur) einer Krankheit gemeinsam, doch zu differenzieren je nach dem betroffenen Ort und nach (dem Grad von) Stärke und Schwäche. Ich habe es Dir dargelegt entsprechend dem, was ich für hinreichend hielt und entsprechend Deinem Platz als Forscher. Bei Gott ist unser Beistand, auf Ihm ruht unsere Zuversicht, und Er ist unser Genügen.

Ebensolche Wünsche widmet dem Adressaten die Einleitung der „Epistel über die Anzahl der Bücher des Aristoteles und darüber, was erforderlich ist zur Kompetenz in der Philosophie“ (*Risālat al-Kindī fī Kammīyat kutub Aristūṭālīs wa-mā yuḥtāḡ ilayhi fī taḥṣīl al-falsafa*):⁴⁸

Gott behüte Dich (*ḥāṭaka*) durch sein Wirken, und Er gebe Dir Seine Gunst (*waffaqaka*) zum Erreichen der Wahrheit (*dark al-ḥaqq*), und stelle Dich in den Dienst dessen, was die Wahrheit erfordert! Du hast mich gebeten—und Gott gebe Dir Glück im Erreichen Deiner Wünsche und mache sie dem Zugriff nahe, entferne Dich von der Unwissenheit und gebe Dir zu eigen die Erleuchtung durch die Wahrheit—daß ich Dir Kunde gebe von den Büchern des Griechen Aristoteles, in denen er philosophiert, von ihrer Anzahl und Anordnung und von denen, um deren Studium keiner, der den Zugang zur Philosophie sucht, umhin kommt....

⁴⁷ Erhalten nur im Kindī-Kapitel des *Muntaḥab Šiwān al-ḥikma*: Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī, *The Muntakhab šiwān al-ḥikmah of Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī*, introduction and indices by D. M. Dunlop (Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1979), 278–90.

⁴⁸ Ed. Abū Rida, in: *Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, vol. 1, 363–74; ed. Guidi & Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindī*, 390.

Die z. T. wörtliche Wiederholung derselben Wendungen ist auffällig, aber nicht überraschend—der regelmäßige Gebrauch derselben syntaktisch-stilistischen Strukturen zeigt, daß wir es mit einer Routine zu tun haben, die nur in einzelnen Fällen mit dem Glanz besonders ausgefeilter Tropen der panegyrischen Prosa persönliche Ehrerbietung und gelehrte Ambition zur Schau stellt.

Derselbe Typus, oft weit knapper ausgeführt, findet sich in vielen, philosophischen wie naturwissenschaftlichen Abhandlungen: Man vergleiche die Episteln „Über die Existenz unkörperlicher Substanzen“ (*Risāla fī annahū ġawāhir lā-aḡsām*),⁴⁹ „Über den Körper, der seiner Natur nach Träger der Farbe ist in den vier Elementen“ (*Risāla fī l-Ġirm al-ḥāmil bi-ṭibāʾihī* [sic leg. pro *bi-ṭibāʾat*] *al-lawn min al-ʾanāšir al-arbaʾa wa-lladī huwa ʾillat al-lawn fī ġayrihī*),⁵⁰ „Über die Ursache der Entstehung von Nebel“ (*Risāla fī ʾIllat kawn aḍ-ḍabāb*),⁵¹ „Über die Ursache von Schnee, Hagel, Blitz, Blitzschlag, Donner und Rauhreif“ (*Risāla fī ʾIllat at-talġ wa-l-barad wa-l-barq wa-ṣ-ṣawāʾiq wa-r-raʿd wa-z-zamharīr*),⁵² „Über die Ursache der blauen Farbe, die man himmelwärts sieht“ (*Risālat al-Kindī fī ʾIllat al-lawn al-lāzuwardī alladī yurā fī l-ġaww fī ġihat as-samāʾ wa-yuḡann annahū lawn as-samāʾ*).⁵³

4

Die weitere Entwicklung, insbesondere die fortschreitende Literarisierung der arabischen Sachprosa bei Kanzlisten, Hofhistorikern wie auch bei den Gelehrten der *ʿulūm al-ʾaḡam*, bei *udabāʾ al-falāsifa* wie Kindīs Schüler Abū Zayd al-Balḥī und dessen Adepten Abū Ḥayyān at-Tawḥīdī führt weit über die wackeren Stilübungen des *Faylasūf al-ʿArab* hinaus. Wie weit aber schon ein Zeitgenosse das Raffinement der Stilkunst mit einer subtilen rhetorischen Logik zu verbinden wußte, sei abschließend an einem Beispiel gezeigt, an der Katoptrik des Qusṭā ibn Lūqā aus Baalbek (gest. um 300/912–3), deren Dedikation an den mächtigen Regenten al-Muwaffaq gerichtet ist:⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Ed. Abū Rīda, in: *Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-falsafiya*, vol. 1, 265–9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., vol. 2, 64–8.

⁵¹ Ibid., vol. 2, 76.

⁵² Ibid., vol. 2, 80.

⁵³ Ibid., vol. 2, 103.

⁵⁴ *Kitāb fī ʾIlal mā yaʾrid fī l-marāyā min iḥtilāf al-manāẓir allafahū li-n-Nāšir li-Dīn-Allāh Abī Aḥmad al-Muwaffaq bi-Llāh Qusṭā ibn Lūqā al-Baʿlabakkī* („Livre sur

Jedem Edlen (*fāḍil*)—Gott stärke den Amīr—gilt notwendige Zuneigung. Der Edelste (*afḍal*) der Menschen ist der bei Gott Erwählte (*mufaḍḍal*), und der von Gott Erwählte ist der, den Gott adelt (*faḍḍalahū*) mit den edelsten (*afḍal*) der menschlichen Qualitäten: Verstand, Religion und schönem Charakter. Gott hat den Fürsten geadelt (*faḍḍala*) mit vollkommenem Verstand, der ihn die rechte Meinung gegenüber den Fehlritten der Leidenschaft bevorzugen läßt; mit tugendhafter (*fāḍil*) Religion, die ihn Mühe und Plage im Hinblick auf das umfassende Heil den Vorzug geben läßt vor Niedertracht und Faulheit; mit schönen Charakterzügen, die ihn disponieren zu trefflicher Gemeinschaft mit seiner Umgebung und seinen Gefährten, um für sie zu sorgen und sich um ihr Ergehen zu kümmern. Obendrein hat er damit vereint Scharfsinn, Witz, (die Kunst der) Staatslenkung und der Haushaltsführung, Liebe und Generosität; er hat sich der Wiederherstellung (*iṣlāḥ*) der Dynastie gewidmet nach ihrem Verfall, und er hat die Einmütigkeit hergestellt nach dem Zerwürfnis. Der Fürst, welcher durch solche Tugend geadelt ist, ist der edelste der Menschen, und die Liebe zu ihm obliegt allen Menschen. Wenn nun die Seelen einen solchen lieben, rufen sie dazu auf, ihn mit den besten Dingen zu verbinden, und die besten der Humaniora sind die demonstrativen Wissenschaften, welche die Natur der Dinge und ihre Gründe erklären—und die beste der demonstrativen Wissenschaften ist diejenige, an der die Wissenschaften der Physik und der Geometrie Anteil haben, denn aus der Wissenschaft der Physik nimmt sie die [Prämissen der] Sinneswahrnehmung und aus der Wissenschaft der Geometrie nimmt sie die Beweisführung aus [der Konstruktion der] Linien. Nun finde ich nichts, das diese beiden Disziplinen schöner und vollkommener vereint als die Wissenschaft der Strahlen, besonders der von Spiegeln reflektierten. So habe ich für den Fürsten einen Spiegel mit zwei Oberflächen genommen....

Aus dem Rang des Adressaten selbst deduziert so der Gelehrte den angemessenen Gegenstand der ihm darzubringenden Belehrung—Panegyrik, die den Geehrten zur Ratio dienender Wissenschaft erhebt.

les causes de la diversité des perspectives qui se produit dans les miroirs“), ed., trad. R. Rashed in: *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), vol. 1, 571–645.

NEW PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS OF YAḤYĀ IBN ‘ADĪ:
A SUPPLEMENT TO ENDRESS’ *ANALYTICAL INVENTORY*¹

Robert Wisnovsky

The codex Madrasa-yi Marwī 19 is a philosophical anthology copied in Rabī‘ al-Awwal 1073/October 1662.² Among other items, the codex contains 53 treatises and letters attributed to the Jacobite Christian philosopher and theologian Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d. 363/974) on various problems of philosophy. The titles of almost all of these 53 essays correspond to those listed by the bio-bibliographers, including Ibn an-Nadīm (d. 380/990), al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248) and Ibn Abī Uṣaybī‘a (d. 668/1270). These and other bio-bibliographers’ lists and notices were collated, analyzed, supplemented and checked against a number of extant manuscripts by Gerhard Endress, whose very helpful “analytical inventory” appeared in 1977.³ Of the extant philosophical treatises, 24 were subsequently edited and published by Saḥbān Ḥalīfāt in 1988.⁴ Among the 53 philosophical works by Yaḥyā contained in the Marwī codex, there are 24 which Endress thought had been lost. By providing transcriptions of the incipits and explicits of these “lost”

¹ Many thanks are due to my research assistants Taro Mimura and Kostyantyn Filonenko for their help with some of the initial transcriptions; to Adam Gacek for his help with some paleographical issues; and to Naser Dumairieh, Felicitas Opwis, Gerhard Endress and the late and sorely missed David Reisman for their acute suggestions and corrections. All remaining errors are my own.

² Fol. 180a, ult. The date of 703 given by the cataloguer (R. Ustādi, *Fihrist-i nushā-hā-yi ḥaṭṭī-yi Kitābhāna-yi madrasa-yi Marwī-yi Tihrān* [Tehran: Kitābhāna-yi Madrasa-yi Marwī, 1321 Sh.], 271–2) is probably a misprint; and in any case, a date of 703 is too early for the hands: Persian *nash* in the first half of the manuscript (the half containing the Yaḥyā treatises), and *nasta‘līq* with elements of *shikasta* in the second half. A facsimile edition, including a comprehensive introduction to the anthology as well as an index of names of individuals and groups, and titles of books, is being jointly prepared by the author and Ahmadreza Rahimirseh for inclusion in the series co-published by the Institute of Islamic Studies of the Free University of Berlin. I am very grateful to Mr. Rahimirseh and Reza Pourjavady for bringing this manuscript to my attention.

³ G. Endress, *The Works of Yahyā ibn ‘Adī: An Analytical Inventory* (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1977). For references to passages on Yaḥyā in the bio-bibliographers’ works, as well as a synopsis of the data they provide on his life, see Endress, *Works*, 1–6.

⁴ S. Ḥalīfāt, *Maqālāt Yahyā ibn ‘Adī al-falsafīya* (‘Ammān: al-Ġāmi‘a al-Urdunniya, 1988).

philosophical treatises, along with the treatises' folio and line references in the Marwī codex, I hope in this chapter to supplement the information that Endress provided, all the while following the formatting and numbering system he used (e.g., E7.4 refers to the text listed by Endress as 7.4). I have also provided citations of the corresponding titles in the inventory that Ḥalīfāt provided in the Introduction to his *Maqālāt* (pp. 24–36), and on occasion I have added further notes of my own (indicated by an asterix *) to Endress' extensive and acute analyses.

E2.21 (= Ḥalīfāt, #41)

Maqāla fī tafsīr faṣl min al-maqāla at-tāmina min as-samā' at-tabī'i

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 17: fol. 28a15–b9

Inc.:

قال إن طلب طالب ما معنى قول الفيلسوف أرسطوطالس في المقالة الثامنة من السماع الطبيعي إن المحرك في المحيط فليعلم أنه إنما يعني أن المحرك وهو يعني بالمحرك الباري جل ثناؤه وبالمحيط الفلك وأنه فيه كالمعقول في العاقل إلا أنه بذاته فيه والدليل على ذلك أنه من المتعارف أن الحكماء قد أطلقوا أن الإناء مكان متحرك وقد أطلقوا أن الحركة واحدة متصلة وأطلقوا أن الكرات السماوية متحركة وإنما وصفوا كل واحد من هذه بما وصف به لا من جهة ذاته بل من جهة وجود بعض ما هو فيه يصدق عليه تلك الصفة . . .

Expl.:

. . . فإذا قد تبين أنه لا يصح أن تكون العلة في المحيط بشيء من الوجوه التي يقال وجود شيء في شيء بذاته فقد تبين أن العلة ليس هو بذاته موجوداً في المحيط وإذ ذلك كذلك فقد تبين أن المتحرك وهو الجرم السماوي إنما يتحرك عن العلة الأولى كحركة العاشق عن المعشوق وكان ذلك موجباً لا محالة أن يكون عاقلاً للعلة الأولى وكانت حقيقة العاقل أن يكون مثال المعقول فيه فقد ظهر ووضح أنه إنما وجود.

*As with E4.41 (= Ḥalīfāt, #85), the treatise on *badal* (“mutual replacement”), this work is a commentary on an issue arising from *Physics* 8.10. Here the question is whether or not the Unmoved Mover, given its primary activity of causing the heavens' circular motion, is “in” the center of the universe or “on” the circumference of the universe. The Greek *anankē dē* [or *de*] *ē en mesōi ē en kuklōi einai hautai gar*

hai arkhai alla takhista kineitai ta engutata tou kinountos toiautē d'hē tou kuklou kinēsis (Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.10, 267b6–9) was rendered into Arabic as *fa-qad yağibu ɗarūratan an yakūna immā fī l-wasaṭi wa-immā fī d-dā'irati wa-ḍālika anna hādayni humā l-mabda'āni lākinna aqraba l-ašyā'i mina l-muḥarriki asra'uhā ḥarakatan wa-ka-ḍālika ḥarakatu l-kulli fa-l-muḥarriku idan hunāka* (Aristūṭālīs: *aṭ-Ṭabī'a* II, ed. 'A. Badawī [Cairo: ad-Dār al-Qawmīya li-ṭ-Ṭibā'a wa-n-Našr, 1965], 932,10–13). Badawī reports that the margin of the Leiden ms Or. 583 Warner contains the comment: *ay naḥwu an yakūna l-muḥarriku immā fī l-wasaṭi wa-immā fī d-dā'irati wa-huwa yaqūlu innahu fī d-dā'irati 'alā ma'nā annahu yuḥarrikuhā bi-l-qaṣḍi l-awwali wa-tataḥarraku 'anhu bi-l-qaṣḍi ṭ-tānī*. cf. Simplicius, in *Phys.* 5–8 (= *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* X), ed. H. Diels (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895), *ad loc.*, 1353,35–1355,ult.

E3.11 (= Ḥalīfāt, #44)

Maqāla fī mabāhiṭ al-ḥamsa 'an ar-ru'ūs aṭ-ṭamāniya

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 4: fol. 4b31–5b31

Inc.:

إن من عادة مفسري كتب الحكماء أن يفحصوا قبل الفحص عن معاني كل كتاب من كتب الحكمة عن ثمانية معان يسمونها الرؤوس وهي غرض الكتاب ومنفعته وسمته وأقسامه وواضعه ومن أي العلوم هو ونحو تعليمه ورتبته وينبغي أن نبحث عن هذه الرؤوس خمسة مباحث أحدها لم سميت رؤوساً وثاني ما كل واحد منها والثالث ما المنفعة في البحث عنها والرابع لم رتبناها هذا الترتيب المرسوم لها والخامس لم صارت عدتها ثمانية لا أكثر ولا أقل . . .

Expl.:

. . . فقد تبينت الأسباب الموجبة لوجود هذه الرؤوس بهذه العدة دون غيرها وإذا قد بينا ذلك فقد بلغنا غرضاً في هذا القول وهو تعيين المباحث الخمسة التي عددناها في الرؤوس الثمانية اتهمينا إلى قصدنا بمعونة الله ذي الجود والحكمة والحول ولي العدل وواهب العقل فله الحمد شكراً دائماً كما هو له اهل .

*A transcription and translation of this text, with introduction, will appear as R. Wisnovsky, "Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's discussion of the prolegomena to the study of a philosophical text," in *Law and Tradition*

in *Classical Islamic Thought*, ed. M. Cook et al. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). Yaḥyā's five inquiries are as follows: (1) Why are they called "headings" (*ru'ūs*)? Answer: On the basis of an analogy with animals' heads, which serve as their source of motion and sensation and hence as an expression of their essence *qua* animals. (2) What is each heading? Answer: the book's aim, its usefulness, its title, its divisions, its author, which science it is part of, the method of instruction, and its rank. (3) What is the use in investigating them? Answer: there are one or more benefits specific to each heading. (4) Why and in what context was this arrangement prescribed for them? Answer: Because the headings correspond to types of causes, and the causes are arranged in terms of priority and posteriority. (5) Why did their number come to be eight, neither more nor less? Answer: Because a book is an artifact, and like all beings, both natural and artificial, it is subject to a prescribed method of causal analysis.

E3.13 (= Ḥalifāt, #46)

Maqāla fī innīyat [E: annīyat] šinā'at al-manṭiq wa-mā'iyatihā wa-limīyatihā wa-hiya l-mawsūma bi-hidāya li-man ta'attā ilā sabīl an-nağāt

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 3: fol. 4a5–b30

Inc.:

لو وافقت أفعال جميع البشر أقوالهم في إثبات الحق والانقياد له لأغنانا ذلك عن تكلف إبانة فضل الصناعة المنطقية وعظم منفعتها إذ ظهورهما مع أيسر تأمل . . .

Expl.:

. . . وقد كان ظهر قبل ذلك ما هي وأي شيء هي وهذه هي الأربعة المطالب العلمية وإذ كان هذا مبلغ نفعها فما أحقها بالرغبة فيها ومحمل كل مشقة وكلفة في التوصل إليها.

* The Incipit and Explicit show that, just as Endress surmised, this text is identical to E3.12 (= Ḥalifāt, #45), which was translated by N. Rescher and F. Shehadi ("Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's treatise 'On the four scientific questions regarding the art of logic,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 25/4 [1964], 572–8), on the basis of an edition by M. Türker ("Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī ve neşredilmemiş bir risalesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 14 [1958], 98–102).

E3.14 (= Ḥalifāt, #47)

*Maqāla fī tabyīn faḍl šināʿat al-mantiq bi-waṣf baʿd mā yufiduhū
ahlāhā min al-quwā l-muʿiza li-sāʿir aṣ-šināʿāt al-kalāmiya siwāhā*

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 2: fol. 3a23–4a4

Inc.:

لما كان واجباً على كل ممنوح إحساناً استفراغ جهده في الثناء على مانحه ونصير وكده القول
بفضل نفعه وكان فضل المنافع الثمار شاهد عدل بجلالة طبائع الأشجار وكانت صناعة المنطق
يفيد أهلها فواضل قوى لا سبيل إلى اقتنائها إلا منها ولا حيلة في الوصول إليها إلا عنها وجب
على من وصل إليه شيء منها شكر ذلك لها والإبانة به فضلها.

Expl.:

. . . فإن الذي ينتج عن هاتين المقدمتين هو أن كل قائل إنه حمار فهو صادق وكقولهم إن
كل واحد من الناس حيوان والحيوان ذو أنواع كثيرة فهاتان مقدمتان صادقتان والذي ينتج
عنهما أن كل واحد من الناس ذو أنواع كثيرة وهذا قول كاذب وكقولهم إن الجسم لا يخلو
من أن يكون حيواناً وليس بحيوان إذ كان من الاضطراب يصدق على كل شيء إثبات شيء بعينه
أو نفيه فإن كان الجسم حيواناً لزم أن يكون الحبر حيواناً إذ كان الحبر جسماً والجسم قد وضع
أنه حيوان وإن كان الجسم ليس بحيوان لزم أن يكون الحيوان ليس بحيوان إذ كان الحيوان جسماً
فالصناعة المنطقية وما تفيده من قوانينها يسهل التخلص من هذه الأغاليط وأمثالها وفي دون هذا
كفاية في تحقيق شرفها.

*The appendix to this text (E3.14.1) is extant (= Ḥalifāt, Text 8, pp. 201–205).

E3.21 (= Ḥalifāt, #40)

ʿIddat masāʾil fī maʿānī Kitāb Isāgūḡī

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 25: fol. 33b14–35b7

Inc.:

لم خالف فرفوريوس عادة الفلاسفة بإعطائه بدلاً من العلة القريبة التي هي علة المعلول بذاتها
شيئاً لا يمكن أن يكون بذاته علة لما أعطاها علة له فإنه جعل سبب جهل خرساوريوس بما في
قاطيغوريوس ضرورة العلم بماهية الجنس والفصل والنوع والخاصة والعرض ومن البين الظاهر أن
العلم لا يمكن أن يكون سبباً لوجود الجهل بذاته إذ كان ضده . . .

Expl.:

. . . فأمّا أن يكون العرض ليس بجنس لشيء غير الموضوع الذي هو عرض له فلم يقل ذلك فرفوربوس ولا يسوغ في معنى قوله فمن هاهنا دخلت الشبهة على المتشكك عليه بهذا الشك إذ كان العرض إنما يمكن أن يوجد جنساً أو فصلاً أو نوعاً أو خاصة لغير الموضوع الذي هو عرض له وهاهنا ليس في رسم فرفوربوس للعرض منع منه ولا إشارة في قوله إليه والحمد لله رب العالمين.

*This treatise appears to be paired with E3.52 (= Ḥalifāt, #63), i.e., *Ağwibat šayhinā Abī Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus al-Qunnā'ī 'an masā'il sa'alahu Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī ibn Ḥumayd ibn Zakariyā' 'anhā fī ma'ānī Ḫāḡūḡī li-Furfūriyūs*. However, the two texts are not identical: for example, the name خروساوريوس (viz., Chrysaorius, the Roman senator, and Porphyry's disciple, who is addressed in the first line of the *Isagogē*) does not appear in E3.52.

E3.31 (= Ḥalifāt, #52)

Maqāla fī tabyīn anna l-maqūlāt 'ašara lā aḡtar wa-lā aqall

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 35: fol. 52b19–53a18

Inc.:

قال إذ كان بحثنا الآن عن الموجودات المقولات العامة التي ليس يعمها جنس فوقها وإنما نعني بالمقولات المحمولات ومن البين أن معنى المحمولات من حيث هي محمولات منطق بأشياء هي محمولات عليها وهي التي يسميها المنطقيون موضوعات. . .

Expl.:

. . . ومن قبل أن ليس كل الجواهر يوجد لها كل واحد من هذه الموجودات لكن منها ما يوجد لها بعضها ولا يوجد لها باقيها انفصل بعضها من بعض بهذا المعنى تحصلت بذلك نسبة الجوهر إلى ما هو له فلزمت مقولة له فهذه هي الأسباب التي بها وجب أن يكون أجناس الموجودات عشرة لا زيادة.

*Endress suggests that this treatise may be identical to E7.1, no. 25, which Ḥalifāt printed on pp. 180–1 of his *Maqālāt*. A comparison of the two works shows, however, that they are distinct.

E3.32 (= Ḥalīfāt, #53)*Maqāla fī ibānat anna ḥarārat an-nār laysat ḡawharan li-n-nār*

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 14: fol. 17b26–20a17

Inc.:

وقاك الله من مخادع الهوى وحماك من مصارع الردى وسلك بك سبيل الهدى وأفاض عليك من ضياء حكمته ما يبين لك به الطرائق في حنادس المشكلات ويكشف لك عن الحقائق في ملابس الشبهات إنني منذ أطلعت على اعتقادك أحسن الله توفيقك في الحرارة أنها في النار جوهر وفي الحديد عرض ووقوفي على حججك في مذهبك الى ذلك . . .

Expl.:

. . . فلا يخلو من أن تكون هي النار فتكون حرارة النار هي النار فيلزم أن تكون هي حرارة نفسها ونفسها هي حرارتها وهذا قول هو بأن يكون من هذيان الموسوسين أولى به من أن تكون من أقاويل المتفلسفين أو تكون جسمًا غير النار فيلزم أن يوجد جسمان في مكان واحد وهذا محال لأنه يلزم وضع وجود جسمين في مكان واحد أن يوجد الفلك بأسره وجميع ما فيه موضوع ذرة من الرمل وهذا في غاية الاستحالة فليس حرارة النار إذاً جوهرًا من هيولى وصورة ولا جوهرًا هو صورة للنار ولا جوهرًا هيولى نيا وكل ما ليس هو لما هو فيه جوهرًا على طريق الهيولى ولا على طريق الصورة ولا على طريق المركب منها فليس هو جوهرًا له البتة فحرارة النار إذاً ليست جوهرًا البتة للنار وذلك ما أردنا أن نبين فقد بلغنا مقصودنا من بيان ما أردنا تبينه بمعونة الله وتأييده وهدايته وتسديده فله ذي الجود والحكمة والحول ولي العدل وواهب العقل الحمد شكرًا دائمًا خالصًا كما هو له اهل .

*This treatise appears to be related to E7.3 (= Ḥalīfāt, #95), *Nuṣṣat mā atbatahu Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī li-Abī Bakr al-Ādamī al-‘Atṭār*, which treats the same topic.

E3.33 (= Ḥalīfāt, #54)

Nuṣṣat mā kataba bihi Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī fī l-ḥukūma bayna Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-ma‘rūf bi-Abī Naṣr ibn ‘Adī al-Kātib wa-munāqidihi fī-mā ḥṭalafā fihi min anna l-ḡism ḡawhar wa-‘araḍ wa-kitābatuhu ilā l-amīr Sayf ad-Dawla Abī l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Hamdān

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 50: fol. 70a20–71b25

Inc.:

قال أوصلت الي أنا يحيى بن عدي رقعة منسوبة إلى إبراهيم بن علي نسختها قرأت ما أنفذه سيدنا الأمير سيف الدولة إلى من خط يحيى بن عدي بما ذكره في الجسم ولو كان غيره المتكلم لما أحبته عنه وذلك لما أعرفه من فهمه وقد وصفته بذلك مرات وليس من عادي أن أظن بمثله إلا أحسن الظنون وأكثر الناس يختلفون في أشياء تكون أكثر الأسباب في ذلك أن يظن هذا الإنسان فهذه الكلمة أنها تدل على معنى والإنسان الآخر يظن أنها تدل على معنى آخر فيكون حينئذ بينهم الخلف لا في المعاني ولكن في غيرها. . .

Expl.:

. . . وذكرت الجواب لتوقف عليه إن شاء الله قد تقدم الجواب عن مثل هذا القول فإعادته من الفضل وبيننا أن الذي يتبين من كتاب الجوهر والاعراض إن كان يعني بهذا الرسم كتاب المقولات وهو المعروف بقاطيغورياس أن الأبعاد التي ظن إبراهيم أن أرسطوطالس إليها يشير باسم الجوهر ليست عرضاً بما فيه كفاية فليطلب الوجه الذي به يدخل الجسم تحت الكمية فيكون به عرضاً فإنه إن ظهر له زالت عنه هذه الحيرة ويرى أن الفيلسوف عنده من هذا الرأي الذي نسبته إليه إن شاء الله ثم قال إبراهيم ولعل يحيى بن عدي ظن أن قائلاً يقول إن هذه الأرض بكيثتها لا أبعادها فقط عرض ولعمري إن هذا منكر وفيما مضى كفاية إن شاء الله ما ظننت هذا وقد بينت أن الأبعاد ليست عرضاً وأن القائل بذلك مخطئ والفيلسوف من هذه الظنة يرى فهذا آخر ما وجدته في رقعة إبراهيم قد ذكرت ما عندي فيه والله ذي الجود والحكمة والحول ولي العدل وواهب العقل الحمد لله شكراً دائماً خالصاً كما هو له أهل وإليه.

*Ḥalifāt tentatively assigned this title to the text he printed on pp. 165–6 of his *Maqālāt* (see p. 165, n. 1). However, the two texts are in fact distinct: Ḥalifāt's text is much shorter than this treatise (i.e., *Madrasa-yi Marwī* 19, no. 50: fol. 70a20–71b25), and the Incipits and Explicits differ. A transcription and translation of this text (and of E. 74, which responds to it), with introduction, has been completed by S. Menn and R. Wisnovsky, and is being submitted as “Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī and Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Adī: On whether body is a substance or a quantity”, to *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*.

E3.35 (= Ḥalifāt, #57)

Maqāla fī qīsmat as-sitt al-maqūlāt allatī lam yaqsimhā Aristūṭālīs ilā l-aḡnās wa-l-anwā‘ allatī tahtahā

MS: Tehrān: *Madrasa-yi Marwī* 19, no. 44: fol. 64b22–65a33

Inc.:

قال إن أرسطاطليس الفيلسوف لإيثاره الإيجاز واختياره الاختصار أغفل قسمة سبع مقولات من العشر إلى الأجناس المتوسطة التي تحت واحدة واحدة منها على مراتبها وقسمة المتوسطات إلى أنواع أنواعها وهذه هي الجوهر والأين والمتى والموضوع وأن يكون له ويفعل وينفعل . . .

Expl.:

. . . فقد تبين وجود أجناس متوسطة بين أجناس أجناس الست المقولات الثواني يجاوز أرسطاطليس تعديدها توجيهاً للإيجاز وانقسام الأجناس المتوسطة إلى أن ينتهي إلى أنواع أنواعها وانقسام أنواع أنواعها إلى أشخاصها وذلك ما أردنا تبينه.

E3.36 (= Halifāt, #58)

Maqāla fī anna l-kamm laysa fīhi taḍādd

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 23: fol. 32b34–33a29

Inc.:

قال يجبي إن قال قائل كيف يتخلص أرسطوطالسكم من أن يكون قد ناقض نفسه في دعواه أن الكر ليس فيه تضاد أي ليس فيه نوعان متضادان مع قوله إن الزوج ضد الفرد فإنه قد مثل بهما في المتقابلات على الأضداد التي هي ليس بين الضدين منها متوسط فهو بذلك يناقض نفسه لا محالة . . .

Expl.:

. . . فقد تبين بطلان ظنك وقولك إن الفيلسوف قد ناقض نفسه إذ كان معنى الأصل إذ الذي نفاه عن الكمية ليس معنى الأضداد الذي أطلقه على الزوج والفرد ولله المعين على إظهار نزاه الفيلسوف من الخطأ.

E3.41 (= Halifāt, #60)

Maqāla fī nahḡ as-sabīl ilā taḥlīl al-qiyāsāt ilā l-aškāl allatī hiya fihā min aškāl al-qiyās at-talāta al-ḥamlīya

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 46: fol. 66b21–69a8

Inc.:

قال إن الفيلسوف أرسطوطالس لما قال في فاتحة الفصل الثالث من المقالة الأولى من كتاب أنولوطيقا الأولى إنه ينبغي أن نقول كيف نرفع المقاييس إلى الأشكال التي ذكرنا لأن ذلك بقية

ما كان يجب أن ننظر فيه لأنه إن عرفنا كون المقاييس وكانت لنا قدرة على أن نوجدها أيضاً وأيضاً أن نرد ما كان منها إلى الأشكال التي ذكرنا فإن في ذلك تمام غرضنا الأول ونعرض فيما سنتكلم فيه الآن . . .

Expl.:

. . . فاعلم أنه لا سبيل إلى معرفة أنها القياس المقصود وتحليله إذ كانت المقاييس المتماثلة أكثر من واحد إلا أنك إذا سلكت في تحليل كل واحد من القياسات التي وجدتها السبيل التي نهجناها وحللتها إلى أشكالها قد حلت القياس الذي التمس منك تحليله إذ كان داخلياً في جملة المقاييس التي قد حللتها ولن يتقضى تحليلك إياه ألا تدري أيما هو منها شيئاً وإن بقا من القضايا المذكورات قضية واحدة أو قضايا أكثر من واحدة إذا جمع بين واحدة واحدة ومنهن وبين قضية قضية من المذكورات أو تقترن اقتراناً يكون في كل اثنتين منهما حد واحد يشتركان فيه وحدان يختلفان بهما وإذا أولف الحدان المختلفان إما بإيجاب أحدهما للآخر وإما بسلبه منه أخرج عن القضية المولفة وإحدى القضيتين الأخرتين القضية الباقية من الثلاث على أنها من القضايا المزيدة عن قضايا القياس الملتبس تحليله فهذا في تحليل المقاييس إلى أشكالها التي منها واف إذ قد استعمل على المقاييس التي تذكر قضاياها من غير زيادة عليها والتي تذكر قضاياها كلها مع زيادة قضايا غيرها والتي يذكر بعض قضاياها ويحذف بعض من غير زيادة عليها ما ليس منها والتي ليس يذكر بعض قضاياها ويحذف بعض ويضاف إليها ما ليس منه.

*The reference in the first line to *Prior Analytics* 1.3 makes it clear that Yahyā is discussing the reduction of second- and third-figure syllogisms to first-figure syllogisms through conversion.

E3.52 (= Ḥalifāt, #63)

Aḡwibat šayḥinā Abī Bišr Mattā ibn Yūnus al-Qunnā'ī 'an masā'il sa'alahu Yahyā ibn 'Adī ibn Ḥumayd ibn Zakariyā' 'anhā fī ma'ānī Īsāgūḡī li-Furfūriyūs

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 43: fol. 60b16–64b21

Inc.:

قال أبو بشر إن الأعراض التي قال فرفوروريوس إن الجنس أعم منها في الأعراض التي تعرض لأشخاص ذلك الجنس خاصة دون أشخاص غيره كالحركة والسكون والنوم واليقظة والصحة والمرض والفرح والغم وما أشبه ذلك في أشخاص الحيوان وقال السبار الذي يسر به الفصول الذاتية ويفرق بينها وبين غيرها هو أن الفصول التي مقامها في الحد مقام الصورة هي التي يكمل

المركب بخروج الفعل الصادر عنها مثال ذلك الحي والناطق في الإنسان فإن الإنسان يكمل بخروج فعل الحي وفصل الناطق إلى الفعل وذلك أن الإنسان إنما قصد به لاستعمالها فإذا استعملت بالفعل حصل للإنسان الكمال الثاني وذلك أن الكمال كمالان أحدهما أول وهو حصول الصورة فيه والآخر حصول فعل الصورة بالفعل كاستعمال النطق بالفعل فإنه به يصير الإنسان إنساناً كاملاً. . .

Expl.:

. . . فإنه لما كانت المقاييس الكائنة من المقدمات المتقابلة مشاركة للمقاييس التي عن المقدمات التي إحداها كاذبة في أن الضربين جميعاً فيهما مقدمة كاذبة أتى بالفرق بينهما وهو هذا الذي أتى به إنما لم يبين أرسطوطالس الاقترانين القياسيين الكليين الذين في الشكل الثاني بطريق الخلف كما فعل في اقترانات الشكل الثالث فإنه بين لزوم نتيجتها بردها إلى الشكل الأول بطريق الخلف وبين الكليين في الشكل الثاني بردهما إلى الشكل الأول فقط لأنه لو فعل ذلك لكان القياس يكون في الضرب الثالث والرابع من الشكل الأول وهذان الضربان سنييهما بالضربين الأولين من الشكل الثاني فيكون قد بين الشيء بنفسه لأنه تبيين الضربين الأولين من الشكل الثاني بالثالث والرابع من الضرب الأول وتبيين الثالث والرابع من الأول بالأول والثاني من الثاني وهذا بيان الدور هكذا قال أبو بشر وينبغي أن ينعم النظر فيه إن شاء الله.

*This treatise appears to be paired with E3.21 (= Ḥalifāt, #40), 'Iddat masā'il fī ma'ānī Kitāb Isāgūghī; but because it also treats issues from the *Prior Analytics* such as the reduction of syllogisms, it appears to be related to E3.41 (= Ḥalifāt, #60), *Maqāla fī nahḡ as-sabīl ilā taḥlīl al-qiyāsāt ilā l-aškāl allatī hiya fihā min aškāl al-qiyās at-ṭalāṭa al-ḥamlīya*, as well.

E4.24 (= Ḥalifāt, #78)

Maqāla fī tazyīf tadrīs al-qā'ilīna bi-tarkīb al-aḡsām min aḡzā' lā tataḡazza'u bi-ḥtiḡāḡihim bi-mulāqāt al-kura al-basīṭa al-musattḥaḡa 'alā nuqtatīhi wa-ḡarakatīhā 'alayhi

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 19: fol. 29a2–b29

Inc.:

قال يحیی إن غرضنا فی هذا القول تزییف أقوى تدلیسات القائلین بأن الأجسام مركبة من أجزاء لا تتجزأ وتكشف تلبيسات المعتقدين لذلك بعد أن نعصدها بما يؤيدها ونزيدها بما يؤكدها مسترشدين الله في ذلك مهتدين بهدأيته وتوفيقه فيقول إن القائلين بأن الأجسام مركبة من أجزاء

غير متجزئة أن يروموا تبين ذلك بأن يقولوا إنه من البين للحس أن الكرة إذ هي جسم ما بحسب وضع مخالفينا القائلين بانقسام الأجسام لا إلى نهاية تلاقي الأجسام المسطحة . . .

Expl.:

. . . فأما توهمهم أن النقط التي عليها تلقى الكرة البسيط عند تحركها إن لم تكن لا بعد بين الأولى والثانية منها لزم أن تكون أن الكرة طافرة في حركتها فيتبين فساد وبطلانه من معرفة كيفية تكون الطفرة فإن الطفرة إنما تكون بأن يفارق الطافر في حال طفرته بكليته جميع البعد الذي يتخطاه من حيث يمس بشيء منه شيئاً من البعد إلا بعد انقضاء الطفرة وانتهائه إلى نهاية البعد الذي نقطه بالطفرة فيلحق حينئذ بشيء منه أو بجملته شيئاً مساوياً للشيء الذي تلقى به النهاية التي ينتهي إليها من البعد الذي يتخطاه أو بعد مساوياً لجملته مبدؤه تلك النهاية التي انتهى إليها في تخطيه وليس هذه حال الكرة في حركتها على البسيط المسطح إذا كانت حركتها تدرجاً أو زحجاً وذلك أنها إذا تحركت تدرجاً تكون معتمدة على البسيط بنقطة وتتخطى في حركتها وهي معتمدة على تلك النقطة إلى أن تلقى نقطة أخرى من البسيط هي نهاية البعد الذي يتخطاه فتفارق عند اعتمادها على نهاية البعد الذي كانت تتخطاه النقطة التي كانت معتمدة عليها وهي مبدؤه وإن كانت غير مماسة لما بين النقطتين المذكورتين وهذا فرق كبير بين الطفرة وبين التدرج فقد ظهر أنه ليس يلزم من مفارقة الكرة عند تدرجها ما بين نقطتي مبدأ البعد الذي تتخطاه ومنتهاه من البعد أن يكون طافرة فقد تبين فساد هذا القول وأفصح هذا.

*This treatise should not be confused with E4.23 (*Qawl fī l-ğuz' alladī lā yatağazza'u*), which Ḥalifāt prints on pp. 160–164 of his *Maqālāt* and mislabels as this treatise, i.e., as *Maqāla fī tazyīf tadlīs al-qā'ilīna bi-tarkīb al-ağsām min aḡzā' lā tatağazza'u*.

E4.34 (= Ḥalifāt, #84)

Maqāla fī annahū laysa šay' mawğūd ġayr mutanāhin lā 'adadan wa-lā 'izaman

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 18: fol. 28b10–29a1

Inc.:

قال لما كانت الموجودات لا يخلو من أن تكون إما أمور جزئية شخصية وإما عامية كلية وكانت العامية الكلية إنما وجودها في الجزئية الشخصية وذلك أن معنى العام هو الأمر الذي من شأنه أن يوصف به أكثر من واحد من الأمور وصفاً صادقاً ووجب ضرورة متى لم يوجد أمور أكثر من واحد يوصف بالكي أن يوجد الأمر الكلي مثال ذلك متى لم يوجد إنسان جزئي كزيد أو عبد الله أو غيرهما

وبالجملة متى لم يوجد ولا واحد من الجزئيات فلن يوجد الإنسان الكلي الذي من شأنه أن يوصف به كل واحد من الناس وصفاً صادقاً وكذلك يجري الأمر في كل واحد من الكليات وجزئياتها . . .

Expl.:

. . . فغير المتناهي في العدد إذاً ليس بموجود وذلك ما أردنا أن نبين وأما أنه لن يوجد متصل غير متناه فإنه يتبين بالطريق بعينه الذي تبين أنه لن يوجد عدد غير متناه وذلك أنه أي مقدار وضع لم يكن مقداراً له إذا كان حده يوجب أن يؤخذ منه مقدار آخر أكبر منه وإنما يوصف الشيء بأن مقداره مثلاً ألف ذراع أو عشرة ألف ذراع أو عشرة ألف ذراع أو أي مقدار فرض إذا كان ذلك الشيء لا يوجد في مقدار أكبر منه وغير المتناهي مأخوذ في حده أنه يمكن أن يوجد منه بعد أي شيء أخذ منه غيره وإذا كان ذلك كذلك فقد وجب ضرورة أن لا يوجد له مقدار واحد جزئي البتة وإذا لم يوجد له مقدار واحد جزئي وقد تبين أنه لا يوجد له مقدار كلي فلن يوجد إذاً مقدار غير متناه لا جزئي ولا كلي وإذا لم يوجد مقدار كلي ولا جزئي فلن يوجد متصل غير متناه وقد تبين أيضاً أنه لن يوجد منفصل غير متناه تبيناً أنه لن يوجد عدد غير متناه وإذا تبين أنه لن يوجد غير المتناهي في هذين النوعين الذين لو جاز أن يوجد لهما وجد في غيرهما فقد ظهر أن غير المتناهي .

E4.41 (= Ḥalīfāt, #85)

Maqāla fī r-radd ‘alā man qāla bi-anna l-aḡsām muḥḍata [E: *muḡtaliba/ muḡallaba*] ‘*alā ṭarīq al-ḡadal* [E: *al-badal*]

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 16: fol. 27b2–28a14

Inc.:

قول من يقوله إن الجسم لم ينقل من الحركة «من الحركة» والسكون يفهم منه معنيان أحدهما لم ينفك منهما جميعاً معاً في حال واحدة حتى يكون موجوداً لا متحركاً ولا ساكناً وهذا حق إلا أنه غير موجب لما يلزمه وهو أن يكون الجسم لم ينفك يتقدّمهما وذلك أنه كما أنه يستحيل وجود الجسم منفكاً منهما جميعاً معاً كذلك يستحيل لا انفكاكه منهما جميعاً معاً فلو كانت استحالة انفكاكه منهما جميعاً معاً موجباً لا لتقدمه إياهما لكانت استحالة لا انفكاكه منهما جميعاً موجبة لتقدمه إياهما . . .

Expl.:

. . . وما ذكرناه فيه كفاية في المنع من نقل حكم ما يوجد للجزئيات والأجزاء إلى الكليات والكُل وإذا منعوا ذلك لم يتبين لهم أن حركة الفلك التي يخالفون في حدوثها محدثة من أن حركة زيد أو حركة غيره من الجزئيات حادثة وإذا لم يجتهدوا يجب لهم حدوث الأجسام كلها وإذا قد بينا فساد

هذا الدليل من أجزائه فلتين فساد في جملة بموازنته بمثله فيما لا خلاف بين الناس في قدمه جل وتعالى عما يقوله الملحدون على هذا الوجه فلينزل خلق زيد مثلاً بالفعل ولا خلقه بالفعل في المعارضة بمنزلة الحركة والسكون في الدليل والتقدير تبارك اسمه بمنزلة الجسم فيه فيقول كما أن الجسم لم ينفك من الحركة والسكون معاً كذلك التقدير عز وجل لم ينفك من خلق زيد ولا خلقه معاً فلو كان دال اللا انفكاك موجباً في الجسم أن لا يتقدم الحركة والسكون لكان هذا اللا انفكاك في المعارضة موجباً في التقدير أن لا يتقدم خلق زيد بالفعل ولا خلقه فإن كانت الحركة والسكون محدثين لتعاقبهما على الجسم وعدم كل واحد منهما في حال وجود ضده فكذلك يجب أن يكون خلق زيد بالفعل ولا خلقه محدثين لتعاقبهما وعدم كل واحد منهما في حال وجود ضده له فإن كان دال الدليل موجباً لحدوث الأجسام فواجب ضرورة أن تكون هذه المعارضة موجبة حدوث التقدير وهذا محال واضح وكفر فاضح فالقول إذاً الموازن له باطل بين البطلان.

*Endress appears to be correct in his conjecture that the title should read as *al-badal* rather than *al-ğadal*, on the grounds that *badal* here refers to the Greek term *antiperistasis* ("mutual replacement") used by Aristotle at, e.g., *Physics* VIII.10, 267a16–17 (= Aristūṭālīs, *aṭ-Ṭabī'a*, 930,13). However, Endress' suggestion of replacing the title's *muḥḍata* with either *muğtaliba* or *muğallaba* cannot stand, in light of the extensive use of *muḥḍata* throughout the text, as exemplified in the Explicit.

E4.51 (= *Ḥalifāt*, #86)

Fī anna l-quṭr ġayr mušārik li-d-ḍila'

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 24: fol. 33a30–b13

Inc.:

قال يحیی تنبین أن موضع القطر مشارک للضلع یلزم أن یكون عدد زوج مساوياً لعدد فرد بما أنا مثبتة إن كان القطر مشارکاً للضلع فن الاضطرار أن یكون نسبة أحدهما إلى الآخر نسبة عدد إلى عدد وذلك أن معنى المشاركة هو أن یوجد مقدار بعد المشارکین کلیهما . . .

Expl.:

. . . فیجب لذلك أن یكون الضلع لذلك زوجاً لأن لمربعها نصفاً هو ربع ضعف مربعها وكل عدد مربعه زوج فهو لا محالة زوج فالضلع إذا زوج وقد كانت فرداً فقد لزم أن یكون عدد واحد زوجاً وفرداً وهذا محال فلیس إذاً الضلع والقطر مشترکین .

E5.12 (= Halifāt, #67)

Maqāla fī l-buḥūt al-‘ilmīya al-arba’a ‘an aṣnāf al-wuḡūd at-ṭalāṭa al-ilāhī wa-ṭ-ṭabī‘ī wa-l-mantiqī

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 45: fol. 65a34–66b20

Inc.:

قال إنه لما كان واجباً جليلاً على كل مؤثر اقتفاء آثار الفلاسفة الفاضلين المتقبّلين أفعال الله تبارك وتعالى بحسب طاقة البشر في الجود هو أفضل ولا فضل كإيجاد الذات الفضلي ولا ذات أفضل في الموجودات الكثنة من الحيوانات ولا في هذه كالإنسان لما فضل به من قوة العقل الهولائي والذي فضله وشرفه بتمامه وكماله وهو العقل بالفعل الذي إنما يتم وجوده للإنسان الطبيعي بتصوره ذاته والاجتهاد بقدر قوته في إفنائه لنفسه وإيجاده لغيره وكانت المطالب العلمية الحقيقة المقومة للفلسفة التي لا قوام لها من دونها ولا حاجة بها إلى غيرها إنما هي المطالب الأربعة التي جميعها البحوث عن الذات دون لواحقها . . .

Expl.:

. . . وأما في وجودها الإلهي الذي هو وجودها الحقيقي أعني على حقائقها الذي لا تلبس فيه غيرها فليست محتاجة فيه إلى غير ذواتها فقط وإن كانت لا توجد في حال من الأحوال بواحد من هذه الثلاثة الأصناف من الوجود دون الصنفين الباقيين بل جميع هذه الوجودات الثلاثة لازمة لها دائماً ما أحب بارئها وموجدتها تقدست أسماؤه وهذا في إثبات وجود الصور الإلهية كان فأما ماهيتها العامة فهي صور وأما ماهيتها الخاصة فهي صور مجردة من الهيولى وجميع اللواحق وعرة عن جميع الأشياء سواها وأما لمر هي فليجود البارئ جلّ إسمه وتعالى جدّه فقد أثبتنا على المطالب الأربعة العلمية في هذه الموجودات الثلاثة وبلغنا غرضنا بمعونة الله وحسن توفيقه والحمد لله رب العالمين .

*A transcription and translation of this text, with introduction, has been completed by S. Menn and R. Wisnovsky, and is being submitted as “Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī’s *Essay on the Four Scientific Questions regarding the Three Categories of Existence: Divine, Natural and Logical*,” to *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*.

E5.33 (= Halifāt, #73)

Ġawāb Abī ‘Abd Allāh ad-Dārimī wa-Abī l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn ‘Isā al-mutakallim ‘an al-ma’sala fī ibṭāl al-mumkin ḥakā Abū l-Qāsim ibn ar-Rāzī annahumā ḡtama’ā ‘alā l-iḡāba bihi

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 48: fol. 69a18–69b2

Inc.:

يقول وبالله التوفيق إن السائل في هذه المسئلة اعتمد تعقيد ألفاظها وترديد معانيها بحسب تصوره لغموضها وتقديره لبعدها الجواب عنها وليست كما ظنه ولا مستغلقة في المعنى على ما قدره . . .

Expl.:

. . . فلا يجب ويمتنع في الحال فهذا مخالف لرتبة الممتنع في نفسه والواجب في نفسه يصح طلبه ورجاؤه والدعاء إليه ومسئلته وانتظاره والرغبة فيه والأمر به وهو ما سميناه ممكناً وأخرجناه عن رتبة ما جعلناه واجباً أو ممتنعاً وهو ما لا يصح القدرة عليه والعجز عنه وهذا بين والحمد لله كثيراً.

E5.34 (= Ḥalifāt, #72)

Nuṣṣat aš-šubḥa fī ibtāl al-mumkin

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 47: fol. 69a9–17

Inc.:

ما تتكرون أعزكم الله إذ كانت صفة الممكن عندكم أن يجتمع فيه وجود أي شيء صدق عليه الحكم بأنه ممكن مع لا وجوده معاً ولا ينفرد به الوجود دون مقابله ولا مقابل الوجود دونه . . .

Expl.:

. . . وهو أن يقال إن كل إمكان وجود شيء من الأشياء ولا وجوده ليس بموجود في شيء من الأزمنة الحاضرة أولاً فأولاً عند حضور ذلك الزمان وكل ما ليس بموجود في شيء من الأزمنة الحاضرة أولاً فأولاً عند حضور ذلك الزمان فليس هو موجوداً.

E5.34 (= Ḥalifāt, #72)

Ġawāb Abī Bakr ad-Daqqāq ‘an aš-šubḥa fī ibtāl al-mumkin

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 49: fol. 69b3–70a19

Inc.:

قال صاحب المسئلة ما تتكرون إذا كانت صفة الممكن عندكم أن يجتمع فيه وجود أي شيء صدق عليه الحكم بأنه ممكن مع لا وجوده ولا ينفرد به الوجود دون مقابله ولا مقابل الوجود دونه . . .

Expl.:

. . . وهو أن يقال إن كل إمكان وجود شيء من الأشياء ولا وجوده موجود في زمان من الأزمنة الحاضرة عند حضور ذلك الزمان فهو موجود على حال من الأحوال فإذا لم يكن لوجود شيء من الأشياء ولا وجوده هو موجود على حال من الأحوال وذلك ما أردنا أن نبين.

*This text quotes from, and responds to, the doubt expressed in the treatise that is placed two before it in the manuscript, i.e., *Nuṣḥat aš-šubḥa fī ibṭāl al-mumkin*. Thus the two treatises probably constitute a single whole, referred to by al-Qifṭī as *Kitāb aš-šubḥa fī ibṭāl al-mumkin*. The term *ad-Daqqāq* in the title could conceivably modify *ḡawāb* ("The painstaking [or hairsplitting] response..."); but more likely it is simply the profession-name ("The Flour-Merchant") for Yahyā's student Abū Bakr al-Ādamī al-ʿAṭṭār.

E5.35 (= *Ḥalīfāt*, #92)

Maqāla fī tabyīn ḍalālat man yaʿtaqidu anna ʿilm al-bārī ʿḡalla ṭanāʿuhu wa-taqaddasat asmāʿuhu bi-l-umūr al-mumkina qabla wuḡūdhā mumtanī

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 21: fol. 30b31–32a39

Inc.:

قال إن كان العلم بالأمر الممكنة قبل وجودها ممتنعاً فلن يوجد علم ببعض جزئياتها قبل وجودها لأن العلم ببعض جزئيات الطبيعة الممكنة قبل وجوده موجود فليس العلم بطبيعة الممكنات قبل وجودها إذاً ممتنعاً والدليل على أن العلم ببعض جزئيات طبيعة الممكنات قبل وجودها موجود ما يعاينه من تقدم علم الأطباء بما يحدث في المستأنف من أحوال المرضى في أمراضهم وإنذارهم بها فيخبرون بأن رعاها سيكون قبل وجوده وأن قبا سينذر قبل وجوده وأن عرقا سينذر قبل وجوده وأن فراقاً أو موتاً سيكون واحد واحد قبل وجوده فيكون ذلك كله كما ينذرون . . .

Expl.:

. . . وأما قياسك الخامس القائل كل الأشياء الهيولانية فإن العلم بها غير محصل لأنها لا تثبت على حال واحد بل هي متغيرة دائماً والأشخاص فهي هيولانية والعلم بها إذاً غير محصل لأنها لا تثبت على حال واحد بل هي متغيرة دائماً فقضيتك فيه القائلة كل الأشياء الهيولانية فإن العلم بها غير محصل لأنها لا تثبت على حال واحدة بل هي متغيرة دائماً يناقض آخرها وأنها لا تثبت أنك أوجبت غير ثبوتها على حال واحدة ثم أوجبت لها الثبوت في التغير دائماً والتغير هو حال لها وقد

أوجبت لها دوامه ثم مع ذلك إن كانت غير معلومة البتة فواجب أن يكون غير معلوم أنها لا تثبت على حال واحدة فوضعك إياها فذلك بحسب وضعك عن غير علم به فتأمل وفقك الله لمعرفة الحق والقول ما قد ألزمتك إقدامك على التسرع إلى قول ما لا يقبله علماً وبينه خبراً من الشناعات وفوق معاودة مثله فهو أصلح لك.

*Given their similar subject matter and their adjacent positions in the manuscript, this treatise and the next treatise (*Maqāla fī tabyīn ḍalālat man yazunnu anna l-aṣḥāṣ al-kā'ina al-fāsida laysa min ṣa'niḥā an yu'lama al-battata*), which is not recorded by Endress or Ḥalīfāt, appear to be paired. On this issue see now P. Adamson, "On knowledge of particulars," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 105.1 (2005), 257–78.

E—unlisted (= Ḥalīfāt—unlisted)

Maqāla fī tabyīn ḍalālat man yazunnu anna l-aṣḥāṣ al-kā'ina al-fāsida laysa min ṣa'niḥā an yu'lama al-battata

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 20: fol. 29b30–30b30

Inc.:

قال إن غرضنا في هذه المقالة أن نبين ضلالة من يظن أن الأشخاص لا يمكن أن يعلم البتة وفساد احتجاجهم لرأيهم في هذا فيقول إن قوماً من الشاذين في النظر ضلوا في ظنهم أن الأشخاص الكائنة الفاسدة غير ممكن أن تعلم وانجذبوا إلى هذا الظن من قبل هذه الثلاثة الأسباب التي أحدها ما قيل فيها إنها غير متناهية وما قضاه الفيلسوف في مواضع من كتبه من أن غير المتناهي لا يعلم وآخر منها أن الأشخاص الكائنة الفاسدة هي في الجريان إذ كانت غير ثابتة على حال واحدة البتة والآخر منها أن أكثرها غير موجود وما هو غير موجود بحسب ما يظن المعتقدون امتناع العلم بالأشخاص لا سبيل إلى علمه . . .

Expl.:

. . . فقد اتضح بما قلناه فساد رأي المانعين من تقدم العلم بما هو مزعم أن يوجد قبل وجوده وأن ذلك مشابه لإنكار السوفسطائيين إدراك المعلومات ومعرفة المشاهدات بل هذا الرأي أحسن وأوضح من ضلالة أولئك وذلك أن هؤلاء إنما ينكرون الحق ويحددون الأشياء الظاهرة بغير حجة ولا تعلق بشبهة والسوفسطائيون وإن كانوا عاطين وغير محقين فإنهم يحتاجون لمذهبهم ويعطون سبباً لظنونهم وإن كان ذلك خطأ وعلى غير استقامة فقد بلغنا غرضنا في هذا القول وهو تبين ضلالة من يظن أن الأشخاص من قبل ذواتها لا يمكن أن تعلم .

E7.3 (= Ḥalifāt, #95)*Nuṣḥat mā aṭbatahu Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī li-Abī Bakr al-Ādamī al-‘Aṭṭār*

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 52: fol. 72b25–73a16

Inc.:

قال يحيى بن عدي وهذه حكاية المقدمتين اللتين أثبت بهما أن حرارة النار ليست جوهرًا في المجلس الذي اجتمعنا فيه بحضرة أبي القاسم عيسى بن علي بن عيسى بن الجراح كل شخص من أشخاص طبيعة عامة لا يوجد جنس أجناس ما جنسًا لشخص ما من أشخاصها فإنه لا يمكن أن يوجد ذلك الجنس جنسًا لشيء من أشخاصها الباقية وحرارة النار شخص من أشخاص الحرارة ولا يوجد الجوهر وهو جنس أجناس ما جنسًا لشخص ما من أشخاصها وهو الحرارة المكتسبة في الحديد فالنتيجة عنهما أن حرارة النار إذاً ليس الجوهر جنسًا لها فإن أضيف إلى هذه المقدمة مقدمة أخرى صادقة أولية الصدق وهي أن كل الموجودات إما مبادئ وإما كائنة عن المبادئ والمبادئ أربعة . . .

Expl.:

. . . وهذه الأربعة تسمى أسطقسات وبسائط بإضافتها إلى ما يتركب منها وهي ثلاثة أجناس وهي جنس الموات كالمعدنيات والأحجار وما أشبهها مما لا يغتذي ولا ينمى ولا يولد مثله وجنس النبات وهو ذو نفس غاذية ونامية ومولدة المثل وجنس الحيوان وهو ذو نفس ذات قوتين قوة غاذية نامية مولدة المثل يشارك بها النبات وقوة ثانية يختص بها وهي قوة حساسية محركة بإرادة وهذا الجنس ينقسم قسمين فنه ما لا نطق له وهو أجناس البهائم كلها ومنه ذو نفس ناطقة وهو الإنسان خاصة فهذه جمل الموجودات بالقول الموجز ولله الحول والحكمة والحول ولي العدل وواهب العقل الحمد شكرًا دائمًا كما هو أهله ومستحقه بإنعامه على جميع خلقه وصلى الله على محمد نبيه وآله الطاهرين.

*On Yaḥyā's student Abū Bakr al-Ādamī al-‘Aṭṭār, referred to in the title, see Ḥalifāt, *Maqālāt*, p. 48.

E7.4 (= Ḥalifāt, #55)*Nuṣḥat mā kataba bihi Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī al-mukannā bi-Abī Naṣr wa-yu’rafu bi-ibn ‘Adī*

MS: Tehrān: Madrasa-yi Marwī 19, no. 51: fol. 71b26–72b24

Inc.:

قرأت ما أجاب به يحيى بن عدي أطال الله بقاء سيدنا الأمير سيف الدولة ولعمري إنه ليس لغيره ممن غرضه الممارسة إلا أنه قد انخرط عن المعهود من أخلاق طبقة ولو انخرط كثيراً عظيماً لم يواز هذه الطبقة التي استأذها لأنه لا غرض لها غير الممارسة ولهذه العلة أمسك عن خطابها وأما ما ظنه يحيى في بعض أقاويلي من ظاهر اللفظ ثم رجع عنه لما لاح له من ألفاظي ما أردته فلا جواب للمعترف وهو يعلم والجماعة أن المعاند إذا أراد معاندة ضده في قول صحيح قد أتاه أمكنه ذلك التشبيه ورأيت قد تكلم على المعنى القريب وتكلمت أنا على المعنى البعيدة ولهذه العلة اختلفنا . . .

Expl.:

. . . فإن كان الغرض في التماس ما التمس مني الوقوف على الحق في المبحوث عنه وهو أن الجسم وهو المحدود بأنه ما له طول وعرض وعمق ليس بعرض إذا كان العرض على ما رسمه أرسطو طالس في قاطيغورياس وهو أول كتبه المنطقية بقوله إنه الموجود في شيء لا يجرء منه ولا يمكن أن يكون قوامه من غير الذي هو فيه فذلك يتبين عن كلام فرفوريس في كتبه في المدخل إلى المنطق عند رسم الجوهر قال إن الجوهر ينقسم إلى الجسم وغير الجسم فإذا كان الجسم نوعاً للجوهر وكل نوع فذاته لا محالة من ذات جنسه فالجسم إذا ذات الجوهر فهو إذا جوهر والجوهر على ما رسمه أرسطو طالس في قاطيغورياس أيضاً بأنه ما ليس هو البتة في موضوع ما فالجسم إذا ليس هو البتة في موضوع ما وكل عرض فهو في موضوع فالجسم إذا ليس هو ما هو في موضوع وما هو في موضوع هو العرض فالجسم إذا ليس هو عرضاً وفي هذا كفاية في تبين أن الجسم عند الفلاسفة ليس هو عرضاً وقد تبين أن ذلك هو الحق من أنه حقيقة الجسم أنه ما له طول وعرض وعمق وكان من الأوائل في العقول السليمة الصحيحة أنه ولا واحد من الأجسام يوجد في شيء لا يجرء منه ولا يمكن أن يكون قوامه من غير الذي هو فيه وهذا هو رسم العرض فمن البين الظاهر أنه يلزم هذين الحكمين أنه ولا واحد من الأجسام عرض فقد اتضح خطأ من قال أو اعتقد أن الجسم عرض والحمد لله الذي ذي الجود والحكمة والحول ولي العدل وواهب العقل شكراً دائماً خالصاً كما هو له اهل .

*The title of E3.33 similarly describes Ibrāhīm ibn 'Adī as *al-ma'rūf bi-Abī Naṣr* ("known as Abū Naṣr"), i.e., Abū Naṣr was Ibrāhīm's *kunya*. It appears that both Ibrāhīm ibn 'Adī and his teacher and associate al-Fārābī had sons named Naṣr, or that Ibrāhīm named his son Naṣr as a gesture of respect to his teacher al-Fārābī, who had earlier named his son Naṣr.

AVICENNA'S NOTION OF TRANSCENDENTAL MODULATION
OF EXISTENCE (*TAŠKĪK AL-WUĞŪD*, *ANALOGIA ENTIS*) AND
ITS GREEK AND ARABIC SOURCES*

Alexander Treiger

Στο σεβαστό και αγαπητό καθηγητή
και μέντορά μου Δημήτρη Γούτα
με πολλή ευγνωμοσύνη και θαυμασμό

The idea that the term “existent” (Greek: *on*, Arabic: *mawğūd*, Latin: *ens*) is neither an equivocal nor a univocal predicate, but governs an intermediate kind of predication has a long pedigree. It is precisely around the question of how to define this intermediate kind of predication that some of the major battles in the history of philosophy were fought.

In medieval philosophy in both Arabic and Latin, the focus of this debate shifted from the *predicamental level* (defining how “existent” applies to the ten Aristotelian categories, substance and the nine accidents) to the *transcendental level* (defining how “existent” applies, across the transcendental divide, to the Creator and the created

* This article is being reprinted, with minor modifications (and some additions, esp. in notes 2, 92, and 97), from *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 21 (2010): 165–98 (©SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo). I am grateful to SISMEL–Edizioni del Galluzzo for the kind permission to reprint the article. I am deeply indebted to Dimitri Gutas, Amos Bertolacci, and Gregor Schwarb for their invaluable comments on various drafts of this article. I am, of course, solely responsible for all the remaining flaws. Avicenna's works are abbreviated as follows: *Dānešnāme*, *Elāhiyāt* = *Dānešnāme-ye 'alā'i: Elāhiyāt*, ed. M. Mo'in (Tehran: Anğoman-e ātār-e melli, 1952); English tr.: P. Morewedge (tr.), *The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sīnā)* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). *Ilāhiyāt* = *aš-Šifā': al-Ilāhiyāt* [French title: *La Métaphysique*], eds. G. Anawati et al., (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣriya al-Āmma li-l-Kutub, 1380/1960); English tr.: M. Marmura (ed. and tr.), *Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). *Maqūlāt* = *aš-Šifā', al-Mantiq*, Book 2 (*al-Maqūlāt*) [French title: *La Logique*, 2. *Les Catégories*], ed. G. Anawati et al. (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣriya al-Āmma li-l-Kutub, 1378/1959). *Mubāḥaṭāt* = *al-Mubāḥaṭāt*, ed. M. Bīdārfar (Qom: Bīdār, [1992–3]/1413/1371š). (I am grateful to Samuel Noble for an electronic copy of this work). *Ta'liqāt* = *al-Ta'liqāt*, eds. 'A. Badawī (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Miṣriya al-Āmma li-l-Kutub, 1392/1973). The series *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* is abbreviated as CAG.

world).¹ Subsequent to this shift, the idea that the term “existent”, as predicated of the Creator and the created world, is neither equivocal nor univocal, but a so-called modulated term (*ism mušakkik*)² played an important role in Arabic philosophy, culminating in the seventeenth-century Iranian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā, who adopted the theory of the transcendental “modulation of existence” (*taškīk al-wuḡūd*) as a cornerstone of his metaphysical system.³ In the Latin West, a comparable theory was put forward by the scholastic philosophers, particularly Thomas Aquinas, under the name of “analogy of being” (*analogia entis*). Though not universally accepted (it was criticized most famously by Duns Scotus), analogy of being became one of the key doctrines of scholastic philosophy.⁴

¹ On the predicamental and transcendental levels see, e.g., J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 73f. with references given there.

² Harry A. Wolfson, in his article “The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides,” in idem, *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, eds. I. Twersky and G. H. Williams, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), vol. 1, Essay 22, 455–77 [originally published in 1938]), translates *ism mušakkik* as “amphibolous term”. As I shall argue in Section 2.4 below, Wolfson’s argument in favor of this translation is erroneous, and his translation is highly misleading. There is no complete certainty as to whether the term should be vocalized as *mušakkik* or as *mušakkak*. I follow the eighteenth-century Indian scholar at-Tahānawī (at-Tahānawī, *Mawsū‘at Kaššāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn wa-l-‘ulūm*, ed. R. al-‘Aḡam (Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāširūn, 1996), vol. 1, 447), who says that the term should be read as *mušakkik* (*bi-kasr al-kāf al-mušaddada*). This seems to be also the opinion of the thirteenth-century Egyptian scholar al-Qarāfi, who explains that modulated terms are so called because they cause doubt as to whether they should be classified as equivocal or as univocal. See M. M. Y. Ali, *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunnī Legal Theorists’ Models of Textual Communication* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 116. It should be noted, however, that medieval Jewish translators apparently follow the reading *mušakkak* in translating the term into Hebrew as *məsuppāq*.

³ C. Bonmariage, *Le réel et les réalités: Mullā Ṣadrā Shirāzī et la structure de la réalité* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2007), esp. 53–74; S. H. Rizvi, *Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being* (London: Routledge, 2009), esp. 38–53 (not seen; I am grateful to Gregor Schwarb for this reference); Y. Eshots, “The Principle of the Systematic Ambiguity of Existence in the Philosophy of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra,” in *Proceedings of Avicenna International Colloquium* (Iran), 1–6, <http://www.buali.ir/PDF/120%20YANISESHOT%20FULL-TEXT.pdf> (retrieved August 15, 2009).

⁴ On Thomas Aquinas see e.g. H. Lytikens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala: Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1952); B. Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004) (I am grateful to Gregor Schwarb for this reference). On Duns Scotus’ “univocity of being” see T. A. Barth, “Being, Univocity, and Analogy According to Duns Scotus,” in *John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965*, eds. J. K. Ryan and B. M. Bonansea (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 210–62; O. Boulnois,

The present contribution focuses on the idea of transcendental modulation of existence in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037) and its sources. It is no exaggeration to say that Avicenna, more than any other Arabic philosopher, had a formative impact on the development of medieval philosophy in both the Islamic East and the Latin West (in the latter on a par with Averroes). It would come, therefore, as no surprise that Avicenna also played a key role in the development of the specifically medieval understanding of existence. As I shall argue in what follows, it is Avicenna, more than anyone else, who was responsible for the aforementioned shift from the predicamental to the transcendental level of the analysis of existence. To put in another way, it is Avicenna who is to be credited with the earliest formulation of the medieval doctrine of *transcendental* modulation of existence, which was later to become known in Latin as *analogia entis*.⁵

In his refutation of Avicenna's metaphysics, Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Karīm aš-Šahrastānī (d. 548/1153) takes Avicenna to task for defining God as the Necessarily Existent Being (*wāğib al-wuğūd*), on which the existence of all the contingently existent beings (*mumkināt al-wuğūd*) depends. In Šahrastānī's view, this definition of God is problematic, for it postulates, as it were, a genus of "existents," subdivided into two species by the differentiae "necessary" and "contingent." If this were the case, Šahrastānī argues, God's essence (*dāt*) would be composite and dependent, for it would comprise, and depend on, two notions, the notion of existence and the notion of necessity, and this would violate the principle of God's oneness (*waḥda*) and absolute self-sufficiency (*istiğnā*).

It is in order to avoid this undesirable conclusion that Avicenna, according to Šahrastānī, invented the notion that "existent," as predicated of the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents, is a modulated term (*ism mušakkik*). This notion means that "existent"

"Analogie et univocité selon Duns Scot: la double destruction," *Les Études Philosophiques* 12 (1989), 347–69 (the entire volume is dedicated to the subject of *L'Analogie*); S. D. Dumont, "Scotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter*, eds. J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 193–212; G. Pini, *Categories and Logic in Duns Scotus: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2002) (I am grateful to Amos Bertolacci for the last reference).

⁵ I shall not deal, in this article, with Avicenna's influence on the Latin West and with the development of the scholastic doctrine of *analogia entis*. See, on this subject, A. de Libera, "Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être," *Les Études philosophiques* 12 (1989), 319–45.

applies “first and foremost” to the Necessarily Existent, and only in a posterior and less dignified sense to contingent existents. Since genera always apply to their species “equally” (*bi-s-sawīya*) and not in a modulated way, “existent” cannot be a genus, and hence the undesirable conclusion that God’s essence comprises a genus and a differentia and is, therefore, composite does not follow.⁶

In his response to Šahrastānī, the famous Avicennian philosopher Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) argued that the notion of *ism mušakkik* predates Avicenna. He cites several proof-texts from Aristotle’s *Topics*, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ (no longer extant) *Commentary on the Categories*,⁷ Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, and several of Fārābī’s works to show that this notion is not Avicenna’s invention.⁸ These proof-texts show conclusively that Avicenna invented neither the notion of *ism mušakkik*—which, Ṭūsī argues, goes back to Aristotle—nor the corresponding term, well attested, as Ṭūsī shows, in Fārābī’s works.

What these proof-texts *fail* to refute, however, is Šahrastānī’s contention that Avicenna “invented” the idea that “existent,” as *predicated of the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents*, is a modulated term. If, as I shall argue in what follows, Avicenna was indeed the first to formulate this idea, there would appear to be a very good reason for Ṭūsī’s failure to furnish evidence for transcendental modulation of existence prior to Avicenna: this idea would be absent in pre-Avicennian philosophy because Avicenna was the first to develop it.⁹

⁶ This is a simplified version of Šahrastānī’s argument. As we shall see in Section 3.3 of this article, Šahrastānī did not believe that “modulation” would solve the problem. For the complete text of the argument see Šahrastānī, *Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna’s Metaphysics, A New Arabic Edition and English Translation of... Kitāb al-Mušāra’a*, tr. W. Madelung and T. Mayer (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 30ff. (Arabic section), 36ff. (English section). See also W. Madelung, “Aš-Šahrastānīs Streitschrift gegen Avicenna und ihre Widerlegung durch Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī,” in W. Madelung, *Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam* (London: Variorum, 1985), Essay XVI; J. Jolivet, “al-Šahrastānī critique d’Avicenne dans *La Lutte contre les philosophes* (quelques aspects),” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10.2 (2000), 275–92.

⁷ On Alexander’s *Commentary on the Categories* see R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 1 (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1989), 129f.; *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Supplement), 62.


⁸ Ṭūsī, *Mušāri’ al-mušāri’*, ed. H. al-Mu’izzī (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-‘Uzmā al-Mar’āšī, 1405/1984), 54ff.

⁹ Jules Janssens notes that in his PhD dissertation he has formulated the hypothesis that Avicenna himself “adheres to the idea of a transcendental analogy of Being” (J. Janssens, *Avicenna: tussen neoplatonisme en islam* (PhD Dissertation, Leuven 1983), vol. 1, 133–40; referred to in the same author’s article “Bahmanyār ibn Marzubān: A Faithful Disciple of Ibn Sīnā?,” in *Before and After Avicenna*, ed. D. C. Reisman

The present article contains three parts. In the first part I shall offer a terminological introduction that will form the basis for subsequent discussion. In the second part I shall attempt a brief, and in many respects inevitably simplified and schematic survey of the history of philosophical analysis of "existent" as a predicate prior to Avicenna. The third part will deal with Avicenna's contribution to this analysis, especially with his doctrine of transcendental modulation of existence.

1. Terminological Introduction

On the following chart, the main kinds of term and predication are presented:



On this chart, "T" stands for *Term*; "M" stands for *Meaning*; "S" stands for *Subject*. Dotted line (between M1 and M2) signifies a *relation between meanings*. An arrow (between M3 and M2) signifies that the higher meaning (M2) is *paradigmatic*, and the lower (M3), *derived*. Difference in the level of subjects (S3 and S4) signifies *modulated* (i.e. unequal) *participation* of subjects in one and the same meaning (M2). This concept will be explained below.

T1 will be called a *polysemous* term, for it has more than one meaning. T2 will be called a *monosemous* term, for it has only one meaning.

T1 as predicated of S1 and S2 or of S3 and S4 is *univocal*, for it has the same meaning when applied to them.¹⁰ T1 as predicated of S1, S3,

(Leiden: Brill, 2003), 177–97, at 185, n. 33). Unfortunately, Janssens' dissertation was not available to me.


¹⁰ The same, of course, is true for T2 as predicated of S7 and S8.

S5, and S6 (or any subset of these comprising two or more subjects) is *equivocal*, for it has different meanings when applied to them.

T1 as predicated of S1 and S6 is a *pure equivocal*, for it has different and unrelated meanings when applied to them. T1 as predicated of S1 and S3 is an *impure equivocal*, for it has different, yet related meanings (M1 and M2) when applied to them.

T1 as predicated of S1 and S2 is a *pure univocal*, for its subjects participate equally in the common meaning M1. T1 as predicated of S3 and S4 is a *modulated univocal*, for its subjects participate unequally in the common meaning M2. T1 as predicated of S3 and S5 is a *paradigmatic equivocal*, for one of its meanings (M2) is paradigmatic, and the other (M3), derived.

The relations between the terms defined above can be graphically represented as follows:



2. "Existent" as a Predicate: A Brief Historical Survey

2.1. Aristotle

In the *Categories*, Aristotle distinguishes between two major kinds of predication. One kind, called by Aristotle "synonymous" (commonly translated as univocal), is when a term predicated of several subjects has the same meaning in each instance.¹¹ The other kind of predication is called by Aristotle "homonymous" (commonly translated as equivocal). Equivocal predication is when a term predicated of several subjects has *different* meanings in each instance.¹²

¹¹ For instance, in the sentences "human being is an animal," "the horse is an animal," and "the elephant is an animal," the term animal is used in exactly the same meaning.

¹² For instance, in the sentences "this animal is a dog" and "the constellation *Canis Major* is a dog," the term dog is used in two different, virtually unrelated meanings.

How does the term "existent" fit into this twofold classification of predication? The *locus classicus* of Aristotle's analysis of "existent" is *Metaphysics*, I 2, 1003a33–b19:

"Existent" (*to on*) is said in many ways (*legetai pollachōs*), but they are all with reference to one and to some one nature (*pros hen kai mian tina physin*), and not equivocally (*ouch homonymōs*). But just as "healthy" always relates to health (either as preserving it or as producing it or as indicating it or as receptive of it), and "medical" does to medicine (either as possessing it or as naturally adapted for it or as being a function of medicine) [...], likewise "existent" too is said in many ways but always with relation to one principle (*pros mian archēn*). For some things are called "existents" (*onta*) because they are substances, some because they are affections of substance, some because they are a way to substance, or corruptions, privations, qualities, or [things] productive or generative of substance or of [things] relating to substance (*tōn pros tēn ousian legomenōn*), or negations of certain of these [things] or of substance. Hence we even say that non-existent (*to mē on*) is non-existent.

And so, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so it is true of everything else. For it is not only in the case of [things] said in one way (i.e. univocally, *tōn kath' hen legomenōn*) that their investigation belongs to one science, but also in the case of [things] which relate to one particular nature (*tōn pros mian legomenōn physin*); for the latter too, in a sense, are said in one way (*legetai kath' hen*). Clearly then the study of existents *qua* existents (*ta onta...hēi onta*) also belongs to one [science]. Now, in every case science is principally concerned with that which is primary, and that upon which all other things depend, and from which they get their names (*di' ho legontai*).¹³ If, then, substance is this [primary thing], it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.¹⁴

(This example is discussed by Avicenna in *Maqūlāt*, Book 1, ch. 2, 12.7ff.) A good English example would be when the term spring is applied equivocally to the season of the year and the fount of water.

¹³ It is not impossible that the reading here is wrong. Grammatically we would expect *legetai* rather than *legontai* (see the apparatus to Jaeger's edition). Also, Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary *ad loc.* does not seem to include any reference to *legontai*, but reads as if the reading were *onta*—see Alexander, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria* (CAG, vol. 1), ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891), 244.20–1; it is perhaps not a mere coincidence that the letters of *onta* form part of the word *legontai*.

¹⁴ All translations from Greek, Arabic, and Persian are mine, unless otherwise indicated. In this case, I have modified Hugh Tredennick's translation published in the Loeb Classical Library series. For an important analysis of this passage see G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, ed. M. Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 180–99.

According to this passage, “existent” is “said in many ways.” The reason Aristotle insists on this is that he believes there is a *paradigmatic* sense and a *derived* sense in which the term “existent” can be used. Used in the paradigmatic sense, it refers to the mode of existence of a primary substance (as in the sentences “Socrates exists”, “this desk exists”).¹⁵ It is no accident that the Greek word for substance, *ousia*, can be literally rendered as “entity” or “being” and means, essentially, an individual instance of existence.¹⁶ Used in the derived sense, the term “existent” refers to one of the nine Aristotelian accidents (such as quality, quantity, location, and so forth). Accidents can be said to “exist” only in a derived sense because their existence is contingent on the existence of one or another primary substance. Aristotle’s phrase “with reference to one and to some one nature” should be taken to refer to substance and its mode of existence.¹⁷

The statement that “existent” is “said in many ways” means that it is not a univocal term: “existent” in the paradigmatic sense (used with reference to a primary substance) and “existent” in the derived sense (used with reference to an accident of that substance) are not the same, and when one says that Socrates exists and that his quality, or location, or quantity exist, one uses the term “exists” in fundamentally different ways.

Nor is Aristotle saying, however, that “existent” is an equivocal term. In fact, he explicitly denies that. His very purpose in this passage is to show that existent qua existent (or being qua being: *to on hēi on*) can be the subject matter of one single unified science (later to be called metaphysics), and in order to establish this he must stress that “existent” is *not* an equivocal term. This is because one cannot have a unified science of an equivocal concept, for the simple reason

¹⁵ In the following the word “primary” will be omitted, and the term “substance” will always refer to primary substances.

¹⁶ The term *ousia* is etymologically related to the term “existent” (*to on*). On *ousia* as a paronym of *on* see J. Owens, “The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics—Revisited,” in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 33–59, at 41.

¹⁷ Substances (*ousiai*), in other words, are just independent instances of being (*ousia* in the generic sense), or, in plain English, “beings”; whereas affections, qualities, privations etc. of being can be said to exist only in a derived sense, in virtue and to the degree of their ontological relation to one or another instance of being, one or another substance. To use a medieval term, existence is predicated of them only by denomination (*denominative*), due to their inhering in a subject of which it is predicated essentially (*quiditative*).

that its different applications are unrelated to one another.¹⁸ “Existent” therefore is neither a univocal nor an equivocal term; it possesses a quasi-univocal unity and holds, in Aristotle, an intermediate position between equivocals and univocals.

2.2. “Existent” As an Intermediate Predicate versus “Existent” As an Equivocal Predicate

With regard to the status of “existent” vis-à-vis univocal and equivocal kinds of predication, two apparently distinct positions evolved in the Greek (and later, Arabic) commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. In what follows, I shall first distinguish between the two positions—the way they are contrasted by the authors themselves—and then argue that the distinction between them is ultimately semantic rather than real.

2.2.1. “Existent” As an “Intermediate” Predicate, i.e. Intermediate between Pure Equivocals and Univocals (Alexander of Aphrodisias)

Some of the commentators followed Aristotle’s lead in the passage from the *Metaphysics* cited above and regarded the way in which “existent” is predicated as an intermediate kind of predication. Alexander of Aphrodisias (d. 211), for example, in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* remarks that the term “existent” is between (*metaxy*) univocals and equivocals.¹⁹ By equivocals Alexander means pure equivocals, or, in his own terms, “equivocals in the strict sense, namely equivocals by chance” (*ta kyriōs homonyma legomena, ha esti ta apo tychēs*).²⁰

To refer to this kind of intermediary predication, Alexander uses the expression “from one and with reference to one” (*aph’ henos kai pros hen*).²¹ Though the expression “from one and with reference to one”

¹⁸ There can be no single unified science whose subject matter is both kinds of “dog”: the animal dog and the constellation *Canis Major*.

¹⁹ Alexander, *In Met.*, 241.8 (*ad Met.*, Γ 2, 1003a33); English tr. in A. Madigan (tr.), *On Aristotle’s Metaphysics 4* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 15.

²⁰ Alexander, *In Met.*, 241.25–6; English tr., 15.

²¹ Alexander, *In Met.*, 241.9; English tr., 15. Cf. also the following passage: “[There are] cases where one [thing] is first, another second, so that when the first is removed so are both that which is common (*to... koinon*, i.e. the quasi-generic concept) and the other things that follow [the first one]. And these are those of the things that are said in many ways that are said [starting] from one thing or in relation to one thing (*aph’ henos ē pros hen*)”—Alexander, “Ethical Problems,” in Alexander, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter commentaria scripta minora*, ed. I. Bruns (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1892),

has its origin in the *Nicomachean Ethics*,²² the notion itself is based on the statement from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* cited above that though "existent" is said in many ways, they are all "with reference to one and to some one nature" (*pros hen kai mian tina physin*). Like Aristotle, Alexander believes that it is the mode of existence of a primary substance (as opposed to that of accidents) that is the paradigmatic sense of the term "existent." When he says that the term "existent" is predicated "from one and with reference to one," he means that it is predicated on the basis of, and with reference to, the mode of existence of substance; substance is the paradigmatic case of existence, with reference to which all other instances of existence are judged.²³ By the expression "from one and with reference to one" Alexander designates what we have called paradigmatic equivocals.²⁴

2.2.2. "Existent" as an Equivocal Predicate (Porphyry)

Other commentators believed, following the *Categories*, that every predicate had to be either univocal or equivocal. Therefore, they refused to speak of "existent" as holding an intermediate position between univocals and equivocals, and treated it as being (a particular kind of) an equivocal term. This approach is taken by Porphyry (d. 304) in his famous "Introduction" to Aristotle's logical works, the *Isagoge*. This passage deserves to be quoted in full:

"Existent" is not a single common genus of all; nor does everything concur in belonging to a single highest genus, as Aristotle says. Rather there must be posited, following the *Categories*, ten first genera as ten first principles. Should one call all of them "existent," one will so call them, according to [Aristotle] (*phēsi*), equivocally, not univocally. That is to say (*gar*),²⁵ if "existent" were a single common genus of all, everything would [admittedly] be called "existent" univocally. But since [in reality] the first [principles, i.e. the categories] are ten, they are associated in

128.12–5; quoted here in R. W. Sharples' English translation, Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Quaestiones 1.1–2.15* (London: Duckworth, 1992), 33–4.

²² *Nic. Eth.*, Book 1, ch. 4, 1096b26–31.

²³ Alexander, *In Met.*, 242.10–11; English tr., 16.

²⁴ It is noteworthy that Alexander considers both pure equivocals and terms predicated "from one and with reference to one" as "said in many ways" (*pollachōs legomena*)—Alexander, *In Met.*, 242.8–10; English tr., 16.

²⁵ The particle *gar* introduces two conditional sentences which, taken as one unit, rephrase, rather than really explain, Aristotle's position. These two sentences are *ei men gar hen ēn koinon pantōn genos to on...* and *deka de ontōn tōn prōtōn...*

name only, but not in the account implied by the name (*kata ton logon ton kata tounoma*).²⁶

Porphry begins his argument by stating that “existent” is not a genus under which the ten categories are subsumed.²⁷ There is no such supreme genus; rather, the ten categories themselves are the highest genera. “Existent” cannot therefore be a univocal predicate, for if it were predicated of the ten categories univocally, it would be their genus, which is not the case. Since “existent” is not predicated of the ten categories univocally, it must be predicated equivocally. This implies that the ten categories share the name “existent,” but not the underlying *meaning* or, in Porphyry’s terms, “the account implied by the name.” The meaning of “existent” is therefore different for each of the ten categories.

What kind of equivocal is “existent” according to Porphyry? In order to answer this question we must turn to Porphyry’s classification of equivocal predicates in his *Commentary on the Categories*. In this commentary, he differentiates between equivocals “by chance” (*apo tychēs*) and equivocals “from thought” (*apo dianoias*), and divides the latter into four kinds: “by similarity” (*kath’ homoiōtēta*), “by analogy” (*kat’ analogian*), “from one” (*apo tinōs henos*), and “with reference to one goal” (*pros hen...telos*).²⁸ Porphyry adds that some people regard the last two types of equivocals as a single type, designated *aph’ henos kai pros hen*, and that others regard this type as being between (*en mesōi*) equivocals and univocals.²⁹ It is clear that he is referring to the aforementioned commentatorial tradition represented by Alexander, possibly even to Alexander himself.


Porphyry’s classification of types of predication, which is based on a passage from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (I 4, 1096b26–31), can be schematically represented as follows:

²⁶ Porphyry, *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (CAG, vol. 4, pt. 1), ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887), 6.5–11.

²⁷ For an important discussion of this question see J. Barnes, *Porphyry, Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Additional Note F: “Being is not a genus,” 329–36.

²⁸ Porphyry, *Porphyrii Isagoge*, 65ff.; English tr. in S. K. Strange (tr.), *Porphyry, On Aristotle’s Categories* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 45ff.

²⁹ Porphyry, *Porphyrii Isagoge*, 66.15–21; English tr., 46–7.



It seems likely that when in the *Isagoge* Porphyry calls “existent” an equivocal term he has in mind equivocals predicated “from one” (*aph’ henos*) and/or “with reference to one” (*pros hen*). Though this is not stated explicitly, this “one,” like in Alexander, would appear to be the mode of existence of a primary substance.

2.2.3. *Later Proponents of the Two Positions in Greek and Arabic*

Extant commentaries on the *Isagoge* also address the question of whether “existent” is an equivocal term. Porphyry’s view that “existent” is an equivocal term is adopted among the Greeks by Ammonius³⁰ (d. ca. 520) and among the Arabs by Abū l-Farağ ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib (d. 435/1043), whose commentary is based on a variety of Late Antique sources.³¹ (His commentary will be discussed below.)

Other commentators tend to reject Porphyry’s approach and adopt Alexander’s view that “existent” holds an intermediate position between equivocals and univocals. This is the view of Elias (d. ca. 580),³² Pseudo-Elias,³³ David (d. ca. 600),³⁴ and Stephanos (first half of the

³⁰ Ammonius, *Ammonii in Porphyrii Isagogen sive Quinque voces Commentarium* (CAG, vol. 4, pt. 3), ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1895), 81–4.

³¹ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge*, Arabic Text Edited with Introduction and a Glossary of Greek-Arabic Logical Terms by K. Gyekye (Beirut: Dār al-Maṣriq, 1975), Lektion 12, §§242–4, pp. 98–9; English tr. in K. Gyekye (tr.), *Arabic Logic: Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1979), §§154–6, pp. 82–3.

³² Elias, *Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias Commentaria* (CAG, vol. 18, pt. 1), ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1900), 70f.

³³ [Pseudo-Elias], *Lectures on Porphyry’s Isagoge*, ed. L. G. Westerninck (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1967), 93.

³⁴ David, *Davidis in Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarium* (CAG, vol. 18, pt. 2), ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1904), lect. 20, p. 158.23–4; Russian tr. from the Armenian in David Anakht, *Sočineniia*, tr. S. S. Arevšatian (Moskow: Mysl’, 1975), *In Isagogen*, ch. 17, 146. Cf. also David, *Davidis Prolegomena Philosophiae*, ch. 2, 2f.; Russian tr. from the Armenian, in David Anakht, *Sočineniia*, 33; Armenian with English tr. in David the Invincible Philosopher, *Definitions and Divisions of Philosophy*, tr. B. Kendall and R. W. Thomson (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), 6–11.

seventh century).³⁵ One may add to this list the Christian Arab Aristotelians Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and Abū Bišr Mattā, as well as the mysterious Allinus ('lyns or 'llyn),³⁶ all of whom, according to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, also subscribed to this view.³⁷

2.2.4. *Are the Two Positions Really Different?*

Despite the apparent contrast between the two positions, I would like to argue that the difference between them is purely semantic. It is obvious from the above that like Alexander, Porphyry too situates "existent" *between* equivocals in the strict sense, i.e. pure equivocals (equivocals "by chance"), on the one hand and univocals on the other. The only difference between his and Alexander's positions would seem to be that unlike Alexander, Porphyry, following the *Categories*, adopts a strict dichotomy between univocal and equivocal kinds of predication. Since for Porphyry *all* predication has to be either univocal or equivocal, he has no choice but to treat this "intermediate" kind of predication as a special kind of equivocity.

It seems that both authors and their followers agree on what kind of predicate "existent" is; they disagree only on what to call and how to classify it. This being the case, I shall simply call this kind of predication "paradigmatic equivocity" (following the "Terminological Introduction" in Section 1 above) and disregard the apparently

³⁵ According to Stephanos (as quoted by Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §242, 98; English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, §154, 82), "existent" cannot be equivocal, for "in the meanings to which an equivocal term refers there can be no prior and posterior" (*lā yakūnu fihā mutaqaḍdim wa-muta'aḥḥir*). This quotation may originate from Stephanos' lost *Commentary on the Isagoge* (reportedly based on Philoponus' *Commentary* on the same work).

³⁶ On this commentator see F. Rosenthal, "A Commentator of Aristotle," in *Islamic Philosophy and Classical Tradition*, eds. S. M. Stern et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 337–49, reprinted in: F. Rosenthal, *Greek Philosophy in the Arab World* (Hampshire and Brookfield, VT: Aldershot, 1990), Essay V (Rosenthal tentatively identifies 'lyns with a certain Apollonius of Alexandria); F. W. Zimmermann, *Al-Farabi's Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle's De Interpretatione* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), Introduction, xcvi–xcviii; and the recent survey by A. Elamrani-Jamal, "Alinūs," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 1, No. 126, 151–2. Gyekye identifies Allinūs with Elias—see Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, xvii and xxvif., n.13; Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, 22 and 221, n. 43, where he justifies this identification (cf. also 228, n. 88 and 229f., n. 124). It may be significant that, as Gyekye notes, on the right margin of the manuscript of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib's *Commentary on the Isagoge*, fol. 44r, the name of this commentator is written in Greek letters as *hellēnos*.

³⁷ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §243, 98–9; English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, §155, 82.

non-substantial disagreement between Alexander and Porphyry in what follows.

2.3. *Aph' henos kai pros hen: From Paradigmatic Equivocity (Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry) to Modulated Univocity (Elias and Ibn at-Tayyib)*

As we have seen above, the kind of predication governed by the term “existent” is commonly designated by the expression “from one and with reference to one” (*aph' henos kai pros hen*). The expression “from one and with reference to one” originally referred to paradigmatic equivocals, with the mode of existence of a primary substance as the paradigmatic case of existence.

Yet in the later Alexandrian Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle, there occurred a slight but all-important change in meaning. Subsequent to this change, the expression “from one and with reference to one” (*aph' henos kai pros hen*) came to refer to what we have called *modulated univocals* rather than paradigmatic equivocals.

This will become clear if we consider the following passage from Elias' *Commentary on the Isagoge*:

Since Plato in the *Parmenides* divides “existent” as a genus [into species, i.e. as a univocal term], and Aristotle in the *Categories* divides “existent” as an equivocal term, let us neither overlook the truth nor allow such great men to remain in disagreement (*diaphōnountas*)! “Existent” is therefore divided neither as an equivocal term... nor as a genus into species [i.e. as a univocal term] [...], but as terms [predicated] from one and with reference to one (*hōs ta aph' henos kai pros hen*). [...] Such [terms] [...] are between (*mesa*) equivocals and genera. For whereas equivocals have only a common name but not an altogether common definition, while genera impart to the species [pl.] both a common name and a definition, these being partaken of equally (*ex isou*) [by the species] [...], terms [predicated] from one and with reference to one have both a common name and a common concept (*pragma*), yet these are partaken of unequally (*anomoios*). [...] For the categories partake of the same name and definition [...], yet unequally, since substance is existent more, and subsequently, through the substance, the remaining [categories exist]. [...] Now since terms [predicated] from one and with reference to one are, as we have shown, between [equivocals and genera], and since intermediates can be called by the names of [both] extremities [...], no disagreement (*diaphōnia*) is found between the [two] philosophers.³⁸

³⁸ Elias, *In Isag.*, 70.15–71.22, with omissions.

Here the ten Aristotelian categories are said to partake of both the name and the *definition* (or concept, *pragma*) of "existent"; therefore "existent" must be a *univocal* term. Yet, they do so *unequally*; therefore "existent" is a *modulated* univocal. The relation between substance and accidents is evoked, but only to make clear why the partaking of the concept of "existent" by the categories is unequal. For Elias, it is no longer the case that the very *concept* of "existent" is different for substances and for accidents, as had been the case with Alexander and Porphyry. Rather, for Elias, the concept of "existent" is one and the same, yet substances and accidents partake of it *unequally* and in varying degrees.

The motive for this significant shift in the meaning of the term *aph' henos kai pros hen* would appear to be indicated in the text itself: the desire to harmonize between Plato and Aristotle, which is so characteristic of the late Alexandrian Neoplatonism. This is what in all probability brought about such "univocalization" of *aph' henos kai pros hen*, and of the concept of "existent."³⁹

In Ibn at-Ṭayyib's *Arabic Commentary on the Isagoge*, the term "existent"—classified as an *aph' henos kai pros hen* predicate—also appears to be understood as a modulated univocal. Following Porphyry, Ibn at-Ṭayyib, maintains that there can be no intermediate between equivocal (*muttafiq*) and univocal (*mutawāṭi*) terms. "Existent" is therefore an equivocal term (*ism muštarak*), but a particular kind of equivocal: namely, an equivocal used "with intention and deliberation" (*bi-qaṣd wa-rawīya*, a hendiadys obviously rendering the Porphyrian *apo dianoiās*) and among these belonging to the class of "what [originates] from one agent and what strives to one goal" (*allatī min fā'il wāḥid wa-llatī tašūqu ilā ḡāya wāḥida*).⁴⁰ The latter expression obviously translates the Greek *aph' henos kai pros hen*.

What is important for our purposes is that in Ibn at-Ṭayyib's view, equivocal terms do not *have* to disagree in meaning; it is sufficient that they do not agree in it *equally* (*ittifāqan sawā'an*, corresponding to Elias' *ex isou*). This is why there can be a case when an equivocal term has *only one meaning* but is predicated differently according

³⁹ Additional factors may have been operative in this development. The question deserves a careful and detailed study.

⁴⁰ Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §244, 99; English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, §156, 83.

to increase and decrease (*bi-z-ziyāda wa-n-nuqṣān*).⁴¹ This implies that what we have called modulated univocals are, according to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, a special class within the equivocals. The reference would appear to be to the *aph' henos kai pros hen* terms, including the term “existent.”

Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib offers an interesting explanation of why “existent” belongs to the *aph' henos kai pros hen* class:

This is because all existents are called existents on account of their emanation from that First Principle and of their desire to imitate It. For the First Principle is exceedingly divine and is the creator and perfecter of all existents, and therefore all existents desire It.⁴²

This explanation is shaped by the Neoplatonic understanding of emanation in terms of procession from, and return to, the One (*proodos* and *epistrophē* respectively), by the Platonic idea of *imitatio Dei* (*homoiōsis theōi*), and by the Aristotelian tenet that the world in its entirety desires and imitates the Unmoved Mover. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib's explanation implies that all existents share the same basic meaning of existence: to exist means to be derived from the First Principle and to desire to imitate It.⁴³ However, depending on their relative place in the great chain of being, existents partake of this meaning unequally, according to increase and decrease (*bi-z-ziyāda wa-n-nuqṣān*). In other words, “existent,” which belongs to the *aph' henos kai pros hen* class of predication, is understood as a modulated univocal.

2.4. *The Arabic Terms taškīk and asmā' mušakkika and the Question of Their Origin*

The Arabic terms most often employed to designate what the Greek tradition meant by *aph' henos kai pros hen* (understood as modulated

⁴¹ “Nor should issues subsumed under an equivocal term necessarily be such as not to share a meaning at all; rather they must not share it equally (*ittifāqan sawā'an*). Indeed they can be different in meaning or share the same meaning (*muttafiqa fi l-mā'anī*) but differ with respect to it in increase and decrease (*bi-z-ziyāda wa-n-nuqṣān*)” (Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §243, 99; cf. English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, §155, 82–3).

⁴² Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §244, 99; English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, §156, 83.

⁴³ According to this definition, the First Principle Itself cannot be said to exist. Rather, following Plotinus, and ultimately Plato's description of the Idea of the Good as being “beyond being” (*epekeina tēs ousias*), the First Principle would appear to be the Cause of existence which Itself is beyond existence.

univocals) are *taškik* (literally: "ambiguity") and *asmā' mušakkika* ("ambiguous terms").

In his article "The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides," published in 1938, Harry A. Wolfson suggested (1) that *taškik* and *asmā' mušakkika* are literal translations of the Greek *amphibolia* ("ambiguity") and *amphibola* ("ambiguous [expressions]") occurring in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Commentary on the Topics*.⁴⁴ (2) He further identified Alexander's *amphibolia* with the intermediate kind of predication designated by the term *aph' henos kai pros hen* and characterized by "prior and posterior" (*proteron kai hysteron*—a Greek term commonly employed to refer to modulated univocals).

Only the first half of Wolfson's hypothesis can be sustained. The second half is to be rejected on the following grounds. The term *amphibolia* has an entirely different meaning in Alexander (and in fact in the entire Greek tradition) and cannot possibly signify the same thing as *aph' henos kai pros hen*, however understood.

In his *Commentary on the Topics*, Alexander states that both equivocity and *amphibolia* are, as it were, "species" of *pollachōs legomena*, the difference between them being that in the former the ambiguity (*to ditton*, literally: duality) resides in the terms (*en onomasi*), and in the latter—*en logōi*.⁴⁵ The term *logos* can mean many things, *inter alia*: (1) account, meaning, or definition; (2) relation;⁴⁶ (3) expression, sentence, or argument. It is the third meaning of *logos* that is intended by Alexander, for both the term *amphibolia* and Alexander's definition of it go back to Aristotle's discussion of ambiguity in the *Sophistici Elenchi*.

In this discussion, overlooked by Wolfson, Aristotle provides examples of different varieties of ambiguity. These examples make clear that by *amphibolia* Aristotle means *expressions, sentences, or arguments* whose ambiguity is due to their syntax, *not* to the equivocality of any particular word.⁴⁷ That Alexander uses the term *amphibolia* in precisely this meaning is borne out by the fact that his terminology

⁴⁴ Alexander, *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo Commentaria* (CAG, vol. 2, pt. 2), ed. M. Wallies (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1891), 96.29, 97.23, 152.8ff., and 556.12–3. See Wolfson, "Amphibolous Terms," 455, cf. 459f.

⁴⁵ Alexander, *In Top.*, 96.28–97.1, and 152.7–8.

⁴⁶ E.g. Alexander, *In Met.*, 241.7; English tr., 15.

⁴⁷ *Soph. El.*, 166a6ff.

closely matches that of *Sophistici Elenchi*⁴⁸ and moreover that in his *Commentary on the Topics* he refers to the *Sophistici Elenchi* in this context.⁴⁹ This is why, *aph' henos kai pros hen* terms (and “existent” in particular) are not called “amphibolous” by Alexander or, to the best of my knowledge, anywhere else in the Greek tradition. By calling *aph' henos kai pros hen* terms “amphibolous,” Wolfson simply read the meaning of the Arabic *taškik* back into the Greek *amphibolia*; the title of his article is therefore anachronistic and misleading.⁵⁰

But how did the Arabic term *taškik*, which literally means “ambiguity” (more precisely, “causing doubt” in the reader or listener), come to refer to the *aph' henos kai pros hen* kind of predication? One may offer the following alternative hypothesis to answer this difficult question.

1. Wolfson is correct in suggesting that the Arabic term *taškik* was originally employed to render the Greek *amphibolia*. Such a translation is in fact attested in the “old” (Ibn Nā'ima's?) translation of the *Sophistici Elenchi* (to which Wolfson does not refer).⁵¹
2. As we have seen above, on two occasions in his *Commentary on the Topics* Alexander states that both equivocity and *amphibolia* are, as it were, “species” of *pollachōs legomena*, the difference between them being that in the former the ambiguity resides in the terms (*en onomasi*), and in the latter—*en logōi*. It is possible that the term *amphibolia* in these passages (or in a similar passage from

⁴⁸ The term *logos* is used in the sense of argument or expression in *Soph. El.*, note especially two cases in which it is juxtaposed with *onoma*: 165b29, 166a16; *to ditton* is used in *Soph. El.*, 177a14–5.

⁴⁹ Alexander, *In Top.*, 556.12–3.

⁵⁰ It is misleading in a number of ways: first, because in Greek there can be no amphibolous terms; there can be only amphibolous expressions; second, because the term “amphibolous” is never used in Greek to designate what Wolfson understands by “amphibolous terms”; third, because it ignores Aristotle's own discussion of amphiboly (ambiguity) and ascribes to him “amphiboly” in a different meaning.

⁵¹ Aristotle, *Manṭiq Aristū*, ed. 'A. Badawī, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub, 1948–1952), vol. 3, 763.13 (166a15), 754.3 (read *fa-t-taškik* for *fa-t-taškīl*, 166a22), 906.2 (175b40), and 924.15 (177a10); other renderings of the same term include *aš-šakk fī l-kalām*, 763.4 (166a6), *at-tašakkuk*, 901.5 (175a41), *al-maškūk fī kalāmihī*, 905.11 (175b29), *mā fī l-kalām min at-tašakkuk*, 905.15 (175b34); related terms are translated as (*al-*) *maškūk fīhī*, 901.2 (175a38, *t'amphibola*), 901.10 (175b7, *to amphibolon*), 925.2 (177a14, *amphibolon*), *taškik*, and 930.10 (177b1, *amphibolōn*). On the attribution to Ibn Nā'ima see F. E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus: The Oriental Translations and Commentaries on the Aristotelian Corpus* (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 23f. (note a). The two Syro-Arabic translations (by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and Ibn Zur'a) translate *amphibolia* as *mirā*—see e.g. *Manṭiq Aristū*, vol. 3, 759.5 for Yaḥyā (166a6) and 761.2 for Ibn Zur'a (166a6).

Alexander's lost *Commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi* or some other related work) got translated into Arabic as *taškik*.⁵²

3. Let us assume now that the term *logos* in the same passage, which originally meant expression, sentence, or argument, was *mistranslated* into Arabic as "meaning" (*ma'nā*), the latter being a common rendering of *logos*.
4. Let us assume further that this Arabic translation was *interpreted* by an Arab reader, who did not have access to the Greek text, as referring to the *aph' henos kai pros hen* kind of predication (understood as modulated univocals), known to him from other sources. Such an interpretation would in fact make sense of the erroneous translation, for modulated univocals are indeed ambiguous (*amphibola* ~ *mušakkika*), but not because the term itself (*onoma* ~ *ism*) involves duality (i.e. two different meanings) but because their (only) meaning (*logos*, which was according to our hypothesis mistranslated as *ma'nā*) applies ambiguously (i.e. by modulation) to subjects of which they are predicated. Such terms are *pollachōs legomena* not in the sense of being polysemous and equivocal but in the sense of being monosemous and univocal yet modulated.

At the present state of our knowledge, it is impossible to prove or disprove this hypothesis, yet it does seem to have a certain plausibility. Alexander's original statement, following Aristotle, meant that there are two "species" of *pollachōs legomena*: polysemous terms (=homonyma, equivocals) and polysemous expressions (=amphibola). In the former, ambiguity (*to ditton*) resides in the term itself, while in the latter it resides in the argument (*en logōi*), that is, in the ambiguous syntax. This statement would have been mistranslated and subsequently interpreted in the sense that there are two "species" of terms which are *pollachōs legomena*: equivocal terms and modulated univocal terms, called *asmā' mušakkika* (rendering the Greek *amphibola*). In the former, ambiguity resides in the term itself, for it has several distinct meanings, while in the latter it resides in the term's single meaning (*ma'nā*), that is, in the fact that this meaning is applied by modulation, i.e. is partaken of *unequally* by the various subjects of which the term is predicated.

⁵² We know that both the *Commentary on the Topics* and the lost *Commentary on the Soph. El.* existed, at least in part, in Arabic translations—see Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus*, 20 and 22 (note f) on the *Topics*, 23 and 26 (note h) on the *Soph. El.*

2.5. *Fārābī on “Existent” As a Predicate*

Be it as it may, the term *asmā’ mušakkika* appears in the newly acquired meaning already in Fārābī.⁵³ In his *Risāla fī Ġawāb masā’il su’ila ‘anhā, ism mušakkik* is defined as a term by which a single meaning is intended, yet its referents (*al-musammayāt*) differ in priority and posteriority with respect to this meaning (*tataqaddamu wa-tata’ahḥaru*, rendering the Greek *proteron kai hysteron*).⁵⁴ This is precisely what we have called modulated univocals.

Fārābī provides the following examples of *asmā’ mušakkika*: “substance (*ḡawhar*), accident (*‘araḍ*), potentiality (*quwwa*), actuality (*fi’l*), prohibition (*nahy*), command (*amr*), and similar [terms].”⁵⁵ Substance, for instance, is a modulated term because it applies to various substances according to priority and posteriority (*bi-t-taqaddum wa-t-ta’ahḥur*), that is to say, primary substances (individuals) “are prior in substantiality and more deserving (*aḥaqq*) of this name than the universals,” i.e. secondary substances (species and genera). Fārābī argues that one could also say the reverse: “Since universal substances are stable, abiding, and permanent, while individuals cease [to be] and disintegrate, universals are more deserving of the name substance than individuals.” On both views, the first among which is obviously Aristotelian, and the second, Platonic: “substance is predicated

⁵³ For the following discussion cf. P. Vallat, *Farabi et l’école d’Alexandrie: Des prémisses de la connaissance à la philosophie politique* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004), 347–65. For some criticisms of Vallat’s thesis see below.

⁵⁴ Fārābī, “*Risāla fī Ġawāb masā’il su’ila ‘anhā*,” in *Alfārābī’s philosophische Abhandlungen aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner Handschriften*, ed. F. Dieterici (Leiden: Brill, 1890), 84–103, at §12, and 88.9–16, cf. also discussion of substance and accident in §§13–14, 88.17–89.8 and of movement in §21, 92.20–93.11 (*muškil/muščila* must be corrected to *mušakkik/mušakkika* in all cases). It is perhaps significant that somebody (a student?) should have asked him about the meaning of this term. If this person called Fārābī’s attention to the relevant passage in Alexander’s *Commentary on the Topics* (or on the *Soph. El.*), this would support our hypothesis, but this of course cannot be verified.

⁵⁵ Fārābī, “*Ġawāb*,” §12, p. 88:15–16; in §21, pp. 92:20–93:11 also the example of movement (*ḥaraka*) is given and explained (*muškil/muščila* must be corrected to *mušakkik/mušakkika* in all cases). According to Wolfson, Fārābī’s discussion in the *Ġawāb*, §12 implies that “existence” applies by modulation to substance and accident and to potentiality and actuality (Wolfson, “Amphibolous Terms,” 456ff.). However this interpretation seems to be based on a misreading of the text, for in the following two paragraphs (§§13–4) Fārābī answers the questions how the terms “substance” and “accident” are applied by modulation. This means that in §12 Fārābī did not mean to say that “existence” applies by modulation to substance and accident but rather that “substance” and “accident” apply by modulation to their respective instances.

of that of which it is predicated according to priority and posteriority (*bi-t-taqaddum wa-t-ta'ahhur*); therefore it is a modulated term (*ism mušakkik*).⁵⁶

In his *Maqāla fī Aḡrād al-Ḥakīm*, Fārābī remarks that in the Book IV (i.e. Book Delta)⁵⁷ of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle deals with the meanings of terms that refer to the subjects (*mawḏū'āt*) of metaphysics, their subdivisions (*anwā'*) and concomitants (*lawāḥiq*), be they univocal (*bi-t-tawāṭu'*), modulated (*bi-t-taškik*), or truly equivocal (*bi-l-ištirāk al-ḥaqīqī*).⁵⁸

In the *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, Fārābī presents a complex analysis of predication. The following are two crucial passages from this work.

[§19] If you are to understand these categories, you must know first [the meaning of] equivocal [terms] (*al-muttafiqa asmā'uhā*), univocal [terms] (*al-mutawāṭi'a asmā'uhā*), and [terms] intermediate between equivocal and univocal. The latter are [of the following types]: (1) those designated by one term and relating to different things with the same relations (*nisaban mutašābiha*),⁵⁹ without the things to which they relate being designated by their name;⁶⁰ (2) those designated by one term and relating to one thing without this one [thing] being called after those things; (3) those designated by one term derived (*muštaqq*) from the name of the thing to which they relate (e.g. "medical" derived from the term "medicine"); and (4) those designated by one term which is the very name of the thing to which they relate. Each of these groups is either (a) equal (*mutasāwin*) or (b) ranked (*mutafāḍil*). [In addition, you must know the meaning of] diversivocal [terms] (*al-mutabāyina asmā'uhā*),⁶¹ multivocal [terms] (*al-mutarādifa asmā'uhā*),⁶² and derived [terms] (*al-muštaqqa asmā'uhā*).⁶³ ⁶⁴

⁵⁶ Fārābī, "Ġawāb," §14, 89.1–8 (read *mušakkik* for *muškil*).

⁵⁷ Since Fārābī's description does not include Book A. See A. Bertolacci, "On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 241–75, at 258f.

⁵⁸ Fārābī, "Maqāla...fī Aḡrād al-Ḥakīm fī kull maqāla min al-kitāb al-mawsūm bi-l-ḥurūf," in *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen*, 34–8, at 37.6–8.

⁵⁹ Reading, with Vallat (*Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*, 349), *nisaban mutašābiha* for *bi-šay' mutašābih*.

⁶⁰ The words <wa>min ḡayr an yusammā ḍālika l-wāḥid b-ism tilka l-ašyā' in ll. 5–6 should be secluded, for they do not seem to belong here (as the editor's addition of <wa> indicates) and are repeated in l. 7.

⁶¹ =*heteronyma* of the Greek tradition: two different terms that differ in meaning.

⁶² =*polyonyma* of the Greek tradition. These are the terms that we call today "synonyms" in the lexical sense: two terms that designate the same meaning.

⁶³ =*paronyma* of the Greek tradition.

⁶⁴ Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, ed. M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1970), §19, 71.2–11. The text of the passage is corrupt and, according to Vallat, *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*,

[§158] Concepts designated by the same shared term (*al-ma'ānī allatī taštarik fī ism wāhid*) are either (1') a quality in that shared term,⁶⁵ or (2') have the same relations (*nisab mutašābiha*) to multiple things, or (3') relate to the same matter according to a certain order (*'alā tartīb*). The latter either (3'a) hold the same rank in relation to this one matter or (3'b) hold unequal ranks in relation to it (*takūn rutbatuhā minhu mutaḥādila*), in that some of them are closer in rank to it, and others are farther away from it. Each of these two groups is either designated by a name other than the name of the single matter to which [the concepts] are related, or designated together with this matter by one and the same name. In the latter case, this matter will be the most prior among them (*ašaddah taqadduman*), and its priority can be either ontological (*fī l-wuḡūd*) or epistemological (*fī l-ma'rifa*). [...] It can often happen that what is prior epistemologically is posterior ontologically, and what is posterior [epistemologically] is prior ontologically. And so [this single shared term] becomes a single name designating [these concepts], either (2') because they have the same relations to multiple things (*min aḡl tašābuh nisabihā ilā ašyā' kaṭīra*), or (3') because they are related to a single thing, in a way which is either (3'a) equal (*bi-tasāwin*) or (3'b) ranked (*bi-taḥādul*), regardless of whether this one thing is designated by the same name as they are or by a name different than theirs. These are neither equivocals (*al-muttafiqa asmā'uhā*) nor univocals (*al-mutawāṭi'a asmā'uhā*), but [terms] intermediate between the two; they are sometimes called modulated [terms] (*al-muṣakkika asmā'uhā*).⁶⁶

Complete analysis of these passages lies beyond the scope of this essay; nor is such an analysis possible at this stage, without giving due consideration to the entire Fārābian corpus and without having access to the—hitherto unpublished—second revised edition of the *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* that has (reportedly) been prepared by the late Muhsin Mahdi.⁶⁷ What can be said at this point is that Fārābī adopts the view that differentiates between three rather than two classes of predication: equivocal, univocal, and *intermediate*. The last class—which in §158 is called “modulated terms” (*al-muṣakkika asmā'uhā*)—is further divided into several subdivisions. Though some subdivisions are difficult to identify, it is clear that one subdivision (No. 1 in §19 and No. 2' in §158) refers to terms predicated “by analogy” (*kat' analogian*, rendered by *nisab mutašābiha* and *tašābuh an-nisab*). Another

349n4 has been corrected by the late Muhsin Mahdi in his new, still unpublished edition, to which I had no access. On the *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* see most recently S. Menn, “Al-Fārābī's Kitāb al-Ḥurūf and His Analysis of the Senses of Being,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 18 (2008), 59–97 (Stephen Menn is preparing a monograph on this subject).

⁶⁵ The text here is not clear and somewhat suspect.

⁶⁶ Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, §158, 160.7–161.9.

⁶⁷ See n. 64 above.

subdivision (No. 3' in §158), designated by the term *tartīb*, refers to some kind of ranked or unranked order or hierarchy of concepts, of which a single term is predicated.⁶⁸

In another important passage of *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, Fārābī calls "existent" an equivocal expression. In this passage there is no mention of *taškīk*.

[§88] "Existent" is an equivocal expression (*lafẓ muštarak*) predicated of all the categories. [...] It is best to say that it is a name of each of the supreme genera, because it has no reference to itself. Then it is predicated of each thing subsumed under each of these [genera], because it is a name of that thing's supreme genus. It is predicated of all of [each genus'] species univocally (*bi-tawāṭu*).

([In this sense "existent" is] similar to the word 'ayn [which means "eye," "dinar," and "spring of water"], for it is a name designating multiple species and predicated equivocally (*bi-štirāk*) of [these species], but univocally (*bi-tawāṭu*) of what is subsumed under each of these species, because it is the primary name of that species.)⁶⁹

Then ["existent"] is predicated [univocally] of everything subsumed under that species [i.e. each species of each of the supreme genera], because it is predicated univocally of [all these species].⁷⁰

In the *Short Treatise on the De Interpretatione*,⁷¹ Fārābī presents a (by-and-large) Porphyrian scheme of the kinds of predication. Equivocals are divided into four kinds corresponding to Porphyry's "by chance," "by similarity," "by analogy," and "from one" and "with reference to one" taken together.⁷² The last kind is defined as equivocals that refer "to a single goal" (=pros hen), or "to a single agent" (=aph' henos), or "to some single thing, not as their common aim or agent, but in different ways."⁷³

Several paragraphs later, Fārābī states that the terms "existent," "thing," and "one" apply to the ten categories equivocally (*bi-štirāk*). To be more precise, they belong to the class of equivocals whose equivocity is one of "order and proportionality" (*bi-tartīb wa-bi-tanāsub*).⁷⁴ This is because

⁶⁸ On the meaning of *tartīb* see the interesting remarks in Vallat, *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*, 352ff.

⁶⁹ I believe the parenthetical remark ends here, but this is conjectural.

⁷⁰ Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, §88, 115.15–22.

⁷¹ The Arabic original of this treatise was not available to me.

⁷² Porphyry's basic distinction between equivocals by chance and equivocals from thought is eliminated. Cf. n. 88 below for a similar phenomenon in Avicenna.

⁷³ Zimmermann, *Al-Farabi's Commentary*, 229f.

⁷⁴ The Arabic text, which was otherwise inaccessible to me, is provided by Vallat, *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*, 355n4. In the same text cited in Ṭūsī, *Muṣāri' al-muṣāri'*, 59, the Arabic reads *tartīb mutanāsib* (Ṭūsī says that he is quoting Fārābī's

["existent"] is applied to substance in the first place, and secondarily to each of the other categories. For, as has been said, substance does not, in order to exist, require accidents; for its accidents can change, but its being is not diminished when one of them ceases to inhere in it. The existence of each accident [by contrast] depends on the substance, and when the substance vanishes the accident, whose subsistence depends on it, vanishes as well. Next, as regards things of the remaining categories, the less they depend, for their existence in a substance, on the mediation of another accident, and the less they follow in the wake of another category of anterior existence in the substance, the more they are entitled to be called ["existent"]. Next, whatever is in a substance through the mediation of fewer things is more entitled to be called ["existent"] than things that are in the substance through the mediation of more things.⁷⁵

It is obvious that by equivocity in "order and proportionality" Fārābī means essentially the same thing as modulated univocals (*asmā' mušakkika*). This is confirmed by the following quotation from Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Burhān*, where "existent," "one," "thing," and other similar terms are classified under modulated univocals:

[Terms] used as genera and differentiae in definitions are of two kinds. The first kind is when, for example, [in the definition of human as a rational animal] "animal" is called a genus and "rational" is [called] a differentia. The second [kind] is that to which reference is made by entirely modulated terms (*al-mušakkikāt at-tāmmat at-taškik*), such as "one," "existent," "perfection," "potentiality," "relation," and the like. The first kind is more deserving of being [called] genus; this is genus in the absolute sense. [...] As for the definitions comprising components other [than genus and differentia in the strict sense], that which, in [such] a definition, takes the place of a genus may not be a genus at all but an equivocal or a modulated term (*isman muštarakan aw mušakkikan*) or may be called a genus in a way other than the way in which it is said that "animal" is the genus of "human." This is the case of [the terms] "one," "existent," and "thing," for these and suchlike [terms] are either not genera at all or are genera in other ways. Such [terms] are likely to cause one to imagine a thing generally (*tahyīlan 'āmmān*) in some way, yet they never refer to a component which is constitutive of that thing (*guz' bihī qiwām aš-šay*).⁷⁶ If this is so, genus is of two kinds. One kind

Commentary on the Categories, but in reality this seems to be a precise quotation from the *Short Treatise on the De Interpretatione*).

⁷⁵ Zimmermann's translation, *Al-Farabi's Commentary*, 231f.

⁷⁶ This means that unlike *real* genera (and *real* differentiae) which point to constituent components of the defined thing's quiddity (*māhiya*), these quasi-genera (and quasi-differentiae), represented by modulated terms, do not point to such constituent components. For a similar idea in Avicenna see Section 3.3 below.

is what causes one to imagine a thing generally in some way. The second kind is what causes one to imagine [a thing] generally, yet in addition to that refers to a component which is constitutive of that thing. The latter kind is more appropriately deserving (*aḥaqq*) of the name “genus” than the former, even though both are called genus.⁷⁷

It is important to stress that in none of these texts there seems to be any indication that Fārābī was concerned with modulation of the term “existent” on the transcendental level. All his discussions focus exclusively on the predicamental level, that is, on how “existent” is predicated of the various categories. His solution is that it is predicated equivocally (*bi-štirāk*), this equivocality being further defined as one of “order and proportionality” (*bi-tartīb wa-bi-tanāsub*), which seems to be the same as modulation (*taškīk*).

In his recent discussion of Fārābī's analysis of existence in his monograph *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*, Philippe Vallat has argued, on the basis of some of the same texts cited above,⁷⁸ that Fārābī espoused the doctrine of transcendental “analogy of being” (*l'analogie de l'être*). His argument is based on a rather far-reaching interpretation of the terms “order” and “proportionality,” *tartīb* and *tanāsub*, both of which are used by Fārābī in the *Short Commentary on the De Interpretatione* (and the term *tartīb* also in the *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, §158). According to Vallat's interpretation, the terms *tartīb* and *tanāsub* mean, respectively, a hierarchical procession of existents from the First Principle and an analogical relationship between this hierarchical chain of existents and the First Principle (“une procession à partir d'un terme unique” and “une analogie avec un terme unique” are his terms, “un terme unique” being a reference to the First Principle). He further connects *tartīb* and *tanāsub*, interpreted in this way, with the Greek terms *aph' henos* and *pros hen* respectively.

Vallat's conclusion is therefore that in Fārābī,

for the first time [in the history of philosophy], being or, more precisely in this context, “existent,” *mawǧūd*, is presented as an analogy, i.e. as a continuous analogical relationship, established between the secondary

⁷⁷ Fārābī, “Kitāb al-Burhān,” in *al-Manṭiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī*, ed. M. T. Dānišpažūh (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-'Uzmā al-Mar'āšī, 1408/1987), vol. 1, 297.3–7 and 298.6–16 (I am grateful to Samuel Noble for an electronic copy of this work). Sections of this passage are cited by Ṭūsī, *Muṣāri' al-muṣāri'*, 59.18–60.6.

⁷⁸ The quotation from Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Burhān* is not taken into consideration in Vallat's account.

analogues and the Primary Analogue, Who is in the strict sense the only holder of the Act of being, *wuġūd*, i.e. the Principal Being.⁷⁹

In my view, this conclusion is, at the present state of our knowledge, not borne out by sufficient evidence. It is based solely on Vallat's *interpretation* of the terms *tartīb* and *tanāsub*, which are left *undefined* in the Fārābīan proof-texts examined by him. Furthermore, even if Vallat is right in his interpretation of these terms, it is by no means certain that the "procession à partir d'un terme unique" and the "analogie avec un terme unique" would in fact *include* this "terme unique," i.e. the First Principle itself. In other words, there is absolutely no proof in Fārābī's writings examined by Vallat (and myself) that Fārābī did in fact include the First Principle in his supposed analogical hierarchy of beings.

As a matter of fact, the proof-texts cited above give, rather, the impression that Fārābī (deliberately?) refrained from doing so. Whenever he was in a position to explain why "existent" is a modulated term or an equivocal term whose equivocality is one of "order and proportionality" (as, for instance, is the case in the *Short Treatise on the De Interpretatione*) he spoke exclusively of the relation of "existent" to substances and accidents, *not* of the relation of "existent" to the First Principle and other beings.

I believe that this omission is significant. Though Fārābī's argument concerning modulation of existence is, in principle, *extendable* across the transcendental divide, from the predicamental to the transcendental level, there seems to be little evidence that Fārābī in fact *wished* to extend it in that direction. Until such evidence be found (which may or may not happen once the *entire* Fārābīan corpus is carefully examined), we ought to refrain from constructing such hypothetical extensions and from reading back into Fārābī such later theories as transcendental modulation of existence (or analogy of being). Evidence for transcendental modulation of existence seems (at present) to be lacking in Fārābī. Its earliest attested formulation would, therefore, appear to be in Avicenna, as I hope to show in the following section.

⁷⁹ Vallat, *Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie*, 355f.: "Et pour la première fois également l'étant ou, plus précisément ici, l'exister', *mawġūd*, est présenté [in Fārābī] comme une analogie, c'est-à-dire comme un rapport analogique *continu* s'instaurant entre les seconds et le Premier analogués, Celui-ci étant en toute rigueur le seul détenteur de l'Acte d'être, *wuġūd*, c'est-à-dire de l'Être principal."

3. Avicenna on "Existent" As a Predicate

3.1. Avicenna's Analysis of the Kinds of Predication

Considering that the kinds of predication are treated by Aristotle in the *Categories*, it is no surprise that Avicenna takes up this subject in the corresponding book—the Book of *Categories* (*Maqūlāt*)—of his philosophical summa *The Book of the Cure* (*Kitāb aš-Šifā*). In this book, Avicenna offers an extensive analysis of predication. The following passage—which to the best of my knowledge has not been translated into English—deserves special attention.⁸⁰ Despite its considerable length it will be quoted in full.

Concerning all that is not [predicated] univocally (*'alā sabīl at-tawāṭu*) one says that it is [predicated] as a shared name (*bi-ttifāq al-ism*). [This type of predication] is divided into three classes, since the intended meaning is either (1) one and the same, albeit different in another way; or (2) not one [and the same], but with some similarity between the two [meanings]; or (3) not one and the same without there being any similarity between the two [meanings].

(1) That in which the intended meaning is the same but which becomes differentiated afterwards is like the meaning of existence, for [the latter] is one in many things but is different in them [in another respect], since it is not present in them in a completely identical way.

(a) This is because in some [existents] it is present before and in others after,⁸¹ since the existence of a substance is before the existence of all that follows it [i.e. the accidents]; and also since the existence of some substances is before the existence of other substances, and similarly the

⁸⁰ This text is not taken into account by Wolfson, who treats Ḡazālī's discussion of predication in the *Mi'yār al-'ilm*, ed. A. Šams ad-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1410/1990), 52ff.), heavily based on this section of Avicenna's *Maqūlāt*, as if it were a totally independent piece of work (Wolfson, "Amphibolous Terms," 461–2). One should also correct two textual problems that mar Wolfson's discussion: what Wolfson reads as *al-awwalīy wa-l-āḥirīy* (and translates "primary and subsequent," tracing this supposed expression to the Greek *prōtōs* and *hepomenōs*, 461) should be read as *al-awlā wa-l-ahrā* ("more deserved and more appropriate"); Wolfson's "ivory and crown" (461, 466, 468, 469, and 471) should be corrected to "ivory and snow" (*tāğ* being a corruption of *talğ*).

On Avicenna's *Maqūlāt* consult the recent study by A. Bäck, "Avicenna the Commentator," in *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories*, ed. L. A. Newton (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 31–71 (not seen; I am grateful to Amos Bertolacci for this reference).

⁸¹ The terms "before" and "after" (as well as "priority" and "posteriority") must be taken in their temporal (as opposed to ontological) meaning, as becomes clear in the second paragraph of section (b).

existence of some accidents is before the existence of other accidents. This is the way of priority and posteriority (*at-taqaddum wa-t-ta'ahhur*).⁸¹

(b) It can also be different by way of being more deserved and more appropriate (*al-awlā wa-l-aḥrā*), since the existence of some things comes in virtue of themselves (*min dātihi*), and the existence of other things comes in virtue of another [existent] (*min ġayrihi*), and that which exists in virtue of itself (*al-mawḡūd bi-dātihi*) is more deserving existence than that which exists in virtue of another [existent] (*al-mawḡūd bi-ġayrihi*).

Everything that is prior with respect to a meaning also deserves it more, but not vice versa, for it can be that two things share a meaning that does not belong to one of them before [the other] but rather belongs to both [things] simultaneously (*ma'an*), yet one of them deserves it more because it is more perfect and more established in it.

(c) As for that which differs with respect to strength and weakness, this only applies to meanings that admit of strength and weakness (*aš-šidda wa-d-ḍu'f*), e.g. whiteness. It is [in this sense that] "whiteness" is not⁸² predicated of [the whiteness] of snow and of that of ivory as a pure univocal (*'alā t-tawāṭu' al-muṭlaq*), and "philosophy" is not predicated of [the philosophy] of the Peripatetics and of that of the Stoics as a pure univocal.⁸³ We are giving you only well-known examples that should be treated with indulgence, if one has already understood the matter.

A term whose meaning is the same when abstracted (*iḍā ġurrida*), yet not the same in every way but similar (*mutašābihan*)⁸⁴ in things subsumed under this term is called "modulated term" (*isman mušakkikan*) and may sometimes be called by another name.⁸⁵

A modulated term can be [used] in the absolute [sense] (*muṭlaqan*), as we have indicated [in the examples given above], and can be [used] [in the relative sense]: (d) with respect to a relation to a single principle (e.g. when we apply the term "medical" to a book, a scalpel, or a medication), or (e) to a single goal (e.g. when we apply the term "healthy" to a medication, an exercise, or venesection), or else (f) with respect to a

⁸² Read *laysa* in lieu of *mā laysa*.

⁸³ Presumably, Peripatetic philosophy is "stronger"; interestingly, Avicenna acknowledges that Stoic philosophy is also worthy of the name, otherwise "philosophy" would be predicated of both kinds of philosophy purely equivocally and not by modulation.

⁸⁴ The meaning "ambiguous" (as in the expression "ambiguous Qur'ānic verses," *mutašābihāt*) seems unsuitable here.


⁸⁵ Perhaps Avicenna has in mind the term *muttafiq*, which he uses in the meaning of "equivocal," but which later on, and perhaps already in his time, was used as a synonym of *mušakkik*—see Wolfson, "Amphibolous Terms," 473, who calls attention to such usage in Ġazālī (*Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, ed. M.Š. al-Kurdi (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Maḥmūdiyya at-Tiġāriyya bi-l-Azhar, 1936), Logic, 10–1 [no correspondence in Avicenna's *Dānešnāme*]; Metaphysics, 30–1 [corresponding to Avicenna's *Dānešnāme*, *Elāhiyāt*, §11—part of this chapter is translated in Section 3.2 below]).

relation to both a [single] principle and a single goal (e.g. when we call all things "divine").⁸⁶

In this passage, Avicenna distinguishes between three kinds of predication. These are (in our terminology): (1) modulated univocals, (2) impure equivocals, and (3) pure equivocals. (The last two kinds, as well as pure univocals, will not be treated here.) Modulated univocals are defined as terms that have *the same meaning* in the instances to which they apply (hence univocal), but whose mode of application to these instances *differs in some other way* (hence modulated).

Avicenna further distinguishes between three types of modulation: (a) modulation in priority and posteriority; (b) modulation in degree of deservingness; and (c) modulation in strength and weakness. In addition to these three types of modulation Avicenna considers modulated terms taken not in the absolute sense, but in relation to (d) one and the same principle, (e) one and the same goal, or (f) both one and the same principle and one and the same goal. A book, a scalpel, and a medication are all called medical, because they have medicine as their principle. A medication, an exercise, and venesection are all called healthy, because they have health as their goal. All things are called divine, because they have God as their principle *and* goal (in post-Aristotelian Peripatetic terminology, God is both their efficient and their final cause).

This rather complicated classification of types of predication can be presented schematically as follows:



⁸⁶ *Maqūlāt*, Book 1, ch. 2, 10.4–11.7.

With respect to this chart some critical observations are in order. It is clear that Avicenna has reworked and synthesized a variety of disparate sources. The basic division of equivocal terms into purely equivocal, impurely equivocal (equivocal “by similarity”), terms related to one principle (*ilā mabda’ wāhid* ~ *aph’ henos*), and related to one goal (*ilā gāya wāhida* ~ *pros hen*) is Porphyrian (as mediated by the later Neoplatonic tradition), with the following modifications: Porphyry’s equivocals by analogy (*kat’ analogian*) seem to be omitted,⁸⁷ and the basic distinction between equivocals by chance (*apo tychēs*) and equivocals from thought (*apo dianoias*) is eliminated as well.⁸⁸

The fact that terms used “in relation to one principle *and* one goal” (*ilā mabda’ wa-gāya wāhida* ~ *aph’ henos kai pros hen*) are introduced as a third class alongside *aph’ henos* and *pros hen* is likely due to Avicenna’s use of another source. This source is probably the same as the one used by Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in his explanation of what kind of term “existent” is, since the example given by Avicenna for terms predicated in relation to one principle and goal—all things being “divine”—is clearly related to Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s explanation.⁸⁹

The major change introduced by Avicenna is that he regards *aph’ henos*, *pros hen*, and *aph’ henos kai pros hen* as a special subclass of modulated terms, “modulated terms in the relative sense,” which is differentiated from modulated terms in the absolute sense. At least two of the three kinds of difference in the application of modulated terms in the absolute sense—(a) priority and posteriority and (b) degree of deservingness—go back to Fārābī’s works cited in Section 2.5 above. The third kind—(c) strength and weakness—may have been added to the classification by Avicenna himself, though this is not certain.⁹⁰

It is highly significant that existence (*wuġūd*) serves as example for the first two kinds of modulation: the existence of substances versus

⁸⁷ Or perhaps subsumed under equivocals by similarity, see *Maqūlāt*, 12.5–6. As we have seen in Section 2.5 above, *taṣābuh an-nisab* is the term used by Fārābī for equivocals by analogy.

⁸⁸ As it is in Fārābī—see n. 72 above.

⁸⁹ It is not impossible that Avicenna relied on Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib’s commentary itself, but this is less likely, for his feud with Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib is well known—see D. Gutas, “Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works,” in *Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions*, ed. C. Burnett (London: The Warburg Institute, 1993), 29–76, at §19, 45, n. 74 and §24, 47f.

⁹⁰ But cf. Wolfson’s discussion of the corresponding text in Ġazālī—Wolfson, “*Amphibolous Terms*,” 461f.

that of accidents⁹¹ is adduced as example of (a) modulation in priority and posteriority; the existence of that which exists in virtue of itself (*al-mawğūd bi-dātihi*) versus the existence of that which exists in virtue of another (*al-mawğūd bi-ğayrihi*) serves as example for (b) modulation in degree of deservingness.⁹² In the latter example, the reference would appear to be to cause and effect in general, or more specifically to the Necessarily Existent (*wāğib al-wuğūd*) and the contingent existents.

If the latter, more specific interpretation is correct—if, in other words, Avicenna is referring to the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents, rather than cause and effect in general⁹³—existence would be modulated on both the predicamental and the transcendental levels: on the predicamental level, because the existence of substances is “prior” to the existence of accidents; on the transcendental level, because the Necessarily Existent deserves existence more than contingent existents.⁹⁴ I shall deal with the predicamental and the

⁹¹ As well as existence of some substances versus that of other substances and existence of some accidents versus that of other accidents.

⁹² The third type of modulation—(c) modulation in strength and weakness—is introduced by the phrase: “As for that which differs with respect to strength and weakness, this only applies to meanings that admit of strength and weakness, e.g. whiteness,” the implication being that in Avicenna’s view, existence does *not* admit of strength and weakness. Indeed, he explicitly says as much in the *Ilāhiyāt* of the *Šifā’*: “Existence in so far as it is existence does not differ in strength and weakness (*aš-šidda wa-d-ḍu’f*) and does not admit of [being] diminished and more deficient (*al-aqall wa-l-anqas*). It can differ in only three respects (*aḥkām*): priority and posteriority (*at-taqaddum wa-t-ta’āḥḥur*), self-sufficiency and need (*al-istiğnā’ wa-l-ḥāğa*), and necessity and contingency (*al-wuğūb wa-l-imkān*). As for priority and posteriority, existence belongs, as you know, first to the cause, and subsequently to the caused. As for self-sufficiency and need, you know that the cause does not need the caused in order to exist; rather it exists in virtue of itself or in virtue of another cause. This aspect is close to the preceding one, yet different from it conceptually (*fī l-i’tibār*). As for necessity and contingency, we know that if there is a cause which is the cause of everything caused, then [this cause] is necessarily existent (*wāğibat al-wuğūd*), both in relation to the totality of all the caused [existents] and in the absolute sense. Also, if there is a cause of some [particular] caused [existent], then it is necessarily existent (*wāğibat al-wuğūd*) in relation to that caused [existent], whereas that caused [existent], however it occurs, is contingently existent (*mumkin al-wuğūd*) in itself”—*Ilāhiyāt*, Book 6, ch. 3, 276.13—277.3 (cf. English tr. by Marmura, 213–4); this passage is summarized in *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §815, 286f.

⁹³ It is perhaps significant that the term *mawğūd bi-dātihi* is used for God in *Ta’līqāt*, 35.8; *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §421, 154.2,4 (=§789, 272.11 and 273.1).

⁹⁴ When Avicenna says that two things can “share a meaning that...belongs to both [things] simultaneously, yet one of them deserves it more because it is more perfect and more established in it,” he is possibly referring to the fact that in his system the Necessarily Existent and (some) contingent existents are coeternal, and

transcendental dimensions of Avicenna's analysis of modulation of existence in the following two sections.

3.2. *Avicenna on Predicamental Modulation of Existence*

Avicenna discusses predicamental modulation of existence on numerous occasions. Perhaps the most extensive treatment of this subject is found in his Persian philosophical summa the *Dānešnāme*. A chapter of this work is devoted to the question of how existence (Avicenna uses the Persian term *hastī*) is related to the ten categories. The following section is relevant for our purposes.

Those who do not have fine understanding believe that the term "existence" (*hastī*) applies to these ten things [i.e. categories] equivocally (*be-ešterāk-e esm*), so that all ten have the same name [sc. "existent"], but the meaning of this name is not the same. This is erroneous, because if it were so, saying that a substance exists would be tantamount to saying that it is a substance, and there would be no meaning to a substance's existence apart from it being a substance, and similarly the term "exists" as applied to quality would have no meaning apart from [it being a] quality. Thus, if one were to say "a quality exists," it would be the same as if he said "a quality [is] a quality"; and when one would say "a substance exists," it would be the same as if he said "a substance [is] a substance." [Furthermore], it would be incorrect [to say] that each thing either exists or does not exist (*yā hast yā nīst*), since "exists" would have not one but ten meanings, and "does not exist" would also have not one but ten meanings. Hence division would not be twofold, and moreover this discussion itself would have no meaning.⁹⁵

so there is no *temporal* priority of the Necessarily Existent to contingent existents with regard to existence; yet the former does deserve existence more than the latter. This interpretation is also corroborated by the following statement in the *Ilāhiyāt*, where Avicenna argues that the Necessarily Existent deserves existence more than contingent existents; the latter, in fact, do not deserve existence at all: "[The Necessarily Existent] is sometimes also called Real (*ḥaqq*), since the belief in Its existence is real. Moreover, there is nothing more deserving this reality (*ḥaqq bi-ḥādihi l-ḥaqq*) than That the belief in whose existence is real, and not only real but eternal, and not only eternal but is also due to Itself, not to another. The quiddities of other things, however, do not...deserve existence (*lā tastaḥiqqu l-wuḡūd*); rather, taken in themselves, when their relation to the Necessarily Existent is severed, they deserve non-existence (*tastaḥiqqu l-'adam*). This is why they are all void (*bāṭila*) in themselves and real (*ḥaqq*) by It, actualized [only] with reference to that aspect [of them] that faces It (*wa-bi-l-qiyās ilā l-waḡhi llaḍi yalihi ḥāṣila*). This is why "Everything is perishing save His Face" [Qur'ān 28:88], and thus It is more deserving [than anything else] to be [the] Real (*ḥaqq bi-an yakūna ḥaqqan*)"—*Ilāhiyāt*, Book 8, ch. 6, 356.10–15 (cf. English tr. by Marmura, 284).

⁹⁵ The same idea seems to be expressed in a summary form in *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §649, 219: "If existence applied equivocally (*bi-štirāk al-ism*) to that to which it applies, the

[However], all wise people know that whenever we say “a substance exists” and “an accident exists” we intend by “existence” the same meaning, just as “non-existence” has one meaning. Indeed, once you start particularizing existence (*ĉūn hastī rā ḥāṣṣ konī*), the existence of everything will be different, just as the particular substance of each thing is different. [...] Yet, though this is so, existence does not apply to these ten [categories] [...] univocally (*motavāṭī*), because only that is called univocal which applies to multiple things without any difference (*bī hič eḥtelāf*). Existence, on the other hand, first belongs to substance, and only through the mediation of substance, to quantity, quality, and relation, and through the mediation of these, to the rest [of the categories]. [...] Therefore, existence applies to these things according to prior and posterior (*pīš-o-pas*) and more or less (*kamābīšī*), though it applies to one meaning. This [kind of predicate] is called modulated (*mošakkek*).⁹⁶

In the metaphysical part (*Ilāhīyāt*) of the *Šifā'*, following Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Avicenna defends the idea that though “existent” is not a genus, it is “sufficiently” univocal to be able to serve as the subject matter of a science. The univocity in question is modulated univocity, since the meaning of existence is predicated of substance and accidents “with respect to priority and posteriority.” (The term *taškik* is implied, but not used in this context.)

We now say: although the “existent,” as you know, is not a genus and is not predicated equally (*bi-t-tasāwī*) of what is beneath it, yet it [refers to] a [single] shared meaning [predicated] with respect to priority and posteriority (*ma'nān muttafaq fihi 'alā t-taqdīm wa-t-ta'hīr*). It applies, first and foremost, to the quiddity which is substance, and subsequently to what comes after it. Since it [refers to] a single meaning, in the way to which we have alluded, there adhere to it accidents proper to it, as we have clarified earlier. For this reason, [“existent”] is taken care of by one science [i.e. metaphysics] in the same way as everything that is healthy has one science [i.e. the science of medicine].⁹⁷

statement ‘a thing must be one or the other alternative’ [i.e. either exist or not exist] would have no meaning. The true reality of this is that two alternatives would not be specified [in the first place] for the thing to have to be one or the other.”

⁹⁶ *Dānešnāme, Elāhīyāt*, ch. 11, 36–8 (cf. Morewedge's English translation, 30–2, which must be used with caution). For Ġazālī's reworking of this passage see Ġazālī, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*, *Metaphysics*, 30–1.

⁹⁷ *Ilāhīyāt*, Book 1, ch. 5, 34.15–35.2 (= *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §804, 280f.). This passage is translated and discussed in M. E. Marmura, “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the *Metaphysics* of his *al-Shifā'*,” in *Logos Islamikos*, eds. R. M. Savory and D. A. Agius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1984), 219–39, at 232. This text goes back to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Γ 2 via Hellenistic introductions to philosophy, in which the argument of an imaginary adversary to the effect that philosophy does not exist, since its prior object of study—existent *qua* existent—is an equivocal term, is refuted. See David, *Davidis Prolegomena Philosophiae*; Philoponus, *In Isagogen* (pre-

3.3. *Avicenna on Transcendental Modulation of Existence*

It is only in the *Discussions* (*Mubāḥaṭāt*) that Avicenna—it seems, for the first time in the history of philosophy—explicitly extends modulation of existence from the predicamental to the transcendental level.⁹⁸ In this work, Avicenna responds to a series of questions touching on the notion of modulation of existence. He argues that existence, as applied to the First Principle and the contingent existents, is a modulated term (*min al-asmā' al-muṣakkika*); it is in virtue of transcendental modulation of existence that the First Principle, too, comes to be included within the scope of metaphysics.

[Question] [§688] It is said in the *Metaphysics* [of the *Šifā'*]: “Substance, quantity, quality, and the rest of the genera are tantamount to species of existent (*ka-l-anwā' li-l-mawḡūd*).”⁹⁹ I do not know how [existent] is divided into these species. [...] [§690] After that it is said: “The First Necessary Existent is such that one does not mean by [Its] existence this [i.e. contingent kind of] existence; rather, [existence] in the two cases is among the equivocal terms (*al-asmā' al-muṣtaraka*).”¹⁰⁰ If this is so, consideration of the First Principle is not part of the scope of the metaphysical science.

[Answer] This is because existent includes the ten [categories] in its name and definition, even though it does not include them the way genus includes [species]. Therefore, they are “tantamount to its species (*ka-l-anwā'*),” and are not [strictly speaking] its species. [...] [§692] As for the application of existence to the First [Principle] and to what is posterior to it, this is not an equivocal term, but a modulated term (*min al-asmā' al-muṣakkika*), and the referents (*musammayāt*) of a modulated name can be incorporated in one science.¹⁰¹

However, as soon as one considers existence as comprising both the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents, the question

served in Syriac), ed. A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom 5. bis 8. Jahrhundert: Syrische Texte* (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1975), 15f. (Syriac) 192f. (German tr.); Ibn at-Ṭayyib, *In Isag.*, §§5–6, English tr. in Gyekye, *Arabic Logic*, 11. David's *Prolegomena* seems to be the only extant Greek source in which such an argument is presented—see L. G. Westerninck, *The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to Their Commentaries*, in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence*, ed. R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), ch. 14, 325–48, at 346.

⁹⁸ On the *Mubāḥaṭāt* see most recently: D. C. Reisman, *The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: the Transmission. Contents, and Structures of Ibn Sīnā's al-Mubāḥaṭāt (the Discussions)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

⁹⁹ Cf. *Ilāhīyāt*, Book 1, ch. 2, 13.14.

¹⁰⁰ I was unable to identify this quotation.

¹⁰¹ *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §§688, 690, 692, pp. 231–2.

inevitably arises as to what it is that differentiates, within the shared concept of existence, between the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents. Is existence a genus (or a quasi-genus), of which "necessary" and "contingent" are differentiae? As we have seen above, this was exactly the question raised by Šahrastānī in his critique of Avicenna's metaphysics.

To repeat Šahrastānī's criticism, the problem with existence being such a (quasi-)genus is that, if it were the case, the Necessarily Existent would comprise two concepts, corresponding to the (quasi-)genus "existence" and the (quasi-)differentia "necessary," and would therefore be composite. As we have seen above, Šahrastānī claimed that Avicenna invented the notion of "modulation" (*taškik*) in order to solve this problem. We have examined Ṭūsī's response to this allegation.

Šahrastānī believed however that even such a device as modulation was insufficient to solve the problem. Here is what he has to say on this subject:

Let us even grant that existence is a modulated [predicate] (*min al-mušakkika*) and that [Avicenna did not invent] such a division [of predication]. Is it still not the case that existence would encompass both [the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents] with some sort of generality (*ya'ummuhumā 'umūman mā*), while necessity would particularize [the Necessarily Existent] with some sort of particularity (*yaḥṣuṣuhū ḥuṣūṣan mā*), and that by which [the Necessarily Existent] is generalized would be different from that by which It is particularized? Therefore, there would be within It a composition (*tarakkub*) of two aspects, signified by two terms, each of which refers to a [notion] other than [the notion] to which the other refers. This is at odds with pure unity (*al-waḥda al-maḥḍa*).¹⁰²

As it turns out, in an important passage in the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, Avicenna had dealt with precisely this objection and had proposed a solution.¹⁰³ According to this solution, related to Avicenna's famous quiddity/existence (*māhīya/wuḡūd*) distinction, existence is neither a genus *nor* a quasi-genus, but a non-constitutive concomitant (*lāzim ḡayr muqawwim*), that is, an inseparable accident of every quiddity, such that it is

¹⁰² Šahrastānī, *Struggling with the Philosopher*, Arabic section, 34.3–6 (cf. Madelung's and Mayer's English translation, 38); see also Arabic section, 37.9–38.1 (cf. English translation, 41).

¹⁰³ It is possible that Šahrastānī was aware of this passage. This passage, in fact, is referred to by Madelung and Mayer in their translation of the relevant section of Šahrastānī, *Struggling with the Philosopher*, English section, 37n28.

not a constituent of that quiddity (i.e. not the genus or the differentia that, taken together, comprise that quiddity).¹⁰⁴

[§647] If existence were predicated of what is below it the way genus is predicated [of its species], it would necessarily follow that what is below it must be differentiated from one another by a differentia. If this were the case, it would necessarily follow that the Necessarily Existent through Itself must be differentiated from what is other than It by a differentia. If this were the case, this differentia would limit the reality of the genus, and the Necessarily Existent would be combined of a genus and a differentia. All this is impossible. Therefore, the initial assumption is impossible, namely that existence is a genus. It follows, therefore, that [existence] is a non-constitutive concomitant (*lāziman ġayr muqawwim*).

[§648] Furthermore, because existence is predicated of what is below it by modulation (*bi-t-taškik*), it follows necessarily that every existent must be differentiated from another existent by its essence (*bi-dātihi*), as blackness is [differentiated] from extension. Such two [concepts] do not share a constitutive common [notion] (*‘āmm muqawwim*), but may share a non-constitutive concomitant (*lāzīm ġayr muqawwim*). As for the case when one of them is differentiated from another by a quality, if this quality is essential then it is a differentia, and what shares this [quality] is undoubtedly a genus; if [by contrast] this quality is not essential, it can be either a proprium (*ḥāṣṣa*) and a concomitant accident (*‘arad lāzīm*) or a common accident (*‘arad ‘āmm*).¹⁰⁵

It is most significant that, as a concomitant (*lāzīm*), existence is predicated of (contingent) existents *in quale*, not *in quid*, i.e. it answers the question “what kind of thing it is” (Greek: *poion esti*, Arabic: *ayy šay’ huwa*, Latin: *quale est*), not “what it is” (*ti esti*, *mā huwa*, *quid est*).¹⁰⁶ In this regard, Avicenna’s view—as expressed in this passage—differs from that of most other philosophers, both before and after him, who considered existence as being predicated *in quid*.

The implications of this theory cannot be discussed here at length. What is important for our purposes is that this theory explains how, in Avicenna’s view, existence is differentiated into the Necessarily Existent and the contingent existents, and further into the ten categories.

¹⁰⁴ Cf., for this idea, the quotation from Fārābī’s *Kitāb al-Burhān*, cited in Section 2.5 above.

¹⁰⁵ *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §§647–8, pp. 218–9.

¹⁰⁶ On one occasion in the *Mubāḥaṭāt*, Avicenna even went as far as to say that even in the Necessarily Existent existence is a concomitant of Its quiddity, this quiddity being the necessity (*wāġibiya*). See *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §479, 169. On *wāġibiya* as the essence of the Necessarily Existent see also *Mubāḥaṭāt*, §476, 168; *Ta’līqāt*, 50.23.

It is differentiated not as a genus (or a quasi-genus) by differentiae, but by the very quiddities of the things of which it is predicated; this becomes possible precisely because it does not form a part, and is not a constituent, of these quiddities.¹⁰⁷ It is differentiated, in other words, in the same way that blackness is differentiated into black objects having different quiddities and belonging to different genera.¹⁰⁸ This being the case, there ensues, according to Avicenna, no composition in the Necessarily Existent.

¹⁰⁷ This is expressed most clearly in *Ilāhiyāt*, Book 5, ch. 6, 232.7ff. and 234.16–8.

¹⁰⁸ The example is mine. Amos Bertolacci is pointing out to me that “by choosing ‘blackness’ as an example of the differentiation of ‘existent,’ you implicitly take ‘existent’ as an ordinary accident, rather than an inseparable concomitant (as it is for Avicenna).” This is of course true, yet it seems to me that this does not affect the analogy between them, which only concerns the way “blackness” and “existence” are differentiated and thus particularized by the quiddities to which they apply.

PART III

MUSLIM TRADITIONAL SCIENCES

THE REVEALED TEXT AND THE INTENDED SUBTEXT:
NOTES ON THE HERMENEUTICS OF THE QUR'ĀN IN
MU'TAZILA DISCOURSE AS REFLECTED IN THE *TAHDĪB* OF
AL-ḤĀKIM AL-ĠIŠUMĪ (D. 494/1101)¹

Suleiman A. Mourad

The Mu'tazila tradition of quranic exegesis (*tafsīr*) remains an area that is little known in modern scholarship.² Several factors have contributed to this situation. First, the only published traditional Mu'tazila *tafsīr* is *Tafsīr al-kaššāf* by az-Zamaḥṣarī (d. 538/1144). *Tafsīr al-kaššāf* synthesizes the Mu'tazila *tafsīr* tradition, but it focuses primarily on the aspects of grammar and language, with some attention given to theology. Thus, given its late date and az-Zamaḥṣarī's unique approach and method, *al-Kaššāf* is not a repository of *tafsīr* glosses—in comparison to major *tafsīr* works like *Ġāmi' al-bayān* by aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922) and *Maġma' al-bayān* by aṭ-Ṭabrisī (d. ca. 540/1146)—nor

¹ This essay is based on a monograph I am preparing on al-Ġišumī and his *tafsīr* of the Qur'ān, facilitated by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, and generous support from Smith College. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer and Felicitas Opwis for their very helpful feedback. All shortcomings remain my own.

² Studies that address the Mu'tazila *tafsīr* tradition include Muṣṭafā Ṣ. al-Ġuwaynī, *Minḥaġ az-Zamaḥṣarī fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān wa-bayān iġāzihi* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'rifa, 1959); id., *Madāris at-Tafsīr al-Qur'ānī* (Alexandria: Dār al-Ma'rifa al-Ġāmi'iya, 1992), 107–17; 'Adnān Zarzūr, *al-Ḥākim al-Ġuṣamī wa-manḥaġuhū fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, 1971); Mazher-Ud-Din Siddiqi, "Some Aspects of the Mu'tazili Interpretation of the Qur'ān," *Islamic Studies* 2.1 (1963), 95–120; Daniel Gimaret, *Une lecture mu'tazilite du Coran: le tafsīr d'Abū 'Alī al-Djubbā'i (m. 303/915) partiellement reconstitué à partir de ses citeurs* (Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 1994); Ṣāliḥ al-Ġāmidī, *al-Masā'il al-i'tizāliya fī tafsīr al-Kaššāf li-z-Zamaḥṣarī fī daw' mā warada fī Kitāb al-Intiṣāf li-Ibn al-Munayyir: 'arḍ wa-naqd*, 2 vols. (Ḥā'il: Dār al-Andalus, 1998); Andrew J. Lane, *A Traditional Mu'tazilite Qur'ān Commentary: The Kashshāf of Jār Allāh az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006); Suleiman A. Mourad, "Ibn al-Khallāl al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988) and His Œuvre on the Problematic Verses of the Qur'ān *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā l-jabriyya al-qadariyya* (Refutation of the Predestinarian Compulsionists)," in *A Common Rationality: Mu'tazilism in Islam and Judaism*, eds. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke and David Sklare (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2008), 81–99.

does it preserve the range of Mu'tazila methods and approaches to exegesis.³

A second factor is that several works by Mu'tazila scholars that directly or indirectly engage exegetically and hermeneutically the text of the Qur'ān have not been studied as *tafsīr* but rather as books of theology. Two examples of such texts are *Kitāb ar-Radd* by Ibn al-Ḥallāl al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988),⁴ and *Mutašābih al-Qur'ān* by al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār (d. 415/1024);⁵ there are also extensive parts of Mu'tazila theological texts that engage the verses of the Qur'ān in one way or another.⁶ The third factor is the rather unfortunate reality that a massive Mu'tazila *tafsīr*, *at-Taḥdīb fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān* by al-Ḥakīm al-Ġišūmī (d. 494/1101), has not been edited and is therefore inaccessible to most scholars.⁷ Unlike az-Zamaḥṣārī's *Kaššāf*, al-Ġišūmī's *Taḥdīb* extensively documents the variety of Mu'tazila opinions and views with regard to the exegesis of the Qur'ān. Although al-Ġišūmī often synthesizes Mu'tazila theological views regarding particular issues, he also identifies the Mu'tazila theologians and exegetes who expressed specific views. Thus his mapping of *who said what* allows for a proper examination and understanding of the variety of

³ I disagree with Andrew Lane's conclusion that az-Zamaḥṣārī's *Kaššāf* is not a Mu'tazila *tafsīr*: cf. Lane, *A Traditional Mu'tazilite Qur'ān Commentary*, 145–8; and my review of it in *Journal of Semitic Studies* 52.2 (2007), 409–11. See also the review by Karen Bauer in *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 126.3 (2006), 435–7. The *Kaššāf* is indeed a Mu'tazila *tafsīr*. The issue with az-Zamaḥṣārī is that he does not assign the theological arguments in *al-Kaššāf* to particular Mu'tazila theologians. Rather, he paraphrases them in his own words; hence, we cannot reconstruct earlier Mu'tazila *tafsīr* tradition on the basis of *al-Kaššāf*.

⁴ The complete title of Ibn al-Ḥallāl's work is *Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā l-ġabriya al-qadariya fī mā ta'allaqū bihi min mutašābih al-Qur'ān*. It is extant in manuscript; I am in the process of preparing a critical edition of the text. For Ibn al-Ḥallāl and his work, see Mourad, "Ibn al-Khallāl al-Baṣrī."

⁵ 'Abd al-Ḥallāl, *Mutašābih al-Qur'ān*, ed. 'Andān M. Zarzūr (Cairo: Dār at-Turāt, 1969).

⁶ In my view this is a problem of *tafsīr* scholarship in general, and is not limited to the case of the Mu'tazila. We tend to "accept" as *tafsīr* only those works that carry that title, and, hence a large number of sources that extensively deal with the Qur'ān from an exegetical and hermeneutical perspective are excluded and ignored. On this issue, see also Jane Dammen McAuliffe, "The Genre Boundaries of Qur'ānic Commentary," in *With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, eds. Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D. Walfish and Joseph W. Goering (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 445–61.

⁷ The popular identification of this author as al-Ġušamī is erroneous, because it assumes a reference to the Arab tribe Ġušam or a town named after that tribe. His hometown is called Ġišūm, and the reference to it therefore must be al-Ġišūmī.

Mu'tazila methodologies and approaches to Qur'ānic exegesis and hermeneutics.⁸

This essay is a preliminary study of al-Ġiṣūmī, with special attention to his *Tahdīb* in order to understand its methodology as well as al-Ġiṣūmī's approach to scriptural hermeneutics. I will also discuss the role al-Ġiṣūmī assigns to the exegete in searching for the "proper" understanding of the revealed text, namely to what extent scriptural exegesis and hermeneutics are bound by established traditions or left to the exegetes rational reasoning. Since this is an ongoing project, I am limiting my examination here to the introduction of the *Tahdīb* and verses 3:7 and 7:22–5. (The Appendix includes an edition of the entire introduction and the sections on verses 3:7 and 7:22–5.)

Al-Ḥākim al-Ġiṣūmī's Life and Career

Abū Sa'd al-Muḥassin ibn Muḥammad ibn Karāma⁹ al-Ġiṣūmī, best known as al-Ḥākim al-Ġiṣūmī, was born in the town of Ġiṣūm in the district of Bayhaq in western Ḥurāsān in 413/1022. His genealogy goes back to Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafīya; hence he is 'Alid by descent, though it seems that the family was not publicly known as such.¹⁰ He pursued his education in the region of Ḥurāsān and studied Mu'tazilism with Abū Ḥāmid Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq an-Nağğār (d. 433/1042), who also taught him *Ḥadīth*. Given that Abū Ḥāmid an-Nağğār was a disciple of al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār and also the way al-Ġiṣūmī indirectly defines his own scholarly genealogy in his writings, he must have considered himself in the Mu'tazila school of al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār, itself a branch of the Bahṣamīya school

⁸ There is no doubt that we were partly aware of the Mu'tazila *tafsīr* tradition through such sources as at-Ṭūsī's *at-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*. Al-Ġiṣūmī's *Tahdīb*, however, is not only our "insider" source, but also accounts for a richer variety of *tafsīr* opinions by the Mu'tazila.

⁹ Ibn Funduq (d. 565/1170) cites a poem that identifies al-Ġiṣūmī as Ibn Karāma (the meter requires that the *rā'* is not stressed); hence the grandfathers name is to be rendered Karāma and not, as commonly done, Karrāma: see Ibn Funduq, *Ta'riḥ Bayhaq*, trans. and ed. Yūsuf al-Hādī (Damascus and Beirut: Dār Iqra', 2004), 391. Karāma is also in *al-Muntaḥab min Kitāb as-Siyāq li-Ta'riḥ Nisābūr* by aṣ-Ṣarīfīnī (d. 641/1243): see *The Histories of Nishapur*, ed. Richard Frye (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), f. 133b.

¹⁰ Ibn Funduq, *Ta'riḥ Bayhaq*, 392.

of Mu'tazilism (named after Abū Hāšim al-Ğubbā'i).¹¹ Al-Ğišumī also studied Ḥanafī law with al-Qāḍī Abū Muḥammad 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Ḥusayn an-Nāṣihī (d. 447/1055), the chief judge in Ḥurāsān under the Ġaznavids. With respect to *tafsīr*, he studied with Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad an-Naysābūrī, known as Ibn Abī ṭ-Tayyib (d. 458/1066).¹² It has been suggested that he studied with the Zaydī *imām* an-Nāṭiq bi-l-Ḥaqq (d. ca. 422/1031),¹³ but this is incorrect; al-Ğišumī gives no indication whatsoever that he was a student of an-Nāṭiq bi-l-Ḥaqq,¹⁴ and, moreover, he acknowledges that it was one of his teachers, Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn 'Abd Allāh (d. 457/1065), who studied with an-Nāṭiq bi-l-Ḥaqq.¹⁵

It is believed that al-Ğišumī left for Mecca toward the end of his life. He was still in Ğišum in 472/1080, for he notes the revolt of the Zaydī *imām* Abū l-Ḥasan al-Hādī l-Ḥuqaynī (d. 490/1097) in Daylam, which started that year.¹⁶ Al-Ğišumī was in his hometown, too, in 478/1086, when he started the teaching of his *Kitāb Ġalā' al-abṣār* in the city's mosque. The book was taught over sixty sessions, between Ramaḍān 478/January 1086 and Ramaḍān 481/November 1088. Proof of his journey to Mecca can be found in a note accompanying the title for session (*mağlis*) 56, delivered in Ramaḍān 481/November 1088, which indicates that al-Ğišumī resumed his lectures following his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca.¹⁷ The previous session, 55, was

¹¹ For instance, al-Ğišumī's constant praise for al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ğabbār and his students is contrasted by his reservation toward Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), the founder of the other significant competing school of Mu'tazilism: see *Faḍl al-İ'tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, ed. Fu'ād as-Sayyid (Tunis: ad-Dār at-Tūnisiya, 1974), 365–71 and 387 respectively.

¹² Ibn Funduq, *Ta'riḥ Bayhaq*, 348.

¹³ As stated by Wilferd Madelung in his review of Gimaret's *Un lecture Mu'tazilite* in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 59.1 (1996), 139.

¹⁴ For example, al-Ğišumī's entry for an-Nāṭiq in *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-masā'il*: see *Faḍl al-İ'tizāl*, 376–7.

¹⁵ See Wilferd Madelung edition *Aḥbār A'immat az-Zaydiyya fī Ṭabaristān wa-Daylamān wa-Ğilān* (Beirut: Oriental Institute, & Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1987), 126–7 and 319.

¹⁶ See al-Ğišumī's *Šarḥ* in *Faḍl al-İ'tizāl*, 384. Since al-Ğišumī's mention implies that al-Hādī l-Ḥuqaynī's revolt is still going on, *Šarḥ 'Uyūn al-masā'il* must have been authored after 472/1080 and before 490/1097. For al-Hādī l-Ḥuqaynī, see his entry in *Aḥbār A'immat az-Zaydiyya*, 325–9.

¹⁷ Al-Ğišumī's, *Kitāb Ġalā' al-abṣār* (Ms. Āl al-Hāšimī, Ṣa'da, Yemen), f. 186b (p. 362 following the numbering on the manuscript).

delivered in Rağab 480/October 1087,¹⁸ so it is clear that his visit to the holy city did not take place toward the end of his life, as he lived on until 494/1101, and certainly he did not remain there.¹⁹

Yet it is in Mecca that al-Ğišumī was allegedly killed in 494/1101,²⁰ an assertion based on claims in later Zaydī literature. The circumstances surrounding his supposed murder are confusing. One well-known story relates that he was assassinated in Mecca by a group referred to as the Compulsionists (*al-Muğbira*) for authoring against them a short epistle entitled *Risālat Iblīs ilā iḥwānīhī l-manāḥīs* (*Satan's Epistle to his Ill-fated Brothers*);²¹ this anti-Ḥanbalī and anti-Aṣ'arī epistle has survived, but nothing in it suggests a Meccan provenance. According to another story, his maternal cousins killed him, but nothing is supplied regarding their motive or the place where he was killed.²² These two stories come to us from later Zaydī sources from Yemen. In *Ta'riḥ Bayhaq*, however, Ibn Funduq (d. 565/1170) speaks of al-Ğišumī and lists his descendants (sons, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren). He is very familiar not only with their genealogy and achievements, but also their whereabouts.²³ If al-Ğišumī was killed in Mecca as is alleged in Zaydī sources, it would not be a secret to his family in Ğišum. Moreover, if al-Ğišumī lived his last years in Mecca, Ibn Funduq undoubtedly would have known this as well. The Zaydī sources from Yemen, on the other hand, have every reason to make up such an allegation, since according to these stories al-Ğišumī left Ğišum for Yemen following his conversion or in order to convert to Zaydism, and was killed in Mecca before reaching his final destination.²⁴

¹⁸ Al-Ğišumī, *Kitāb Ğalā' al-abṣār*, f. 183b (p. 356 following the numbering on the manuscript).

¹⁹ Later Zaydī sources argue that al-Ğišumī moved to Mecca and stayed there until his assassination; the evaluation of these claims requires further research beyond the scope of this essay.

²⁰ The date 484 of the Hiğra given for his death by W. Madelung, "al-Ḥākim al-Djushamī," in the EI2, vol. 12 (Supplement), 343 is wrong.

²¹ This epistle is known under several titles: see Hossein Modarressi's introduction to *Risālat Iblīs ilā iḥwānīhī al-manāḥīs* (Beirut: Dār al-Munṭaḥab al-'Arabī, 1995), 14. I am using the title he adopted.

²² See al-Ğišumī, *Tanbīḥ al-Ğāfilīn 'an faḍā'il aṭ-ṭālibiyīn*, ed. Ibrāhīm Y. ad-Darsī (Sa'da: Markaz Ahl al-Bayt, 2000), 25 (introduction).

²³ Ibn Funduq, *Ta'riḥ Bayhaq*, 390–2.

²⁴ Again, the issue of al-Ğišumī's presumed assassination in Mecca requires further research and is beyond the scope of this essay. The claim of al-Ğišumī's conversion to Zaydism is also problematic and is yet to be verified.

Al-Ğišumī authored more than forty books, and a good number of them, especially the major ones, have survived thanks to the tremendous interest in his thought and works on the part of the Zaydīs of Yemen. The most important ones, all of which are extant, include:

1. An exegesis of the Qurʾān: *at-Tahdīb fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān* (The Refinement of the Exegesis of the Qurʾān).
2. An encyclopedia of humanistic knowledge: *Kitāb as-Safīna al-ḥāwiya li-anwāʾ al-ilm wa-l-maʾārif* (The Vessel Containing All Types of Learning and Knowledge).
3. Two theological works: *ʿUyūn al-masāʾil fī l-uṣūl* (On the Main Questions Regarding the Fundamental Principles)²⁵ and *Šarḥ ʿUyūn al-masāʾil* (The Elucidation of the Main Questions); the latter is an extensive exposition (in four volumes) of the former.²⁶

Manuscripts of the Tahdīb

All the manuscript copies of the *Tahdīb*—around eighty, dispersed in libraries and private collections across the world—come to us from Yemen. Unless new manuscript evidence come to light and proves otherwise, we can assume that the *Tahdīb* survived only because of the interest of the Zaydī scholars of Yemen; the manuscripts were copied or commissioned by Zaydī imams, viziers, or scholars. Some of the manuscripts were taken, for a variety of reasons, to such places as India (likely by Zaydī scholars resettling in Hyderabad; hence the volumes in Patna library), Italy (nineteenth- and twentieth-century Italian Orientalists working in Yemen; hence the collections at the Vatican and Ambrosiana), and Iran (hence the collections of the ayatollahs Kalbāyikānī and Marʾaṣī in Qum). In Yemen, copies of the *Tahdīb* are found in many private or public manuscript collections, most notably in Āl al-Hāsimī private library in Ṣaʿda and the Great Mosque (al-Maktaba aš-Šarqīya) in Ṣanʿāʾ.

²⁵ This work is known under other titles with minor variations.

²⁶ On al-Ğišumī's life and career, see also Wilferd Madelung, *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965), especially 187–90; id., "al-Ḥākim al-Djushamī," EI2, vol. 12 (Supplement), 343; Zarzūr, *al-Ḥākim al-Ğuṣamī*, 65–120; Hossein Modarressi's introduction to al-Ğuṣamī, *Risālat Iblīs*, 9–15; and ad-Darsī's introduction to al-Ğišumī, *Tanbīh al-Ğāfilīn*, 18–25.

The earliest datable manuscript of the *Tahdīb* is from Raġab 565/April 1170, and was copied in Yemen by Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Walid for his own use. It is now in the possession of the Vatican (Ms. Arabo 1023), and represents volume 8 of the *Tahdīb*, which covers suras 40–61. A good number of the extant manuscripts were copied in the seventh/thirteenth century. The ownership notes on those manuscripts give us a valuable map of the many Zaydī imams, viziers, and scholars who commissioned, purchased, or inherited them. They stand as testimonies to the great interest in the text on the part of Zaydī scholars, and also suggest its impact on Zaydī religious education, especially regarding *tafsīr* and theology.²⁷

Al-Ġišumī's *Tahdīb* was introduced to Yemen by the celebrated Ismā'īli-turned-Zaydī scholar Šams ad-Dīn Ġa'far ibn Aḥmad, better known as Qāḍī Ġa'far (d. 573/1178); he brought it, along with other works by al-Ġišumī and other Mu'tazila scholars, which he had studied or for which he simply received *iğāzas* while sojourning in Ḥurāsān. Qāḍī Ġa'far studied al-Ġišumī's *Tahdīb* in Rayy with Abū Ġa'far ad-Daylamī, who, it is said, had studied it with al-Ġišumī's son, Muḥammad.²⁸ It is also alleged that the *Tahdīb* was brought to Mecca by az-Zamahšarī, who taught it to the Zaydī scholar Ibn Wahhās (d. ca. 550/1155), from whom it passed to Qāḍī Ġa'far. From Qāḍī Ġa'far, the *Tahdīb* passed down to major Zaydī imams and scholars.²⁹ In this context, the Vatican manuscript Arabo 1023 is significant in that its early date, 565/1170, highly suggests that it must have been copied from the manuscript of the *Tahdīb* that Qāḍī Ġa'far brought with him to Yemen.

There is no complete copy of the *Tahdīb* at any single location, and invariably the large collections—such as the ones at the Āl al-Hāšimī (17 manuscripts), Great Mosque of Šan'ā', al-Maktaba aš-Šarqīya (14 manuscripts), Vatican (6 manuscripts), and Abrosiana (9 manuscripts)—are not volume sets. Rather, what we mostly have is individual volumes copied by different scribes at different times.

²⁷ This interest is not limited to al-Ġišumī. It extends to other Mu'tazila theologians whose works Zaydis were able to locate, copy and send to Yemen. The circumstances of the Zaydī's interest in Mu'tazila theology are discussed in Wilferd Madelung, *Der Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm*.

²⁸ See Maġd ad-Dīn al-Mu'ayyidī, *Lawāmi' al-anwār fī ḡawāmi' al-'ulūm wa-l-aṭār wa-tarāḡim awliyā' al-'ilm wa-l-anzār*, 3 vols. (Ša'da: Maktabat at-Turāt al-Islāmī, 1993), 2, 34–6.

²⁹ See, for example, the list provided by al-Mu'ayyidī in ib. vol. 2, 60–1.

The reconstruction of the entire text is possible, but it would be an enormous task, given the large number of individual manuscripts in various locations, and only a comprehensive examination of all extant manuscripts of the *Tahdīb* might allow for the identification of volume sets.³⁰ The primary difficulty is that some manuscripts were copied in a rushed manner, and in several cases the handwriting is barely legible. Other manuscripts were badly preserved, resulting in the loss or damage of a number of folios, especially at the beginning and end. Moreover, the custom among medieval Zaydī scribes in Yemen was to use diacritical pointing sparsely, adding to the difficulty of deciphering these texts.³¹

A further complication is that the many manuscripts of the *Tahdīb* do not allow us to reconstruct with any certainty the number of volumes that comprised the original text. Some of the extant manuscripts divide the text into nine volumes; this seems to be the original division, but information from other manuscripts suggests a division into eighteen volumes.³² To add to the confusion, the testimony of Ibn Funduq is that the *Tahdīb* was written in twenty volumes.³³ The conflicting figures might have resulted from the likely original division of the text into nine or ten volumes (*ağzā*), each comprised of two parts (*aqsām*). The parts were later misunderstood to be volumes, and attempts to gather the complete text created a mess, with volumes and parts further confused.³⁴ It might also be the case that the volumes were so massive that some scribes decided to split each volume in half, which would account for the difference between sets of nine volumes and sets of eighteen or more volumes.

³⁰ Gimaret assumed, on the basis of the manuscripts available to him, that the section covering verses 4:103–16 is lost (see Gimaret, *Une lecture mu'tazilite*, 25), but some manuscripts do have it.

³¹ I am in the process of preparing an edition of the *Tahdīb*.

³² For instance, Ms. Marāṣī 3746, dated 678/1279, is identified as volume 9, the last volume of the *Tahdīb*. However, Ms. Ambrosiana C210 Arabo, dated 622/1225, is identified as volume 4 out of 18 volumes of the *Tahdīb*, and Ms. Āl al-Hāšimī, dated 685/1286, is identified as volume 9 and covers verses 19:71–25:77 (on the last folio of the same manuscript the identification is restated as volume 9 to be followed by volume 10).

³³ See Ibn Funduq, *Ta'rīḥ Bayhaq*, 390.

³⁴ For example, Ms. Vatican Arabo 1025 is identified as volume 6 of the *Tahdīb*, and covers verses 7:158–9:129. Ms. Munich Arab. 1209 is identified also as volume 6 but covers verses 17:61–25:77. Ms. Āl al-Hāšimī, dated 685/1286, is identified as volume 9 and covers verses 19:71–25:77.

*Al-Ġiṣūmī As Exegete*³⁵

In addition to the massive *Tahdīb*, al-Ġiṣūmī may have written a minor *tafsīr* in Persian,³⁶ but this might well have been an abridgment of the *Tahdīb*. Unfortunately, al-Ġiṣūmī does not tell us directly anything about the sources that he used. The *Tahdīb* is a repository of exegetical opinions and glosses, and the names of earlier exegetes, grammarians, philologists, theologians, and poets appear constantly throughout it, but we can only guess as to what particular texts al-Ġiṣūmī actually used. We know that he studied *tafsīr* with Ibn Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib,³⁷ who had himself authored a massive *tafsīr* of thirty volumes, known as *at-Taḥfīr al-kabīr*.³⁸ So it is very likely that al-Ġiṣūmī accessed traditional non-Muʿtazila *tafsīr* through the work of Ibn Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib. As for Muʿtazila names, they are quoted repeatedly in the *Tahdīb*, especially Abū ʿAlī al-Ġubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balḥī (d. 319/931), Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī (d. 322/934), ʿAlī ibn ʿĪsā ar-Rummānī (d. 384/994), and al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ġabbār,³⁹ but here we do not know if he possessed their individual *tafsīr* books (as opposed to their theological works), or if he accessed them through another source, most likely the now-lost *tafsīr* of ʿAbd al-Ġabbār.³⁹

In the *Tahdīb*, al-Ġiṣūmī takes an encyclopedic approach to the study of the Qurʾān. There is no one aspect to the study of the Qurʾān; rather, there are “sciences” (*ulūm*) of the Qurʾān, and the exegete must master them in order to access the text. Al-Ġiṣūmī lays out this in a concise manner in the introduction, which allows for the understanding of his hermeneutical system and theoretical approach.

³⁵ Since this essay is based on a monograph in progress, I am not engaging in secondary literature in this section.

³⁶ See al-Muʿayyidī, *Lawāmiʿ al-anwār*, 13.

³⁷ Ibn Funduq, *Taʾrīḥ Bayhaq*, 348.

³⁸ On Ibn Abī ṭ-Ṭayyib, see Ibn Funduq, *Taʾrīḥ Bayhaq*, 348; and ad-Dahabī, *Siyar aʿlām an-nubalāʾ*, eds. Ṣūʾayb al-Arnāʾūṭ et al. (Beirut: Muʾassasat ar-Risāla, 1996), vol. 18, 173–4.

³⁹ A similar issue is that al-Ġiṣūmī frequently quotes figures such as the philologist Abū ʿUbayda (d. 210/825), especially in the section on Philology (*al-luġa*), which here again means that he either possessed a copy of Abū ʿUbayda’s *Kitāb Maġāz al-Qurʾān*, or knew of Abū ʿUbayda’s opinions as quoted in later *tafsīr* works.

The Introduction to the Tahdīb

In a rather short introduction, al-Ġišumī offers his readers the reasons for authoring a *tafsīr* work as well as his methodology and approach to *tafsīr*:

In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate. Him we seek for help. His blessing and peace on our lord Muḥammad and his family.

Thanks to God who guided us to Islam and invited us to the abode of everlasting peace, granted us our prophet Muḥammad, peace on him, bestowed on us all types of benefactions, revealed the Qurʾān and protected it from forgery, addition and omission, and by it abrogated all other religions. Furthermore, praise to the lord of messengers, seal of the prophets, and leader of the pious, Muḥammad, and his entire lineage.

The most appropriate preoccupation for the individual is to seek the religious sciences which assure his escape and salvation, and to worship his Lord who is his ultimate recourse in life and death. The most noble of the religious sciences is the knowledge of the Book of God almighty and the grasp of its meanings and decrees, for religion revolves around it, and it is the firm bond of God. The scholars have endeavored, clarified and authored on that, and the former ones are privileged for being the originators and laying down the foundations, whereas the later ones are privileged for the fine organization, eloquent refinement, and enhanced valuableness. If one were to say: 'The former scholars did not leave anything for the later ones,' he is to be answered: 'Indeed, the former scholars left a lot to the later scholars.'

I have included in my book focused and extensive discussions pertaining to the sciences of the Qurʾān, without undue and boring excess or disappointing concision. I hope it to be enlightenment for the novice and stimulant for the expert. I ask guidance from God and on Him I rely, for He is my reckoning and the best of helpers.

The Sciences of the Qurʾān: the sciences of the Qurʾān are numerous and revolve around eight categories.

The first is the Reading and its variations and rationales. The reading is verified on the basis of what is extensively widespread and authoritatively transmitted, not the odd and anomalous. Since the verification of the Qurʾān can only be achieved on the basis of extensively widespread transmission, similarly are the readings and what has been authoritatively transmitted. Nothing of that can be rejected because all are revealed and firmly established.

The second is Philology. All of the Qurʾān is in Arabic, for God said so: 'In eloquent Arabic speech' (Q. 26:195). What has been related on the authority of some early scholars that some words are Greek or Persian, like *al-qistās* (Q. 17:35 & 26:182), *as-siġġil* (Q. 11:82, 15:74, & 105:4), and [words] similar to them, they are only so in that the two languages agree on the use of the same word, or that the Arabs had taken the word and

arabized it. Also, there is not a single expression in the Qur'ān that is strange, incorrect, or contradictory. The Qur'ān specializes in a particular style of composition and rhetoric that makes it distinctive from all other texts, hence its miraculousness.

The third is Grammatical Syntax. The Qur'ān does not include any case of mis-vocalization or wrong expression, unlike what the heretics say.

The fourth is Composition. The Qur'ān and the way it is composed of suras and verses linked together was revealed as such, for there is a purpose and advantage for that.

The fifth is Meaning. There is nothing in the Qur'ān that cannot be understood, for the purpose of speech is to convey a meaning. Each word can have one meaning, hence the only way to interpret it would be by following that meaning. But some words can have multiple meanings, all of which are possible; then they are to be followed either in totality or selectively. But if there is compelling evidence that only certain meanings are intended but not others, then those meanings deduced by evidence are to be followed. Moreover, if a word has a lexical meaning and a legal meaning, then the legal meaning is heeded because it is overriding. Furthermore, words might carry literal and allegorical meanings. The literal meaning has priority unless there is compelling evidence that it is more appropriate to follow the allegorical meaning, in which case the allegorical meaning is to be followed.

The sixth is Occasion of Revelation. Some of the Qur'ān was revealed for an occasion, which might indicate that it is limited to that occasion. But in some cases it might apply to other occasions. Yet, the imperative is to follow the wording, not the occasion.

The seventh is Legal and Theological Implications. The Qur'ān is the true speech and the proof. Parts of it are affirmative, as in the evidence of God's Unity, and others are clear, as in the evidence of laws. Parts are to be understood according to the apparent meaning, such as the perspicuous and clear verses. But others, such as the obscure and ambiguous verses, require, in order to understand them, to look elsewhere. Also there are abrogating parts that must be followed, and abrogated parts that must not be followed, hence the need to know the chronology of revelation and which parts were revealed in Mecca and which were revealed in Medina. There are also the general verses and the specific verses which cover parables, wisdom-sayings, admonitions, restrictions, commands, prohibitions, promises of reward, and threats of punishment.

The eighth is Messages and Stories.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ For the Arabic text, see the Appendix at the end of this article, under Introduction of the *Tahqīb*.

The Reason for Authoring the Tahḍīb

In his introduction, al-Ġiṣūmī advocates that the study of the Qurʾān is the most noble of the religious sciences. Not only does salvation depend on the understanding of the Qurʾān, but the divine text itself is the firm bond that connects humanity to God. It must therefore be truly understood in order for the principles and laws it advocates to be observed and followed. It is clear that al-Ġiṣūmī considers the composition of a *tafsīr* work as a personal duty, meant in the first place to fulfill his own search for understanding the divine text, and by extension to help others find the true meanings of the text. In al-Ġiṣūmī's view the process of understanding the Qurʾān assumes dynamism with the text; hence his distinction between former and later exegetes. The understanding of the Qurʾān is an ongoing and never-achieved enterprise. The earlier scholars started the process and offered their opinions (in al-Ġiṣūmī's words, "being the originators and laying down the foundations"), and the later ones must complement and complete that in the sense of perfecting the study of the Qurʾān ("fine organization, eloquent refinement, and enhanced value"). The *Tahḍīb* is therefore an effort that underlines the necessary dynamism of *tafsīr* scholarship; it is not the final composition.⁴¹

The Eight Categories of al-Ġiṣūmī's Hermeneutics

In the introduction, al-Ġiṣūmī also defines his hermeneutical system. The understanding of the Qurʾān involves eight categories:

1. Reading (*al-qirā'a*);⁴²
2. Philology (*al-luġa*);
3. Grammatical Syntax (*al-i'rāb*);
4. Composition (*an-naẓm*);

⁴¹ Here al-Ġiṣūmī is essentially making the case for why he is writing a *tafsīr*, and is therefore in full agreement with the conventional rationale given in medieval scholarship for authoring a book. For an example of this trend in *tafsīr*, see Walid A. Saleh, *The Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qurʾān Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī* (d. 427/1035) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 68.

⁴² The translation of any of these concepts is not an easy task. Here, for instance, "reading" (*qirā'a*) is to be understood in the sense of correct pronunciation and orthography.

5. Meaning (*al-ma'nā*);
6. Occasion of Revelation (*an-nuzūl*);
7. Legal and Theological implications (*al-adilla wa-l-aḥkām*);
8. Messages and Stories (*al-aḥbār wa-l-qīṣaṣ*).

Tafsīr entails a complete and comprehensive study of the Qur'ān as it relates to a hermeneutical system made of eight categories. This hermeneutical system is not unique to al-Ġiṣūmī, nor was he the first to introduce such a system. In *at-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, the Twelver-Šī'ī exegete and theologian aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1068) adopts a similar system: *al-qirā'a*, *al-luġa*, *al-i'rāb*, *al-ḥuġġa* (al-Ġiṣūmī calls this *an-naẓm*), *al-ma'nā*, and *an-nuzūl*; one might suspect that al-Ġiṣūmī introduced two new categories—nos. 7 and 8—but these are already covered by aṭ-Ṭūsī under *al-ma'nā*.⁴³ Given the fact that aṭ-Ṭūsī openly acknowledges his indebtedness to Mu'tazila exegetes before him,⁴⁴ it might be that such a hermeneutical system was devised earlier by a Mu'tazila exegete, possibly 'Abd al-Ġabbār, or even someone before him.⁴⁵ But the *tafsīr* of 'Abd al-Ġabbār is not extant, nor for that matter are any of the earlier Mu'tazila *tafsīrs*.⁴⁶ Thus, any attempts to establish influence are merely speculative. Indeed, the system could have been devised by a non-Mu'tazila exegete and then adopted by more than one group, including the Mu'tazila. For example, Walid Saleh has shown that the Sunnī exegete aṭ-Ṭa'labī (d. 427/1035) divides his hermeneutical approach into fourteen aspects,⁴⁷ some of which overlap with what al-Ġiṣūmī presents, and the anonymous Karrāmī author (early fifth/eleventh century) of the fragmentary *tafsīr* book,

⁴³ Aṭ-Ṭūsī does not fully define his system in the introduction, but follows it when interpreting the quranic verses: Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aṭ-Ṭūsī, *at-Tibyān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, ed. Aḥmad Qaṣīr al-Āmilī, 10 vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā' at-Turāṭ al-'Arabī, no date), 1, 2. Aṭ-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1154), too, adopts this system in *Maġma' al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, and it is obvious that he was influenced by aṭ-Ṭūsī. On aṭ-Ṭabrisī and his *tafsīr*, see Bruce G. Fudge, *The Major Qur'ān Commentary of al-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1154)* (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2003).

⁴⁴ See, for example, aṭ-Ṭūsī's acknowledgment that the best two *tafsīr* works that he saw were those by the Mu'tazila exegetes Abū Muslim al-Iṣfahānī (d. 322/933) and 'Alī ibn 'Isā ar-Rummānī (d. 384/994): aṭ-Ṭūsī, *at-Tibyān*, vol. 1, 1–2.

⁴⁵ A volume of ar-Rummānī's *tafsīr* is extant (Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Ms. 6523), and from it one can see that he does not follow such a system. I thank Bruce Fudge for providing me with a copy of this manuscript.

⁴⁶ With the exception of a volume of ar-Rummānī's *tafsīr* mentioned in the previous note.

⁴⁷ See Saleh, *Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition*, 84–9.

published by Josef van Ess, also uses a similar system.⁴⁸ The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the idea that quranic exegesis involves a hermeneutical system appears in early fifth/eleventh century *tafsīrs* by a number of groups, and the evidence we have points to these groups being active in Iraq and Ḥurāsān.

Al-Ġiṣūmī's system is best understood by arranging the eight categories into three groups: verification of the text (categories 1–4), meaning of the text (categories 5–6), and implication of the text (categories 7–8). The verification of the text is the first step; it requires the establishment of how the text appears and involves the first four categories: Reading, Philology, Grammatical Syntax, and Composition. This fundamental step determines the options that the exegete will have for establishing the meaning of the text and by extension the text's legal and theological implications.

Under the rubric of Reading, the verification of the text is done on the basis of widespread and authoritative transmission. The variation in the readings is not a reflection of divisions among early exegetes, but rather a testimony to the Qur'ān's divine origin: the different readings were revealed as such. Hence, the anomalous is to be rejected because it lacks the support of Muslim exegetes and, thus, there is no way to verify that it was revealed.⁴⁹ With respect to Philology, the Qur'ān is in Arabic and includes no foreign word. That a word is also encountered in another language is not indicative of any influence on the Qur'ān, and by extension does not require knowledge of that language.⁵⁰ Moreover, the philology of the Qur'ān is the proof of its miraculousness (*i'ğāz*). With respect to Grammatical Syntax, every expression in the Qur'ān is grammatically correct. And with respect to Composition, the

⁴⁸ See Josef van Ess, *Ungenützte Texte zur Karrāmiya: Eine Materialsammlung* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1980), 41–55.

⁴⁹ The discussion here echoes the position of earlier grammarians in that they insisted on the Reading being compatible with *rasm* (the way a word appears written in the 'Uṭmanic *muṣḥaf*) and supported by a trustworthy *isnād* (chain of transmitters). On the issue of Reading (*qirā'a*) and *tafsīr*, see Ramzi Baalbaki, "The Treatment of *Qirā'āt* by the Second and Third Century Grammarians," in *The Qur'an: Formative Interpretation*, ed. Andrew Rippin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), 159–80.

⁵⁰ That the Qur'ān includes no foreign expressions is already argued by such scholars as the philologist Abū 'Ubayda (d. 210/825) in *Mağāz al-Qur'ān* and the jurist aṣ-Ṣāfi'ī (d. 204/820) in *ar-Risāla*: see Andrew Rippin, "Syriac in the Qur'ān: Classical Muslim Theories," in *The Qur'ān in Its Historical Context*, ed. Gabriel S. Reynolds (London & New York: Routledge, 2008), 249–62, at 251. For a classical example, see the extensive discussion in aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922), *Ġāmi' al-bayān fī ta'wīl al-Qur'ān*, 12 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1999), vol. 1, 35–52.

Qur'ān was revealed in the way it is arranged in the sequence of verses and suras; one assumes in this particular case that al-Ġiṣūmī signifies the 'Uṭmanic *muṣḥaf*.

It is evident therefore that al-Ġiṣūmī does not tolerate any innovation or originality on the part of the exegete in this aspect of the study of the Qur'ān. The verification of the quranic text is beyond the exegete in the sense that he is bound to adopt what has already been verified and established, and is not allowed to amend any part of the text.

It is in the categories applying to the meaning of the text (categories 5–6) that the exegete has to demonstrate himself. According to al-Ġiṣūmī, every word in the Qur'ān has a meaning, and when more than one is found, it is incumbent upon the exegete to determine whether all or only some are acceptable. This is why the fifth category, Meaning, is so important. The idea that the exegete must verify “compelling evidence” in order to accept or dismiss a particular meaning entails a direct responsibility on his part that cannot be evaded by imitating earlier exegetes. He must determine the literal and legal meanings, which supersede allegorical and lexical meanings. Moreover, the meaning of a verse is not restricted to the occasion of its revelation unless there is a specific quranic stipulation to that effect; hence the necessary expertise in the chronology and occasion of revelation of each verse (category 6).

The last group, implications of the text (categories 7–8), seems to be the most central; indeed, they may be seen as the two categories around which all others revolve. Categories 7 and 8 address respectively how one is to live in accordance with God's word, and the past stories that the Qur'ān recounts to illustrate the implications of observing or ignoring God's word. Al-Ġiṣūmī tells us that the legal and theological implications determine what to believe and how to act (which involve among other things, the doctrine of monotheism, as well as commands and prohibitions); thus, it is no surprise that he reopens the issue of the proper understanding of the text (categories 5–6), which in turn depends on the verification of the text (categories 1–4). But he does that with a specificity that goes somewhat beyond what he discusses under categories 5–6. There are the perspicuous and clear verses that must be understood according to their apparent meaning. There are also the obscure and ambiguous verses, which require investigation involving not only other quranic verses but, as we will see, extra-quranic material (such as poetry and grammar) as well. Categories 7–8 also require knowledge of the chronology and

occasion of revelation in order to determine and follow the abrogating verses and dismiss the abrogated ones. Thus, these two final categories show why all other categories are so important.

Al-Ġiṣumī's Methodology and Approach to Tafsīr

To argue that the introduction holds all the answers to al-Ġiṣumī's methodology and approach to *tafsīr* would be misleading. It is partly in the concise theoretical prologue but more fully in the actual body of the *Tahdīb* that al-Ġiṣumī completely unveils his methodology and approach. What is meant here is not only the application, but also those instances where al-Ġiṣumī offers additional reflections on *tafsīr* that ideally would belong in the introduction. The two examples from verse 3:7 and verses 7:22–5 are cases in point. They allow the reader to have a closer understanding of the additional theory regarding *tafsīr* that al-Ġiṣumī dispenses all over his *Tahdīb*. Verse 3:7 reads:

It is He who revealed to you the Book. Some of its verses are perspicuous—they are the core of the Book—and others ambiguous. Those who deviate from the truth observe the ambiguous so as to create dissension and confuse its meaning. For no one knows their meaning except God. Those who are well-grounded in knowledge say: 'We believe in it; it is all from our God.' Only the wise discern.⁵¹

In the section on *aḥkām* (legal and theological implications) for verse 3:7, al-Ġiṣumī states that:

...this verse shows that the Qur'ān comprises perspicuous and ambiguous verses. The most plausible opinion is what we have already stated, which was preferred by al-Qādī, namely that the perspicuous exhibits the intended meaning in itself, whereas the ambiguous obscures its intended meaning. It also shows that the ambiguous must be referred to the perspicuous, and its meaning must be deciphered by recourse to the

⁵¹ Q. 3:7 has been the subject of debate not only regarding its meaning, but also the way it should be read. Notable among the problems is the issue of whether God and the "well-grounded in knowledge" are meant as one group who understand the meaning of the ambiguous verses, or whether the sense is that only God possesses this understanding and the "well-grounded in knowledge" admit the limitations of their knowledge. See Leah Kinberg, "*Muḥkamāt* and *Mutashābihāt* (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis," *Arabica* 35 (1988): 143–72; id., "Ambiguous," in *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), vol. 1, 70–7; and Stefan Wild, "The Self-Referentiality of the Qur'ān: Sura 3:7 as an Exegetical Challenge," in *With Reverence for the Word*, 422–36.

perspicuous. It also shows that the perspicuous and ambiguous verses involve only the fundamental principles of religion, such as the doctrines of God's Unity and Justice, because what pertains to issues deduced by independent reasoning is not found blameworthy if followed. Hence only our argument is the plausible one. In dividing the Qur'ān in that manner there is a benefit. That is why He revealed it perspicuous and ambiguous. It has been argued that the benefit is to encourage inquiry and learning, for if all of it was perspicuous that would have led to reliance on imitation and shunning inquiry. It also shows the enormous value of scholars, for what is meant by the 'well-grounded in knowledge' are those who stand up to defend religion and refute the apostates and heretics, and rush to the assistance of religion. Anyone who looks into the stories of scholars realizes that these are the characteristics of the upholders of the doctrine of God's Justice, such as Wāṣil, 'Amr, al-Ḥasan, and Ḡaylān. From the start, they stood up to defend religion during the reign of the Umayyads and Marwānids, most of whom were heretics, despite these scholars' fear for their lives. And like Abū l-Huḍayl, who refuted all types of opponents such as the Materialists, Manichaeans, and all heretics, and about whom Ṣāliḥ ibn 'Abd al-Quddūs said: "Had it not been for Abū l-Huḍayl, we would have preached Manichaeism from the *minbars*." Also like our ancestral teachers Abū 'Alī and Abū Ḥāšim and all the teachers from Baṣra and Baḡdād who clarified and authored books. The verse also shows that truth is attained by rational reasoning, for that He said: 'Only the wise discern.' He specifically intended them because they are under obligation."⁵²

It is clear that here al-Ḡiṣūmī is advocating issues that he did not directly address in his introduction. To be sure, he mentions there the perspicuous verses (*al-muḥkam*) and ambiguous verses (*al-mutaṣābih*), but he does not tell us that both types involve the fundamental principles of religion (*al-uṣūl*). It is in his comments on verse 3:7 that he discloses this very significant information. The perspicuous verses are important in order to determine the fundamental principles of religion, but not to the exclusion of the ambiguous verses, which also determine those principles. Yet by its very nature, the ambiguous needs the perspicuous, as well as other evidence, to help decipher its meaning. If the ambiguous verses were not relevant to the fundamental principles of religion, then any meaning that an exegete offered for them would be acceptable, because issues determined by independent reasoning (*iḡtihādīyāt*) do not earn punishment or blame. Blame and punishment

⁵² For the Arabic text, see the Appendix at the end of this article, under Verse 3:7.

are only assigned to the erroneous application of independent reasoning to the fundamental principles of religion.

This dynamic relationship between perspicuous and ambiguous reflects a major aspect of the Mu'tazila approach to quranic hermeneutics. One might be tempted to call it *tafsīr al-Qur'ān bi-l-Qur'ān* (using verses of the Qur'ān to explain other verses). But it is not entirely accurate in the sense that, as seen in countless cases in the *Tahdīb* as well as in examples from other Mu'tazila exegetes quoted below, evidence beyond the Qur'ān, such as Arabic poetry, language syntax and rhetoric, is often brought in to help identify and explain the ambiguous verses. Even so, to link the ambiguous verses to the fundamental principles of religion has enormous implications; there is no doubt that al-Ġišūmī intends by the "fundamental principles of religion" the theological system of Mu'tazilism, the Five Principles (*al-uṣūl al-ḥamsa*).⁵³ It is as if the soundness of the fundamental principles of religion requires constant inquiry into the meaning of a set of quranic verses without which the Qur'ān is not fully understood. This is why the Mu'tazila, more than any other group, were attracted to the genre of *mutaṣābih al-Qur'ān* (books and treatises on the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān), and that was precisely because it allowed them to identify the ambiguous verses, but more importantly to offer the "true" interpretation of these verses in a way that helps them determine and validate the tenets of their theological system.⁵⁴

Another important point about al-Ġišūmī's methodology and approach to *tafsīr* with respect to categories 5–8, is that, unlike categories 1–4, the exegete is not restricted by the range of opinions reached by earlier scholars. If that was the case, God would have revealed the

⁵³ These are 1) Gods Unity (*at-tawḥīd*), 2) God's Justice (*al-'adl*), 3) Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (*al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahī 'an al-munkar*), 4) the Intermediate Position (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*), and 5) Reward and Punishment (*al-wa'd wa-l-wa'id*).

⁵⁴ Of the many Mu'tazila works authored on this genre, two books have survived: Ibn al-Ḥallāl al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988) and al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār (see notes 4 and 5 above). We also have a number of short epistles that address this topic, such as the *Risāla fī l-Hidāya wa-d-dalāla* by aṣ-Ṣāhib Ibn 'Abbād (d. 385/995), ed. Ḥusayn 'A. Maḥfūz (Tehran: Maṭba'at al-Ḥaydarī, 1955)—in which aṣ-Ṣāhib lists the names of six Mu'tazila theologians who also wrote on the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān. The famous *Epistle to Caliph 'Abd al-Malik* wrongly attributed to al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) also fits into this genre: see Suleiman A. Mourad, *Early Islam between Myth and History: al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 110H/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 176–239.

Qur'ān in perspicuous verse only. That God chose to reveal the Qur'ān in perspicuous and ambiguous verse mandates that one steer clear of the imitation of early traditions and opinions. Although al-Ġiṣūmī recognizes that later exegetes might reach the same conclusions as earlier ones, that is not the result of imitation but rather of the application of the individual exegetes rational reasoning and the range of talents and skills each exegete possesses. Thus, it is not surprising that al-Ġiṣūmī lists the names of major Mu'tazila figures (Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā', 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Ġaylān ad-Dimaṣqī, Abū l-Huḍayl al-'Allāf, Abū 'Alī l-Ġubbā'ī, and Abū Hāšim al-Ġubbā'ī) and then invokes the notion of obligation (*taklīf*) to show that each one believed he was under obligation to endeavor to study the Qur'ān and decipher its meanings and did not rely on his predecessors.⁵⁵ This is also why al-Ġiṣūmī raises the point about the enormous value of scholars, because their rational reasoning enables them to determine the proper meaning of the ambiguous, and once they do they are bound to believe and follow it. Here al-Ġiṣūmī echoes an earlier Mu'tazila position by al-Qāḍī 'Abd al-Ġabbār, that God specifically denoted the "well-grounded in knowledge" as capable of understanding the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān.⁵⁶

A final point regarding al-Ġiṣūmī's methodology and approach to *tafsīr* is that he understands quranic exegesis to be a battlefield, where the exegete fights his opponents over their misinterpretation of scripture. It is not a passive process in which the exegete simply proposes the meanings of the quranic verses. Rather, it is an opportunity to validate one's position and point to the fallacies of one's opponents. This process can be seen throughout the *Tahdīb*. For example, in verses 7:22–25 al-Ġiṣūmī uses the example of Adam and Eve admitting their sin for eating from the tree, out of their own free will, in order to point to the erroneous belief of his opponents. In particular, al-Ġiṣūmī maintains that verse 7:23

...shows that they admitted their guilt and asked for forgiveness. It also shows that the eating was their own action, thus the argument of the Compulsionists regarding people's actions is invalid. It also shows that the minor sin is an offense against one's self; we have explained what was

⁵⁵ It is obvious that this process extends to fields other than quranic exegesis.

⁵⁶ See 'Abd al-Ġabbār, *Mutaṣābih al-Qur'ān*, 15.

said about this. It also shows that Paradise and its food are forbidden to transgressors, thus the argument of the Postponers is invalid.⁵⁷

In these comments, al-Ġišumī's aim is not merely to inform his readers about the proper interpretation of verse 7:23, and indirectly validate at least two of the Mu'tazila Principles: God's Justice, and Reward and Punishment. He also seizes the opportunity to point out the error in the belief of the Compulsionists (*al-Muğbira*) that God predestines the actions of humans,⁵⁸ and to contend that sinners are forbidden the food of Paradise, contrary to the allegation of the Postponers (*al-Murğī'a*).⁵⁹ *Tafsīr* is therefore used as a vehicle for legitimizing ones beliefs and delegitimizing those of one's opponents.

Al-Ġišumī is therefore advocating a methodology and approach to *tafsīr* that assume the exegete's rational reasoning and expertise in a wide range of topics as well as a hermeneutical system composed of pronunciation and orthography, philology, syntax, composition, meaning, occasion of revelation, legal and theological implication, and history;⁶⁰ the exegete must abide by the revealed text and endeavor to decipher its meaning. Yet, one gathers that this comprehensive and encyclopedic knowledge is not necessarily meant to commend or, for that matter, tolerate a diversity of opinions. Rather, it is a deliberate strategy intended to supply the exegete with a wide range of options in order to facilitate imposing on the text a particular meaning. The reason for this complexity is that the Mu'tazila go to the quranic text loaded with theological biases, often having already decided what the Qur'ān should or should not say;⁶¹ thus, it is as if the exegete has to be equipped with the proper tools in order to tame the text. It is precisely for this reason that Mu'tazila exegetes argue forcefully that the quranic sciences require extensive knowledge and expertise in a variety of fields to allow for the proper identification and interpretation

⁵⁷ See the Arabic text in the Appendix at the end of this article, under Verses 7:22–5.

⁵⁸ *Al-Muğbira* was a blanket reference to several Sunnī groups, especially the Aš'arīs.

⁵⁹ Both groups (*al-Muğbira* and *al-Murğī'a*) were among the chief rivals of the Mu'tazila.

⁶⁰ One needs to keep in mind, however, that Mu'tazilism streamlined its basic theological tenets only at a much later period, and the findings here relate primarily to that period and not to early Mu'tazilism (the period down to Abū l-Hudayl al-'Allāf [d. c. 227/842] and his contemporaries).

⁶¹ I am not arguing that this is limited to the Mu'tazila; every Muslim group, past and present, imposes on the text of the Qur'ān, under different disguises, its own preconceived understanding of what the text ought to say.

of the perspicuous and ambiguous verses, and subsequently determine what the Qur'ān truly says. Besides al-Ġišūmī, another case in point is az-Zamaḥṣarī's comment when interpreting verse 5:64 *yadu 'llāhi maḡlūlatun* (literally: "Gods hand is tied up"): "He who is not versed in rhetoric (*ilm al-bayān*) is blind to the correct meaning of verses like this one."⁶² Az-Zamaḥṣarī is arguing here that the expression *yad* is purely allegorical and does not in any way mean a physical hand. This can be seen, too, in the comment of an earlier Mu'tazila theologian and exegete, Ibn al-Ḥallāl al-Baṣrī (d. after 377/988), on verse 7:179 ("We have created for Hell many of the ġinns and humans"):

One meaning is that it foretells the outcome of their affair: they will end up in Hell by committing the actions that make them earn it. The Arabs use this kind of expression to indicate the consequence and not the intention, because what is indicated has not yet occurred, as in God's saying: 'The Pharaoh's family picked him up to be an enemy and sorrow for them' (Q. 28:8). We have discussed this earlier and mentioned that the Qur'ān and the Arabic language have enough evidence to support our interpretation.⁶³

These examples demonstrate how the proper understanding of the Arabic language helps in finding the proper meaning of the Qur'ān. It is this extra-quranic material to which al-Ġišūmī and other Mu'tazilī exegetes appeal, along with the perspicuous verses, in order to determine the proper *tafsīr* of the ambiguous verses, so that they can then use both perspicuous and ambiguous to determine the fundamental principles of religion as conveyed in the Qur'ān. *Tafsīr* is therefore an effort to unveil the apparent as well as intended subtext in the revealed text.

⁶² Az-Zamaḥṣarī, *al-Kaššāf*, 4 vols., ed. Muḥammad 'A.-S. Sāhīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiya, 1995), vol. 1, 641–2.

⁶³ Ibn al-Ḥallāl, *Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā l-ġabrīya al-qadariya* (Ms. Caetani 332), ff. 87b–88a; and Mourad, "Ibn al-Khallāl al-Baṣrī," 89. The discussion by Ibn al-Ḥallāl is rather extensive; I selected only a short text here for the relevance of his argument.

Appendix

The Manuscripts

A. The edition of al-Ġišumī's introduction to the *Tahdīb* presented here is based on three manuscripts:

1. **K:** Ayatollah Kalbāyikānī Library, Qum: Vol. 1. Date: 651/1254. Extracts from ff. 1b–3a.
2. **L:** Leiden University Library, Leiden: Ms. OR-2583. Vol. 1. Date: 650/1252. Extracts from ff. 1b–2a.
3. **V:** Vatican Library: Ms. Arabo 1064. Vol. 1. Date: possibly second half of sixth/twelfth century. Extracts from ff. 1a–2a.

Leiden (**L**) is the basis for this edition, as it is the only manuscript in my possession that contains the entire introduction (all other manuscripts have part or the entire introduction missing due to damage or loss of folios).

B. The section on Verse 3:7 is edited on the basis of three manuscripts:

1. **A:** Ambrosiana: Ms. Arabic F184. Vol. 2. Date: 702/1303. Copied by Fayṣal ibn ʿAbd Šams ad-Ḍuhalī for *amīr* Aḥmad ibn al-Qāsim ibn Ġaʿfar. Extracts from ff. 5b–6a.
2. **H1:** Āl al-Hāšimī Library, Šaʿda: Vol. 2. Date: possibly second half of the sixth/twelfth century, copied by Muḥammad ibn Saʿīd ibn Abī l-ʿAšīra. Extracts from ff. 4b–5a.
3. **H2:** Āl al-Hāšimī: Vol. 2. Date: 697/1298. Extracts from ff. 2a–2b.

C. The section on Verses 7:22–25 is edited on the basis of three manuscripts:

1. **A:** Ambrosiana: Ms. Arabic B44. Vol. 4. Date: 1058/1648. Extracts from ff. 5a–6b.
2. **H:** Āl al-Hāšimī: Vol. 3 (7:17–187). No Details. Extracts from ff. 3a–4b.
3. **V:** Vatican: Ms. Arabo 1026. Vol. 4. Date: 625/1228. Extracts from ff. 5a–7a.

Introduction of the Tahdīb

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين وصلواته على سيدنا محمد وآله وسلامه.⁶⁴

الحمد لله الذي هدانا للإسلام ودعانا إلى دار السلام ومنّ علينا بنبيّنا محمد عليه السلام وأنعم علينا بضروب الإناعام وأنزل القرآن وصانه عن التحريف والزيادة والنقصان ونسخ به سائر الأديان. ثمّ الصلوة على سيد المرسلين وخاتم النبيّين وإمام المتّقين محمد وعلى آله⁶⁵ أجمعين. أمّا بعد فإنّ أولى ما يشتغل به المرء طلب العلوم الدينيّة التي بها فوزه ونجاته ثمّ عبادة ربّه الذي إليه يحيا ومماته. ومن أجل العلوم معرفة كتاب الله تعالى وتفهم معانيه وأحكامه فإنّ عليه مدار الدين وهو جبل الله المتين. وقد اجتهد العلماء في ذلك⁶⁶ ويتنوا وصنفوا ولأولين فضل السبق وتأسيس الأمر ولآخرين حسن الترتيب وجودة التهذيب وزيادة الفوائد، ولئن قال بعضهم ما ترك الأول للآخر، فقد قال آخر ترك الأول للآخر. وقد جمعت في كتابي هذا جملاً وجوامع في علم القرآن من غير تطويل ممّل وإيجاز محلّ أرجو أن يكون تبصرة للبتدي وتذكّرة للمستهي ومن الله استمدّ التوفيق وعليه أتوكل وهو حسي ونعم المعين.⁶⁷

علوم القرآن

وعلوم القرآن كثيرة ومدارها⁶⁸ على ثمانية أولها القراءة ووجوهها وعللها. وإنّما تجوز القراءة بالمستفيض المتواتر دون الشاذ والنادر وكما لا يجوز إثبات القرآن إلا بنقل مستفيض كذلك القراءة⁶⁹ وما تواتر نقله فلا يجوز ردّ شيء منها لأنّ كلّها منزلة ثابتة.⁷⁰

وثانيها اللغة. والقرآن كلّ⁷¹ بلغة العرب هكذا قال الله تعالى ﴿لسان عربي مبين﴾ (الشعراء 26: 195) وما روي عن بعض السلف أنّها رومية أو فارسية كـ ﴿القسطنطس﴾ (الإسراء 17: 35؛ الشعراء 26: 182) و ﴿البحيل﴾ (هود 11: 82؛ الحجر 15: 74؛ الفيل 105: 4) ونحوهما⁷² فمحمول

⁶⁴ V: (بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم). K: (بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم وبه نستعين).

⁶⁵ V and K: (واله)

⁶⁶ V: (في مثل ذلك)

⁶⁷ K: (ونعم الوكيل)

⁶⁸ K: (مدارها)

⁶⁹ K: (القراءة)

⁷⁰ K: (وما تواتر منها)

⁷¹ V: (كلّها). K: (كلّها نزل)

⁷² K: missing (ونحوهما).

على موافقة اللغتين أو على أن العرب أخذته فعرّته. وكذلك ليس فيه لفظ⁷³ مستنكر أو خطأ أو تناقض واختصاص بنوع من النظم والفصاحة بان بها عن غيره فصار معجزاً.

وثالثها الإعراب. فليس فيه لحن ولا خطأ خلاف⁷⁴ ما تهذي به الملحدة.

ورابعها النظم. فإن القرآن على ما هو عليه من السور والآيات اتصل بعضها ببعض كذلك أنزل وفي كل ذلك غرض وفائدة.

وخامسها المعنى. وليس فيه شيء لا يُعرف معناه إذ المقصود من الكلام إفهام المعنى. وكل كلمة لا تخلو إما أن يكون لها معنى واحد فلا بد أن تحمل عليه، وإن احتمل معاني والكل جائز حمل على الكل على وجه يصح من جمع أو تخيير. فإن دلّ دليل على أن بعضه مراد وبعضه ليس بمراد حمل بمقتضى الدليل. فإن كان له معنى في اللغة ومعنى في الشرع حمل على المعنى الشرعي لأنه ناقل. ثم فيه حقيقة ومجاز فالحقيقة أولى ألا أن يدلّ الدليل على أن حمله على المجاز أولى فيحمل عليه.

وسادسها النزول. فإن منه ما نزل بسبب ثم قد يقتصر على سببه وقد يتعدى إلى غيره. والواجب اعتبار اللفظ دون السبب.

وسابعها الأول والأحكام. فإنه كلام مصادق وهو حجة. ثم منه ما ورد مؤكداً كأدلة التوحيد، ومنه ما ورد مبيّناً كأدلة الشرائع، ومنه ما يُعرف المراد بظاهره كالمحكم والمبين، ومنه ما يرجع في معرفة المراد به إلى غيره كالمجمل والمتشابه، ومنه ناسخ يجب العمل به ومنسوخ لا يجب. ولذلك يجب معرفة تاريخ النزول وما نزل منها بمكة وما نزل بالمدينة، ومنه العموم والخصوص وتدخل فيه الأمثال والحكم والمواعظ والزواجر والأوامر والنواهي والوعد والوعيد.

وثامنها الإخبار والقصص.

⁷³ K: rest of the introduction is missing due to what is certainly the loss of a complete folio in the original from which it was copied.

⁷⁴ V: rest of the introduction is missing due to what is certainly the loss of a complete folio in the original from which it was copied.

أَسَامِي الْقُرْآن

وللقرآن أسامي، ففيها القرآن ومعناه الجمع يقال قرأت قراءة وقرأنا، ومنه قيل للحوض مقراءة لاجتماع الماء فيه. ومنها الفرقان، قيل معناه أنه النجاة والمخرج، ومنه ﴿يَجْعَلُ لَكُمْ فُرْقَانًا﴾ (الأنفال 8: 29)، وقيل هو الفرق بين الحق والباطل عن ابن عباس. ومنها الذكر، قال الله تعالى: ﴿إِنَّا نَحْنُ ذِكْرٌ﴾ (الحجر 15: 9)، قيل أنه ذكر من الله لعباده بالفرائض والأحكام، وقيل أنه شرف لمن تمسك به ومنه ﴿أَنزِلْ لَكَ الذِّكْرَ﴾ (الزخرف 43: 44). ومنها الكتاب لأنه مكتوب فسعى المكتوب كتابًا.

وروي عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال: أعطيت مكان التوراة السبع الطوال ومكان الإنجيل المثاني ومكان الزبور المائين وقُضِلَت بالمفصل. فالطوال البقرة وآل عمران والنساء والمائدة والأنعام والأعراف والتوبة. وقيل: آخر سورة يس.⁷⁵ والمثاني ما زاد على مائة آية لأنه تُثْنِي فيها الأحكام، وقيل: الفاتحة والمائين ما كان مائة آية أو زاد قليلاً أو نقص قليلاً. والمفصل السور القصار لكثرة الفصول من السور.

وفي القرآن آيات وسور فالسور جمع سورة كحرفة وغرف، وهو بغير همز المنزل المرتفع، ومنه سور المدينة، ومنهم من يهمزه ويريد به القطعة من القرآن، وسور كل شيء بقتبه بعد الأخذ منه . فأما الآية فقيل معناه العلامة سمي بذلك لدلالة تعالى أول الكلام وآخره، وقيل الآية الجماعة من الحروف يقال خرج القوم بآيتهم أي بجماعتهم . وقال سيبويه: موضع العين من الآية والأول لأن ما كان موضع العين واولاً واللامياء أكثر مما كان موضع العين واللامياء، أن فتوت مثله أكثر من ثبوت . وقيل وزنه فعلة، وقيل: فاعلة وقيل: فعلة .

التقسيم

أما التفسير فالتفسير ككشف المغطى، قال أبو العباس: التفسير والتأويل والمعنى واحد. وقال غيره: التفسير كشف المراد عن اللفظ المشكل، والتأويل رد أحد المحتملين إلى ما يطابق الظاهر. والتفسير البيان، والتأويل انتهاء الشيء ومصيره وما يؤل إليه أمره، ومنه ﴿يَطْرُقُونَ لِإِتَّائِيلِهِ﴾ (الأعراف 7: 53). وقيل: التفسير تأويل لثَمَّ مقصود الكلام يؤل إليه، والمعنى مأخوذ من قولهم عنيت فلاناً، أي قصدته، فكانت قصده بالكلام مكداً، وقيل هومن الإظهار كأنه أظهر مراده باللفظ، وقيل هومن⁷⁶ قولهم عنيت بهذا الأمر أي تكلفته.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ This should read: (يونس).

⁷⁶ K: text resumes here.

⁷⁷ K: (الأمر، تكلفته).

التعوذ

القراءة: أعوذ بالله العظيم⁷⁸ من الشيطان الرجيم، ابن كثير. أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم إن الله هو السميع العليم، نافع وابن عامر والكسائي. نستعذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم، حمزة. أعوذ بالله⁷⁹ السميع العليم من الشيطان الرجيم، أبو حاتم. أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم، عاصم وأبو عمرو. وروى مرفوعاً.

اللغة: التعوذ من العياذ وهو الملجأ. والشيطان من شطنت الدار⁸⁰ أي بعدت، ووزنه فعال. والرجم الرمي بالحجارة ومنه المرجوم، والرجيم بمعنى المرجوم فاعيل بمعنى مفعول، كقولهم كف خصيب أي مخضوب.

المعنى: لما أمر الله تعالى بقراءة القرآن ولا يخلوا الإنسان من وسوسة الشيطان أمر بالاستعاذة منه فقال تعالى ﴿فَإِذَا قَرَأْتَ الْقُرْآنَ فَاسْتَعِذْ بِاللَّهِ﴾ (النحل 98: 16). ومعنى أعوذ⁸¹ أُلجأ إلى الله تعالى من شرّ الشيطان. وقيل المُبعد من رحمة الله تعالى، وقيل المُبعد من كلّ خير. الرجيم قيل المُبعد من رحمة الله،⁸² وقيل المرمي بالشهب، وقيل رُجم بالعنة. إن الله هو السميع لجميع المسموعات، العليم لجميع المعلومات.

الأحكام: التعوذ عند القراءة ستة بالإجماع ثمّ اختلفوا فقليل قبل القراءة لأنه يراد للقراءة، عن أكثر الفقهاء. وقيل بعد القراءة، عن أصحاب الظاهر. اختلفوا في قراءته في الصلوة، فقليل يقرأ في الركعة⁸³ الأولى، وقيل في كلّ ركعة.⁸⁴ واختلفوا فالأكثر على أنه لا يجهر به، وعن بعضهم الجهر. وأجمع الفقهاء على أن التعوذ بعد التكبير، إلا ما روي عن الهادي عليه السلام⁸⁵ أنه قبل التكبير. وبدل التعوذ على أن الشرّ والمعاصي ليس بخلق لله إذ لو كان كذلك لم يكن للاستعاذة بالله من الشيطان⁸⁶ معنى.

⁷⁸ K: (أعوذ بالله السميع العليم).

⁷⁹ V: text resumes here.

⁸⁰ K: (شطنت).

⁸¹ V: (ومعنى الاستعاذة أعوذ بالله).

⁸² V: missing (الرجيم قيل المُبعد من رحمة الله).

⁸³ L: (الركعة) in the margin with same hand.

⁸⁴ K: (اختلفوا في قراءته في الصلوة، فقليل يقرأ في الركعة الأولى، وقيل في كلّ ركعة) in the margin with same hand.

⁸⁵ V: (الهادي).

⁸⁶ K: (للاستعاذة من الشيطان).

Verse 3:7

قوله تعالى ﴿سوالذي أنزل عليك الكتاب من آيات فُحِّمَتْ مِنْ أَمِّ الْكِتَابِ وَخُرُتْ مُشَابَهَاتٌ فَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ زَيْغٌ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ مَا تَشَابَهَ مِنْهُ ابْتِغَاءَ الْفِتْنَةِ وَابْتِغَاءَ تَأْوِيلِهِ مَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَالرَّاسِخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ آمَنَّا بِكُلِّ مَا نَزَّلَ اللَّهُ وَلَا أُولُوا الْأَلْبَابَ﴾

الأحكام: تدلّ على⁸⁷ أنّ في القرآن محكمًا ومتشابهًا، وأقرب الأقاويل ما ذكرناه أولاً، وهو الذي اختاره القاضي أنّ المحكم ما يدلّ على المراد بنفسه، والمتشابه ما يشبه المراد به. وتدلّ على أنّ المتشابه يُردّ إلى المحكم، ويُطلب معناه منه.⁸⁸ وتدلّ على أنّ المحكم والمتشابه إنما يدخل في الأصول كالتوحيد والعدل لأنّ ما يدخل من ذلك في الاجتهاديات لا يُدْمَ على إتباعه فلم يبق إلا ما ذكرناه. وتدلّ على أنّ في جعل القرآن كذلك مصلحة لذلك أنزله محكمًا ومتشابهًا. وقد قيل: الفائدة فيه الحثّ على النظر والمذاكرة، ولو كان جميعه محكمًا لكان طريقًا للاشكال على التقليد والعدول عن النظر. وتدلّ على عظم محلّ العلماء لأن المراد بـ ﴿الراخين في العلم﴾ الذابون⁸⁹ عن الدين، الرادون⁹⁰ على الملحدّين والمبتدعين، ومن قام بنصرة الدين. ومن نظر في أخبار العلماء علم أنّ هذه صفة مشايخ أهل العدل كواصل وعمر والحسن وخيلان، من أوائلهم اتصبوا للذبّ عن الدين في أيام بني أمية ومروان مع تدنّ كثير منهم بالإلحاد وخوف هؤلاء العلماء على دمائهم. وكأيّ الهذيل الذي ردّ عليّ أصناف المخالفين من الدهرية والثنوية وأهل البدع، حتى قال صالح بن عبد⁹¹ القدوس وهو رأس في الإلحاد: لولا أبو الهذيل لخطبنا بالثنوية على المنابر. وكشيخنا أبي علي وأبي هاشم وسائر مشايخنا البصريين والبغداديين حيث يتنوا وصنفوا. وتدلّ على أنّ الحق يُعرف⁹² بالتفكر لذلك قال ﴿وما يذكر إلا أولوا الأبواب﴾ وخصّهم بالذكر لأنهم المكلفون.

⁸⁷ H1: (يدلّ). H2: (يدلّ الكتاب).

⁸⁸ A: missing (وطلب معناه منه) إلى المحكم، ويُطلب معناه منه).

⁸⁹ H2: (الذابين).

⁹⁰ H2: (الرادين).

⁹¹ H1: (عبد الله) with (الله) crossed. H2: (عبد الله).

⁹² A: (يدلّ).

Verses 7:22-25

قوله تعالى ﴿فليهما⁹³ بغرو فلما ذاقا الشجرة بدتا لهما سوءاتهما وطقما يخضغان عليهما من ورق الجنة وناذا اسماء بهما ألم أنهما عن تلكا الشجرة وأقل لكما إن الشيطان لكما عدو مبين. قال ربنا طمأنأ أنفسنا وإن لم تغفر لنا وترحمنا لنكونن من الخاسرين. قال امبطوا بعضكم لبعض عدو وكلم في الأرض مستقر ومتاع إلى حين. قال فيها تحيون وفيها تموتون ومنها تخرجون﴾

الأحكام تدل الآية أنه⁹⁴ لما بدت سوءاتهما اجتهدا⁹⁵ في سترها فدل على أن ستر العورة كان من شريعة آدم عليه السلام. وقد استدل قوم بالآية على وجوب الستر. قال القاضي: وليس في الآية ما يوجب الوجوب إذ ليس فيها بأكثر⁹⁷ من أنهما فعلا ذلك. قال الأصم: وتدل على أن الستر من خلق آدم وحواء⁹⁸ وأنهما كرها التعري وإن لم يكن لهما ثالث، مع⁹⁹ ذلك دليل على قبح التعري إلا عند الحاجة. وتدل على أن نزع اللباس لم يكن عقوبة إذ لو كان عقوبة¹⁰⁰ لما فعل بآدم لأنه لم يستحق العقوبة. ويجوز أن يكون فعله الله لمصلحة وهو الأقرب. وقيل: ¹⁰¹ إنه كان علامة لوقت هبوطه إلى الأرض. وقد روي أن¹⁰² الناس يحشرون عراة وليس ذلك بإهانة ولا عقوبة، على أنه لو كان مذمماً لكان إذا ظهر بغيرهما. وأما كشف¹⁰³ العورة بين الزوجين خلال طلق. ويدل قوله تعالى ﴿ألم أنهما﴾¹⁰⁴ أن ماتا ولا من الشجرة دخل¹⁰⁵ تحت النهي فإذا لم يكن بالنص والتعيين فليس إلا ما ذكرنا أنه من جنسه لتناول آدم. وتدل أنه تعالى أمره بالتحري¹⁰⁶ من الشيطان فإذا أوجب¹⁰⁷ عليه ذلك مع جلالته قدره¹⁰⁸ فعلينا واجب¹⁰⁹

⁹³ H: (فدلاًهما).

⁹⁴ A & V: (الآية).

⁹⁵ H: (اجتهدوا).

⁹⁶ A & V: (آدم).

⁹⁷ A & V: (أكثر).

⁹⁸ H: (وحواء).

⁹⁹ A: (في).

¹⁰⁰ V: missing (إذ لو كان عقوبة).

¹⁰¹ H: (قيل).

¹⁰² A: (روي).

¹⁰³ A: (كشوف).

¹⁰⁴ A & H: (ويدل قوله).

¹⁰⁵ A: (دخلت).

¹⁰⁶ A: (التحرر).

¹⁰⁷ A: (وجب).

¹⁰⁸ A: (جلالته).

¹⁰⁹ A: (فعلينا ذلك أوجب).

وإذا أوجب التحرّرمه لأنه يدعو إلى الفساد فكلّ من¹¹⁰ هذا حاله وجب¹¹¹ التحرّرمه، فلهذا قلنا يجب التحرّر¹¹² أولاً من الكفار ثمّ¹¹³ من المبتدعة ثمّ من الظلمة وأهل الفساد. وتدّل على اعترافهما بالذنب وسؤالهما المغفرة فدّل أنّ الأكل كان فعلهما فبطل¹¹⁴ قول المجبرة في المخلوق. وتدّل على أنّ الصغيرة ظلم للنفس وقد يتّما ما قيل فيه. وتدّل على أنّ الجنة وطعامها حرام على العصاة فبطل¹¹⁵ قول المرجئة. وتدّل على أنّ¹¹⁶ الأرض مستقرّ الخلق إلى وقت الموت، وفيه تنبيه على نعمة عظيمة وكمال قدرة من الله تعالى.

¹¹⁰ A: (ما).

¹¹¹ V: (وجب) in the margin with same hand.

¹¹² H: missing

من الشيطان فإذا أوجب عليه ذلك مع جلالة قدره فعلينا وجب وإذا أوجب التحرّرمه لأنه يدعو إلى (الفساد فكلّ من هذا حاله وجب التحرّرمه، فلهذا قلنا يجب التحرّر

¹¹³ A: missing (ثمّ).

¹¹⁴ V: (فيبطل).

¹¹⁵ V & H: (فيبطل).

¹¹⁶ A: (وندلّ على).

ATTRIBUTING CAUSALITY TO GOD'S LAW: THE SOLUTION OF FAḤR AD-DĪN AR-RĀZĪ

Felicitas Opwis

The complex relationship of theology to religious law is illuminatingly displayed when the legal theory that legitimizes the law-finding process is at odds with the theological doctrine underlying the legal system as a whole. One such telling instance in medieval Islam is found in the work of the Šāfi'ī jurist and Aš'arī theologian Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). In his work on legal theory, *al-Maḥṣūl fī 'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, ar-Rāzī discusses the existence of causal relationships in God's law. The discussion of causality was prompted by a conflux of factors, many of which will be touched on in due course. In what follows, I will focus not on the contextual origins but on the intellectual challenges that theological positions on causality posed for Islamic jurisprudents and how ar-Rāzī resolved them in a manner acceptable to jurists of all theological persuasions.

Causality in Theology and Law

The question of causality is an old one in Muslim intellectual history. Most of the discourse on causality occurred in the fields of theology and philosophy, of which the former is of particular interest here due to its influence on the articulation of legal theory.¹ The terms that theologians used for 'cause' were either *'illa* or *sabab* and derivations of these words. While most preferred the term *sabab*, which denotes occasion more than cause, some authors used the terms interchangeably. The prevalence of using either of these terms also depends on the historical period under investigation; after al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111), the term *'illa* is more frequently found than *sabab*, and later Ibn Ḥaldūn

¹ One need not forget that most medieval scholars were well-versed in both theology and law.

(d. 808/1406), as-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490), and al-Bāğūrī (d. 1276/1860) tend toward the term *sabab* again.²

Why was causality so avidly discussed in Muslim theology? The main reason was that, logically, a cause induces its effect (*musabbab, ma'lūl*). As Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) said, "everything which is a cause of an existence different than itself becomes...an efficient cause."³ The efficacy (*ta'tīr*) of the cause on the effect establishes a necessary link between them, a view voiced, for instance, by the Brethren of Purity.⁴ Without an impeding factor, the cause cannot exist without its effect and this effect cannot exist without its cause. The necessary and reciprocal relationship between cause and effect prompted philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, to argue, for example, for the eternity of the existence of the world.⁵ The acceptance of a necessary, determining relationship between cause and effect implies, however, an intrinsic causal relation that is not directly dependent on God's agency. It, thus, compromises God's omnipotence and His free will, and it questions God as the sole Creator.

While hardly any religious scholar, regardless of his theological persuasion, would deny that, in the final analysis, God is the sole Cause and Creator of everything,⁶ theologians debated the question whether a causal relationship exists outside of God's direct interference. This debate covered questions ranging from the existence of natural laws of cause and effect to that of human efficacy and responsibility for his/her acts. Does fire cause burning? Is the human being the causal agent of his/her act and, hence, is s/he responsible for it?

Some theologians⁷ accepted necessary causal relations apart from God's immediate creative will. Mu'tazilī scholars generally accepted

² *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition [hereafter EI2], s.v. "Illa," vol. 3, 1127–32, at 1132.

³ Quoted in Michael E. Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina)," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 172–87, at 174. See also Marie Bernand, "Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh Through a Manuscript of al-Ğaṣṣāṣ," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105 (1985), 623–35, at 633.

⁴ EI2, s.v. "Illa," vol. 3, 1129 and 1131.

⁵ Marmura, "Efficient Causality in Avicenna," 175.

⁶ Cf. Richard Frank, "The Structure of Created Causality According to Al-Aṣ'arī: An Analysis of the 'Kitāb al-Luma' §82–164," *Studia Islamica* 25 (1966), 13–75, at 15.

⁷ Since this paper is concerned with law rather than theology, it cannot go into detail about the various positions held by scholars belonging to one school of thought.

the existence of secondary causes which act efficaciously on their effects, arguing that God laid down such an order of events and, hence, secondary causality was dependent on His creative act.⁸ Aš'arī theologians, by contrast, were more concerned to safeguard God's power of action and creation. Their objection to the existence of a necessary sequence between cause and effect was directed at the predictability and demonstratability of such efficient relations; they argued that to affirm causal efficiency would confine the divine omnipotence to do as He pleases.⁹ Hence, theologians with an Aš'arī leaning understood the relationship between cause and effect as a non-necessary sequence; a sequence which was directly created by God and did not come from some intrinsic efficacy of one on the other. They held that God continuously creates this relationship for each and every instance in the universe, without necessity.¹⁰ In order to explain the regular occurrence of cause and effect that can be observed empirically, Aš'arī theologians turned to the concept of custom or habit (*āda*). Thus, we find al-Ġazālī arguing that we know that rocks fall, that bread satiates, and that wine inebriates not because one causes the other but because it is God's custom (*āda*) to create them in the same manner each instance.¹¹ In the work of later Aš'arīs, like Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī, 'Aḍud ad-Dīn al-Īǧī (d. 756/1355) and al-Ġurġānī (d. 816/1413), causes are

The reader should be mindful that members of the same theological school often held very diverse views, which were much more complex than here portrayed.

⁸ *EI2*, s.v. "Allāh," vol. 1, 406–17, at 412; ib., s.v. "Illa," vol. 3, 1132. Emon argues for a tradition of natural law in Islam and presents a detailed account of the proponents and opponents of the existence of laws of nature (see Anver E. Emon, "Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law," *Journal of Law and Religion* 20 [2005], 351–95, at 353–79).

⁹ *EI2*, s.v., "Illa," vol. 3, 1132; W. J. Courtenay, "The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism," *Harvard Theological Review* 66 (1973), 77–94, at 79.

¹⁰ Cf. Binyamin Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality," *Studia Islamica* 67 (1988), 75–98, at 75–6; Chafik Chehata, "Études de philosophie musulmane du droit I: Logique juridique et droit musulman," *Studia Islamica* 23 (1965), 5–33, at 7; Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*, repr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 230–2.

¹¹ Abū Hāmid Muḥammad al-Ġazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā min 'ilm al-uṣūl*, ed. Ḥamza ibn Zuhayr Ḥāfiẓ, 4 vols. (Jeddah: Šarikat al-Madīna al-Munawwara li-ṭ-Ṭibā' wa-n-Našr, n.d. [1993]), vol. 1, 141–3; Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Causality," 76; Lenn Evan Goodman, "Did al-Ghazālī Deny Causality?" *Studia Islamica* 47 (1978), 83–120, at 84–8; see also Courtenay, "The Critique on Natural Causality," 78 and 85–8.

understood as conditions (*ṣart*, pl. *ṣurūt*) of their effects without any efficacy of the first on the existence of the second.¹²

Denying the existence of fixed relationships between cause and effect in the mundane world preserved the Aṣ'arī position that God was the only Cause and Agent of all effects. However, such a stance led to problems in the sphere of the religious law, in particular in the area of legal change. One of the main vehicles to rule on situations not explicitly addressed in the textual sources of the divine law was the procedure of legal analogy (*qiyās*). In this procedure, jurists transfer a ruling (*ḥukm*) of a primary source (*aṣl*) of the law (Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*) to a situation that is not directly addressed in these sources (*far'*) if the ruling of the original case (*aṣl*) and the unprecedented case (*far'*) display the same legal rationale, or *ratio legis*. The existence of a common *ratio legis* in the textually attested case and in the novel case prompts jurists to extend the divine ruling to the new case. The terms jurists use for *ratio legis* are the same as those in theology and philosophy to denote cause, namely *sabab* and *'illa*, the latter becoming over time the technical term for *ratio legis*.

The procedure of analogy is one of the main methods to extend Islamic law. Jurists have to be able to address new legal situations in order to keep the religious law with its finite textual sources applicable and, thus, relevant to an ever-changing environment. Without the ability to apply the limited textual basis of the divine law to the infinite number of possible new cases, Islamic law would over time become obsolete.¹³ Yet, stipulating the transferal of a revealed ruling on the existence of the *ratio legis* implies a fixed relationship between the *ratio legis* and its associated ruling, a relationship that jurists called efficacy (*ta'tīr*), meaning that the existence of the *ratio legis* entails or brings about the existence of the ruling.¹⁴ Extending the law in analogy to the revealed texts, thus, put jurists into a dilemma: Either they have to admit some type of causal relationship between *ratio legis* and ruling or the divine law cannot speak to matters not directly addressed

¹² EI2, s.v., "Illa," vol. 3, 1132; Courtenay, "The Critique on Natural Causality," 81.

¹³ Cf. Felicitas Opwis, "Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of *Maṣlaḥa* in Classical and Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory," in *Shari'a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context*, eds. Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 62–82, at 63–5.

¹⁴ Cf. Wael B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 90–1.

in the revealed texts. The first option would mean that they may be accused of arbitrarily attributing causes for God's commands¹⁵—unless the *ratio legis* is explicitly stated in the revealed text. Adopting the latter stance would mean that “when there is no scripture on a matter, one is left in a state of legal suspension (*tawaqquf*)” and if one were to pronounce a ruling it would not have the normative force of the divine law.¹⁶ The Šarī'a could not lay claim to be all-encompassing.

Muslim jurists avoided the implication of causality in the procedure of legal analogy because for a long time they did not consider the *ratio legis* a ‘cause’ or ‘explanation’ but rather a ‘sign’ for the ruling. Aš-Šāfi'ī (d. 204/820), for example, understands the *ratio legis* in terms of similitude (*šabah*) and meaning (*ma'nā*).¹⁷ When a jurist conceives of the *ratio legis* as expressing a similarity, he could argue, for example, that the *ratio legis* of Qur'an 4:25, which rules that a slave woman shall be given half of the punishment of a free woman, is the meaning of slavery (*riqq*). Hence, he could transfer this Qur'anic ruling to the male slave in analogy because of their similarity concerning slavery. Slavery is not the cause or explanation for meting out half the punishment but only the sign that justifies applying the Qur'anic ruling also to the male slave. The importance of the *ratio legis* to extend the law means that a jurist's main intellectual inquiry in the procedure of analogy is to identify the *ratio legis* of the original ruling and verify that the same characteristics are displayed in the new case.

With the maturing of legal theory and the absorption of Greek logic into Islamic law one notices, however, a development in the concept of the *ratio legis*. Jurists increasingly understand the *ratio legis* not as a sign for the ruling but as a motivating factor (*bā'it*). The shift from the ‘sign model’ to the ‘motive model’ of the *ratio legis*, as Zysow calls it, occurred around the 5th/11th century.¹⁸ For the proponents of the sign

¹⁵ Muhammad Khalid Masud, *Islamic Legal Philosophy: A Study of Abū Ishāq al-Shāfi'ī's Life and Thought* (Delhi: International Islamic Publishers, 1989), 167.

¹⁶ Emon, “Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law,” 351.

¹⁷ *Islamic Jurisprudence: Shāfi'ī's Risāla*, translated with an Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by Majid Khadduri (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), 290; EI2, s.v. “Kiyās,” vol. 5, 238–42, at 240–1.

¹⁸ See Aron Zysow, *The Economy of Certainty* (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1984), 374–94. It needs to be noted that the shift from sign to motive model of the *ratio legis* is neither a complete shift, nor that jurists, even within the same school of law, followed only one of these models. The Mu'tazili Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980), for example, combined both models in his doctrine, and the sign model is still espoused by Ibn Taymīya in the 8th/14th century (see ib., 386 and 393–4).

model, the *ratio legis* functions as a sign (*amāra*, *‘alāma*), by means of which the original ruling may be applied to a new case; it does not explain the textual ruling. This understanding of the *ratio legis* is based on the belief that the purpose of the revealed law is unknown and that one can only adhere to the signs God set out. These signs are the basis for transferring a ruling from the original case to the new case in question.¹⁹ In the work of the Ḥanafī jurist and Mu‘tazilī theologian al-Ġaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980), we still find a typical expression of the sign model. Al-Ġaṣṣāṣ defines the *ratio legis* in the following way: “As for the *ratio legis* (*‘illa*), it is the meaning (*ma‘nā*) which, when it occurs, brings about the ruling (*ḥukm*).”²⁰ He distinguishes the *ratio legis* in legal analogy (*qiyās šar‘ī*) from the cause in syllogistic analogy (*qiyās ‘aqlī*). The latter he sees as the efficient cause that determines the existence of effects, whereas a legal cause (*‘illa šar‘īya*) does not necessitate the ruling but is only an indication or a signal for it.²¹

A second way to conceive of the *ratio legis* is the ‘motive model.’ In this model, the *ratio legis* serves as an explanatory element of the law and is considered the motivating factor (*bā‘it*) for the ruling. Underlying this interpretation of the *ratio legis* is the belief that God’s law is attached to purposes and reasons that are accessible to the human intellect through the revealed texts. However, without the sacred texts, those purposes cannot be discerned by the intellect alone.²² The purpose (*ġaraḍ*, *maqṣad*) or underlying reason (*ḥikma*) of a ruling can be recognized in characteristics pertaining to the *ratio legis*.

Understanding *rationes legis* as explanatory purposes for rulings does not, in itself, conflict with attributing causality to the law. The Šāfi‘ī jurist and Aš‘arī theologian Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī (d. 478/1085), a proponent of the motive model, emphasizes that the *‘illa* in law does not induce the ruling by itself but by virtue of God determining it as a *ratio legis* of the ruling.²³ Around the same time, two developments concerning the *ratio legis* occurred. First, jurists

¹⁹ Nabil Shehaby, “*‘Illa* and *Qiyās* in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102 (1982), 27–46, at 39–40; Zysow, *Economy of Certainty*, 375–6; cf. also Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Ġaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl*, ed. Sa‘īd Allāh al-Qāḍī (Lahore: al-Maktaba al-‘Ilmīya, 1981), 135.

²⁰ *Wa-ammā l-‘illa, fa-hiya al-ma‘nā l-laḍī ‘inda ḥudūṭihi yahduṭ al-ḥukm* (Bernand, “Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” 632).

²¹ *Ib.*

²² Zysow, *Economy of Certainty*, 344 and 375–6.

²³ Bernand, “Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” 633.

increasingly identified the correctness of the *ratio legis* by the fact it was “suitable” (*munāsib*) for its ruling. And second, this suitability (*munāsaba*) was defined in terms of the purpose of God with laying down His law, namely to bring about *maṣlaḥa*, i.e. a source of good and well-being, for the believers and avert from them *mafsada*, i.e. a source of harm and corruption. The association of *maṣlaḥa* with suitability and that criterion being used to identify the *ratio legis* of a ruling are implicitly expressed in the legal writings of al-Ġuwaynī.²⁴ Al-Ġuwaynī even goes beyond the deductive reasoning of legal analogy and also employs suitability to identify the *ratio legis* when no concrete textual source of law applies to the case for which a ruling is sought. He states that when no agreed-upon source (*aṣl*) with its ruling and associated *ratio legis* exists, a jurist looks for a “meaning (*ma'nā*) that imparts knowledge about the ruling and that is suitable for [this ruling] in that the rational mind requires [this ruling for this situation].”²⁵

The use of suitability to rule on unattested cases—technically called unattested *maṣlaḥa* (*maṣlaḥa mursala*)—is more coherently expressed in al-Ġazālī's legal works. When discussing analogy, he states that one method to verify the correctness of the *ratio legis*²⁶ is to determine that the meaning (*ma'nā*) used as *ratio legis* in the analogy is suitable (*munāsib*) for the ruling. A meaning or characteristic (*waṣf*) is suitable to be the *ratio legis* of the ruling when it indicates an aspect of *maṣlaḥa*.²⁷ Al-Ġazālī defines attaining *maṣlaḥa* as the purpose of the law, namely preserving for humankind their religion (*dīn*), life (*nafs*), intellect (*'aql*), progeny (*nasl*), and property (*māl*).²⁸ Something is a suitable meaning because it preserves the purposes of the law; whatever is not connected to preserving them, is not suitable.²⁹ A suitable meaning or characteristic is established as *ratio legis* and, al-Ġazālī says, is successfully defended in legal disputations with other jurists

²⁴ See 'Abd al-Malik ibn 'Abd Allāh Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Ġuwaynī, *al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, ed. 'Abd al-'Azīm ad-Dīb, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Anṣār, 1400/1980), vol. 2, 787–8, 802–3, 830, 860, 876–8, 891–2, 904, and 1113–4.

²⁵ *Ib.*, vol. 2, 1113.

²⁶ The other method al-Ġazālī mentions to verify the *ratio legis* is that of classification and successive elimination (*as-sabr wa-t-taqṣīm*); see al-Ġazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 3, 618–9.

²⁷ See *ib.*, vol. 3, 620; *id.*, *Šifā' al-ḡalīl*, ed. Ḥamd 'Ubayd al-Kubaysī (Baghdad: Maṭba'at al-Irṣād, 1390/1971), 144–59.

²⁸ Al-Ġazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 2, 481–2.

²⁹ *Id.*, *Šifā'*, 159–60.

because it is obviously compatible with the ruling.³⁰ For example, it is suitable to say that wine is prohibited because it impairs the intellect (*ʿaql*), whereas to say it is prohibited because it is kept in earthen jars is not.³¹ Prohibiting wine, thus, reflects the purpose of the law by preserving the intellect. In order to avoid the accusation that the use of suitable characteristics as *rationes legis* is tantamount to attributing causality to them, al-Ġazālī asserts that the ruling is not logically required due to its suitability, but rather God is the one who made the *ratio legis* suitable, and suitability is but a way to inform that it is the *ratio legis*.³² Al-Ġazālī accepts that even a textually unattested *maṣlaḥa* may serve as *ratio legis* of new rulings; yet, he put stringent conditions on its validity: it had to reach the level of necessity (*ḍarūra*), be known with certainty (*qaṭʿī*), and apply universally (*kullī*) to all believers.³³

It may seem paradoxical that Aṣʿarī scholars are the ones leading the charge in understanding the *ratio legis* as a motive for the ruling, thus, seemingly contradicting their claim that the human intellect is unable to pronounce legal judgments independent of divine guidance.³⁴ Their search for law-finding procedures that apply the existing law to unprecedented situations is born out of their understanding that the divine law is all-encompassing and applies to all of human experience.³⁵ The need for keeping the religious law relevant to Muslim society in light of an ever-changing environment led them to partly abandon their stance on the impenetrability of divine acts. They conceded, as evident in the work of al-Ġuwaynī and al-Ġazālī, that, by looking at the revealed law itself, the human intellect is able to grasp God's intention for His law, namely for the *maṣlaḥa* of humankind.³⁶ In the

³⁰ Ib., 143.

³¹ Id., *al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 3, 620.

³² Id., *Šifāʾ*, 145.

³³ Id., *al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 2, 482, 487, and 489.

³⁴ See ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh Imām al-Haramayn al-Ġuwaynī, *Ġiyāt al-umam fī ltiyāt al-ḥulam*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm ad-Dīb (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Nahḍa, 1401/1981), 430; George F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 10–11; A. Kevin Reinhart, *Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 62–76.

³⁵ Cf. al-Ġuwaynī, *al-Burhān*, vol. 2, 805–6 and 1116; id., *Ġiyāt al-umam*, 267 and 430–3. The Muʿtazilī al-Ġaṣṣās, in contrast, accepted that the human intellect could determine rulings based on their benefit for people; such rulings, however, were not part of the religious law (see al-Ġaṣṣās, *al-Fuṣūl*, 57–9, 62, 85, and 93–5).

³⁶ Cf. al-Ġuwaynī, *Ġiyāt al-umam*, 267 and 431–3; id., *al-Burhān*, vol. 2, 923–60; al-Ġazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 2, 470–506 and vol. 3, 620–39.

law-finding procedure, this purpose can be identified in the form of suitable *rationes legis*.

Neither al-Ġuwaynī nor al-Ġazālī, however, successfully addressed the implication of causality in employing suitability/*maṣlaḥa* as a valid criterion to identify the *ratio legis* in analogy. The assertion that it was God who made the *ratio legis* suitable was not convincing enough to stop other jurists from rejecting the use of suitability.³⁷ Employing the criterion of suitability to identify the *ratio legis* attributes people's *maṣlaḥa* as a motivating cause (a *ratio legis*) for God's rulings and implies a causal relationship between God's intention and the ensuing ruling. Suitability, thus, reflects God's purpose in imposing a ruling derived on account of the presence of a suitable *ratio legis*. Furthermore, when jurists use suitable *rationes legis* to arrive at rulings that are not based on concrete textual evidence, the fallible human intellect attributes a divine purpose to a ruling that God did not reveal. Such application of suitability in analogical reasoning is problematic in terms of its implications of causality and confining God's legislative power. Yet, without employing suitable *rationes legis* to extend the law to unprecedented situations, the Aṣ'arī claim of an all-encompassing religious law that can address legal change is in the long run untenable.

About a century after al-Ġazālī had defined suitability in terms of the purpose of the law to bring about *maṣlaḥa* for the believer, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī took up the challenge to find a compromise. He accepted that God is the only Actor and that no necessary succession of cause and effect exists outside of God's unrestrained will,³⁸ and at the same time he wanted to allow the use of legal analogy in which the *ratio legis* is identified by its suitability to attain the purpose of the law. He demonstrates in the form of syllogistic proof the validity of using the criterion of suitability to verify the correct *ratio legis*. Ar-Rāzī's solution, which is presented below, makes analogy applicable in a manner that accords jurists a wide range to attain legal change without attributing causality between the *ratio legis* and its ruling and without confining God's omnipotence.

³⁷ Cf. Fathalla Kholeif, *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his Controversies in Transoxania* (Beirut: Dār al-Mašriq, 1966), Arabic text, 24–9.

³⁸ Cf. A. Djavad Falaturi, "Fakhr al-Dīn [sic] al-Rāzī's Critical Logic," in *Yād-Nāmeḥ-ye Irānī-yi Minorsky*, eds. M. Minovi and I. Afshar (Tehran: Tehran University, 1969), 51–79, at 69–71.

*Ar-Rāzī's Discussion of Suitability and Causality*³⁹

In his chapter on analogy, ar-Rāzī states that the most important indicant for the correctness of the *ratio legis*—after the authoritative texts, their linguistic intimations, and Consensus—is to establish that a characteristic of the original case is suitable (*munāsib*) for its ruling.⁴⁰ He then sets out to prove the validity of this method. His aim is to reconcile the proponents of the existence of some type of causal relationship between *ratio legis* and divine ruling with those who oppose this position. To this end, ar-Rāzī first defines suitability and how to establish it correctly, and then he tackles the issue whether employing suitability attributes causality to God's law.

Ar-Rāzī proceeds in his discussion of suitability (*munāsaba*) by reviewing definitions of the term “suitable” given by the proponents and opponents of attributing some form of causality to God's rulings. Those who accept a causal relationship between the *ratio legis* and its ruling say that suitable is whatever leads to attaining as well as retaining that which is agreeable to human beings, namely something that brings about a source of benefit (*manfaʿa*) and averts a source of harm (*maḍarra*). Retaining the agreeable is as important as attaining it because the loss of something beneficial leads to harm. The source of benefit may refer to religious or mundane matters and whether one attains or retains it may be known or probable. Defining suitable as something that brings about benefit and averts harm is accepted, says ar-Rāzī, by those who attribute to God's rulings *rationes legis* of underlying reasons (*ḥikam*) and *maṣlaḥas*.⁴¹ In other words, this definition of suitability is advanced by the supporters of the motive model of the *ratio legis*.

³⁹ The following section is based on work done for my book on the development of *maṣlaḥa* (cf. Felicitas Opwis, *Maṣlaḥa and the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to the 8th/14th Century* [Leiden: Brill, 2010], 113–21).

⁴⁰ After demonstrating that analogy constitutes legal proof in Islamic law, ar-Rāzī treats different ways to derive the *ratio legis* of rulings. He lists ten such methods: the text itself, linguistic intimations, Consensus, suitability, efficacy, resemblance, concomitance, classification and successive elimination, co-presence, and determining the hinge (*tanqīḥ al-manāt*) (see Faḥr ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Ḥusayn ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, 2 vols. [Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiya, 1408/1988], vol. 2, 311–60).

⁴¹ *Ib.*, vol. 2, 319–20.

The second definition of suitable which ar-Rāzī presents is that of the opponents of inherent motivation in God's rulings. The opponents reject the view that the human mind is able to determine God's motivation. They consequently reject that the *ratio legis* is connected to God's intentions as Lawgiver or that it can be used to find normative rulings for unprecedented cases. According to them, suitable is merely that which intelligent people customarily think to be fitting (*mulā'im*). Ar-Rāzī illustrates this definition saying that a particular pearl, for example, is deemed suitable for another in the sense that the two fit well together (*mutalā'im*) on a string.⁴² Those who define suitability in this manner reject that a suitable characteristic in a legal case leads to probable knowledge about the *ratio legis* of its ruling. They deny that a suitable characteristic indicates the *ratio legis* in legal analogy.⁴³ Ar-Rāzī thoroughly refutes this position. Before presenting his arguments, I will briefly summarize his view on how to determine suitable characteristics.⁴⁴

Suitability in a characteristic pertaining to the *ratio legis* can be established, ar-Rāzī says, when the associated ruling brings about benefit and averts harm to the five necessary *maṣlaḥas* (*al-maṣāliḥ aḍ-ḍarūriya*) of human existence, namely life, intellect, religion, property, and lineage (*nasab*).⁴⁵ Three criteria determine whether or not a suitable characteristic can be used as *ratio legis* in legal analogy: First, it has to be real (*ḥaqqī*), as opposed to spurious (*iqnā'i*), in that the suitable characteristic pertains to a *maṣlaḥa* of this world at the level of necessity (*ḍarūra*), need (*ḥāḡa*), or matters of improvement (*taḥsīnāt*), or pertains to an otherworldly *maṣlaḥa*.⁴⁶ Second, it has to be considered by the law (*i'tibār aš-šar'*). Something is considered by the law when there is evidence in the textual sources that attests either in favor

⁴² Ib., vol. 2, 320.

⁴³ Although ar-Rāzī does not mention any names, it is likely that he has the *Ẓāhirīs* in mind as opponents of causality. Ibn Ḥazm (384–456/994–1064) states explicitly that the *Ẓāhirīs* hold that God does not do anything, whether a ruling or something else, for a reason ('*illa*') (see 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ḥazm, *al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad 'Abd al-'Azīz [Cairo: Maktabat 'Ātif, 1398/1978], 1426).

⁴⁴ For a detailed account of ar-Rāzī's definition of suitability and how to determine it see *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 319–27.

⁴⁵ Ar-Rāzī does not follow al-Ġazālī's order of ranking the five necessary elements of human existence. Moreover, he is not always consistent in the order in which he mentions these elements. It appears, however, that for him the element of life receives priority in case of contradictory indications (ib., vol. 2, 324).

⁴⁶ Ib., vol. 2, 320–3.

or against paying attention to the characteristic in the law-finding process.⁴⁷ Third, the suitable characteristic has to be relevant (*mulā'im*) to the way in which the law operates. That is to say that its genus (*ġins*), or general class, has legal effects on the genus of the ruling.⁴⁸ For example, crimes are legally relevant to the rulings of punishment, but they are not relevant to the rulings concerning ritual ablution. In ar-Rāzī's interpretation of analogy, a *maṣlaḥa* does not have to be concretely mentioned in the textual sources to serve as valid *ratio legis* as long as it displays suitability and relevance.⁴⁹ Contrary to al-Ġazālī, he incorporates a *maṣlaḥa* that in its specific form is not found in the revealed texts, i.e. an unattested *maṣlaḥa* (*maṣlaḥa mursala*), into the deductive procedure of analogy⁵⁰ by arguing that the law attests to general *maṣlaḥas*.⁵¹ Since all specific *maṣlaḥas* are subsumable under their general category, they are—almost by default—considered by the law. One may even say that for ar-Rāzī, a truly unattested *maṣlaḥa* does not exist. As long as a suitable characteristic meets his definition of being real, considered by the law, and relevant, with the additional stipulation that no countervailing factor (*mu'ārid*) prevents the suitable characteristic from bringing about benefit and averting harm,⁵² that characteristic is valid to be the *ratio legis* of a ruling, irrespective of whether it is concretely attested in the textual sources or not. Ar-Rāzī's next step is to establish the theological validity of employing suitable *rationes legis* in the law-finding process.

Is There Causality in God's Law?

Ar-Rāzī sets out to prove that, irrespective of one's position on causality, suitability in a characteristic leads to the probable knowledge that it is correct to view that characteristic to be the *ratio legis* of the ruling in question. He further maintains that it is obligatory to act upon probability.⁵³ Ar-Rāzī tackles the issue of causality through the

⁴⁷ Ib., vol. 2, 323–4.

⁴⁸ Ib., vol. 2, 324–5.

⁴⁹ Ib., vol. 2, 323–4, 389, and 391.

⁵⁰ Al-Ġazālī specifically excludes the unattested *maṣlaḥa* from the procedure of analogy (*al-Mustaṣfā*, vol. 2, 488).

⁵¹ Ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 324.

⁵² Ib., vol. 2, 326–7.

⁵³ Ib., vol. 2, 327.

two above-mentioned definitions of suitability by the proponents and opponents of the existence of a causal relation between the *ratio legis* and its ruling. He first explains the position of the proponents, whom he further divides into two groups, the Mu'tazila and the jurists, and then he addresses the opponents' view.⁵⁴

Arguments by the Proponents of Causality

The proponents of the view that it is possible to attribute to divine injunctions the *ratio legis* of wisdom (*ḥikma*) and *maṣlaḥa* maintain, according to ar-Rāzī, that God legislates the rulings of the Šarī'a for the *maṣlaḥa* of humankind. This theological statement leads to the legal argument that upon identifying a *maṣlaḥa* in a ruling, probable knowledge arises that God imposes this ruling only on account of this *maṣlaḥa*.⁵⁵ Ar-Rāzī explains that this argument is based on three premises that are established by indicants. The first premise is that God specifies for every concrete incident a corresponding concrete ruling due to a preponderant factor (*murağğah*) that pertains to the *maṣlaḥa* of human beings. This premise, ar-Rāzī asserts, is true because by arguing that such specification is not due to a preponderant factor, one attributes senseless actions to God—which is absurd. Likewise, since God is without need, it would be absurd to assume that the preponderant factor pertains to God as opposed to the believer. It is equally futile to argue that a ruling is specified for the *mafsada* of humankind, or neither for their *maṣlaḥa* nor their *mafsada*.⁵⁶

Ar-Rāzī provides the following supportive indicants for his first premise that God's rulings are purposeful and that this purpose is the *maṣlaḥa* of His servants. As first indicant, ar-Rāzī refers to the Consensus (*iğmā'*) of Muslims that God is wise (*ḥakīm*). Any wise person only acts due to a motive, namely *maṣlaḥa*, or else s/he would be a fool. Attributing foolishness to God is an absurdity, he says. The Qur'ān affirms that God neither acts without purpose nor foolishly (e.g., Qur'ān 23:115; 3:191; and 44:39); Muslims agree that God is

⁵⁴ It should be noted that ar-Rāzī's assertion that Mu'tazilis and jurists both belong to the camp of the proponents of attributing to God's rulings motivations of underlying reasons and *maṣlaḥas* cannot be taken at face value. Al-Ğaṣṣāṣ, for example, denies this.

⁵⁵ *Ib.*, vol. 2, 327–8.

⁵⁶ *Ib.*, vol. 2, 328.

not foolish; and one knows through reason that foolishness is stupidity which, in turn, is a characteristic of lack of intelligence, which is inconceivable with reference to God. Thereby it is confirmed, according to ar-Rāzī, that God legislates rulings purposefully, namely for the *maṣlaḥa* of His servants.⁵⁷ Ar-Rāzī then presents additional indicants to establish that God does not impose rulings for the believers' *mafsada* but only for their *maṣlaḥa*. He argues that God created humankind in a privileged state of honor and nobleness, as known from His own words in the Qur'ān (17:70). Consequently, it is probable that God prescribes only something that is a *maṣlaḥa* for His creatures, since ennobling and harming contradict each other, which is inconceivable of God.⁵⁸ Furthermore, God created humankind to worship Him, as stated in Qur'ān 51:56. Imposing obedience to God's injunctions on the religiously accountable (*mukallaf*) requires the probability that God prescribes only what entails *maṣlaḥa* for them.⁵⁹ Moreover, the sacred texts themselves indicate that the law is a *maṣlaḥa* for people. This is evident from such Qur'ānic statements as: "We sent you only as a mercy for humankind,"⁶⁰ as well as from prophetic *ḥadīṡs* such as "neither harm nor harmful requital shall be inflicted in Islam" (*lā ḍarar wa-lā iḍrār fī l-islām*).⁶¹ In addition, in Qur'ān 7:156, God describes Himself as being kind and merciful to His servants, which implies that He prescribes what is beneficial for the believer. These indicants lead to the conclusion, ar-Rāzī argues, that the motivating factor for God's rulings is indeed the *maṣlaḥa* of the believer.⁶¹

Ar-Rāzī says that up to this point in the argument, the proponents of attributing motivation to God's rulings generally agree. However, the Mu'tazila and the jurists disagree over the theological implications of this attribution. Mu'tazilis, he maintains, hold that God's rulings must comprise an aspect of *maṣlaḥa* and purpose (*ḡaraḍ*), since otherwise God would be acting abominable and foolish, which is an absurdity.

⁵⁷ Ib.

⁵⁸ Ib., vol. 2, 239.

⁵⁹ Ib. Ar-Rāzī's argument reminds of the statement by the Mu'tazilī Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 434/1044) that the believer is only obliged to act upon God's ruling if s/he believes it is his/her *maṣlaḥa*. In contrast to al-Baṣrī, ar-Rāzī only claims probable knowledge (Muḥammad ibn 'Alī al-Baṣrī, *al-Mu'tamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh*, ed. Ḥalīl al-Mayyis, 2 vols. [Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiya, 1403/1983], vol. 2, 343–4).

⁶⁰ Qur'ān 21:107. Ar-Rāzī refers also to similar verses in the Qur'ān, such as 2:29; 45:13; 2:185; and 22:78 (*al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 329).

⁶¹ Ib.

The jurists, in contrast, maintain that God prescribes a particular ruling only due to (*li*) this-and-that meaning and on account of (*li-ağli*) this-and-that wisdom. Ar-Rāzī almost mocks the jurists' rejection of the Mu'tazilī position when he says: "Were [jurists] to hear the word 'purpose' [with regard to God] they would accuse the one uttering it of unbelief, although the [letter] 'l' [in the word *li* and *li-ağli*] means nothing else but 'purpose'."⁶² Ar-Rāzī explains that the jurists differ from the Mu'tazila in that they say that "although it is not incumbent upon God to safeguard people's *maṣlaḥas*, He nevertheless does only what is a *maṣlaḥa* for His servants out of grace and favor on His part (*tafaḍḍulan minhu wa-iḥsānan*), not out of obligation."⁶³ Ar-Rāzī's criticism of the jurists' aversion against ascribing 'purpose' to God's rulings seems to be directed primarily at their terminology. After all, he himself proclaims the view that God is not bound to safeguard people's *maṣlaḥas* in His law but does so out of His grace.⁶⁴

Ar-Rāzī's second premise in the argumentation for suitability being an indicant for the *ratio legis* is the following: When it is said that a particular action encompasses in a particular way a *maṣlaḥa*, it is obvious that attributing the *ratio legis* to this characteristic is only done when the two clearly correlate. One knows, for example, regarding the prohibition of wine that there is an obvious connection between the inebriating characteristic of wine and the *maṣlaḥa* that results from prohibiting it.⁶⁵

This leads to ar-Rāzī's third premise, or rather to the conclusion he draws from the first and second premises. "When we know that [God] only prescribes [something] due to a *maṣlaḥa*, and we know that a meaning is a *maṣlaḥa*, then we obtain the probable knowledge that the motivating factor for Him to prescribe this ruling is this very *maṣlaḥa*."⁶⁶ This conclusion, ar-Rāzī admits, depends on two

⁶² Ib., vol. 2, 330.

⁶³ Ib. As evident in al-Ğaṣṣāṣ' and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's work, the Mu'tazilī insistence that God is bound to prescribe only what is a *maṣlaḥa* for the believer is separate from their stand toward the use of *maṣlaḥa* as *ratio legis*. Rather, their adherence to the sign model of the *ratio legis* leads them to reject *maṣlaḥa* or suitability as *ratio legis* in analogy (cf. al-Ğaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl*, 134; al-Baṣrī, *al-Mu'tamad*, vol. 2, 238–9, 328, and 343–4). Ar-Rāzī, unfortunately, does not refer to any names when talking about the Mu'tazila.

⁶⁴ Cf. ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 389, where he says that God's rulings are *maṣlaḥas* based on His grace (*tafaḍḍul*).

⁶⁵ Ib., vol. 2, 330.

⁶⁶ Ib.

assumptions. First, that there is only one *ratio legis* for the ruling, namely the very *maṣlaḥa* that is discerned. He maintains that no other *maṣlaḥa* can be assumed to necessarily obtain from that ruling, or else this additional *maṣlaḥa* would have to be prior to the ruling, since it is impossible for the *ratio legis* to be posterior to its ruling.⁶⁷ It is absurd, according to ar-Rāzī, to argue otherwise for that would imply that there had been a ruling that ought to be adhered to by the believer even before God informs the person of the obligation, and the other *maṣlaḥa* would have had to exist prior to God revealing His rulings to the Prophet Muḥammad.⁶⁸ Ar-Rāzī then concludes that “when probability is established that no characteristic other [than the one under investigation] is the *ratio legis* of the ruling, then probability is established that this characteristic is the *ratio legis* of that ruling.” He insists that he claims for all of this only probable knowledge.⁶⁹

The second assumption on which the above conclusion depends involves a conjecture from the known world to the unknown, i.e. the divine. The probability that a wise person is wise, in addition to the knowledge that a particular ruling is attributable to a particular aspect of wisdom leads, in the present world, to the probable knowledge that this wise person legislated that particular ruling only on account of that particular aspect of wisdom. If this argument holds in the material world, ar-Rāzī argues, it necessarily follows that it should also hold with regard to God.⁷⁰ Ar-Rāzī illustrates this assumption with the example of a wise king whom we believe to act only on account of wisdom. If the king gives money to a pauper and if we know that the pauper’s poverty is a suitable characteristic for giving him money, while no other property comes to our mind that is suitable to explain this charitable act, then it is very probable that the king gives the pauper money only on account to the latter’s poverty. One cannot rule out the possibility that the king’s charity is motivated by some other

⁶⁷ Ib. This argument appears to be a stab at al-Baṣrī’s argument that *maṣlaḥa* is prior to the ruling, because al-Baṣrī understands *maṣlaḥa* as God’s informing the believer about the prospect of reward entailed in obeying His law (see al-Baṣrī, *al-Mu’tamad*, vol. 2, 238).

⁶⁸ Ar-Rāzī’s argument here is obviously directed against the claim that *maṣlaḥa* exists prior to the revelation. Ar-Rāzī, apparently, agrees with al-Baṣrī in this regard (see al-Baṣrī, *al-Mu’tamad*, vol. 2, 207).

⁶⁹ Ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 330–1.

⁷⁰ Ib., vol. 2, 331. This argument of the analogy of the invisible to the visible (*qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā š-šāhid*) is a Mu’tazilī principle which some Aṣ’arī theologians also employed (see EI2, s. v. “Mu’tazila,” vol. 7, 783–93, at 787, 789, and 791).

cause; if, for example, the pauper happens to be a jurist, the king may have other reasons to bestow his favors on him. Yet, unless one can establish a more preponderant reason the probability remains that the wise king acts only on account of that underlying reason (*ḥikma*).⁷¹ On the basis of these two assumptions, ar-Rāzī claims probable knowledge for his conclusion that God legislates a concrete ruling only due to a concrete *maṣlaḥa*. He then transfers this conclusion to the criterion of suitability. By determining suitability (*munāsaba*) in a characteristic of a ruling, he states, one obtains probable knowledge that attributing this characteristic as *ratio legis* to the ruling is correct.⁷²

Arguments by the Opponents of Causality

After presenting the reasoning process of the proponents of attributing motivation to God's law, ar-Rāzī proceeds to lay out the position of those who deny causality in God's rulings. While he does not refute the absence of a causal relationship between *ratio legis* and ruling, he refutes their rejection of using suitable characteristics to identify correctly the *ratio legis*. He maintains that even if one does not accept the view that God's actions and rulings are attributable to motives and purposes, one nevertheless can accept the statement that determining suitability in a characteristic leads to the probable knowledge that attributing that characteristic as *ratio legis* to the ruling under consideration is correct. Ar-Rāzī supports this statement with the following arguments: First, even though Muslims hold that it is not a logical necessity that, for example, stars and planets rise and set the way they do or that they retain their forms and colors, nevertheless, it is God's habit (*ʿāda*) to make them conform to this unique set of patterns and qualities. As a result, probability obtains that they will retain their current properties in the future. The same holds true, he says, for the fact that rain falls from a rain cloud, satiety follows eating, and burning results from contact with fire.⁷³ There is no certainty that these things will always happen but since they customarily happen this way,

⁷¹ Ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 331.

⁷² *Ib.*

⁷³ For an account of al-Ġazālī tackling the same issue in his refutation against the philosophers in *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* see Fakhry, *History of Islamic Philosophy*, 229–33; Goodman, “Did Ghazālī Deny Causality?” 87–91 and 96–8.

probability close-to-certainty arises that they will continue to follow the same pattern.⁷⁴

Ar-Rāzī presents a second argument to support suitability as *ratio legis* without attributing a causal relationship between *ratio legis* and ruling. He says that when pondering over the Šarī'a, one finds rulings and *maṣlaḥas* to be mutually simultaneous and concomitant; once the law was revealed, neither is separated from the other. When we know that one of the two occurs, we necessarily assume that the other occurs as well, with neither being effective on the other nor inducing it. Consequently, ar-Rāzī concludes, it is confirmed "that suitability [in a characteristic] is the indicant (*dalīl*) for attributing [this characteristic as] *ratio legis* to a ruling, despite the certainty that God's rulings are not causally attributable to purposes."⁷⁵ Furthermore, he maintains that since the suitability of a characteristic leads to the probable knowledge that this characteristic is the *ratio legis* of the ruling in question, it is also obligatory to consider an analogy based on this suitability to constitute legal proof.⁷⁶ With these words ar-Rāzī ends his proof that suitability is a valid indicant for the *ratio legis*.

Ar-Rāzī's proposition that God's rulings are concomitant with bringing about *maṣlaḥa* and averting harm for humankind is acceptable to both proponents and opponents of causality outside of God's immediate creative act. *Maṣlaḥa* and rulings are co-present, each being an indicant for the other. Understanding the relationship between *ratio legis* and ruling as one of concomitance renders the term cause (*'illa*) innocuous. When jurists find a characteristic displaying suitability in connection with a ruling, they can consider it the *ratio legis* of that ruling and extend the ruling in analogy to unprecedented cases. Ar-Rāzī's solution upholds God's omnipotence and sole causal agency while at the same time providing jurists with means to extend the law by means of *rationes legis*. His discussion of the subject of causality in God's law opens up new ground in Islamic legal philosophy. He overcomes the rift between those jurists who deny the human intellect's ability to comprehend God's motivation and, hence, reject the use of

⁷⁴ Ar-Rāzī's argument for the validity of probability in this case clearly shows that for him probability is a function of custom and frequency. The possibility to attain probability in analogy by mere frequency was subject to debate among Islamic jurists (see Zysow, *Economy of Certainty*, 461–3).

⁷⁵ Ar-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 2, 332.

⁷⁶ *Ib.*

rationes legis in legal analogy, and those jurists who consider human-kind's *maṣlaḥa* to be God's motivation in revealing His law. Moreover, ar-Rāzī goes beyond the controversy between the Mu'tazila and the Aṣ'ariya over whether or not God is obliged to prescribe His rulings for the *maṣlaḥa* of His servants. No matter which of these three positions one holds, the common denominator acceptable to all is that rulings and *maṣlaḥas* are concomitant. Thus, whenever suitability, which entails *maṣlaḥa*, is determined, it can be considered to be the *ratio legis* of the ruling. For the opponents of causality in God's rulings this would mean that the *ratio legis* is simply an indicant for the ruling without causal connection; it functions more like an occasion (*sabab*) or a sign (*amāra*). Consequently, all three groups can use the notion of *maṣlaḥa* as *ratio legis* for divine rulings without compromising their theological world views.

From ar-Rāzī's presentation of both the proponents and opponents' arguments of attributing motivation to God's rulings, it is difficult to determine his own stand. We know that ar-Rāzī did not advocate that God is bound to legislate His rulings for the *maṣlaḥa* of the believers.⁷⁷ Likewise, it is unlikely that he agreed completely with the opponents of any form of motivation and causality in God's law. Most likely he held a position that did not conflict with Aṣ'arism: embracing that God laid down His law for the *maṣlaḥa* of the believer; rejecting necessary causality between *maṣlaḥa* and rulings, yet accepting that God's habit⁷⁸ permits to consider suitability a probable indicant for establishing the *ratio legis* of a ruling. This conclusion regarding ar-Rāzī's own view on suitability and causality corresponds to what Louis Gardet says about the so-called 'modern' tendency in Aṣ'arism, introduced by al-Ġuwaynī. Modern Aṣ'arism, according to Gardet, is distinguished by the preference for reasoning in the three terms of the syllogistic type (as opposed to the two terms in dialectic) and by recourse to causality, "even when, on the ontological plane, the efficacy of secondary causes is denied."⁷⁹ We find both of these features in ar-Rāzī's argumentation in favor of using suitability in a characteristic to identify it as *ratio legis*: he reasons—almost exclusively—in form of syllogisms, and he employs the notion of causality, albeit one which is different

⁷⁷ Ib., vol. 2, 389.

⁷⁸ See on ar-Rāzī's use of God's habit also Falaturi, "Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī," 70.

⁷⁹ EI2, s.v. "Ilm al-kalām," vol. 3, 1142–50, at 1146.

from the necessary causality as propounded, according to ar-Rāzī, by the Muʿtazila.⁸⁰ The causality which ar-Rāzī advocates is a concomitant relationship between the *ratio legis* and its effect.⁸¹ God is not bound to act in any particular way and to prescribe only what entails *maṣlaḥa* for humans but, nevertheless, experience and repetition show that on the scale of probability, one can assume a constant relationship between the existence of suitable characteristics and *maṣlaḥa*.

Conclusions

The existence of efficient cause-effect relationships in this world was for Muslim theologians a problematic issue because such causal relations infringe on God's omnipotence. Some theologians, mainly those belonging to the Muʿtazilī school, explained empirically known causes and their effects as following God's order, i.e., they accepted secondary causality that was put into existence initially by the Creator. Others, mainly from the early Aṣʿarī school, denied such secondary causality and instead proposed that God directly and constantly created the effect in each instance anew. There was no predicting such relations as God could choose freely to create them differently.

For a long time, the theological debates over causality had few repercussions in the field of law, apart from jurists' insistence that the *ratio legis* was not a cause for divine rulings but only a sign or indication of them. However, by the 5th/11th century, jurists increasingly thought of the *ratio legis* not just as a sign but as a motive for the ruling. They considered the attainment of humankind's *maṣlaḥa* to be the reason that God revealed His law. While some jurists of the late 4th/10th and early 5th/11th centuries, such as the Ḥanafī-Muʿtazilī jurists al-Ğaṣṣāṣ and al-Baṣrī, understood the believers' *maṣlaḥa* in purely otherworldly terms, others, such as the Šāfiʿī-Aṣʿarī jurists al-Ğuwaynī and al-Ğazālī, saw God's intention to be the attainment of *maṣlaḥa* for the believer in this world and the one to come. In legal matters, *maṣlaḥa* as the purpose of the law was associated with

⁸⁰ Al-Ğaṣṣāṣ and al-Baṣrī, both counted among the Muʿtazila, differentiate between necessary causality as used in the rational sciences and the causal relationship that exists between the *ratio legis* and its ruling, which they do not conceive of as one of necessity (cf. al-Baṣrī, *al-Muʿtamad*, vol. 2, 201; al-Ğaṣṣāṣ, *al-Fuṣūl*, 58, 132–3, and 153).

⁸¹ See also *EI2*, s.v. “*Illa*,” vol. 3, 1132.

suitability as a criterion to identify the characteristics of a case that gives rise to its ruling, i.e. its *ratio legis*. Not only was *maṣlaḥa* associated with suitability but—since al-Ġazālī—*maṣlaḥa* had been defined by concrete determinable characteristics, namely those that preserve for humankind their religion, life, intellect, progeny, and property.⁸² Hence, jurists identified *rationes legis* by looking whether they attained the purpose that the divine rulings served. Wherever a jurist identifies *maṣlaḥa*, it is commensurate with the purposes of the divine law and constitutes the *ratio legis* of the ruling.

It seems that the issue of causality in the procedure of analogy did not come to the fore among Aṣ'arī jurisprudents until suitability was widely accepted as an expression of *maṣlaḥa*. If rulings are laid down due to a *ratio legis* that is identifiable as *maṣlaḥa* and people's *maṣlaḥa* is the purpose of the divine legislation, then the *ratio legis* reflects God's purpose and as such cannot be separated from the divine causal agency. The implication of a causal relationship between *maṣlaḥa* and the divine ruling is relatively unproblematic as long as the *maṣlaḥa* is textually attested. However, the growing use of unattested *maṣlaḥas* as suitable *rationes legis* for rulings that are not addressed in the revealed law is paramount to establishing a causal relationship between the divine purpose and rulings that is independent of God's revealed word because it articulates rulings not found in scripture. While the use of unattested *maṣlaḥas* opens up new ways of addressing those areas where the law is silent and, thus, strengthens the argument for an all-encompassing religious law, it also undermines the Aṣ'arī position that God is the only Cause in the universe. In order not to weaken the Aṣ'arī worldview, ar-Rāzī had to find a solution that validated the use of *rationes legis* that pertain to *maṣlaḥa*, be they attested or not. He found it by means of already established concepts in Muslim intellectual thought. Based on the notions of God's habit (*'āda*), concomitance (*dawarān*), and probability (*ẓann*) any jurist, no matter of which theological persuasion, could use suitability/*maṣlaḥa* as *ratio legis* for rulings, be they attested or not, without compromising God's omnipotence and volition.

⁸² Al-Ġazālī's definition of *maṣlaḥa* became so widely accepted by mainstream Islamic jurisprudence that one may say that it, or variations of it, serves up until today as a standard definition of *maṣlaḥa*. Those jurists who disagree with defining *maṣlaḥa* in terms of preserving the five necessities are, though not insignificant, a minority.

One further result of ar-Rāzī's defense of the motive model was the ascendance of the purposes of the law (*maqāṣid aš-šarī'a*) as a theme in writings on legal theory. While ar-Rāzī rarely refers to them, future jurists increasingly do so. This is evident in the work of jurists such as al-ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd as-Salām (d. 660/1263), al-Qarāfi (d. 684/1285), Nağm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfi (d. 716/1316), and even Ibn Taymiya (d. 728/1328) who otherwise rejects al-Ġazālī's definition of *maṣlaḥa*.⁸³ Growing consciousness in law-finding about God's intention with revealing His law affected legal concepts other than analogy. For example, it produces new interpretations of the concepts of legal license (*ruḥṣa*)⁸⁴ and leads the Mālikī jurist aš-Šāṭibī (d. 790/1388) to articulate a new theory of law-finding.⁸⁵ Ar-Rāzī's solution for explaining the relation between *ratio legis* and ruling made suitability and *maṣlaḥa* a palatable way of law-finding to Muslim jurists of all theological schools. It may rightly be seen as the basis upon which future generations of jurists could build their interpretations of the purposes of the divine law because, even if ar-Rāzī stayed within the realm of probability, his syllogistic reasoning was impeccable to the point of reaching certainty.

⁸³ Cf. Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiya, *Mağmūʿat ar-rasāʾil*, ed. Muḥammad Rašīd Riḍā, 5 vols. (Mecca: Dār al-Bāz li-n-Naṣr wa-t-Tawzīʿ, reprint 1976 [?]), vol. 5, 22.

⁸⁴ Cf. Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfi, *Šarḥ Tanqīḥ al-fuṣūl fī ḥtiṣār al-Maḥṣūl fī l-uṣūl* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1393/1973), 85–7; id., *al-Furūq wa-bi-hāmiš al-Kitābayn Tahdīb al-furūq wa-l-Qawāʾid as-saniya fī l-asrār al-fiqhiya*, 4 parts in 2 vols. (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, n.d.), part 1, 216, part 2, 33–4; Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā aš-Šāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl aš-šarī'a*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Darāz, 4 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, n. d.), vol. 3, 292–5, vol. 4, 299.

⁸⁵ By focusing on the purpose of the law, aš-Šāṭibī presents in his work *al-Muwāfaqāt* a novel approach to law-finding with far-reaching effects on the understanding of the process of revelation and on the epistemology of legal rulings (cf. Wael B. Hallaq, "The Primacy of the Qurʾān in Shāṭibī's Legal Theory," in *Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams*, eds. W. B. Hallaq and D. P. Little [Leiden: Brill, 1991], 69–90; Opwis, *Maṣlaḥa and the Purpose of the Law*, 294–9 and 324–6; id., "Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory," *Islamic Law and Society* 12 [2005], 182–223, at 195–6).

KITĀB AL-ḤAYDA: THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN APOCRYPHAL TEXT¹

Racha El Omari

Mais à quoi rêvent les théologiens? A la théologie. Je ne pense pas ici aux rêves prémonitoires ni à ceux qui contiennent un avertissement divin et invitent le rêveur à renoncer au monde, mais aux rêves dans lesquels une question de théologie est tranchée et le salut évoqué, dans lesquels un dialogue de nature hérésiographique s'engage avec un mort ou avec un être surnaturel. Le rêve est alors une occasion de s'entretenir avec Dieu, avec Satan, avec le Prophète ou avec tel personnage célèbre qui vient de mourir. La question de la sincérité du rêveur me semble secondaire, l'important étant de souligner le besoin de solliciter les morts afin qu'ils servent les desseins des vivants.²

Introduction

One of the more prominent characteristics of Ḥanbalite³ intellectual history and historiography is its proponents' staunch criticism of the doctrines of their Mu'tazilite and Ḡahmite⁴ opponents, whose

¹ I would like to thank Professor Everett Rowson and Felicitas Opwis for their comments and Intisar Rabb, Naseem Surhio and Christine Thomas for their valuable suggestions on an early draft of this paper.

² Abdelfattah Kilito, *L'auteur et ses doubles: Essai sur la culture arabe classique* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), 92.

³ Ḥanbalites were Sunni traditionists known for emphasizing the scripture and the prophetic tradition as a source of religious knowledge. For a history of Ḥanbalism, the work of George Makdisi provides an excellent starting point; most comprehensive is his *L'Islam Ḥanbalisant* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1983).

⁴ The Ḡahmites were known principally for reading the divine attributes metaphorically, and hence their opponents viewed them as deniers of the reality of the divine attributes. Furthermore, the doctrine of predestination sets them against the Mu'tazilites, who are proponents of free will. The Ḡahmites' history remains shrouded in obscurity and is based on their opponents' heresiographical accounts. An early survey of sources on the Ḡahmites can be found in Gösta Vitestam, introduction to *Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā l-Ḡahmīya* (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 12–44. See also Josef van Ess, "Dirār b. 'Amr und die 'Ḡahmīya," *Biographie einer vergessenen Schule*, *Der Islam* 43 (1967), 241–79, and 44 (1968), 1–70 and 318–20. A study of their early figure Ḡahm ibn Ṣafwān as well as the later and best known proponent Bīṣr ibn Ḡiyāṭ al-Marīṣī can be found in Josef van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), vol. 2, 493–508 and vol. 3, 175–88. The

theology was shaped by their adoption of the question and answer form of disputation known as *‘ilm al-kalām*.⁵ Equally characteristic of the Ḥanbalites was their condemnation of the *kalām* method, which they derogatively referred to as *al-ḥawḍ fi l-kalām*.⁶ Yet, the Ḥanbalites were at times willing to invoke this very method to formulate and propagate their own doctrines against their opponents.⁷ Although contested, the *kalām* method was adopted with varying degrees of opposition and controversy throughout Ḥanbalite writings. Ibn ‘Aqīl’s (d. 513/1119) adoption and subsequent retraction of Mu‘tazilite methods and doctrines was one of the more dramatic instances in this chapter of Ḥanbalite history,⁸ but it is not an isolated moment evidencing the adoption of the *kalām* method in Ḥanbalite thought. Since Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the disputation method of *kalām* was adopted by the Ḥanbalites in spite of those who strongly condemned it.⁹ This paper addresses this less studied side of Ḥanbalite history by tracing the steps of an apocryphal text,¹⁰ that came to be known by the title of *Kitāb al-Ḥayda* (*The Book of Evasion*) [Henceforth abbreviated as *KH*]. This paper traces its history by first establishing this work as apocryphal, and then demonstrating how it developed and continued

only work dedicated to a systematic discussion of their doctrines remains Richard Frank, “The Neoplatonism of Ḡāhm Ibn Ṣafwān,” *Le Muséon* 78 (1965), 395–424. The Ḡāhmītes transformed from an historical, albeit obscure, group to a polemical trope in Ḥanbalite literature but the time and exact moment of that transition remains thus far unstudied.

⁵ This method was most prominently established and systematized by the rationalist theological group the Mu‘tazilites, who emerged in the eighth century and disappeared from Sunnī theology in the fourteenth century. On the beginning and early period of the Mu‘tazilites, see van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*. For more recent scholarship on Mu‘tazilism, see *A Common Rationality: Mu‘tazilism in Islam and Judaism*, eds. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke and David Eric Sklare (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007).

⁶ The term used for engaging in theological disputation is always derogatory in Ḥanbalite literature (*al-ḥawḍ fi l-kalām*), see Ibn Ḥanbal’s work noted in Ibn Abī Yā‘lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (Cairo: Maṭba‘at as-Sunna al-Muḥammadiya, 1952), vol. 1, 130 and 241.

⁷ For example see Sabine Schmidtke, “Creeds,” *Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān*, vol. 2, 482.

⁸ On the condemnation of the method of *kalām* disputation in Ibn ‘Aqīl’s censure among fellow Ḥanbalites, see George Makdisi, *Ibn Qudamā’s Censure of Speculative Theology* (London: Luzac & Company LTD, 1962).

⁹ This will be discussed in detail below (see *A History of KH*).

¹⁰ The term apocryphal here is used to describe a text that is initially falsely ascribed to one historical person by another historical figure, and which has been subsequently expanded with manifold additions made by anonymous forgers.

to propagate in Ḥanbalite circles. Ultimately, this paper argues that it was the Ḥanbalites' simultaneous need for the *kalām* method, as continuously displayed in *KH*, and the overwhelming criticism of this method that contributed to the adoption and growth of *KH* in Ḥanbalite literature: It served the Ḥanbalites' polemical purposes of proving their opponents wrong without compromising their official commitment to avoiding the ways of *kalām*.

By tracing the trajectory of one apocryphal *kalām*-imbued Ḥanbalite work in the context of Ḥanbalite doctrinal writings, this paper shows that the Ḥanbalite position on *kalām* was far from one of simple condemnation. It argues that the *kalām* method was, rather, simultaneously opposed *and* applied among the Ḥanbalites during the first five centuries of their history. Further, the texts analyzed illustrate how this simultaneous condemnation and performance was far from even. When applied, *kalām* thrived in an apocryphal text such as *KH* but far less so in works falsely attributed to important figures such as Ibn Ḥanbal,¹¹ and when applied in authentic texts, it appeared with an apology and less systematically.¹² Thus, this paper adds to the literature that situates the Ḥanbalites' place and contribution to Islamic theology and intellectual history. More generally, the present investigation adds to Ḥanbalite intellectual history and historiography on the *miḥna* (218/833–234/848–849), an inquisition started by the Caliph al-Ma'mūn (r. 198/814–218/833).¹³ It was Henri Laoust¹⁴ who situated Ḥanbalism as a “traditionalist” movement—namely one that

¹¹ See below (Anti-Ġahmite Polemical Works) on Pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal's *Radd 'alā l-Ġahmiya*.

¹² See below (Anti-Ġahmite Polemical Works) on ad-Dārimi's *Radd 'alā Biṣr b. Marīsī al-'Anīd*.

¹³ On the events of the *miḥna* see Walter M. Patton, *Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna: A Biography of the Imam Including an Account of the Mohammedan Inquisition called the Miḥna* (Leiden: Brill, 1897), 218–34. For literature on the inquisition and its historical causes, see Martin Hinds and Patricia Crone, *God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the first Centuries of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and John Nawas, “The *Miḥna* of 218 A.H./833 A.D. revisited: an empirical study,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 116 (1996), 698–708.

¹⁴ Laoust's contributions included editions of major Ḥanbalite works as well as larger studies on early and later Ḥanbalism. See for example, his *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa, tradioniste et jurisconsulte musulman d'école Ḥanbalite* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1958), and for the latter, his *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Takī-d-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taimīya, canoniste ḥanbalite, né à Harrān en 661/1262, mort à Damas en 728/1328* (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1939).

is anchored in scripture and the prophetic tradition (*sunna*)—in the larger scope of Islamic intellectual history.¹⁵ George Makdisi further situated Ḥanbalism on the map of Islamic intellectual history by highlighting its specifically “traditionist” quality, that is, by focusing on it as a form of strict anti-rationalist traditionalism proffered in opposition to the rationalist traditionalism of the Ašʿarites. Makdisi’s scholarship focused on situating Ḥanbalism, defined as “traditionist,” as more central to Sunnism than Ašʿarism. Josef van Ess and Wilferd Madelung sought, rather, to highlight the rationalists’ contribution to Ḥanbalite traditionalism. This contribution is noted in the wide range of proto-Sunni traditionalism in the works of al-Ḥārīṭ al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) and Ibn Kullāb (d. 241/855), and the proliferation of a multifaceted traditionalism that developed at the time of the *miḥna*.¹⁶ Madelung proved that the Ḥanbalite doctrine of the eternity of the Qurʾān had not yet appeared in the earliest Ḥanbalite writings and only resulted from the debates that sought to rebuke the Ḡahmite and Muʿtazilite doctrine of the Qurʾān; thus, showing how at the time of the *miḥna*, the proto-Ḥanbalite view only touched upon the non-createdness of the Qurʾān and had not yet spoken of its eternity.¹⁷ Christopher Melchert addressed the intellectual traditionalist milieu of Ibn Ḥanbal and his worst enemies the semi-rationalists.¹⁸ More recently, the Ḥanbalites’ reaction to Ašʿarite *kalām*-imbued philosophy has received increased attention, as in the work of Jon Hoover on Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) anti-*kalām* rationalism.¹⁹ This paper revisits

¹⁵ For George Makdisi’s argument regarding the centrality of traditionalism in Sunnism see his, “Ašʿarī and the Ašʿarites in Islamic Religious History,” *Studia Islamica* 17 (1962), 37–80 and 18 (1963), 19–39. For a reassessment of Makdisi’s conclusion on al-Ašʿarī, see Richard M. Frank, “Elements in the Development of the Teaching of al-Ašʿarī,” *Le Muséon* 104 (1991), 141–90. Also see Makdisi’s work on Ibn Aqīl’s career and his controversial gravitation towards Muʿtazilism, which he was forced to recast, *Ibn ʿAqīl et la résurgence de l’islam traditionaliste au XI^e siècle, V^e siècle de l’Hégire* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1963).

¹⁶ Josef van Ess, *Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥārīṭ al-Muḥāsibī anhand von Übersetzungen aus seinen Schriften dargestellt und erläutert* (Bonn: Orientalisches Seminar der Universität Bonn, 1961); id., “Ibn Kullāb und die Miḥna,” *Oriens* 18 (1965–1966), 92–142; and idem, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 4, 123–227.

¹⁷ Wilferd Madelung, “The Origins of the Controversy Concerning the Creation of the Koran,” in *Orientalia Hispanica sive stuida F. M. Pareja octogenario dicata*, ed. J. M. Barral (Leiden: Brill, 1980), vol. 1, 504–25.

¹⁸ Christopher Melchert, “The Adversaries of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal,” *Arabica* 44 (1997), 234–53.

¹⁹ Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

the question of defining Ḥanbalite traditionalism by highlighting the role of Ḥanbalite reliance on the *kalām* method of argumentation for the propagation of the doctrine of the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān. A second line of inquiry which this paper contributes concerns the impact of the events of the *miḥna* on Ḥanbalite self-representation.²⁰ Here, this paper builds on van Ess's recognition in *KḤ* of an alternative model of Ḥanbalite historiography regarding the *miḥna* that celebrates triumphant heroes instead of martyrs.²¹

Van Ess discussed *KḤ* on two occasions.²² Initially, he identified it as a document exemplifying the *kalām* disputation method.²³ Next, he identified it as part of the *miḥna*'s legacy in his monumental *Theologie*. This latter discussion is critical because of its reference to the existence of an early recension of *KḤ* in Ibn Baṭṭa al-ʿUkburī's (d. 387/997) *al-Ibāna ʿan šarīʿat al-firaq an-nāḡiya wa-muḡānabat al-firaq al-maḍmūma*,²⁴ (henceforth *al-Ibāna*) and its identification of the primary forger of the story.²⁵ This paper brings to van Ess' foundational scholarship on *KḤ* consistent attention to its historical unfolding as a non-fixed apocryphal text, that focuses on the historical and textual context in which it originally emerges and then outlines two of its further developmental stages.

Towards this goal, this paper highlights, first, the main contents of *KḤ* and then describes its corpus, namely the editions and the manuscripts in which it survives today. Second, it revisits the contentious question of *KḤ*'s authenticity, clearing the confusion surrounding

²⁰ On the *miḥna* in Ḥanbalite historiography see the work of Nimrod Hurvitz and Michael Cooperson who have made new contributions to the issues raised by this question. Michael Cooperson, "Ibn Ḥanbal and Bishr al-Hāfi: A Case Study in Biographical Traditions," *Studia Islamica* 86 (1997), 71–101; id., *Arabic Biographical Dictionaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Nimrud Hurvitz, *The Formation of Ḥanbalism, Piety into Power* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), as well as van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 502–8.

²¹ As van Ess puts it, Ḥanbalites wished to hear about heroes and not only martyrs (*Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 502).

²² The earliest reference to *KḤ* in modern scholarship is in the context of the history of *munāzarāt* (public disputation), see ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maḡribī, "Munāzarat ʿālimayn fī maḡlis al-Maʿmūn," *Maḡallat al-Maḡma ʿal-ʿIlmī al-ʿArabī fī Dimašq* 29 (1954), 3–21.

²³ Van Ess, "Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie," *Revue des études islamiques* 44 (1976), 23–60.

²⁴ Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna ʿan šarīʿat al-firaq an-nāḡiya wa-muḡānabat al-firaq al-maḍmūma*, (Riyadh: Dār ar-Rāya li-n-Našr wa-t-Tawzīʿ, 1988), Part III [*ar-Radd ʿalā l-Gahmiya*] vol. 2, 225–48.

²⁵ Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 508.

the status of its apocryphal nature as it appears in the sources and establishing its apocryphal status despite the apparent contradictions that abound in the biographical literature. Third, the paper traces three important moments of *KH*'s history: its earliest extant recension in Ibn Baṭṭa's *al-Ibāna*, its citation in the work of Ibn Taymīya, and its appearance in an independent dramatized version, that point to the breadth and popularity of its distribution after the Qādirī creed (*ar-Risāla al-Qādirīya*) instigated by the Caliph al-Qādir bi-llāh (r. 381/991–422/1031).²⁶

Summary of KH's Content

The *KH* consists of a fluid, continuously changing text that was added to and embellished over a period of at least five hundred years starting in the third/ninth century. In the three versions examined here, it relates a first person narrative falsely attributed to a minor student of aṣ-Ṣāfi'ī, by the name of 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Kinānī (d. 221/836),²⁷ who narrates a debate that took place between him and Bišr ibn Ġiyāt al-Marīsī (d. 218/833). Al-Marīsī was a Ġahmite and one of the major political orchestrators of the *miḥna*. During the *miḥna*, key traditionalist figures,²⁸ most importantly, Ibn Ḥanbal, were forced, often by violent means, to uphold the belief that the Qur'ān was created. By commencing this inquisition, al-Ma'mūn exacerbated the pending clash of theological visions between a group of proto-Sunnī traditionists, later known to their opponents as al-Ḥašwiya and Nābita²⁹ and the *ahl al-kalām* (dialectical theologians), who at the time were mostly represented by the Mu'tazilites and the Ġahmites. Although the Mu'tazilites were not the major force instigating this *miḥna*, their shared views with the Ġahmites on the doctrine of the createdness

²⁶ See Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqīl*, 302.

²⁷ Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 507.

²⁸ See aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Ta'riḥ ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, n. d.), vol. 8, 631–46. On the political nature of proto-Ḥanbalism, see Wilferd Madelung, "The Vigilant Movements of Sahl b. Salāma al-Ḥurāsānī and the Origins of Ḥanbalism Reconsidered," *Journal of Turkish Studies* 14 (1990), 331–7.

²⁹ The terms Ḥašwiya and Nābita reflect the proto-Sunnī traditionist views on the nature of God, specifically their literalist reading of the divine attributes. See A.S. Halkin, "The Ḥašwiyya," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 54 (1934), 1–28; and Wadād al-Qāḍī, "The Nābita and the Paradigmatic Nawābit," *Studia Islamica* 78 (1993), 27–61.

of the Qurʾān stigmatized them forever in Ḥanbalite literature.³⁰ The alleged debate that took place between al-Kinānī and al-Marīsī in the presence of al-Maʾmūn was dominated by two key non-historical traits: al-Kinānī not only convinces al-Maʾmūn of the falsehood of the doctrine of the createdness of the Qurʾān, but also wins the debate against the *mutakallim* (dialectical theologian) al-Marīsī, who “loses” by evading the question al-Kinānī posed. The title *Ḥayda* captures the moment when al-Marīsī fails to respond to the principle question in the debate demanding whether God’s knowledge exists, thereby disclosing the Ġahmites’ failure to defend on sound ground their denial of the divine attributes, in general, and God’s knowledge, in particular.³¹

The KH Corpus

A diachronic approach to this text, calls for an investigation of the extant versions of this text, although the exposition of every version of the text is beyond the scope of this paper. Texts with the title and content of *KH* are extant in two venues, either as independent manuscripts or as citations in other works. Fuat Sezgin singles out twenty-one independent manuscripts and one published version from the beginning of the twentieth century, which does not include details about the manuscripts from which these texts derive.³² These works listed by Sezgin are entitled either *Kitāb al-Ḥayda* or *Kitāb al-Ḥayda wa-al-ʾitidār*. Only Ibn Baṭṭa’s *al-Ibāna*³³ and a fragmentary quotation in Ibn Taymiyya’s *Dar’ ta’āruḍ al-ʾaql wa-n-naql* provide citations in other works.³⁴ Ibn Baṭṭa’s recension was identified by Josef van Ess when he first hinted at the promise of comparing it to other recensions.³⁵

³⁰ See, for example, Ibn Taymiyya’s comments on the false identification of the Muʾtazilites with the Ġahmites in Ḥanbalite writings, *al-Fatāwā al-kubrā* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1998), vol. 9, 165.

³¹ Al-Kinānī describes al-Marīsī’s failure to respond in these terms as “Biṣr evaded my question and refused to admit unbelief by stating that God has no knowledge (*fa ḥāda Biṣr ‘an ḡawābī wa-abā an yuṣarriḥ bi-l-kufr fa-yaqūl laysa li-llāhi ‘ilm*),” Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, (Riyadh, Dār al-Rāya li-n-Naṣr wa-l-Tawzī, 1988), Part III, vol. 2, 229.

³² Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schriftums* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), vol. 1, 617.

³³ Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 225–48.

³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Dar’ ta’āruḍ al-ʾaql wa-n-naql*, ed. Muḥammad Raṣād Sālim (Riyadh: Ġāmiʿat al-ʾImām Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd, 1979–1981), vol. 2, 245–51.

³⁵ Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 507.

As far as one can tell, *al-Ibāna* is the earliest available recension to date, and as will be seen by comparing it to other recensions, it is pivotal to understanding the history of *KH*. A comprehensive history of *KH* would naturally have to rest on a critical apparatus that accounts for both kinds of recensions of the work outlined here.³⁶ The present inquiry, however, highlights only the main features of three forms of the text that point to three recensions. The first two are those quoted in the Ḥanbalite texts (*al-Ibāna* and *Dar' ta'āruḍ*) noted above and the third is Landberg 75,³⁷ one among the twenty-one manuscripts identified by Sezgin. Landberg 75 dates to 509/1116 and displays the highly dramatized features of *KH* prevalent in independent recensions.

Despite their obvious importance for having called the attention of modern scholars to this neglected source of Islamic intellectual history, current editions are not useful here because they contain corrupt and mixed recensions. Ḡamīl Ṣalībā's 1964 *KH* edition used five different sources: four manuscripts and the one published version based on an anonymous manuscript located in Cairo (noted in Sezgin). Ṣalībā's edition remains misguided in tracing *KH*'s history³⁸ since it does not explain the transmission of the recensions. A 1992 edition from Medina by 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Faqīhī is valuable for its use of two new sources not examined by Ṣalībā: a Tunisian manuscript and the *al-Ibāna* version.³⁹

³⁶ The challenge with a critical edition of a spurious text is to identify the original text, while still preserving all the details of its various recensions, and thus account for the development of all recensions. See for example Dimitri Gutas and Hans Biesterfeldt, "The Malady of Love," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 104 (1984), 21–55.

³⁷ Landberg 75, Beinecke Rare Books Library, New Haven, CT.

³⁸ On Ṣalībā's discussion of the manuscripts he used, see Ḡamīl Ṣalībā, ed., introduction to *Kitāb al-Ḥayda* (Damascus: al-Mağmā' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī bi-Dimašq, 1964), 41–7.

³⁹ *Kitāb al-Ḥayda wa-l-i'tidār*, ed. 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Nāṣir al-Faqīhī (Medina: al-Ġāmi'a al-Islāmiya bi-l-Madīna al-Munawwarra, 1992). Faqīhī notes the existence of an *isnād* (chain of transmitters) of *KH* in *al-Ibāna* that is distinct from the one he finds in the *KH* manuscripts he uses and takes this additional *isnād* as evidence of its authenticity. Aside from the elements of fabrication that he does not address, Faqīhī does not mention the fact that the narrator in *al-Ibāna* and the *isnāds*, Muḥammad ibn Farqad, recurs in other extant *isnāds* of *KH* used by him and Ṣalībā.

Authenticity and Apocrypha

The apocryphal nature of the text is not addressed in the doctrinal literature, but it is addressed in biographical literature, although with inconsistency. The name of the forger of the first extant version of *KH* has been identified by van Ess as Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Azhar ibn Ġubayr ibn Ġaʿfar Abū Bakr ad-Daʿā al-Aṣamm (d. 320/932).⁴⁰ Still there remains the problem of the apparent inconsistency in the way the ascription of *KH* was covered in the biographical literature, which led modern readers to mistake them for statements affirming the authenticity of *KH*. Thus before analyzing the first extant version of *KH*, we should clarify what caused this confusion and, in the process, hopefully explain the change in the reception and function of *KH*. Indeed, one of the barriers to using the Ṣalībā and al-Faqīhī editions is that both editors did not recognize the apocryphal nature of *KH* and its subsequent fluidity and growth in the critical apparatus. Ṣalībā accepts the ascription of *KH* to al-Kinānī, resting his views on *KH*'s self-presentation as including a nucleus of truth to which spurious material was added later. However, the biographical sources are themselves ambivalent when it comes to their discussion of the authorship of *KH*.⁴¹ It is, therefore, critical to clear up the confusion that results from the ambivalent discussion of the authorship of *KH*.

Historical Elements in the Apocrypha

Without some degree of likelihood of authenticity derived from historical detail, it would be difficult for any apocryphal work to gain the minimum momentum required for it to have sufficient credibility to circulate. Both al-Marīsī and al-Kinānī were historical figures: the former became the more notoriously prominent and better known of the two protagonists, since he was demonized in Ḥanbalite doctrinal and historical literature. Along with the Muʿtazilite Aḥmad ibn Abī Duʿād (d. 240/854), al-Marīsī, a follower of Ġahmite doctrines,

⁴⁰ Al-Ḥaṭīb al-Baġdādī, *Taʾrīḥ Baġdād*, ed. Baššār ʿAwwād Maʾrūf (Beirut: Dār al-Ġarb al-Islāmī, 2001), vol. 2, 591–3; van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 502–8.

⁴¹ The apologetic functions of *KH* persist in the prefaces of Ṣalībā and Faqīhī. They both argue for the truthfulness of the ascription of *KH* to al-Kinānī (Faqīhī, *Kitāb al-Ḥayda*, 6–11; and Ṣalībā, *Kitāb al-Ḥayda*, 15–6).

was most influential in the orchestration and implementation of the *miḥna*.⁴² His involvement in the *miḥna* furthered his status as a heretic (*zindīq*) whose blood was deemed lawful to be shed.⁴³ A follower of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) and a student of Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798), al-Marīsī is cast by the Ḥanafite Ibn Abī l-Wafā' (d. 775/1374) in the least possible heretical guise in comparison to traditionalist biographies.⁴⁴ For instance, al-Marīsī is described as a Mu'tazilite, when he was indeed a Ḡahmite. This is because Mu'tazilism became a relatively less condemning accusation in later Sunnī literature than Ḡahmism, which became equated to the denial of divine reality.⁴⁵ Al-Marīsī's ascetic traits, long eroded by the post-*miḥna* anti-Ḡahmite Ḥanbalite rhetoric, also appear in Ibn Abī l-Wafā'.

Most arresting of our attention among the details of al-Marīsī's biographies, are reports (*aḥbār*) that describe his association with aš-Šāfi'ī.⁴⁶ Aš-Šāfi'ī is said to have lived in close proximity to the quarters of al-Marīsī, and was hosted by him when he visited Baḡdād.⁴⁷ That the two were acquainted is especially evident in a report that describes al-Marīsī's mother imploring aš-Šāfi'ī to intervene in her son's affairs and convince him to abandon *kalām*.⁴⁸ In one version of this report, al-Marīsī displays an unmistakable deference for aš-Šāfi'ī.⁴⁹ In addition to the story of al-Marīsī's mother, which includes aš-Šāfi'ī's intervention, there are reports of debates between aš-Šāfi'ī and al-Marīsī, further confirming their close acquaintance despite their divergent theological opinions. The degree of familiarity between these two figures, as established in these accounts, renders the interaction between associates of aš-Šāfi'ī and al-Marīsī all the more likely, and

⁴² Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 175–88.

⁴³ One of the least favorable biographical entries regarding al-Marīsī is in al-Ḥaṭīb al-Baḡdādī, *Ta'riḥ Baḡdād*, vol. 7, 531–45, as well as Ibn Ḥaḡar, *Lisān al-mizān* (Haydarabād: Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif an-Nizāmīya, 1911–1913), vol. 2, 29–31. For an account of various views see Ibn Ḥallikān, *Wafāyāt al-a'yān*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās (Beirut: Dār at-Taḡāfa, 1971), vol. 1, 277–478.

⁴⁴ See al-Ḥaṭīb al-Baḡdādī, *Ta'riḥ Baḡdād*, vol. 1, 531–45; aḍ-Ḍahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*, ed. Šu'ayb al-Arnā'ūt (Beirut: Mu'assasat ar-Risāla, 1998), vol. 10, 199–202; and id., *Mizān al-i'tidāl*, ed. Muḥamad al-Barḡūṭi (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1985), vol. 1, 322–3.

⁴⁵ Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Ḡawāhir al-mudī'a fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya*, (Haydarabād, n. d.), vol. 2, 165.

⁴⁶ Al-Ḥaṭīb, *Ta'riḥ Baḡdād*, vol. 7, 535–7.

⁴⁷ Ib., vol. 7, 535.

⁴⁸ Ib.

⁴⁹ Ibn Abī l-Wafā', *al-Ḡawāhir*, vol. 2, 165.

the extent of contention between the two and their followers all the more likely as well.

Al-Kinānī was also associated with aš-Šāfiʿī as his student and close companion during his teacher's stay in Yemen.⁵⁰ The descriptions of al-Ḥaṭīb al-Baġdādī (d. 463/1071) have led most biographers to regard him mainly as a disciple of aš-Šāfiʿī, since these accounts invoke aš-Šāfiʿī's influence on al-Kinānī's adoption of theories of generality (*ʿumūm*) and specificity (*ḥuṣūṣ*) in linguistic-jurisprudential theory.⁵¹ In Ibn an-Nadīm's (d. between 385/995–388/998) *Fihrist*, al-Kinānī appears as a more independent figure than in other biographies: an ascetic and *mutakallim* of the generation of al-Ḥārīt al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857).⁵² Aside from a fairly late reference to a work attributed to him titled *ar-Radd ʿalā l-Ġahmiya* invoked by Ibn Qayyim al-Ġawziya (d. 751/1350),⁵³ the only work consistently mentioned by his biographers is *KH*. Although he is recognized as a *ḥadīṭ* narrator by al-Ḥaṭīb, al-Kinānī's principle scholarship was not limited to *ḥadīṭ* reporting.⁵⁴

Al-Kinānī's *kalām* expertise attested by his biographers, starting with Ibn an-Nadīm, finds an important precedent in Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr's (d. 313/925–26) references to two debates al-Kinānī held with al-Marīsī at the court of al-Ma'mūn, one of which is related in its entirety.⁵⁵ This debate analyzes the nature of belief⁵⁶ and shares

⁵⁰ Al-Ḥaṭīb, *Ta'riḥ Baġdād*, vol. 12, 212–4.

⁵¹ In Abū Ishāq aš-Širāzī's (d. 476/1083) biography of al-Kinānī, he is simply described as having debated Bišr al-Marīsī at the court of al-Ma'mūn and that he was a *mutakallim*; no reference is made to *KH*. See *Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahā'* (Port Sa'īd: Maktabat at-Taḳāfa ad-Diniya, 1997), 101.

⁵² Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. Riḍā Taġaddud (Beirut: Dār al-Masīra, 1988), 236.

⁵³ See Ibn Qayyim al-Ġawziya, *Iġtimā' al-ġuyūṣ al-Islāmiya ʿalā ġazw al-mu'aṭṭila wa-l-Ġahmiya*, ed. Zakariyā' ʿAlī Yūsuf (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Imām, n. d.), 104–5; and van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 507. Given its late appearance, the title found in Ibn al-Qayyim under *ar-Radd ʿalā l-Ġahmiya* is very likely to be identical with *KH*. Two other titles ascribed to al-Kinānī appear in Ṣalībā's edition of *KH*: *Risāla fī faḍl banī Hāšim* and *Kitāb as-Sunan wa-l-aḥkām* (Ṣalībā, *Kitāb al-Ḥayda*, 224). Given the spurious and late nature of the recensions in which these titles appear, they must be considered with caution (van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 507).

⁵⁴ Al-Ḥaṭīb, *Ta'riḥ Baġdād*, vol. 12, 212–4.

⁵⁵ Ibn Abī Ṭayfūr, *Ta'riḥ Baġdād*, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawṭari (Baghdad: Matkabat al-Muṭanna, 1949), 47–9. The earlier unrelated report discusses anthropomorphism. Van Ess notes that there is no reason to doubt the historical possibility of a meeting between al-Kinānī and Bišr al-Marīsī (*Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 507).

⁵⁶ On the telling and retelling of the same reports for new purposes, see van Ess, "Theorie und Anekdote zur Verarbeitung theologischer Argumente in biographischer Literatur," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 135 (1985), 22–54.

with the earlier version of *KH* related by Ibn Baṭṭa (see below) three key elements: the first person narration by al-Kinānī, his winning the argument against al-Marīsī, and most importantly, Ibn Abī Ṭayfūr's introduction of al-Kinānī as a *mutakallim*.⁵⁷ The similarities stop here. Al-Kinānī's method of argumentation, as reported in Ibn Abī Ṭayfūr, is far from what we find in *KH*, for here al-Kinānī uses *ḥadīṭ* (as well as non-prophetic reports) to support his position, a premise that, in al-Kinānī's view in *KH*, is deemed an unacceptable way to argue with Ḡahmites, whom he proclaims unbelievers. Al-Kinānī had strong ties to the fathers of the *sunna*, having conducted his discipleship under aš-Šāfi'ī. Furthermore, he had never associated with the controversial proto-Sunnī traditionalist Ibn Kullāb (d. 241/855). Yet, al-Kinānī was placed in the same category as al-Muḥāsibī, the one proto-Sunnī *mutakallim* who had more than any other been absolved of criticism by his Ḥanbalite successors.⁵⁸ Finally, the historical al-Kinānī topped these two qualities with an absence of ties to Ibn Ḥanbal. This absence served to prevent any indignation from arising if a work were to be falsely ascribed to al-Kinānī. Given al-Kinānī's summation of an obscure form and personification of a powerful variant of traditionalist *kalām*, his consumption by Ḥanbalite writings becomes understandable. Although not a true Ḥanbalite insider, he was able to fulfill Ḥanbalite theological-polemical demands over time. In defense of the authenticity of the ascription of *KH* to al-Kinānī, Ṣalībā raised an important question: why should anyone make up a story about a marginal figure?⁵⁹ This paper suggests that it was precisely *because* al-Kinānī was a marginal figure that this spurious text not only appeared but was expanded upon.

In sum, let it be noted that there is no reason to doubt that al-Kinānī and al-Marīsī met and debated the nature of the Qur'ān, for, as we have just detailed, there is evidence that they did. Rather, it is only the content and structure of the narrative that came to be known as *KH* that proved to be spurious.

Here he discusses the appearance in Ibn Abī Ṭayfūr of the debate between Kinānī and al-Marīsī on the nature of belief where al-Kinānī's role is replaced by Abū l-Hudayl al-'Allāf.

⁵⁷ Ibn Abī Ṭayfūr, *Ta'riḥ Baġdād*, 47.

⁵⁸ See ad-Dahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*, vol. 12, 110–12.

⁵⁹ Ṣalībā, *Kitāb al-Ḥayda*, 22.

Incommensurable Evidence in Biographical Dictionaries

Inconsistency regarding *KH*'s spurious nature, however, begs for an explanation. The false ascription of *KH* to al-Kinānī is not found in his biographies, but in those of ad-Daʿā al-Aṣamm, the forger, until the writings of the traditionist Šāfiʿite ad-Dahabī (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352–3) and his contemporary the Ašʿarite Šāfiʿite as-Subkī (d. 769/1368).⁶⁰ As-Subkī denounced the ascription of *KH* to al-Kinānī, all the while acknowledging al-Kinānī's status as a defender of the *sunna* in his stance on the question of the createdness of the Qurʾān, in addition to the existence of the debate between him and al-Marīsī. The lateness of this acknowledgment of the apocryphal status of *KH* was viewed by some as proof of the truthfulness of the tradition.⁶¹ The fabrication reference appears early, however, not in the biography of al-Kinānī but in the biography of ad-Daʿā al-Aṣamm, the man accused by al-Ḥaṭīb of forging *KH*.⁶² Al-Aṣamm is described by al-Ḥaṭīb as not only untrustworthy (*kāna ġayr ṭiqa*), but also not hesitating to attribute forged reports to trustworthy figures (*yarwī l-mawḏūʿāt ʿan at-ṭiqāt*).⁶³ Al-Ḥaṭīb includes two forged reports that he suggests were not only attributed by al-Aṣamm to trustworthy figures but also cites trustworthy figures in their chains.⁶⁴

Two points require clarification here: First, why does al-Ḥaṭīb remain silent about *KH*'s spuriousness in al-Kinānī's biography, yet raises it in the biography of the alleged fabricator?

Second, why did this apparent contradiction appear so late, namely in ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī? It might be useful to recall that in *Taʾrīḥ Baġdād*, al-Ḥaṭīb mainly concerns himself with addressing the *ḥadīth*-reporting activity of each figure. His aim is to expose lying and expose a reporter's character. Since lying about *KH* had no

⁶⁰ Ad-Dahabī, *Mizān al-iʿtidāl fī naqd ar-riġāl* (Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1963–1964), vol. 2, 141; id., *Taʾrīḥ al-Islām*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd as-Salām (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1987), vol. 5, 873–4; and as-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt aš-Šāfiʿiyya* (Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1964–1976), vol. 2, 144–5. Moreover, the available biographies of al-Kinānī that make no reference to false ascription are Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, 236; al-Ḥaṭīb, *Taʾrīḥ Baġdād*, vol. 12, 212–4; Ibn al-Ġawzī (d. 597/1200), *al-Muntazam* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1992), vol. 11, 67; and Ibn al-ʿImād, *Šaḍarāt ad-ḍahab fī aḥbār man ḍahab* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Qudsī, 1931), vol. 2, 95.

⁶¹ Šalībā, *Kitāb al-Ḥayda*, 18.

⁶² Al-Ḥaṭīb, *Taʾrīḥ Baġdād*, vol. 2, 591–3.

⁶³ Ib.

⁶⁴ Ib.

bearing on al-Kinānī's character, but on that of al-Aṣamm, a discussion of *KH*'s fabrication had no place in al-Kinānī's biography but in that of al-Aṣamm. Still, this line of thinking can constitute only part of the answer. Had the fabricated work contained contents that he deemed heretical and harmful, it is difficult to believe al-Ḥaṭīb would not have exposed it. This seems to have been the motivation of ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī in commenting on the contents of *KH* in the biography of al-Kinānī, even though no one else had done so before. There ought to have been a cause. Perhaps some change occurred in ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī's contexts as well as in the corpus of *KH* that prompted their decision to address *KH*'s spurious nature in al-Kinānī's biography when no one else did before. One could fully investigate these changes only by studying the version of *KH* alongside the contemporaneous intellectual changes that began to inform the Ḥanbalite and Šāfi'ite communities.⁶⁵ For now, however, all we know is that ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī were not only copying al-Ḥaṭīb's entries, but had first hand access to *KH*, which proved to contain unbefitting theological arguments.

Later scholars did not follow ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī's lead. Despite Ibn Ḥağar's (d. 852/1449) unusual access to early sources, he did abide by al-Ḥaṭīb's decision to separate discussion of the text's inauthenticity, relegating comments stressing the unlikely content of the *KH* to the biography of al-Aṣamm instead.⁶⁶ Indeed, Ibn Ḥağar's decision may suggest that ad-Dahabī and as-Subkī's differing opinions were triggered by shifts in the Ḥanbalite milieu at the time.

This apparent incommensurability in the examination of *KH*'s ascription points to two important details regarding the reception and readership of *KH*. First, for al-Ḥaṭīb and the biographers who followed his lead in separating issues of al-Kinānī's biography, textual analysis from those of *KH*'s authenticity acknowledging the falsehood of *KH* did not prevent him regarding the work as a useful doctrinal source. Willingness to parse the doctrinal relevance of *KH* from its inherent

⁶⁵ We know about the new tensions between the Aṣ'arites and the Ḥanbalites at the time and the changes they were undergoing, most importantly but not exclusively, through the career and work of Ibn Taymiyya. See Sherman A. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyya on Trial in Damascus," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 39 (1994), 41–85. As for knowing what form of *KH* would have been available at the time, we will have to await a critical study and edition of the available manuscripts of the work.

⁶⁶ Ibn Ḥağar, *Lisān al-mizān*, vol. 5, 128–9.

authenticity did not persist unconditionally during the span of the next five hundred years. Yet we can be certain of two conclusions: The text of *KH* underwent a substantial change in form and diffusion by the time of aḍ-Ḍahabī and as-Subkī, which certainly seemed to inform their reactions to it; and, larger significant changes were sweeping through traditionalist circles in which aḍ-Ḍahabī and as-Subkī took part, which in turn influenced their shift toward *KH*.

A History of KH

To trace the history of *KH*, one should turn to explain how it developed in Ḥanbalite writings. Before embarking on this quest, one should keep in mind that neither the initial fabricator, ad-Daʿā al-Aṣamm, nor the pseudo-epigrapher to whom the work was falsely attributed, al-Kinānī, were Ḥanbalites. Also, let it be noted that the initial version of *KH* crafted by al-Aṣamm remains unavailable to us. The first and most extensive part of our tracing of the history of *KH* will be dedicated to the content and context of *KH*'s initial appearance, namely in Ibn Baṭṭa's *al-Ibāna*. Among the more significant characteristics that will be highlighted is the deeply divided views of the early Ḥanbalites on the use of the *kalām* method of disputation to make their points against their opponents (which was briefly touched upon in the introduction). One then turns to two later versions, whose content will only be outlined, even though full assessment would be necessary for a comprehensive analysis of this work. The first of these is a version of *KH* found in the work of Ibn Taymiya's *Dar' ta'āruḍ al-'aql wa-n-naql*, which displays arguments not evident in the first version. The second is a fictionalized independently circulated version of *KH* that dates back to the century after the public promulgations of the Qādirī creed (*ar-Risāla al-Qādirīya*) launched by the Caliph al-Qādir bi-llāh, which attacked and condemned the Mu'tazilites and Ḡahmites, among other groups,⁶⁷ and in whose extant passages there are references to the event of *al-Ḥayda* with al-Kinānī's debating with Biṣr al-Marīsī at the court of al-Ma'mūn.

⁶⁷ This is reported in Ibn al-Ḡawzī, but the entire text of the Qādirī creed is not extant, *al-Muntaẓam* (Haydarābād: Maṭba'at Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-ʿUṭmāniya, 1938), vol. 8, 109–11.

KH in Ibn Baṭṭa's al-Ibāna: Content and Context
Synopsis of KH in al-Ibāna

Al-Kinānī's first person narrative starts with his description of being summoned for a disputation with al-Marīsī by the caliph al-Ma'mūn, who describes himself as acting on behalf of the people. The two debaters are then invited to identify a premise (*aṣl*) by which they will both abide. Al-Kinānī asks to have precedence in dictating what the principle ought to be, on the grounds that al-Ma'mūn has little acquaintance with his style of argumentation. His request is granted. The principle he chooses is *tanzīl* (revelation). Al-Kinānī justifies his choice on the grounds that it is impossible for someone who does not believe in God's book to debate by interpretation (*ta'wīl*), exegesis (*tafsīr*), or prophetic tradition (*ḥadīth*); rather, he can only be debated on the basis of *tanzīl*.⁶⁸ To reinforce his choice of *tanzīl* further, al-Kinānī cites verses from the Qur'ān describing prophets referring to revelation for their debates.⁶⁹

Ready to take on the debate, al-Kinānī asks al-Marīsī to spell out his argument for the createdness of the Qur'ān.⁷⁰ Al-Marīsī cites the verse "the creator of everything (*ḥāliq kulla šay'*)," implying that the Qur'ān is a thing among other creations.⁷¹ Rather than responding to this immediately, al-Kinānī targets his opponent's premise by exposing what he considers to be the falsehood of the Ḡahmite denial of the reality of the divine attributes, focusing most importantly on the attribute of God's knowledge. Thus, al-Kinānī turns to citing verses affirming God's knowledge and then questions al-Marīsī regarding his stance on God's knowledge.⁷² This is followed by a key moment, after which the debate would subsequently be named: Forced to describe the divine attributes based on *tanzīl* alone, al-Marīsī is depicted in al-Kinānī's first person narrative as evading the answer. Had he answered that God has no knowledge, which is his position, he would

⁶⁸ Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 227.

⁶⁹ *Ib.*, 228.

⁷⁰ Al-Marīsī challenges the use of the *tanzīl* only much later in the debate, where, addressing al-Ma'mūn, he refuses to argue from *aḥbār* (reports) and he argues with *qiyās* (syllogism) (*ib.*, 246), to which al-Ma'mūn retorts with the rhetorical question: "Isn't our religion proved by means of reports?" However, al-Kinānī never used prophetic reports here, thus rendering al-Marīsī's remark unclear.

⁷¹ *Ib.*, 229.

⁷² *Ib.*

have undermined his credibility as an unbeliever in God's attributes. As a consequence, his capacity to proceed with his argument for the createdness of the Qur'ān is hampered. Al-Kinānī describes him thus, "He avoided answering me and refused to disclose his unbelief (*fa ḥāda Biṣr 'an al-ḡawāb wa-abā an yuṣarriḥ bi-l-kufr*)."⁷³

Aiming to expose how al-Marīsī and the Ḡahmites had divested God of his scriptural reality, al-Kinānī restates his question and asks al-Marīsī whether God's knowledge is included in the verse (*ḥāliq kulla šay'*), the verse first quoted by al-Marīsī to support his doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān. To that, al-Marīsī is said to "have kept to his shunning the response and introduced a topic that I did not ask him about" (*lazima al-ḥayda wa-ḡtalaba kalāman lam aṣ'alhu 'anhu*). That uncalled-for topic is the Ḡahmite position that God's knowledge simply means that He "is not ignorant" (*ma'nā dālīka lā yaḡhal*). True to his *tanzīl* premise, al-Kinānī resists this line of argumentation. Yet his first person narrative allows al-Marīsī to ask, with al-Ma'mūn's concurrence and a share of irony, whether what al-Kinānī accuses him of, namely, "*al-Ḥayda*" is in the Qur'ān. Backing his response with citations from the Qur'ān, al-Kinānī states that of course it appears in it.⁷⁴

However biased in favor of al-Kinānī, this first person rendition of the debate is far from a monologue-like replica of a debate with a passive opponent. It allows al-Marīsī some agency because he capitalizes on the opportunity presented by al-Kinānī's affirmation of the existence of God's knowledge, hearing, and seeing to accuse him of anthropomorphism. Then al-Marīsī asks al-Kinānī to provide a definition of God's knowledge; is it God or other than God? Noting that there is nothing in the Qur'ān to answer this question, al-Kinānī refuses to respond.⁷⁵ Al-Kinānī then invokes a deeper level of disagreement by calling for a methodological distinction between the general and the specific in the Qur'ānic language, attributing many of al-Marīsī's citations of the Qur'ān to his lack of mastery of this distinction.⁷⁶ In a second round of attack (that is, after his use of the verse of

⁷³ Ib.

⁷⁴ For this al-Kinānī cites passages where prophets address pagans concerning their deities (ib., 230).

⁷⁵ Ib., 233–5.

⁷⁶ Ib., 237–40. Al-Kinānī only once breaches his initial promise to only use *tanzīl* when he uses *sunna*, and consensus of the companions, as an argument for the falsehood of al-Marīsī's position (ib., 240).

ḥāliq kulla šay' which ended with the "*ḥayda*" accusation), al-Marīṣī launches another text-based statement, citing the verse *innā ḡa'alnāhu Qur'ānan 'arabīyan*, by which he implies that *ḡa'ala* means "to create".⁷⁷ To counter this argument, al-Kinānī establishes that *ḡa'ala* does not always mean to create and that this passage exemplifies one such case. Al-Kinānī refutes al-Marīṣī's interpretation of this verb based on his alleged lack of familiarity with Arabic, a weakness that al-Kinānī highlights to illustrate al-Marīṣī's general interpretive unreliability. The debate ends with al-Ma'mūn being persuaded by al-Kinānī's argument, and rewarding al-Kinānī with ten thousand *dirhams* and gifts. No synopsis of the debate would be accurate without noting that al-Kinānī argues by employing what he calls syllogism (*qiyās*), just before the debate ends, letting it be known that he is capable of sustaining such methods should he choose to do so.⁷⁸

Prominent Features of KH in al-Ibāna

The *KH* narrative starts with elements familiar from hagiographic reports about the *miḥna*. However, what happens in *KH*'s plot is the opposite of what we are used to: the familiar court and the context of the *miḥna* are there, but the protagonists are transformed. Not only does the persona of al-Kinānī fail to conform to the usual Ḥanbalite prototype of the *miḥna*, but so does the central figure of al-Ma'mūn.⁷⁹ Al-Ma'mūn appears here as a figure of impartiality. He is portrayed as willing to listen to a proponent of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, namely al-Kinānī, stand to defend it at some length. Furthermore, al-Kinānī's persona is presented as far more than that of an aspiring debater. Al-Kinānī takes his role seriously, succeeding in prompting

⁷⁷ Ib., 241–7.

⁷⁸ Ib., 246–7. When the debate narrative ends, Ibn Baṭṭā's text continues reporting that other interactions took place between al-Kinānī and al-Ma'mūn. He reports that al-Ma'mūn probes al-Kinānī to accept the createdness of the Qur'an lest he be hurt. Al-Kinānī responds that it is debate and not threat that should rule as a measure for truth, to which al-Ma'mūn nods in approval (ib., 248).

⁷⁹ The Ḥanbalite prototype is often described in hagiographical writings as standing aloof from not only the doctrines of the Ḡahmites but also the circles of debate. On having to refrain from "*al-ḥawḍ and mirā'*," see for example, Ibn Ḥanbal's "Aqida IV," (Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 1, 241), and aḍ-Ḍahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā*, vol. 11, 212–313. On the Hanbalite hero as conceived in hagiographical accounts, see for example, Ibn Ḥanbal's biography in aḍ-Ḍahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā*, vol. 11, 177–357.

al-Ma'mūn to reconsider the truth of the very doctrine he sought to impose. Surely, this plot partakes not of the historical domain but of a theological-fictitious one where not only a false report is ascribed to someone, as we saw in our discussion of the false ascription of this story to al-Kinānī by al-Aṣamm, but also the line of the story itself is implausible. The storyline only serves a polemical purpose, by which the pseudepigrapher wishes to foreground Ḥanbalite excellence and heroism.

But *KḤ* does not merely present a staged version of a debate; rather, it has al-Kinānī develop his own debating methods, by drawing on a variety of methodologies. The first most prominent element in al-Kinānī's methods is nothing less than his adherence to the protocol of the debate by subscribing to the wish of the moderator, al-Ma'mūn, to argue based on a premise by which both protagonists agree to abide. Indeed, the narrative adoption of the title "*ḥayda*" indicates that what is at stake here for the pseudepigrapher is to stage how the traditionalist hero subscribes to the rules of the debate and honors its premise while the *kalām* opponent (pseudo-Marīsī) proves incapable of honoring precisely what he and his proponents claim to be most representative of their disputation strengths. The plot then heralds al-Kinānī's superiority as a debater by catching al-Marīsī in a moment in which he is rendered speechless (*ḥayda*) and thus incapable of sustaining the debate without breaking away from the agreed-upon premise. The second characteristic of al-Kinānī's argument is the choice of *tanzīl* (revelation) as this premise. His choice of the term *tanzīl* stands out from the term *kitāb* or just al-Qur'ān, more commonly encountered. Al-Kinānī explains his specific choice of the term *tanzīl* as one guided by his deliberate resistance to any openness to discussing the interpretation of his opponents that the term "book" or Qur'ān would invite. His self-described inspiration in this stems from passages in the Qur'ān where the *tanzīl* or *waḥy* (also revelation) is used to describe the prophets' arguing against unbelievers.⁸⁰ He creates a parallel between his situation and that of the prophets who would also fall back on referring to revelation when arguing with unbelievers. His choice of *tanzīl* is thus specific to his argument against a Ḡahmite opponent, who is placed clearly outside the scope of the Muslim community. Al-Kinānī's use of *tanzīl*, however, cannot be reduced to the *bi-lā kayfa* (without how)

⁸⁰ *Al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 228.

principle invoked in Ḥanbalite and other traditionalist writings on the attributes and, especially, defense of anthropomorphic attributes.⁸¹ But al-Kinānī is not advocating a literalist reading of the verses nor a reading of the verses through the *sunna*. He states specifically that he will neither be engaging in interpretation (*ta'wīl*) nor exegesis (*tafsīr*). To understand how he argued from *tanzīl*, we turn to the two methods he used. One derives from legal analysis and other language usage. Arguments based on legal analysis appear in his analysis of the functions of discourse (*ḥabar*) in the Qur'ān, in defining what constitutes a specific report (*ḥabar ḥāṣṣ*) and general report (*ḥabar 'āmm*), and the distinction to be drawn between form (*maḥrağ*) and content (*ma'nā*).⁸² He outlines his main theory of discursive interpretation as follows:

O Prince of the believers, God the exalted revealed the Qur'ān by means of specific and general reports, including those [reports] whose form (*maḥrağ*) and content (*ma'nā*) are general and those [reports] whose form of expression (*maḥrağ lafẓihī*) and content is specific. These are two clear (*muḥkam*) reports of the Qur'ān that do not change because of the unbelief of the unbeliever. However, there are in the Qur'ān reports whose form of expression (*maḥrağ lafẓihī*) is specific and whose meaning is general and reports whose form of expression is general and content is specific. It is through these reports that the ambiguities (*šubha*) have crept upon someone who cannot distinguish between the specific and the general in the Qur'ān.⁸³

Al-Kinānī then proceeds to illustrate the sort of confusion that arises when the general meaning and the general form or the specific meaning and the specific form do not overlap.⁸⁴ Aš-Šāfi'ī's influence on al-Kinānī, as mentioned in his biography, is readily apparent in this legal analysis of his speech.⁸⁵ His language usage argument is grounded in the assumption that all non-traditionalist positions on scripture result from lack of knowledge of the Arabic language, casting his arguments in the dependence on "correct" interpretation of the Qur'ān and indeed correct doctrine derived from proper mastery of the Arabic

⁸¹ See Binyamin Abrahamov, "The 'Bi-La Kayfa' Doctrine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology," *Arabica* 42 (1995), 365–9.

⁸² *Al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 237–40.

⁸³ *Ib.*, 237–8.

⁸⁴ *Ib.*, 240.

⁸⁵ See for example, aš-Šāfi'ī, *ar-Risāla*, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Šākīr (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Ḥalabī, 1940), 52 and 148.

language.⁸⁶ What is implied here is that his understanding of language is superior while that of al-Marīsī is deficient simply because of his non-Arab origin.⁸⁷ We see this polemical argument used in al-Kinānī's response to al-Marīsī's use of the verse "we made it (*ġa'alnāhu*) an Arabic Qur'ān to be a proof that God meant to say we 'created it' an Arabic Qur'ān."⁸⁸ Al-Kinānī proves that *ġa'ala* has two meanings, "to create" and "other than to create," and argues that had God wished to use the term that means "to create" he would have used the verb *ḥalaqa*, the one verb that cannot be used to refer to human beings.⁸⁹ This point is followed by al-Kinānī enlisting cases, in which the verbs do not mean to create.⁹⁰ Having thus identified these elements that inform *KH*'s content, one can now assess them in the larger Ḥanbalite polemical, specifically, anti-Ġahmite writings.

Context

In this section, we will outline the structural and contextual significance of the work in which *KH* appears for the first time. Ibn Baṭṭa's *al-Ibāna 'an šarī'at al-firaq* is cited in most of Ibn Baṭṭa's biographies as the *Ibāna al-kubrā* to distinguish it from his shorter profession of faith *Kitāb aš-Šarḥ wa-l-ibāna 'an uṣūl as-sunna wa-d-diyāna*, referred to as *al-Ibāna aš-ṣuġrā* and intended for a popular audience.⁹¹ *Al-Ibāna aš-ṣuġrā* was Ibn Baṭṭa's contribution to the Ḥanbalite genre of creeds (*'aqā'id*) and its success dictated the future growth of the genre. The Ḥanbalite creed genre began in the middle of the third/ninth century,⁹² and was tempered by the theological and political threats of the Būyid era. As Laoust explained, Ibn Baṭṭa's *Ibāna aš-ṣuġrā* inherited all the

⁸⁶ On the latent counter-*šu'ūbī* motif in doctrinal literature and the *Šu'ūbiya* movement see H. T. Norris, "Shu'ūbiyyah in Arabic literature," in *The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: 'Abbāsīd Belles Lettres*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 32–47.

⁸⁷ Anti-*šu'ūbī* tropes and claims of the superiority of the Arabic language are found in Ḥanbalite *'Aqā'id*, see Ibn Ḥanbal, *'Aqida I*, in Ibn Abī Ya'lā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila*, vol. 1, 30.

⁸⁸ Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 242–6.

⁸⁹ *Ib.*, 243.

⁹⁰ *Ib.*, 243 and 244.

⁹¹ Laoust, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Baṭṭa*, xlvii.

⁹² On early Ḥanbalite creeds, see Laoust, "Les Premières Professions de Foi Ḥanbalites," in *Mélanges Louis Massignon* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1957), vol. 3, 7–35.

earlier creed writings of his predecessors, most importantly those of al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī l-Barbahārī (d. 329/941), and had a lasting impact on the Ḥanbalite creeds of later periods.⁹³ Thus, we are safe to assume that the spread of *KḤ* in future Ḥanbalite works derives largely from the centrality of Ibn Baṭṭa’s work, in which *KḤ* first appears. As for *al-Ibāna*, some preliminary remarks about its characteristics can be made here. Ḥanbalite creeds are written for the internal consumption of followers; they outline the details of the correct creed, through negation of others, and contain with varying degrees heresiographical and polemical sections.⁹⁴

In addition to this primary function, *al-Ibāna* is encyclopedic in its scope, as seen in its preserved volumes: Book one (*On Belief*) and two (*On Predestination*), and four (*On the Merits of the Companions*), and, pertinent to our concern, it also serves as a polemical book of an anti-Ḡahmite statement, particularly book three *ar-Radd ‘alā l-Ḡahmiya*, in which *KḤ* first appears. This third book not only combines creed and polemics but also contains a section reporting debates on the nature of the Qur’ān at the court of caliphs.⁹⁵ Al-Kinānī’s debate is the first among five others that appear under the section entitled “On the Debates of those tested at the hands of ruthless kings who called people to this deviation.” Having a section dedicated to reporting debates is unusual for a Ḥanbalite creed and stands out from the remainder of the book.

Third Book of al-Ibāna

The debates (*munāzarāt*), in the third volume of *al-Ibāna*, which include *KḤ* under discussion, provide further grounds for refuting the Ḡahmites. The rest of *al-Ibāna*’s *Radd ‘alā l-Ḡahmiya* book includes Ibn Baṭṭa’s citation of reports by the Prophet or major *ḥadīth* scholars’ analysis of the most detailed of the Ḡahmite tenets. The content and structure of the various narratives cited in the debate section are far from homogenous. Some present historical personae as protagonists engaged in debates with one of the *miḥna* caliphs, such as Ibn Ḥanbal,⁹⁶

⁹³ Laoust, *La Profession de Foi d’Ibn Baṭṭa*, xlvī–xlviīī, and xcvi–xcix.

⁹⁴ *Ib.*, xlvīī.

⁹⁵ *Al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 225–96.

⁹⁶ *Ib.*, 249–68.

al-Kinānī, others feature obscure figures such as the ṣayḥ from Adhana with al-Wāṭiq,⁹⁷ Ibn aṣ-Ṣaḥḥām,⁹⁸ and al-ʿAbbās ibn Mūsā ibn Miskawayh.⁹⁹ Still others feature anonymous debaters.¹⁰⁰ But all the narratives have specific characteristics.¹⁰¹ Most remarkable at first is the counter-historical quality of the caliphs who, for the most part—the greatest exception being the case of Ibn Ḥanbal's debate¹⁰²—are depicted in favorable terms. Be it al-Ma'mūn, al-Mu'taṣim or al-Wāṭiq, the caliph stands open to the arguments of the Ḥanbalite hero and is not, in principle, biased against the Ḡahmite or Mu'tazilite opponents—namely al-Marīsī and Ibn Abī Du'ād.¹⁰³ The caliph also appears as the protector of the *sunna*, mirroring the rehabilitation of the Abbasid caliphate in Sunnī eyes that had been underway since the fourth/tenth century and is captured in the Qādirī creed.¹⁰⁴ Even in the least expected situations, when the caliph decides to implement the wish of his Ḡahmite court proponent, the caliph is never quite demonized. For example, when the court proponent of the createdness of the Qur'ān is the Mu'tazilite Ibn Abī Du'ād, al-Ma'mūn is portrayed as convinced of the arguments of the non-createdness of the Qur'ān and only yielding to the pressure of this entourage, upon whom the spurious narrative wishes to lay the burden of responsibility.¹⁰⁵ The doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān is cast as forced on the caliph by the pressure of the court theologian, whether Mu'tazilite or Ḡahmite. Both the ṣayḥ from Adhana, and the anonymous ṣayḥ of the debate narrative that follows argue for the falsehood of the createdness of the Qur'ān based on the notion of precedence: God completed his message with the Prophet, hence discussion of the createdness of the Qur'ān

⁹⁷ Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, Part III (*ar-Radd 'alā l-Ḡahmīya*), vol. 2, 269–74. The name of this ṣayḥ is Abū 'Abd ar-Raḥmān 'Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Mawṣili al-Adramī.

⁹⁸ Ib., *Munāẓarat Ibn aṣ-Ṣaḥḥām Qāḍī r-Rayy li-l-Wāṭiq*, 278–81.

⁹⁹ Ib., *Munāẓarat al-ʿAbbās ibn Mūsā ibn Miskawayh al-Hamadānī*, 284–96.

¹⁰⁰ Ib., *Munāẓarat raḡul āḥar bi ḥadrat al-Mu'taṣim*, 282–3.

¹⁰¹ Although the divergent *isnāds* of each of the reports do not point to a common source, further research into a possible common genesis remains a desideratum.

¹⁰² For some of the more familiar hagiographic motives informing Ibn Ḥanbal's debate, see ad-Dahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*, vol. 11, 248–53. Note also that Ibn Ḥanbal is described by the reports included in ad-Dahabī as refuting the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān with his use of the *kitāb* and *sunna*.

¹⁰³ Ibn Abī Du'ād is the Createdness of the Qur'ān proponent in the debate with Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 249–74.

¹⁰⁴ Makdisi, *Ibn 'Aqil et la résurgence de L'Islām traditionaliste*, 302.

¹⁰⁵ For example, Ibn Baṭṭa, *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 257.

is absent in the prophetic tradition and in the Qur'ān, and thus has to be an innovation.¹⁰⁶ In both cases, the caliphs release the Ḥanbalite protagonist and are convinced by their arguments.

The debate narrative ascribed to Ibn Ḥanbal stands out on many accounts. Its narrative is often fragmentary, composed of many reports (with their respective *isnāds*), and these reports give accounts of Ibn Ḥanbal both as the typical enduring Ḥanbalite hero recognizable in other sources,¹⁰⁷ and as the debating hero. As for the methods of disputation used by Ibn Ḥanbal, they are also mixed, consisting of arguments based on *ḥadīṭ* and Qur'ān together¹⁰⁸ as well as on the Qur'ān alone.¹⁰⁹ Like al-Kinānī, Ibn Ḥanbal in this section of *al-Ibāna* refers to *nāsīḥ* (abrogating) and *mansūḥ* (abrogated)¹¹⁰ but with no systematic plot of argument in contrast to al-Kinānī's systematic method, specifically his use of the concept of *ḥāṣṣ* and *'amm*. Indeed, the section on Ibn Ḥanbal's debate reads like a composite of reports reworded but not completely synthesized into one larger narrative.

Of the other debates outlined above, KH's al-Kinānī narrative is the most reworked in its writing and the most systematized in its method. Displaying a conscious reworking and dramatization on the part of its author, with a beginning, a highpoint (the very *ḥayda*) and an ending, KH's narrative is far from the simple report, or the many *isnāds* covering different aspects of an event found in Ibn Ḥanbal's debate.¹¹¹

Anti-Ġahmite Polemical Works

As briefly noted above, the section in rebuttal of the Ġahmites in *al-Ibāna* was part of other works that actively refuted Ġahmite doctrines. Works specifically written in refutation of the Ġahmites became

¹⁰⁶ For the argument regarding the *ṣayḥ* from Adhana, see *al-Ibāna*, Part III, vol. 2, 272–3 and the anonymous *ṣayḥ*, see ib., 275. On the *isnād* and various versions of this story that appear also in one of the glosses of KH in Ṣalībā's edition, see van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 3, 502–4.

¹⁰⁷ For example, ad-Ḍahabī, *Siyar a'lām an-nubalā'*, vol. 11, 232–65.

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Baṭṭā, *al-Ibāna*, III, vol. 2, 253.

¹⁰⁹ Ib., 254.

¹¹⁰ Ib., 257.

¹¹¹ The parallelism we saw between the debates calls for an inquiry into a possible common origin. Unfortunately, an inquiry into their respective *isnāds* is not helpful, since they have separate ones, which remain unidentifiable. The hypothesis of their common origin, however, remains open, pending the discovery of new evidence.

a genre that can be located within larger Ḥanbalite polemical writings at the time of Ibn Baṭṭa. This genre emerged among the traditionalists in the aftermath of the *miḥna*.¹¹² Despite their shared aim to rebuke Ḡahmite doctrines, works of this genre diverged in their methods. One group (the majority) relied exclusively on reports, both of major early *ḥadīṭ* scholar figures and of the Prophet. This reliance on reports appears as early as Abū Saʿīd ʿUtmān ibn Saʿīd as-Siġistānī ad-Dārimī's work¹¹³ (d. 282/895), and continues much later with a contemporary of Ibn Baṭṭa, the traditionalist Nīšāpūrī, Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn Yahyā ibn Manda (d. 395/1005)¹¹⁴ in his *Radd ʿalā l-Ḡahmīya*. The tradition-based method is also used by non-Ḥanbalite traditionalists, most importantly the famous *ḥadīṭ* scholar Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Buḥārī's (d. 256/870) *Ḥalq af ʿāl al-ʿibād wa-r-radd ʿalā l-Ḡahmīya*,¹¹⁵ and the litterateur Ibn Qutayba's (d. 276/889) *Iḥtilāf al-lafẓ wa-r-radd ʿalā l-Ḡahmīya*.¹¹⁶ Ibn Qutayba's work diverges from that of the others because in addition to arguing for the uncreatedness of the Qurʾān, he also argues for the created nature of the spoken and written form of the Qurʾān. This doctrine was shared by others, including Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Karābīsī (d. 245/859 or 248/862)¹¹⁷ and Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Buḥārī, and equally condemned by the Ḥanbalites.

Another category of anti-Ḡahmite works, albeit a minor one, employs a different methodology. These authors cite the arguments of the Ḡahmites in some detail and then refute them point by point, thereby engaging in the condemned method of disputation (*ḥawḍ fī l-kalām*).¹¹⁸ Such is the case in ad-Dārimī's other anti-Ḡahmite work, *Naqḍ ʿalā l-Marīsī al-Ḡahmī*. Ad-Dārimī's text is a testimony to the presence of these "two paths" of argument among the Ḥanbalites at

¹¹² Sezgin, GAS, vol. 1, 597–8.

¹¹³ *Ib.*, vol. 1, 600–1.

¹¹⁴ *Ib.*, vol. 1, 214–5.

¹¹⁵ *Ib.*, vol. 1, 133.

¹¹⁶ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Iḥtilāf fī l-lafẓ wa-r-radd ʿalā l-Ḡahmīya wa-l-muṣabbiha*, ed. Muḥammad al-Kawṭārī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudṣī, 1930). On Ibn Qutayba, see Gérard Lecomte, *Ibn Qutayba (mort en 276/889): L'homme, son oeuvre, ses idées* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1965).

¹¹⁷ Van Ess, *Theologie und Gesellschaft*, vol. 4, 210–4.

¹¹⁸ On Ibn Ḥanbal's condemnation of the very engagement in disputation with the Ḡahmites, see Ibn Ḥanbal, *ʿAqida II*, in Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, *Ṭabaqāt al-Hanābila*, vol. 2, 130–1. See *ʿAqida III*, *ib.*, vol. 1, 241–6), where Ibn Ḥanbal specifically pronounces sitting with one's opponents and engaging in disputation with them to be reprehensible.

this early phase of their writings. Ad-Dārimī's *Naqd* addresses an anonymous opponent (*mu'arid*) described as a follower of al-Marīsī and Ġahm ibn Ṣafwān, and not al-Marīsī himself as the title might suggest. Rather than warn of the danger of mentioning the opponents' arguments as he did in this other work, here, ad-Dārimī launches a lengthy apologia to refute his opponents' arguments when debating, thereby publicly disclosing the opponent's claims. Apprehension regarding reporting the views of one's opponents and debating with them, he insists, was an early position of the traditionalist fathers, and he names Ibn al-Mubārak (118 or 119/736 or 737–181/797) and Ibn Ḥanbal, who now, he claims, understands the necessity of debating one's opponent.¹¹⁹ The majority of Muslims have had a forced acquaintance with Ġahmite methods through the latter's *miḥna* policy, so it now stands to the traditionalists' sense of duty to use argumentation to describe and refute the Ġahmites' false propositions. Ad-Dārimī's overdrawn apology for his method reflects the strong resistance with which it was met.¹²⁰ It is all the more poignant, given that in an earlier work he argues for just the opposite position. In *Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā l-Ġahmīya*, he explicitly makes the case for not articulating the details of the Ġahmites' arguments, lest those details misguide the weak-hearted among in the audience,¹²¹ for whom the most general awareness of the Ġahmites' claims should suffice.

Ar-Radd 'alā z-zanādiqa wa-l-Ġahmīya, attributed to Ibn Ḥanbal, is another work that employed the disputation method in its arguments. Indeed, it is these very methods that caused ad-Ḍahabī to refute its ascription to Ibn Ḥanbal.¹²² Without apologizing for his method, a pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal was focused on refuting what he deems his opponents' abuse of the notion of the ambiguous (*mutaṣābih*). The Ġahmite position, in other words, can be reduced to a methodology that abuses

¹¹⁹ Ad-Dārimī, *ar-Radd 'alā Biṣr al-Marīsī al-'Anīd*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqqī (Cairo: Maṭba'at as-Sunna al-Muḥammadiya, n.d.), 109–10.

¹²⁰ *Ib.*, 106–9. The topic of the perils of engaging in *ḥawḍ fi l-kalām* is discussed in detail in ad-Dārimī's work. For example, the anonymous opponent mentions on more than one occasion that the very debate (*ḥawḍ fi l-kalām*) on whether it is created or not created is an innovation (106–7). To gain credibility, ad-Dārimī calls on the authority of the traditionist ancestors whom he claims to have allowed debates with the Ġahmites so that they can be properly defeated (110).

¹²¹ Ad-Dārimī, *Kitāb ar-Radd 'alā l-Ġahmīya*, ed. Gösta Vitestam (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 82.

¹²² Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, *ar-Radd 'alā z-zanādiqa wa-l-Ġahmīya* (Cairo: al-Matba'at as-Salafiya, 1973); see Ḍahabī, *Siyar A'lām an-Nubalā'*, vol. 11, 286–7.

interpretation: “Ġahm and his cohorts called people to the *mutaṣābih* of the Qur’ān and the *ḥadīṭ* and they led many people astray.”¹²³ Like ad-Dārimī, in his *Radd ‘alā Biṣr al-Marīsī al-Ġahmī*, Ibn Ḥanbal’s *Radd* includes heresiographical reports on the genesis of the Ġahmite doctrine and what it owes to the debates Ġahm ibn Ṣafwān (d.128/746) had with the Sumanīya¹²⁴ that resulted in the latter’s influence on him.¹²⁵ Ibn Ḥanbal takes on the task of addressing each of the Ġahmites’ scriptural arguments for the createdness of the Qur’ān. For instance, we read his argument that the Ġahmites’ reading of the verb *ḡa’ala* to mean *ḥalaqa* (to argue for the scriptural basis for the createdness of the Qur’ān) takes root in nothing more than the Ġahmites’ ignorance of the Arabic language and its usage.¹²⁶ Indeed both Ibn Ḥanbal and to a greater extent ad-Dārimī do not abandon the tradition-based arguments used to rebuke the Ġahmites, but rather continue to enlist the authority of reports about the “foreign” origins of the Ġahmites, its proponent al-Marīsī, and its founder Ġahm ibn Ṣafwān.

Ibn Qutayba’s *Iḥtilāf al-lafẓ wa-r-radd ‘alā l-Ġahmīya* relies on traditions and reports in addition to contesting misinterpretation of ambiguous verses (*mutaṣābih*).¹²⁷ Like pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal, he asserts his linguistic usage as grounds for his “correct” interpretation of these verses.¹²⁸ However, Ibn Qutayba’s position is that the reproduction of the Qur’ān in recitation (*qirā’a*) and pronunciation (*lafẓ*) is created. Indeed, he devotes the majority of his work to apologizing for his views, stating that Ibn Ḥanbal could not have thought that upholding this view on (*lafẓ*) is heresy,¹²⁹ and to proving that the pronunciation (*lafẓ*) could not have been part of God.¹³⁰ But this position to which Ibn Qutayba adhered was pronounced by the Ḥanbalites as heretical as the Ġahmite position.

When comparing al-Kinānī’s three methods to the two general trends of writing anti-Ġahmite works, we find that he put forth elements that were already present in the minority of the debate-minded Ḥanbalite

¹²³ Ibn Ḥanbal, *ar-Radd*, 19.

¹²⁴ The Sumanīya was one of the terms used to refer to Buddhists, see Guy Monnot, “Al-Sumaniyya,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., vol. 9, 869.

¹²⁵ Ibn Ḥanbal, *ar-Radd*, 19–20.

¹²⁶ *Ib.*, 22.

¹²⁷ Ibn Qutayba, *al-Iḥtilāf fī l-lafẓ wa-r-radd ‘alā l-Ġahmīya wa-l-muṣabbiha*, 25–7.

¹²⁸ *Ib.*, 27.

¹²⁹ *Ib.*, 52–5.

¹³⁰ *Ib.*, 60–7.

anti-Ġahmite writings. Al-Kinānī used methods present in pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal's writings, including linguistic-legal terminology, anti-*šu'ūbī* tropes and language usage argument. Yet, at the same time, he did not discuss the *mutašābih* question in the theoretical way that pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal does. Al-Kinānī consciously used the theme of *mutašābih* to set the stage for his opponents to fail to respond to his attacks (*ḥayda*). In his construct of the moment of his opponent's evasion and defeat, al-Kinānī was conscious of his polemical prowess in a way that earlier texts, namely pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal and ad-Dārimī were not. As we have also seen, al-Kinānī stands out in his exclusive reliance on the category of *tanzīl*; he avoids using prophetic reports and reports in general, both of which pseudo-Ibn Ḥanbal and ad-Dārimī employ.

Moreover, reading *KH* in the context of anti-Ġahmite works allowed us to see the tension and division around the question of whether using *kalām* was acceptable. The division was so pronounced that Ibn Ḥanbal's *kalām*-influenced work was falsely attributed to him and ad-Dārimī had to make an apology for using *kalām* in one of his works.

Two Further Versions of KH: A Brief Outline
KH in Ibn Taymīya's Dar' Ta'āruḍ

Another fragmentary version of *KH* appears in *Dar' ta'āruḍ*, a work self-described as aiming to establish the lack of contradiction between reason and revelation. In it, Ibn Taymīya surveys the falsehood of all past arguments that supported Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī's (d. 606/1209) principle that sometimes reason contradicts revelation, in which case reason should supersede revelation. In a section where Ibn Taymīya surveys and refutes past positions on the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān, he highlights al-Kinānī's argument as traditionally sound versus that of Ibn Kullāb or al-Aṣ'arī. The fragment of *KH* cited here by Ibn Taymīya shares none of the arguments of the *al-Ibāna* version. Here, al-Kinānī is quoted using rational inquiry (*naẓar*) and syllogism (*qiyās*), what Ibn Taymīya describes as *taqṣīm ḥāsir ma'qūl* (divisional syllogism),¹³¹ to prove that the Qur'ān is not created.¹³² Acknowledging the existence of other *KH* variants, Ibn Taymīya prefaces his citation with

¹³¹ Ibn Taymīya, *Dar' ta'āruḍ al-'aql wa-n-naql*, vol. 2, 251.

¹³² *Ib.*, 247–91, including Ibn Taymīya's commentary on *KH*.

a disclaimer in which he notes that he does not recall from which version this quotation derives.¹³³ This disclaimer is of utmost importance, as it shows that although Ibn Taymīya was aware that several versions of this work did circulate, the question of authenticity did not concern him. Although all the methods used in the full version from which this excerpt is quoted are not presented, we learn from the last line of al-Ma'mūn quoted by Ibn Taymīya that al-Kinānī used several methods to prove the Qur'ān was uncreated, listing *Kitāb* (the Book), *sunna* (prophetic sayings and deeds), the Arabic language, and rational inquiry (*an-naẓar wa-l-ma'qūl*).¹³⁴ As far as Ibn Taymīya is concerned, the quoted excerpt of *KH* is valuable because it illustrates that it is possible to argue through reason without abiding by *kalām* ontology as Ibn Kullāb and al-Aṣ'arī did, much to Ibn Taymīya's chagrin.

This version of *KH* can be briefly summarized as follows: al-Kinānī agrees to argue with al-Marīsī based on the principle that he calls *qiyās* at al-Marīsī's request. The crucial point is this: al-Kinānī challenges al-Marīsī that when he states that the Qur'ān is created, he cannot but be positing three possibilities, each of which is false. 1) Either God created His speech in Himself (*fī nafsihī*), or He created it (*qā'imān*) subsisting in its (i.e. the speech's) essence (*dāt*) and self (*nafsihī*), or (3) He created it in something else (*fī ḡayrihī*).¹³⁵ In response to these three possibilities, al-Marīsī offers neither rebuke nor contestation but simply repeats that the Qur'ān is created, implying that he would not choose among any of these possibilities. Al-Kinānī dubs this response as avoiding his question.¹³⁶ Ibn Taymīya finds in al-Kinānī's three possibilities the perfect reason-based response to the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ān. Al-Kinānī explains that God cannot create speech in Himself because speech is created in time and God is eternal, the view that God's speech is created in other than Himself is also not tenable because it suggests that God's speech is like any "other speech". As for the third possibility that God creates speech subsisting in its essence, this is deemed impossible because speech can only derive from a speaker just as what is willed can only derive from someone who has a will.

¹³³ Ib., 263.

¹³⁴ Ib., 251.

¹³⁵ Ib., 247.

¹³⁶ Ib.

For Ibn Taymiya, then, al-Kinānī embodies the ideal debater who uses reason on its own terms to refute the proponents of the createdness of the Qurʾān without succumbing to their ontology of accidents and atoms. A comprehensive explanation of Ibn Taymiya's endorsement of al-Kinānī would require an extensive investigation of Ibn Taymiya's method and refutation of the philosophers' logic.¹³⁷ For now, let us simply note that Ibn Taymiya's endorsement of al-Kinānī comes at a different moment in the history of Ḥanbalism than *al-Ibāna*. The very use of disputation and debate is clearly not a problem for Ibn Taymiya. For him, the ideal representative of the traditionalist position on the Qurʾān could respond to all that he considers non-scriptural systems by enlisting every acceptable method that does not subscribe to *kalām* or the philosophers' ontology, and al-Kinānī in the *KH* version he cites did just that.¹³⁸

A Third Version of KH

By way of providing a preview of *KH*'s independent history as a text, namely the nineteen manuscripts in which it survives, we turn to the one of them identified by Sezgin: Landberg 75. With its 84 folios, the Landberg 75 version of *KH* is stylistically far from both *KH* versions we examined. Dated to the year 509/1116,¹³⁹ it displays growth in comparison to the earlier examined versions in three defining ways. First, it includes an additional plot that is entitled *al-I'tidār* (apology). This plot is as follows: Al-Kinānī's enemies at the court of al-Ma'mūn conspire against him and report to al-Ma'mūn that he betrayed his confidence by narrating in a book what happened at the court after winning the debate.¹⁴⁰ Al-Kinānī is then summoned by al-Ma'mūn and asked

¹³⁷ On Ibn Taymiya's critique of the metaphysics of Avicennian logic and his paradoxical adoption of it as a mere tool, see Wael Hallaq, *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹³⁸ At the time of Ibn Taymiya, no *kalām* was free from the influence of *falsafa*, including logic. See Dimitri Gutas, "The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca. 1350," in *Avicenna and his Heritage*, eds. Jules Janssens and Daniel de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 81–97; and Robert Wisnovsky, "One aspect of the Avicennan turn in sunnī theology," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 14 (2004), 65–100.

¹³⁹ However, given the handwriting, it is probably a late copy of a manuscript from 509/1116.

¹⁴⁰ For al-Kinānī's description of what happened after he left victorious from the court, see Landberg 75, 51v–52v; for his enemy's plot, see 52v–53v.

to explain the rumors regarding his disclosure and dissemination of the debate.¹⁴¹ The *I'tidār* narrative is, thus, an attempt by Landberg 75's pseudepigrapher to plead for al-Kinānī's innocence based on the composition and dissemination of *KH*. This is accomplished through lengthy tradition-based arguments invoking the theme of repentance, in which al-Kinānī describes the circulation of *KH* as not within his control.

This *I'tidār* section points both to *KH*'s continuous growth and circulation, and to the indignation and protest that began to rise against it. In Landberg 75, *KH*'s style of writing breaks with any remnant of verisimilitude, and adopts the circularity of a fictional narrative. For example, in the text, al-Kinānī now pleads against having written it, and refers to himself in the third person.

What this addendum tells us about *KH*'s history requires further analysis of its extant manuscripts. The exact moment when the additional redaction of the *I'tidār* section was written remains unknown. One thing is clear, however: Landberg 75 displays great deference towards the caliph. This version is written to apologize for the disrespect that may have been misunderstood to be at the root of the writing of the apocrypha in the first place. It takes the favorable perception of al-Ma'mūn in the two earlier versions to a heightened level of urgency.

Second, in style, Landberg 75 includes references to the wide circulation of the text. But it expresses no small degree in addition to the high narrative development that exhibits marks of new writing and rewriting, with repetitions, and rephrasing of sentences. Third, and most importantly, Landberg 75 includes a theological element worthy of attention. Here, al-Kinānī argues not only on the basis of *tanzīl* as he had in *al-Ibāna*, but also on the basis of syllogism (*qiyās*), as in the *Dar' ta'āruḍ KH* version. Like the Ibn Taymīya version, but with extensive dramatic repetitions, al-Kinānī in Landberg 75 applies proofs based on syllogisms to drive home the reality of the divine attributes, by affirming the attribute of divine knowledge.¹⁴²

Thus, with Landberg 75, *KH* emerges in a new apocryphal guise. In content, it evidences the development of a Ḥanbalite method of disputation that accepts different forms of syllogisms all the while

¹⁴¹ This part of the text starts at 53v, Landberg 75, and continues to the end folio 88v.

¹⁴² Landberg 75, 46v–50v.

resisting *kalām* ontology. In form, it heralds a tradition that, paradoxically, and in a cavalier fictitious mode, reflects on and apologizes for its dissemination at the same as perpetuating it.

Conclusion

This paper set out to determine just what a growing spurious tradition of texts, with the title *KH*, had in store for the historian of Ḥanbalism and *kalām*. What does *KH* disclose that other authentic Ḥanbalite texts do not? When we traced *KH*'s first footsteps and their context, most extensively in *al-Ibāna* and then in *Dar' ta'āruḍ*, the following elements emerged: Aside from the tradition-based doctrinal and polemical writings most familiar to the historian, the Ḥanbalites, in an early period of their history (late third/ninth, early fourth/tenth century), engaged in serious exercises of disputation, making use of more than prophetic tradition and reports of early traditionalists.¹⁴³ When used in official sources, such as ad-Dārimī, these disputations apologized for their existence and faced strong resistance. However, in spurious writings, they were far from apologetic. Indeed, the spurious texts took disputation to a high level of systematization and consistency in which tradition was not used at all, and only scripture (*tanzīl*) was used as a premise for argumentation. This premise was used in dialectical argumentations that relied on legal and linguistic techniques. At a later stage in the development of Ḥanbalism, *KH* appears again, but with a content in which a new method of logical argumentation is introduced. Both of these versions were cited and used to support claims by the major Ḥanbalite figures, Ibn Baṭṭa and Ibn Taymīya, at different stages in this school's history. The appearance and toleration of *KH* in the work of major Ḥanbalites establish the historical role of *KH* as harbinger of new meanings. The first two versions of *KH*

¹⁴³ On the role of the *kalām* method of disputation in later Ḥanbalism see the work of Naḡm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316), see, *Naḡmaddin aṭ-Ṭūfī al-Ḥanbalī 'Alam al-ḡadal fī 'ilm al-ḡadal*, *Das Banner der Fröhlichkeit über die Wissenschaft vom Disput*, ed. Wolfhart Heinrichs (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1987), 11, 236–9, and 209–45). Aṭ-Ṭūfī makes the case not only for the necessity of employing disputation (*ḡadal*) in general, but also for *ḡadal* as practiced by the Mu'tazilites. When describing the wisdom of employing *ḡadal* in all disciplines, he also dedicates a chapter to its apology citing 'Abd al-Ḡabbār who speaks of the superiority of the Mu'tazilites' *kalām* methods over *ḥadīth*. Aṭ-Ṭūfī argues that truth lies in the prophetic tradition (*kitāb as-sunan*), and if *ḡadal* leads to that truth, it is commendable and even necessary.

contain a more transparent reflection of the intellectual trends (*kalām*, philosophy, and philosophized *kalām*) against which the Ḥanbalites were more vulnerable than their non-spurious texts would allow us to realize. But, as our brief overview of Landberg 75 shows, the history of *KḤ* is not limited to the citations in Ḥanbalite writings. The number of folios of the manuscripts identified by Sezgin and the characteristics highlighted in Landberg 75 announce a dramatic growth, through which *KḤ* emerges in familiar but also unfamiliar roles that await full recovery.

FROM AL-MA'MŪN TO IBN SAB'ĪN VIA AVICENNA:
IBN TAYMĪYA'S HISTORIOGRAPHY OF *FALSAFA*

Yahya Michot

Dimitri Gutas' *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture* makes a remarkable contribution to better understanding of the origins of *falsafa* and a more accurate mapping of its evolution relatively to the scientific and other intellectual pursuits of Muslims during the classical period of Islam. Since it is devoted to the Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baġdād and early 'Abbāsīd society, the work does not, nor could be expected to, include a trans-historical analysis of the convergences, dependences and influences, interactions and processes of cross-fertilization or ideological metamorphosis that took place over the centuries between the *falāsifa* and the thinkers involved in *Kalām*, *Šūfism* and other religious disciplines. In its narrative therefore, developed especially in its seventh chapter "Translation and History," there is no role for well known personalities such as Ġahm b. Safwān, Ibn Kullāb, Ibn Ḥanbal and al-Aṣ'arī, or later ones such as al-Ġuwaynī, as-Suhrawardī, Ibn Sab'īn, Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī and Ibn 'Arabī.

One exception is "the famous Ḥanbalī Ibn Taymiyya" (d. 728/1328), whose alleged hostility to the Greek sciences, "more aggressive ideological attitude" and "return to a 'conservative' traditionalism" are explained by D. Gutas—in refutation of certain views held by I. Goldziher—as reactions against the Crusader and Mongol dangers that are not at all representative of an "old Islamic orthodoxy."¹ Now, Ibn Taymīya's own writings reveal how complex his opinion about the Greek sciences can sometimes be. He considers, for example, that the physics and mathematics of Aristotle and his followers, unlike their metaphysics, is much better than those of the later Christian, Muslim or Jewish philosophers. As for thinking that Ibn Taymīya's views must generally have been *either* reactions aggravated by historical and social circumstances *or* ideas determined by some old orthodox

¹ See D. Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early 'Abbāsīd Society* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), 170–1 and 166.

anti-rationalist dogmas, this is an alternative far too strict and narrow for a fruitful approach to his thought. On the one hand, being a Ḥanbalī *muftī*, he had to be, at the same time, both faithful to his scriptural and canonic sources and moderate and flexible enough to serve the context in which he operated. On the other hand, as the title of one of his major works attests, rather than opposing reason, he was deeply convinced of the essential congruity between the authentic Islamic tradition and what is clearly reasoned by people.

This explains, among other things, Ibn Taymiya's particularly acute perception of societal history, in which he prefigures in some ways Ibn Ḥaldūn. He sees history developing in the societies around him and he wants to make sense of their past by investigating it critically, beyond fabrications and myths.² Ideas then become, for him, major players on the human stage and he is at his best relating them to each other and tracing their lineages, legitimate and illegitimate, up and down the centuries, East and West, amongst pagans and believers, heretics and saints, theologians, mystics and philosophers. The narratives that he produces might lack the factual foundation and the neutrality that are supposed to characterize academic scholarship in our day. However, it would be a mistake to ignore them as they often offer original insights about what may indeed have triggered important debates of ideas during the classical period of Islam, oriented them in new directions or unexpectedly exacerbated them.

It is my pleasure to present, to the great scholar honored in this volume, five Taymiyan texts which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been published hitherto in English. Text I is a passage of the *Fatwa on Ibn Tūmart* which Ibn Taymiya, according to H. Laoust, wrote in Alexandria in 709/1310.³ Text II is an excerpt from the second section of the undated *Book on the Specifics of the Creed* (*Kitāb Mufaṣṣal al-i'tiqād*).⁴ Texts III and IV are pages from *The Path of the*

² See Y. Michot, "Between Entertainment and Religion: Ibn Taymiyya's Views on Superstition," *The Muslim World* 99.1 (2009), 1–20.

³ H. Laoust, "Une fetwā d'Ibn Taymiya sur Ibn Tūmart," *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale* 59 (1960), 158–84, at 160–1. More information on the individuals and groups mentioned by Ibn Taymiya can be found in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

⁴ See Ibn Taymiya, *Maḡmū' al-fatāwā*, ed. 'A. R. ibn M. Ibn Qāsim, 37 vols. (Rabat: Maktabat al-Ma'ārif, 1401/1981, King Ḥālid ed.), vol. 4, 1–190.

Prophetic Tradition (Minhāğ as-sunna an-nabawīya),⁵ Ibn Taymīya's famous refutation of *The Way of Charisma (Minhāğ al-karāma)* written in 721/1321 by the great Šī'ī theologian al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 612/1325). Text V is a passage from the undated *Commentary on the Ḥadīṭ of Gabriel (Šarḥ ḥadīṭ Ġibrīl)*, also called *The Middle Book of Faith (Kitāb al-īmān al-awsaṭ)*.⁶ As Ibn Taymīya comes back to the same topics on different occasions, other writings could also have been chosen, in which even more authors and doctrines are named than in our Texts I–V. Some of these writings are already available in various European languages.⁷ Valuable studies of the Taymīyan views on *falsafa* also exist.⁸ The five texts translated here were selected for the light they may shed on the historical and ideological contexts of the translation movement as well as on the origins, the development and the multiple facets of *falsafa* and philosophizing (*tafalsuf*) in Islam up to the end of the 7th/13th century.

Part of Avicenna's project is the elaboration of a philosophy of religion, particularly, but not exclusively, Islam. Conversely, Ibn Taymīya's purpose is a theological appraisal of *falsafa*. A comparison of Texts I and II with Text III shows a difference of approach, and perhaps,

⁵ See Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāğ as-sunna an-nabawīya fī naqd kalām aš-šī'a al-qadariya*, ed. M. R. Sālim, 9 vols (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymīya, 1409/1989).

⁶ See Ibn Taymīya, *Šarḥ ḥadīṭ Ġibrīl fī l-Islām wa l-īmān wa l-iḥsān, al-ma'rūf bi-ism Kitāb al-īmān al-awsaṭ li-Šayḥ al-Islām... Ibn Taymīya*, ed. 'A. ibn N. az-Zahrānī (ad-Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Ġawzī li-n-Našr wa-t-Tawzī', 1423[/2002]), 289–648, and *Mağmū' al-fatāwā*, vol. 7, 461–622 (incomplete edition).

⁷ See for example Y. Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya. Lettre à Abū l-Fidā', Traduction, présentation, notes et lexique* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994); id., "A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *Risāla Aḍḥawīya*: Being a Translation of a Part of the *Dar' at-Ta'arūf* of Ibn Taymiyya, with Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 14.2–3 (2003), 149–203 and 309–63; id., "Vizir « hérétique » mais philosophe d'entre les plus éminents: al-Ṭūsī vu par Ibn Taymiyya," *Farhang* 15–16, no 44–45 (2003), 195–227; id., "Misled and Misleading... Yet Central in their Influence: Ibn Taymiyya's Views on the Ikhwān al-Šafā'," in *The Ikhwān al-Šafā' and their Rasā'il, An Introduction*, Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, ed. N. El-Bizri (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2008), 139–79. Revised version, with important editorial corrections, access by www.muslimphilosophy.com; W. B. Hallaq, *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians*, Translation with an Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

⁸ Notably T. Michel, "Ibn Taymiyya's Critique of Falsafa," *Hamdard Islamicus* 6.1 (1983), 3–14; id., *A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity. Ibn Taymiyya's Al-jawāb al-šaḥīḥ*, Studies in Islamic philosophy and science (Delmar & New York: Caravan Books, 1984), 15–24. Michel's approach to the Taymīyan critique of philosophy mainly develops from two angles: Christianity and the late Šūfī doctrine of the oneness of existence (*waḥdat al-wuġūd*); Hallaq's, from the angle of logic.

even, an evolution. In Texts I and II, both “Šābaean” philosophers and Mu‘tazilīs are held as Ġahmī enemies of the Prophets and held responsible for al-Ma‘mūn’s *miḥna*. In Text III, heretic philosophizers are still said to appear when Islam is weak but they are now considered as a reaction against the intellectually deficient theology of the Ġahmīs and Mu‘tazilīs. The best of them—Avicenna and his like—are even praised for having extolled the superiority of Muḥammad’s Law (*nāmūs*, i.e. *nómos*) over other religions.

For the Mamlūk theologian, the *scientia divinalis* of the philosophers always falls short of an adequate understanding of the oneness of God’s godhead (*tawḥīd al-ilāhiya*) and prophethood. He is quite ready to acknowledge an evolution and progress between the Greeks and the *falāsifa*, and he indeed does as much in Texts III, IV and V. Because of the impact of their respective religions on them, Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers have greatly reformed and improved the philosophical legacy they inherited from the Greeks. A serious problem, however, is that Islamic theology and spirituality became contaminated by *falsafa* as much as they influenced it.

There are obvious similarities between some *Kalām* doctrines and philosophical ideas. In Text IV, Ibn Taymiya underlines the congruity between the Aristotelian–Avicennian explanation of the celestial movements—a final cause setting the spheres in motion by being loved—and the reductionist (*mu‘aṭṭil*) theology of the Qadarī affirmers of a human capacity independent from God’s omnipotence. In Text V, he compares Ġahm’s reduction of faith (*īmān*) to knowledge and assent (*taṣdīq*) to the philosopher’s gnosticism reducing happiness and righteousness to a matter of knowledge of existence and truth. At some point, it is, however, not enough to speak of similarities: real melanges of ideas can be observed, as well as deep influences. Early Christianity was adulterated by Greek idolatry (Text III). Similarly, later theologians were plunged into more obscurity by the “philosophizers’ mixing philosophy with *Kalām* theology,” and themselves started “mixing *Kalām* theology with philosophy.” Hence a decrease of quality in their understanding of some of the divine attributes of perfection and oneness (*tawḥīd*) (Text IV). As for spirituality, it is to Avicenna’s prophetology with its three prophetic faculties (intuition, mental influence on the world and imagination) that Ibn Taymiya traces back both Ibn Sab‘īn’s endeavour to become a prophet himself and Ibn ‘Arabī’s idea of the superiority of Friendship (or sainthood, *walāya*) over prophethood (*nubūwa*) (Text V).

The Šayḥ al-Islām loves hierarchizing people, doctrines, and religions. By doing so, he links them to each other and, although we might not agree with his classifications, forces us to reconsider the divisions and boundaries of our own historiographies of *falsafa* and, more generally, classical Islamic thought. Strangely enough, in these hierarchies, Avicenna usually goes from top to bottom, and vice versa. In other words, he is most often central. It is no wonder therefore that Šams ad-Dīn ad-Dahabī (d. 748/1348) said that the Mamlūk theologian had himself “repeatedly swallowed the poison of the philosophers and their works.”⁹

Translations

I The “Tūmartan” Inquisition of al-Ma'mūn

[The followers of Ibn Tūmart]¹⁰ had a day which they called “the Day of the Criterion” (*yawm al-furqān*)¹¹ and during which he used to discriminate, as he claimed, between the “People of the Garden” and the “People of the Fire.” All those whom they knew to be of their friends, they would then put among the People of the Garden and assure the protection of their blood. As for those whom they knew to be of their enemies, they would put them among the People of the Fire and declare it lawful to spill their blood. They thus declared it lawful to spill the blood of thousands and thousands of Mālikī people of the Maḡreb, who were among the people [following] the Book and the *Sunna* according to the way of Mālik [ibn Anas]¹² and the people of Medina. They indeed used to recite the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīṭ* of the two *Šaḥīḥs*¹³ for example, the *Muwaṭṭa'* and other [collections] of it—and [to practice] jurisprudence (*fiqh*) according to the way of the people of Medina. He thus claimed that they were corporealizing assimilationists (*mušabbih muḡassim*), although they were not among the people [following] such a doctrine (*maqāla*) and it is unknown of any of the companions of

⁹ See D. Little, “Did Ibn Taymiyya Have a Screw Loose?” *Studia Islamica* 41 (1975), 93–111, re-ed. in his *History and Historiography of the Mamlūks*, VIII (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986), 101.

¹⁰ The founder and *mahdī* of the Almohad movement (d. 524/1130). “What [Ibn Tūmart] said about *tawḥīd* was indeed what the deniers of the attributes—Jahm, Avicenna, and their like—say” (Ibn Taymiyya, *Dar' at-ta'arud*, trans. Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary I,” 179).

¹¹ Cf. the name of *sūra* xxv of the Qur'ān.

¹² Theologian and jurist (d. Medina, 179/796), eponym of one of the four schools of *Sunnī* law and author of the *Muwaṭṭa'*.

¹³ The two most important canonical *ḥadīṭ* collections, by al-Buḡārī (d. Ḥartank, 256/870) and Muslim an-Naysābūrī (d. 261/875).

Mālik that he spoke publicly of assimilating [God to His creatures] and corporealizing [Him].

On the basis of such an interpretation (*ta'wīl*) and others like it, [Ibn Tūmart] also declared it lawful [to confiscate] the wealth of [these people] and [to commit] other prohibited [actions] of the same kind as had been declared lawful by the reductionist (*mu'aṭṭil*) Ġahmīs,¹⁴ such as the philosophers, the Mu'tazilis and the rest of the deniers of the [divine] attributes, in regard to the people of the Tradition and the Communion (*ahl as-sunna wa-l-ġamā'a*), when they had subjected people to trials during the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn.¹⁵ They said publicly that the Qur'ān is created and that God is not seen in the hereafter. They also denied that God has a knowledge, or a power, or a speech, or a will, or any of the attributes subsisting by His essence. Anyone agreeing with them about this reductionism, they used to assure the protection of his blood and of his wealth, to entrust him with official positions and to provide him with sustenance from the Treasury, to accept his testimony and to redeem him from captivity. Anyone not agreeing with them on the Qur'ān being created and on their innovated views (*bid'a*) following therefrom, they used to kill or put in prison, beat him or refuse him gifts from the Treasury; they would not entrust him with any official position, not accept his testimony and not redeem him from the unbelievers.¹⁶ They used to say: "Here is an assimilationist (*muṣabbih*); here is a corporealist (*muḡassim*) because he says that God is seen in the hereafter and that the Qur'ān is the uncreated speech of God, that God is established on the Throne"¹⁷ and similar things.

This inquisition (*miḥna*) imposed on the Muslims lasted ten and some more years: the end of the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn and the caliphates of his brother al-Mu'taṣim¹⁸ and of al-Wāṭiq,¹⁹ the son of al-Mu'taṣim. God Most High then pulled away this affliction from the community, during the reign of al-Mutawakkil 'alā Llāh²⁰—and it is from amongst his descendants, not the descendants of those who had imposed the

¹⁴ The followers of the theological doctrines of Ġahm ibn Ṣafwān, Abū Muḥriz (d. 128/746). Ibn Taymiya makes Ġahm a disciple of Ġā'd ibn Dirham (d. 124/742) and a precursor of the Mu'tazilis.

¹⁵ Al-Ma'mūn, Abū l-'Abbās 'Abd Allāh ibn Hārūn ar-Rašid, 7th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 196/812–218/833).

¹⁶ When the 'Abbāsīd authorities redeemed thousands of Muslim prisoners from the Byzantines in 231/846, they deliberately refused to pay the ransom of those who did not accept the dogma of the createdness of the Qur'ān; see H. Laoust, "Une fetwā d'Ibn Taimiyya sur Ibn Tūmart," 173, n. 1.

¹⁷ See Qur'ān, *Ṭā' Hā'*—xx, 5.

¹⁸ Al-Mu'taṣim bi-Llāh, Abū Ishāq ibn Hārūn ar-Rašid, 8th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 218/833–227/842).

¹⁹ Al-Wāṭiq bi-Llāh, Abū Ġā'far Hārūn ibn al-Mu'taṣim, 9th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 227/842–232/847).

²⁰ Al-Mutawakkil 'alā Llāh, Abū l-Faḍl Ġā'far ibn Muḥammad, 10th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 232/847–247/861).

inquisition on the people of the *Sunna*, that God made the whole of the [later] 'Abbāsid caliphs to come.²¹ Al-Mutawakkil commanded suspending the inquisition, restoring the authority (*iẓhār*) of the Qur'ān and the *Sunna*, and reporting the [traditions] well established as coming from the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, the Companions and their followers, affirming [the divine attributes] and refuting reductionism.

In their replacing the religion [by other things] (*tabdīl*), these reductionist Ġahmīs had gone so far as to write on the cover of the Ka'ba: "Nothing is as His likeness, and He is the Mighty, the Wise."²² They would not say "...and He is the Hearer, the Seer"²³ and they used to subject people to trial by [reciting this] saying of God Most High "Nothing is as His likeness..." If people then said "...and He is the Hearer, the Seer," they would condemn them. Now, the way (*maḍhab*) of the Ancients (*salaf*) of the community and of its imāms consists in describing God by means of that which He has described Himself and by means of that which His Messenger has described Him, with neither alteration (*taḥrīf*) nor reduction (*ta'ṭīl*), and with neither imposing a "how" (*takyīf*) nor striking likenesses (*tamṭīl*). [*Sunnīs*], thus, do not deny of God what He has affirmed of Himself and they do not liken His attributes to the attributes of His creatures. Rather, they know that nothing is as His likeness, neither in regard to His essence, nor in regard to His attributes, nor in regard to His actions. Just as His essence is not similar to the essences [of the creatures], His attributes are not similar to their attributes. God Most High sent the Messengers and they described Him by means of a detailed affirmation [of His attributes] (*iṭbāt mufaṣṣal*) and a general negation [of all likeness] (*nafy muḡmal*), whereas the enemies of the Messengers—the Ġahmī philosophers and their like—describe Him by means of a detailed negation [of His attributes] (*nafy mufaṣṣal*) and a general affirmation [of His existence] (*iṭbāt muḡmal*).²⁴

II Weakened Sunnism and the Flowering of Innovations, including Philosophy, from the Translation Movement under al-Ma'mūn up to the Ayyūbids

The reverence of the imāms of the community and of its commonalty for the *Sunna*, the *ḥadīṭ*, and their people (*ahl*), concerning the principles and the derived branches [of the religion]—sayings and deeds—is too

²¹ With the exceptions of al-Musta'in (r. 248/862–252/866) and al-Muhtadi (r. 255/869–256/870).

²² Imaginary Qur'ānic verse made of the beginning of Qur'ān, *aṣ-Ṣūrā*—xlii, 11, and of the formula "...and He is the Mighty, the Wise" ending several Qur'ānic verses (for example *an-Nahl*—xvi, 60, and *al-Ankabūt*—xxix, 42).

²³ I.e. the authentic ending of Qur'ān, *aṣ-Ṣūrā*—xlii, 11, considered as too anthropomorphic by the Mu'tazilis.

²⁴ Ibn Taymiya, *Maḡmū' al-fatāwā*, vol. 11, 478–80.

important to be noted here. One finds that every time Islam and faith are apparent and strong, the *Sunna* and its people are more apparent and stronger; whereas, if any unbelief and hypocrisy appear, innovations appear proportionately. For example, during the reign (*dawla*) of al-Mahdī,²⁵ ar-Rašīd,²⁶ and the other [rulers] who were revering Islam and faith, and were carrying out military expeditions against its enemies—the unbelievers and the hypocrites—, in those days the people of the *Sunna* were stronger and more numerous, whereas the people of innovations were more submissive and fewer. Al-Mahdī indeed killed a number of hypocrite freethinkers (*zindīq*) which no one but God can count, whereas ar-Rašīd carried out many military expeditions and made many pilgrimages.

When the ‘Abbāsid empire expanded, there were indeed, among the people of the Orient and the non-Arabs supporting it, groups of those whom the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, had characterized by saying: “There will be trouble (*fitna*) there.”²⁷ It is then that many of the innovations appeared. It is also in that time that a group of the books of the non-Arabs—the Persian Magi,²⁸ the Byzantine (*Rūm*) Šābaeans,²⁹ and the Indian associators—were translated into Arabic. Al-Mahdī was among the most excellent of the ‘Abbāsid caliphs, and the best of them in the matter of faith, justice and liberality. He, thus, also got to the point where he took action against the hypocrite freethinkers.

The ‘Abbāsid caliphs were better committed to doing the prayers at their [canonical times] than the Umayyads. The latter indeed often used to let slip the times of the prayer, as mentioned about them in the *ḥadīṡ*: “After me, there will be emirs who will delay doing the prayer beyond its time. Do the prayer on time, and consider the prayers that you do with them as supererogatory!”³⁰ However, during the three eminent generations,³¹ innovations used to be repressed, the Law (*šarī‘a*) was mightier and more apparent, and waging *ghīhād* against the enemies

²⁵ Al-Mahdī, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, 3rd ‘Abbāsid caliph (r. 158/775–169/785).

²⁶ Ar-Rašīd, Hārūn ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh, 5th ‘Abbāsid caliph (r. 170/786–193/809).

²⁷ See Ibn Ḥanbal, *al-Musnad*, 6 vols (Cairo: al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1313/[1896], anastatic reprint: Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1403/1983), vol. 2, 143. The Prophet said so three times while pointing with his hand towards ‘Irāq.

²⁸ I. e. the Zoroastrians.

²⁹ The Šābaeans of Ḥarrān, who were able to maintain an ancient planet cult long after the spread of Islam to their region.

³⁰ See Muslim, *al-Ġāmi‘ aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ*, 8 vols (Constantinople, 1334/[1916], anastatic reprint: Beirut: al-Maktab at-Ṭigārī li-ṭ-Ṭibā‘a wa-n-Naṣr wa-t-Tawzī‘, n.d.), vol. 2, 120; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 5, 159.

³¹ The first three generations of Muslims: the Companions of the Prophet, the Followers, and the Followers of the Followers.

of the religion—the unbelievers and the hypocrites—was given more importance.

The Ḥurramīs³² and other hypocrites like them appeared during the reign of Abū l-'Abbās al-Ma'mūn, and books of the Ancients (*al-awā'il*) brought from the countries of the Byzantines were translated into Arabic, on account of which the doctrines of the Šābaeans spread. He carried on a correspondence with the kings of the associators—the Indians and their like—so that friendly relations (*mawadda*) developed between him and them.

When unbelief and hypocrisy appeared among the Muslims as they did, when the situation of the associators and the people of the Book became strong as it did, one of the consequences was what became apparent of the power reached by the Ġahmīs, the Rāfiḍīs³³ and the other people of error, as well as of the promotion of the Šābaeans and their like among the philosophizers. And this, through a set of ideas that were deemed to be rational and just ('*adl*) by their authors although they are nothing but ignorance and injustice! Indeed, to treat as equals the believer and the hypocrite, or the Muslim and the unbeliever, is the gravest injustice. As for searching for guidance from the people of error, it is the gravest ignorance. The Ġahmī inquisition (*mihna*) originated therefrom, the community even going through the trial of being forced to negate the [divine] attributes and to consider as lies that God speaks and is seen [in the hereafter]. Imām Aḥmad [ibn Ḥanbal]³⁴ and others consequently went through the trials that they went through, but the matter would be too long to report [here].

Islam regained its might in the days of al-Mutawakkil, so that the protected people (*ahl aḍ-ḍimma*) were once more compelled to fulfill the conditions [laid for them by the caliph] 'Umar³⁵ and to be submissive (*ṣigār*). The *Sunna* and the [Islamic] communion (*ḡamā'a*) regained their might, and the Ġahmīs, the Rāfiḍīs and their like were repressed. Similarly in the days of al-Mu'taḍid,³⁶ al-Mahdī, al-Qādir,³⁷ and the other

³² Ḥurramīya, or *Ḥurramdīniya* (from the Persian *hurram-dīn*, "joyous, agreeable religion"), originally meant the religious movement of Mazdak in general. Later it became used for several Iranian, anti-Arab and frequently rebellious, sects influenced by Mazdakī and Manichaean beliefs as well as by extremist Šī'i doctrines. Ḥurramīs were often identified with the Muslimīya, partisans of the anti-Umayyad leader Abū Muslim (d. 137/755), who regarded the latter as their imām, prophet or incarnation of the divine spirit.

³³ Pejorative appellation for the Šī'īs, who "refuse" (*rafaḍa*) the three first caliphs.

³⁴ Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. Bagdād, 241/855), theologian, jurist, and traditionist, eponym of one of the four schools of *Sunnī* law.

³⁵ 'Umar ibn al-Ḥattāb, the second caliph (d. 23/644).

³⁶ Al-Mu'taḍid bi-Llāh, Abū l-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Ṭalḥa, 16th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 279/892–289/902).

³⁷ Al-Qādir bi-Llāh, Abū l-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn Iṣḥāq, 25th 'Abbāsīd caliph (r. 381/992–422/1031).

caliphs who had a more laudable way of life and were following a better path than the others: in their times, Islam was mightier and so was the *Sunna*, proportionately.

During the reign of the Būyids³⁸ and their like, it was the reverse. The various types of blameworthy doctrines indeed [circulated] among them. There were freethinkers among them. There were also, among them, many Qarmaṭīs³⁹ and philosophizers, Muʿtazilis and Rāfiḍīs, and these things were plentiful among them, overwhelming them. In their days, a previously unknown feebleness (*wahan*) thus came about among the people of Islam and the *Sunna*, with the consequence that the Nazarenes conquered the border fortresses of Islam,⁴⁰ the Qarmaṭīs expanded into the land of Egypt, the West, the East and other [regions],⁴¹ and many developments took place.

As the kingdom of Maḥmūd ibn Sebūktigīn⁴² was amongst the best kingdoms of his fellow tribesmen, Islam and the *Sunna* were mightier in his kingdom. He carried out military expeditions against the associators—the people of India—and spread justice on an unprecedented scale. In his days, the *Sunna* was apparent whereas the innovations, in his days, were repressed.

Similarly for the Sulṭān Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd⁴³ who ruled Syria: in his time the people of Islam and the *Sunna* were mighty whereas the unbelievers and the people of innovations—those of the Rāfiḍīs, the Ġahmīs and their like who were in Syria, in Egypt and elsewhere—were subdued. Similarly also, in his time, for the caliphate of the ʿAbbāsids and the vizierate of Ibn Hubayra⁴⁴ who was serving them. He was among the most exemplary viziers of Islam and this is why he cared for Islam and the *Ḥadīṭ* in a way unmatched by others.⁴⁵

³⁸ Twelver Šīʿī Iranian dynasty which controlled the ʿAbbāsīd caliphate of Baġdād from 334/945 until 447/1055.

³⁹ An Ismāʿīlī sect.

⁴⁰ Allusion to the military successes of the Byzantine Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimisce over the Ḥamdānids of Aleppo after 350/961.

⁴¹ Allusion to the Fāṭimid dynasty, founded in 297/909 by the Ismāʿīlī ʿUbayd Allāh al-Mahdī in North Africa. Ġawhar, general of the fourth Fāṭimid caliph, al-Muʿizz, conquered Egypt and begun building Cairo in 358–359/969–970.

⁴² Sulṭān of the Turkish Ġaznawīd dynasty of Afġānistān (r. 388/998–421/1030).

⁴³ Nūr ad-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Zankī, sulṭān of the Ayyūbīd dynasty of Syria (r. 541/1146–569/1174).

⁴⁴ Ibn Hubayra, ʿAwn ad-Dīn Abū l-Muẓaffar Yaḥyā ibn Muḥammad (d. 560/1165), vizier of the ʿAbbāsīd caliphs al-Muktafi and al-Mustanḡīd during the last 16 years of his life, protector of the Ḥanbalī school and author, among other works, of commentaries on the *ḥadīṭ* collections of al-Buḥārī and Muslim.

⁴⁵ Ibn Taimīya, *Maġmūʿ al-fatāwā*, vol. 4, 20–3.

III *The Theologians' Contribution to the Appearance of Heretical Falāsifa*

For many of the later observers, the *Kalām* theological way invented by the Ġahmīs and the Mu'tazilīs, and condemned by the Ancients (*salaf*) of the community and its imāms, has itself become the religion of Islam. They even believe that whoever opposes it opposes the religion of Islam, although neither a verse from the Book of God, nor a report (*ḥabar*) coming from the Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, nor any of the Companions and of those who followed them in good-doing, has talked about the judgments and the proofs [found] in that [theological way]. So, how could the religion of Islam or, rather, the fundamental of the fundamentals of the religion of Islam, be among the things that are corroborated neither by a Book, nor by a *Sunna*, nor by the words of any of the Ancients (*salaf*)?

The heretics (*mulhid*)—the philosophizers and others—turned up in Islam afterwards. They turned up and spread after the passing of the favored epochs.⁴⁶ They indeed start to appear in every time and place in which the light of Islam weakens. Among the reasons for their appearance was the fact that they were of the opinion that the religion of Islam was nothing but what those [Ġahmī and Mu'tazilī] innovators were saying, and that they regarded that as something intellectually corrupted (*fasād fī l-'aql*). They, thus, regarded the well known religion of Islam as something intellectually corrupted, and the most radical (*ḡulāt*) of them attacked the religion of Islam in its totality, with their hands and their tongue; for example the Ḥurramīs—the followers of Bābak al-Ḥurramī⁴⁷—the Qarmaṭīs of al-Baḥrayn—the followers of Abū Sa'īd al-Ġannābī⁴⁸—and others.

As for the moderates among them and the intelligent ones, they considered that in what Muḥammad had brought, may God bless him and grant him peace, there was a goodness and something beneficial (*ṣalāḥ*) that it was not possible to vilify. Or, rather, the astute ones (*ḥādīq*) among them admitted what Avicenna and others have said, i.e. that no *nómos* (*nāmūs*) more eminent than the *nómos* of Muḥammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, has reached the world.⁴⁹ This [judgment]

⁴⁶ The three first Muslim generations already alluded to in Text II.

⁴⁷ Violent leader of the Ḥurramī rebellion in Ādarbayḡān during the reigns of al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim, executed in Sāmarrā in 223/838.

⁴⁸ Qarmaṭī leader who controlled Eastern Arabia, defeated the army of the caliph al-Mu'taḍid and was assassinated in 301/913.

⁴⁹ See Avicenna, *ar-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-ma'ād*, in F. Lucchetta, *Avicenna. Al-Risālat al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-ma'ād, Epistola sulla Vita Futura*. I. Testo arabo, traduzione, introduzione e note, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di Storia della Filosofia e del Centro per Ricerche di Filosofia Medioevale, Nuova serie, 5 (Padova: Editrice Antenore, "Università di Padova," 1969), 84–5; Ibn Taymiyya, *Maḡmū' al-fatāwā*, trans. Y. Michot, "A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary I," 175–6; id., "Ibn Taymiyya on Astrology.

was a necessary consequence of their intellectualism (*ʿaql*) and philosophy. They had indeed studied the Greek authors of *nómoi* and seen that the *nómos* brought by Moses and Jesus was much greater than the *nómoi* of those. This is why, when the *nómos* of Jesus, the son of Mary, peace be upon him, came to the Byzantine (*Rūm*), they shifted from Greek philosophy to the religion of the Messiah.

Aristotle lived some three hundred years before the Messiah, the son of Mary, peace be upon him. He was the vizier of Alexander, the son of Philip the Macedonian, who defeated the Persians, after whom the dates are fixed, today, according to the Byzantine era,⁵⁰ and after whom the Jews and the Nazarenes also fix dates. This Alexander is not the Two-Horned one (*dū l-qarnayn*) mentioned in the Qurʾān⁵¹ as thought by a group of people. That [Dū l-Qarnayn] was anterior to this [Alexander] and that anterior one is the one who built the barrier of Gog and Magog, whereas this Macedonian did not reach that barrier. That [Dū l-Qarnayn] was a Muslim, a monotheist, whereas this Macedonian was an associator. He and the people of his country—the Greeks—were associators worshipping stars and idols. It has been said that the last of their kings was Ptolemy, the author of the *Almagest*.⁵² After [him, the Greeks] shifted to the religion of the Messiah. The *nómos* with which the Messiah had been sent was indeed greater and more sublime.

Even after having changed the religion of the Messiah and replaced it [with other things], the Nazarenes are still closer to [God's] guidance and the religion of the Real than those philosophers who were associators. And the gross associationism of the latter is amongst the things that necessarily entailed the corruption of the Messiah's religion, as noted by a group of people of knowledge. Those, they said, were indeed idolaters; they were worshipping the sun, the moon, the stars, and they were prostrating to them, whereas God Most High only sent the Messiah with the religion of Islam, just as He had sent the rest of the Messengers with the religion of Islam, which consists in worshipping God alone, without His having an associate [...].

The Messiah, may the blessings of God be upon him, was sent with what the Messengers had been sent with before him: the [command to] worship God alone, without His having an associate. He made lawful for people some of the things that had been prohibited to them in the Torah.

Annotated Translation of Three Fatwas," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11.2 (2000), 147–208, at 182–3.

⁵⁰ I.e. the Seleucid era; see the similar text translated and annotated in Y. Michot, "A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary II," 341–3.

⁵¹ See Qurʾān, *al-Kahf*—xviii, 83–98; Y. Michot, "A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary II," 342, n. 112.

⁵² Ibn Taymiya considers Claudius Ptolemy, the Greek astronomer, astrologer and geographer of Alexandria (d. c. 168) as the greatest of the astrologers, but generally confuses him with the last king of the Ptolemaic dynasty; see Y. Michot, "A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary II," 341–2.

His followers maintained his religion (*milla*) for some time—it has been said: less than hundred years. Thereafter, innovations appeared among them because of their hostility toward the Jews. They started seeking to oppose them and so they made excessive claims about the Messiah, they declared lawful things that he had prohibited and they authorized [the eating of] pork, etc. Because of the associationism of the nations, they invented associates [for God]. Those associators—the Greeks, the Byzantines (*Rūm*) and others—used to prostrate to the sun, the moon and the idols. The Nazarenes made them shift from worshipping embodied idols that have a shadow to worshipping representational pictures (*tamṭil muṣawwar*) in the churches and they came up with this innovation consisting in praying toward the Orient. They thus prayed toward the place where the sun, the moon and the stars appear and they used to pray toward them and prostrate toward them as a substitute for praying to them and prostrating to them.

What is meant here is that the *nómos* and the religion of the Nazarenes, after they have replaced their religion [with other things], is still better than the religion of those Greeks, followers of the philosophers. And this is why the philosophers who have seen the religion of Islam say that the *nómos* of Muḥammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, is more eminent than the whole of the *nómoi*. They have seen that it is more eminent than the *nómoi* of the Nazarenes, the Magi and others. They have, thus, not attacked the religion of Muḥammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, as those philosophers publicizing free-thinking (*zandaqa*) attacked it. They saw that, in what those *Kalām* theologians say, there are things contradicting what is clearly intellected (*ṣariḥ al-ma'qūl*); they attacked them for that and started saying that someone who is fair, is not a fanatic and does not follow his caprice does not say what those [theologians] say about the beginning and the return [of the creatures] (*al-mabda' wa-l-ma'ād*).

These [philosophers praising the *nómos* of Muḥammad] were [nevertheless] also saying intellectually corrupted things which they had learned from their predecessors (*salaf*), the philosophers.⁵³ They saw that what was coming in a plentifully certified manner (*tawātara*) from the Messengers was contradicting these things and they, thus, entered upon their esotericist (*bāṭinī*) road. They said that the Messengers had not expounded (*bayyana*) the knowledge and the truths on which demonstration is founded in theoretical matters. Then, there are some of them who said that the Messengers knew that but had not expounded it, whereas others said that they did not know it but were brilliant only in practical wisdom, not in theoretical wisdom: they addressed the populace (*ḡumhūr*) with a discourse making [them] imagine [things] (*tahyīlī*) and, regarding the faith in God and in the Last Day, made them imagine things in which, in order to lead them (*siyāsa*), it was useful that they

⁵³ — E ap. cr.: wa raaw... al-falāsifa E

believe, even if this was a vain belief, not corresponding to real things (*ḥaqā'iq*). These philosophizers do not allow interpreting (*ta'wīl*) that [discourse] because, according to them, what is aimed at by it is to make [people] imagine [things]; now, interpretation is inconsistent with such an aim. They approve the acts of worship but say that what is aimed at by them is to reform the morals of the soul. They may also say that, for the elite of those who know the true realities, these [acts] are dropped.

The innovated doctrine (*bid'a*) of those [early Ḡahmī and Mu'tazilī] *Kalām* theologians was thus among the things that helped the heresy of these heretics.⁵⁴

IV *The Philosophers and Kalām Theologians, between the
Reductionism of Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Revealed Doctrine
of the Oneness of the Divinity*

In reality, [the philosophizers] acknowledge fundamentally no action to the Lord and thus, really, they are reductionists (*mu'aṭṭil*). Aristotle and his followers only affirm [the existence of] the First Cause from the viewpoint of its being a final cause, as [is the case with] the movement of the [celestial] sphere. According to them, the movement of the sphere is indeed by choice (*iḥtiyār*), like the movement of man; now, for a movement by choice, there must unavoidably be something which is willed (*murād*) and which will, thus, be sought after (*maṭlūb*). For them, this means that the sphere moves by assimilating (*tašabbuh*) to the First Cause, as [is the case with] the movement of someone praying behind an imām in relation to the imām, and of someone following a model in relation to this model. This is the meaning of [their] assimilation (*tašbīh*) of its [moving] to the moving of the lover by the beloved. What it means is not that the essence of God sets the sphere in motion. What they mean to say is only that what is willed by the sphere is being as much like Him as possible. Now, this is wrong from [various] viewpoints extensively dealt with elsewhere.

The First Cause, they say, which is the one due to which the sphere moves, is a cause of it, which sets it in motion just as a lover (*āšiq*) moves because of the beloved (*ma'sūq*). It is tantamount to a man feeling appetite for food and extending his hand towards it, or seeing somebody whom he loves and rushing towards him. This beloved is the one setting in motion, because the one moving is loving him and not because he ['the beloved'] has initiated (*abda'a*) the movement, nor because he has made it [be] (*fa'ala*). Then, they thus do not affirm, for the movement of the sphere, [the existence of] an originator (*muḥḍit*), who originates that [movement], other than the sphere [itself]; just as the affirmers of human capacity (*qadari*) do not affirm, for the acts of the living being (*ḥayawān*), [the existence of] an originator, who originates them, other

⁵⁴ Ibn Taymīya, *Minhāğ as-sunna an-nabawīya*, vol. 1, 315–9 and 320–2.

than the living being [itself]. This is why, according to them, the sphere is a great living being. They even say that the sphere moves by assimilating to the First Cause, because the First Cause is worshipped by it, loved by it. This is also because of this that they say that philosophy [consists in] assimilating to God as much as one is able [to do so].

In reality, for them, the Lord is neither a God of the world, nor a Lord of the worlds. The farthest they go in their affirmation of Him is that He is a condition for the existence of the world and that the perfection of the created consists in being assimilated to Him. This is the Divinity [of God] according to them, and that is [His] Lordship. What they say is therefore worse than what the Jews and the Nazarenes say, and they are farther away than them from what is intelligible and what is transmitted by tradition, as extensively explained elsewhere.

It is thus obvious that those philosophizers are affirmers of human capacity (*qadari*) in regard to all the originated things (*ḥādīt*) of the world and that they are amongst the most erring of the sons of Adam. This is why they relate the originated things to the natures that are in the bodies and are indeed tantamount to the faculties that are in living beings. They thus make every originator (*muḥdit*) into an independent agent, like the living beings for the affirmers of human capacity (*qadari*), and they do not affirm, for the originated things, [the existence of any other] originator.

What these people are really doing in saying so is rejecting that God is the Lord of the worlds. They indeed do not affirm that God is the Lord of the worlds. Rather, the farthest they go is to make Him into a condition for the existence of the world. When truly investigated, [the fact is that] they are reducing to nothing (*mu'aṭṭil*) God's being the Lord of the worlds, just as is said by those amongst them who say that the sphere is necessarily existing *per se*. These, however, affirm [the existence of] a cause, either final, according to the earlier ones among them, or active, according to the later ones among them. Now, when truly investigated, [the fact is that] that [whose existence] they affirm has no reality; which is why the affirmers of natures (*ṭabā'i'i*) amongst them deny it.

When it is supposed that the sphere moves by its [own] choice, without God creating its movement, there is no proof that what sets it in motion is a loved (*ma'sūq*) cause to which it is assimilating. Rather, it is conceivable that what moves (*mutaḥarrik*) is [itself] what sets [it] in motion (*muḥarrik*). What is to be said against that was extensively explained elsewhere, and what is to be said against what⁵⁵ Aristotle mentioned in the science of divinity (*al-'ilm al-ilāhī*) is obvious from numerous viewpoints. It is also [obvious] that these [philosophers] are among the people [who are] the most ignorant of God, Powerful and Majestic is He.

⁵⁵ *mā E ap. cr.: [buṭlān] mā E*

Those of them who are included among the followers of the various religions (*ahl al-milal*)—the adherents to Islam for example, like al-Fārābī,⁵⁶ Avicenna and their like among the heretical (*mulḥid*) Muslims, Mūsā ibn Maymūn⁵⁷ and his like among the heretical Jews, Mattā⁵⁸ and Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī⁵⁹ and their like among the heretical Nazarenes—though they are among the heretical followers of the various religions, are more correct, as far as concerns intelligence and insight about the science of divinity, than the Peripatetics like Aristotle and his followers, even if the latter [said] many things detailing the matters of physics and mathematics in which they surpassed the former.

What is meant here is that those [Greeks] were more ignorant of the matters of divinity and more erring concerning them. To these [philosophers adhering to a religion] indeed came a type of the same light, intelligences and guidance as [had come to] the followers of the various religions. Thereby, they thus came to [think] in less obscurity than those [Greeks]. This is why Avicenna, in establishing [the existence of] the First Cause, departed from the road of his predecessors (*salaf*) and took the road known as his: dividing existence into necessary and possible, and [saying] that the possible is inevitably in need of the necessary. This road is the one known as his and as that of those who followed him, like as-Suhrawardī—the one who was killed⁶⁰—and his like among the philosophers, Abū Ḥāmid,⁶¹ ar-Rāzī,⁶² al-Āmidī⁶³ and others among the later *Kalām* theologians, who mix philosophy with *Kalām* theology.

The incoherence, the doubts and the confusion of these later *Kalām* theologians, who mix philosophy with *Kalām* theology, are frequent, in proportion to the increase of obscurity which they have been [plunged into] by these philosophizers mixing philosophy with *Kalām* theology. The latter’s obscurity decreased thanks to what they got involved in of the things said by the followers of the various religions, whereas the obscurity of those [theologians] became more frequent because of what they got involved in of the things said by these philosophizers. And

⁵⁶ Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), philosopher and logician.

⁵⁷ I.e. Maimonides (d. 1204).

⁵⁸ Mattā ibn Yūnus al-Qunnā’ī, Abū Biṣr (d. 328/940), ‘Irāqī Nestorian translator and commentator of Aristotle, professor of al-Fārābī.

⁵⁹ Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (d. 363/974), ‘Irāqī Christian philosopher and theologian, translator and commentator of Aristotle.

⁶⁰ Šihāb ad-Dīn Yaḥyā as-Suhrawardī, theosophist and mystic, executed in Aleppo in 587/1191; see Ibn Taymīya, *Dar’ at-ta’āruḍ*, trans. Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary I,” 183.

⁶¹ Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ġazālī aṭ-Ṭūsī, Aṣ‘arī theologian and mystic (d. 505/1111).

⁶² The great Aṣ‘arī theologian and exegete of both the Qur’ān and Avicenna, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad Faḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. in Herāt, 606/1209).

⁶³ ‘Alī Abū l-Ḥasan Sayf ad-Dīn al-Āmidī at-Taḡlabī, theologian who left Ḥanbalism for Šāfi‘ism, was interested in philosophy but anti-Avicennian (d. 631/1233).

this⁶⁴ [took place] although there are, in the *Kalām* theologians who are among the followers of the various religions, things for which the 'ulamā' of the faith (*milla*) and the imāms of the religion have blamed them: incoherence and skepticism about [various] things and dissenting from the truth in [various] subjects, following [their] caprices in [various] subjects and being incapable of the truth in others. They have indeed been incapable of recognizing the intellectual proofs which God mentions in His book, and they have departed from this road in favor of other, innovated [roads] in which there are vain [affirmations]. Because of that they dissented from some of the truth common between them and others; they got involved in some of the vain, innovated [ideas]; they excluded from the proclamation of God's oneness (*tawḥīd*) things that are part of it—like the proclamation of the oneness of Divinity (*tawḥīd al-ilāhīya*) and the affirmation of the realities of the names of God and of His attributes. And, concerning the proclamation of God's oneness (*tawḥīd*), they had knowledge of nothing but the proclamation of the oneness of Lordship (*tawḥīd ar-rubūbiya*), which consists in confessing that God is the Creator of everything and its Lord; now, such a doctrine of the divine oneness [is one that] the associators also used to confess, about whom God said: "If you ask them who created the heavens and the earth, they will surely say: "God."⁶⁵ [...]

Every person who is closer to the Messenger, may God bless him and grant him peace, to his Companions and to those who followed them in good-doing is closer to a perfect proclamation of God's oneness (*tawḥīd*) and faith, intelligence (*'aql*) and gnosis (*'irfān*). Every person who is farther away from them is also farther away from that.

The later *Kalām* theologians affirming the divine attributes (*mutakallimat al-iṭbāt*), who mix *Kalām* theology with philosophy—like ar-Rāzī, al-Āmidī and their like—are inferior to Abū l-Ma'ālī al-Ġuwaynī⁶⁶ and similar [theologians] as far as concerns confessing the doctrine of the divine oneness (*tawḥīd*) and affirming the attributes of perfection. Abū l-Ma'ālī and similar [theologians] are inferior to the Qāḍī Abū Bakr Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib⁶⁷ and similar [theologians] in that matter. These are inferior to Abū l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arī⁶⁸ in that matter; al-Aš'arī, in that matter, is inferior to Abū Muḥammad Ibn Kullāb;⁶⁹ Ibn Kullāb is inferior to the Ancients (*salaf*) [of the community] and the imāms in that matter.

⁶⁴ I.e. the improvement of the thought of the philosophers adhering to Islam, in comparison to their Greek predecessors.

⁶⁵ Qur'ān, *Luqmān*—xxxī, 25.

⁶⁶ Abū l-Ma'ālī 'Abd al-Malik al-Ġuwaynī, Imām al-Ḥaramayn, Aš'arī theologian, professor of al-Ġazālī (d. 478/1085).

⁶⁷ Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, Aš'arī theologian (d. 403/1013).

⁶⁸ Abū l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arī, *Kalām* theologian (Baṣra, 260/873–Baġdād, 324/935).

⁶⁹ 'Abd Allāh ibn Sa'īd al-Qaṭṭān al-Baṣrī, a major theologian of the middle way at the time of the Mu'tazilī *miḥna* (d. 241/855?).

The *Kalām* theologians who are among the people affirming the divine attributes (*mutakallimat ahl al-iṭbāt*) and who confess determinism (*qadar*) are, as far as concerns the doctrine of the divine oneness (*tawḥīd*) and affirming the attributes of perfection, better than the affirmers of human capacity (*qadari*)—the Muʿtazilis, the Šīs and others—because the people affirming the divine attributes (*ahl al-iṭbāt*) affirm, for God, the perfection of power (*qudra*), the perfection of will (*mašīʾa*) and the perfection of creativity (*ḥalq*). [They affirm] that He is unique (*munfarid*) in having these [perfections] and they say that He alone is the Creator of all things—the identifiable concrete beings (*ʿayn*) and the accidents. This is why they consider as the most exclusive attribute of the Lord the power to create (*iḥtirāʾ*). When properly investigated, the truth is however that the power to create is one amongst the whole of His most exclusive characters; it is not, it alone, the most exclusive of His attributes. These [affirmers of human capacity] exclude the acts of the living being (*ḥayawān*) from being created by Him. What they really say amounts to depriving (*taʿṭīl*) these originated entities from a [principle] creating them, and to affirming [the existence of] associates of God making them. Many of the later affirmers of human capacity say that the servants are creating these [acts]; as for their predecessors (*salaf*), they did not dare to say that.

Moreover, the *Kalām* theologians who are among the people affirming the divine attributes (*mutakallimat ahl al-iṭbāt*) affirm, for God, the attributes of perfection such as life, knowledge, power, speech, hearing and sight. As for these [theologians mixing *Kalām* with philosophy], they also affirm that but have a deficient understanding of some of the attributes of perfection and a deficient understanding of the divine oneness (*tawḥīd*). They are thus of the opinion that perfectly proclaiming the divine oneness consists in proclaiming the oneness of Lordship and they have not risen to the [higher] proclamation of the oneness of Divinity, which the Messengers brought and with which the Books were sent down. The reason is that they have drawn much of what they say (*kalām*) from the *Kalām* theology of the Muʿtazilis and that the Muʿtazilis are deficient in this matter: they have indeed not fully proclaimed the oneness of Lordship as it deserved [to be proclaimed]; so, *a fortiori*, how [would they have fully] proclaimed the oneness of Divinity? And in spite of that, the imāms of the Muʿtazilis and their *ṣayḥs*, the imāms of the Aṣʿarīs, the Karrāmīs⁷⁰ and their like are better, as far as concerns confessing the oneness of Lordship, than the Aṣʿarī philosophizers such as ar-Rāzī, al-Āmidī and similar [thinkers]. The latter have indeed mixed this with the doctrine of divine oneness of the philosophers—such as Avicenna and similar [thinkers]; now, concerning divine oneness, this doctrine (*kalām*) is amongst the one farthest from the truth, although it

⁷⁰ The disciples of the theologian Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Karrām (d. 255/869).

is better than what was said by their ancient [counterparts]—Aristotle and his kin.⁷¹

V *The Theology and Prophetology of the Falāsifa, from Ġāhm's Doctrine of Faith to Ibn 'Arabī's "Seal of Friendship"*

The saying of Ġāhm and of whoever agrees with him that faith is just knowing and assenting (*taṣdīq*), and that someone, by that alone, deserves reward and happiness, is similar to the saying of those who, amongst the Peripatetic philosophers and their followers, say that man's happiness consists just in his knowing existence as it is. Likewise, the things that the Ġāhmīs and these philosophers say concerning the questions of the [divine] names and attributes, and concerning the questions of the [divine] coercion (*ḡabr*) and decision (*qadar*) are close to each other; and, similarly, concerning the questions relating to faith. We have spoken about this extensively elsewhere, and clearly explained some of the corrupt [ideas] it includes; for example, that knowing is one of the two faculties of the soul, the soul having two faculties—the faculty of knowledge and assent, and the faculty of will and action—just as the animal has two faculties—the faculty of sensation and the faculty of voluntary movement.

Now, the righteousness (*ṣalāh*) of man and of his soul does not consist just in knowing the Truth, without⁷² loving it, willing it and following it. Similarly, his happiness does not consist just in his knowing of God and confessing what He deserves [of names, attributes, and powers] without loving God, worshipping God, obeying God. Or even, the man who endures the most intense torment on the Day of Resurrection is a scholar whom God did not make benefit from his knowledge. When a man knows the Truth, hates it and is its enemy, he deserves, of the wrath of God and of His chastisement, something which someone not like him does not deserve. Similarly, in somebody who is pursuing the Truth and in search of it, but is ignorant of that which he is in search of and of the way leading to it, there is errancy and he deserves, of the [divine] curse—which consists in being far away from God's mercy—something which someone not like him does not deserve. This is why God Most High commanded us to say: "Guide us on the straight path, the way of those upon whom You have bestowed Your Grace, not of those upon whom Your wrath is brought down, nor of those who are erring."⁷³ "Those upon whom the [divine] wrath is brought down" were knowing the Truth but did not love it nor follow it. "Those who are erring" were pursuing the Truth but in an ignorant and erring manner concerning it and the way leading to it. The first ones are the equivalent of a libertine scholar, the

⁷¹ Ibn Taymiya, *Minhāḡ as-sunna an-nabawīya*, vol. 3, 283–9 and 293–5.

⁷² — : *lā* E

⁷³ Qur'ān, *al-Fātiḥa*—i, 6–7.

others the equivalent of an ignorant worshipper. The first situation is that of the Jews, as they are people “upon whom the [divine] wrath is brought down.” The other situation is that of the Nazarenes, as they are “erring.” It is indeed established about the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, that he said: “The Jews are people upon whom the [divine] wrath is brought down, and the Nazarenes are erring.”⁷⁴ The philosophizers’ situation is worse than that of the Jews and the Nazarenes as they join together the ignorance of the latter and their erring, and the libertinism of the former and their injustice. There is thus in them, as far as concerns ignorance and injustice, something that does not exist in the Jews, nor in the Nazarenes; which led them to put happiness in knowing just the true natures of things (*ḥaqīqa*), man becoming an intelligible world corresponding to the existing world.

Furthermore, [philosophizers] have reached nothing but a tiny amount of the knowledge of God, His names and His attributes, His angels, His Books and His Messengers, His creation and His command. Their ignorance is thus larger than their knowledge, and their errancy greater than their guidance. They have been wavering between simple ignorance and composite ignorance. What they say about physics and mathematics is beneficial neither for the perfection of the soul, nor for its righteousness and its purity, this being only brought about by the science of divinity. Now, what they say about the latter is like “the meat of a lean camel at the top of a pathless mountain: it is not easily ascended and there is no fat to degustate.”⁷⁵ What they say about the Necessary Existent is indeed something wavering between a little bit of truth and a lot of vain, corruptive [views].

Similar [is the case] for what they say about the intelligences and the souls which their followers amongst the adherents of the religious confessions (*milla*) claim to be the angels about which the Messengers have informed [people]. The matter is however not like that. Or, rather, their claim that those are the angels is of the same kind as their claim that the Necessary Existent is the existence absolute on the condition of absoluteness (*al-wuḡūd al-muṭlaq bi-ṣarṭ al-iṭlāq*) though they acknowledge that the absolute on the condition of absoluteness does not [exist] but in the minds!⁷⁶ Moreover, what they say about the intelligences and the souls, when truly investigated (*taḥqīq*), goes back to things supposed in the minds and devoid of reality in the concrete. And also, in saying these [things], they give associates to God, they affirm [the existence of] a lord other than Him, initiator (*mubdi*) of the whole world but caused

⁷⁴ See Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 4, 378–9.

⁷⁵ On the *ḥadīṭ* of Umm Zar’ to which this metaphor goes back, and other Taymiyyan texts in which it is used, see Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary II,” 345–6, n. 130.

⁷⁶ On Ibn Taymiyya’s typology of absolute existence, see Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian’s Commentary II,” 360–3.

by Him, and they affirm [the existence of] a lord, initiator of all that is under the sphere of the moon [though he is] caused by a lord above him, this latter lord being [himself] caused by a lord above him... All this is much more horrible than what the Nazarenes say when they say that the Messiah is the Son of God, as extensively clarified elsewhere.

The earlier [philosophers] had absolutely nothing to say concerning prophethood and the later ones are confused about it. Among them, there are some who consider it all lies, as Ibn Zakarīyā' ar-Rāzī⁷⁷ and his like did—although they were speaking of the origination (*ḥudūt*) of the world, they used to affirm the existence of five pre-eternal [entities] and, from among the [various] doctrines, embraced the worst and most corruptive ones. Among them, there are also some who acknowledge the truth of [prophethood] although they speak of the pre-eternity of the world, such as Avicenna and his like. They however give [the Prophet] the same status as a just king and they make the whole of prophethood be of the kind of what happens to some of the righteous—uncovering (*kašf*), exerting an influence (*ta'tīr*) and imagining (*tahyil*). They indeed consider three things peculiar to the Prophet: the faculty of correct intuition (*al-ḥads aṣ-ṣā'ib*), which they call “the holy faculty;” the faculty [consisting in] having, by means of his soul, an influence in the world; the faculty of sensation, by which he hears and sees the intelligibles as imagined in his soul. The speech of God, for them, thus consists in the sounds that are in his soul, and His angels are the forms and the lights that are in the souls of the [Prophets]. These properties are [also] attained by the majority of the people exercising and purifying themselves (*ahl ar-riyāda wa-ṣ-ṣafā'*). This is why, according to them, prophethood can be acquired (*muktasab*). Everyone of those who tread on the path of these [philosophizers], like as-Suhrawardī—the one who was killed—Ibn Sab'īn the Maḡriban,⁷⁸ and their like, eventually tried to get prophethood and craved to be told: “Rise, and warn!”⁷⁹ This one⁸⁰ used to say: “I will not die until it is said to me: “Rise, and warn!” whereas that one⁸¹ used to stay in Mecca and dwell in the cave of Ḥirā', trying to get revelation to come down upon him there as it had come down [there] upon the [Prophet] wrapped and enveloped in garments (*al-muzzammil*

⁷⁷ Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyā' ar-Rāzī (Rhazes for the Latins; d. 313/925 or 323/935), physician and philosopher, who considered all the Prophets as impostors and spoke of five eternal entities anterior to the cosmos: God, the soul and matter, space and time.

⁷⁸ Quṭb ad-Dīn Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥaqq ibn Sab'īn, philosopher and mystic (Murcia, 613/1217–Mecca, 668/1269).

⁷⁹ See Qur'ān, *al-Muddattir*—lxxiv, 2.

⁸⁰ As-Suhrawardī; see Ibn Taymiya, *Maḡmū' al-fatāwā*, trans. Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary I,” 183–4.

⁸¹ Ibn Sab'īn; see Ibn Taymiya, *Maḡmū' al-fatāwā*, trans. Y. Michot, “A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary I,” 184.

al-muddattir)⁸² similarly to him. Every one of them and of their like is engaged in various practices of phantasmagoria (*sīmiyā*), which pertains to magic, and imagines (*tawahhama*) that the miracles of the Prophets are of the same kind as the magic of a phantasmagorist (*sīmāwī*).

Someone such as Ibn 'Arabi⁸³ and his like, for whom it is not possible to try to get prophethood nor to pretend to possess it because of his knowledge of the saying of the truthful, and proven to be true, [Messenger] "No Prophet after me!"⁸⁴ tries to get something which, he claims, is higher than prophethood. He thus pretends that Friendship (*walāya*) is greater than prophethood and that the Seal of the Friends is greater than the Seal of the Prophets, that the Friend draws [his knowledge] from God without intermediary whereas the Prophet draws it by the intermediary of the angel. This [idea] is based on the [following] principle of those of the philosophers who are followed by them: the angels, according to them, are the luminous, imaginal figures that are represented (*taṣawwara*) in the soul of the Prophet or of the Friend. The angels, according to them, are thus something which he imagines (*taḥayyala*) in his soul. The Prophet, according to them, gets [his knowledge] by the intermediary of this act of imagination (*taḥayyul*), whereas the Friend gets the intellectual knowledge without such an act of imagination. Now there is no doubt that someone getting knowledge without imagining is more perfect than someone getting it by imagining. As they believe about prophethood what those philosophizers believe, they end up saying that Friendship is greater than prophethood just as many of the philosophers say that the philosopher is greater than the Prophet. This is indeed what al-Fārābī, Mubaššir ibn Fātiq⁸⁵ and others say. These also say that prophethood is the most eminent of things as far as concerns the populace, not the elite. The characteristic of the Prophet, they say, is an excellent [power] to make [people] imagine [things] (*taḥyīl*) and to imagine (*taḥayyul*) [them].

[Then] came those who produced philosophy in the mould of Friendship and spoke of "Friend" to designate the philosophizer, took the ideas of the philosophers and made them come out in the form of a [mystical] uncovering and [divine] address (*muḥāṭaba*). The Friend, they said, is greater than the Prophet because he draws the abstract (*muḡarrad*) ideas from God without the intermediary of an act of imagination of something in his soul, whereas the Prophet draws them from God by the intermediary of the forms and sounds which he imagines in his soul.

⁸² See Qur'ān, *al-Muzzammil*—lxxiii, 1; *al-Muddattir*—lxxiv, 1.

⁸³ Muḥyi d-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn al-'Arabī, theosophist and mystic (Murcia, 560/1165–Damascus, 638/1240).

⁸⁴ See Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, vol. 6, 17; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. 2, 172.

⁸⁵ Egyptian scholar and historian, 5th/11th c., adept of philosophy and medicine, author of a substantial anthology almost entirely devoted to the ancient Greek sages, the *Selection of Apophthegms and Nice Sayings* (*Muḥtār al-ḥikam wa-maḥāsin al-kalim*, composed 440/1048–9).

Such slander, however, did not suffice them: they even claimed that all the Prophets and the Messengers derive their knowledge of God from the Niche of the Seal of the Friends. The latter is, however, among the creatures the most ignorant about God and the farthest from the religion of God. Moreover, for them, knowing God consists in knowing that He is the absolute existence diffusing in the beings. The existence of every existent is thus, identically, the existence of the Necessary Existent. Saying so is, in reality, what is said by the naturalist eternalists (*dahrīya ṭabīʿīya*) who deny that the world has an initiator who initiated it, i. e. the Necessary Existent *per se*. Or, rather, they say that the world itself is necessarily existent *per se*. What those [people] really say is, thus, worse than what the divinalist eternalists (*dahrīya ilāhīya*) say and, when truly investigated (*taḥqīq*), it goes back to what the naturalist eternalists say.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Ibn Taymīya, *Šarḥ ḥadīṭ Ġibrīl*, 496–509 (= *Mağmūʿ al-fatāwā*, vol. 7, 585–90).

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